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IOHANNIS WYCLIF
TRACTATUS
DE LOGICA.

NOW FIRST EDITED FROM THE VIENNA AND PRAGUE MSS.

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BY

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INTRODUCTION.

All details concerning the manuscript (Univ. Prag. V. E. 14) and the authenticity and date of the work itself having been discussed at sufficient length in the Introduction to the first volume, we may at once proceed to examine the second with regard to its contents alone. It comprises the first eight chapters of the third treatise of *Logica*, or more properly of *Logicae Continuatio*. Wyclif goes over the same ground three times, it may be remembered: once in his Summary, or short abstract of Logic; a second time, with much greater developments, in the first and second treatises of *Logicae Continuatio*; and once again in the work which forms the second and third volumes of the present edition: in a most exhaustive manner this time, and treating of a variety of questions which often seem quite irrelevant to the science of Logic. It is true that in this third treatise Wyclif ostensibly deals with hypothetical propositions alone, and that he leaves out, or expounds only parenthetically, many questions already quite threshed out in his first volume. The difference, however, is to a great extent nominal. Both categorical and hypothetical propositions are for the most part as mere headings of chapters, or as texts from which Wyclif preaches his system with greater or less detail. In the third treatise, the matter is thus really the same, but approached from a different standpoint, and expounded for more advanced students. Perhaps some apology will be necessary for the very detailed summary that is to follow; if so, I may say that I thought it would not be quite useless to go thoroughly through the first work in which Wyclif's system is set forth as a whole, and of which the other philosophical treatises are but modifications and developments. Two volumes of metaphysics — *De Compositione Hominis* and *De Ente Predicamentali* — have indeed been issued already; but the editor has laid

much more stress upon their philological interest than upon their doctrinal meaning. I have, therefore, thought that a full exposition of Wyclif's ideas as set forth in this work might prepare the way for a better understanding of the other treatises.

It is perhaps superfluous to add — but in such cases I prefer saying too much to saying too little — that I must here repeat the thanks I gave to Mr. Matthew in the first volume of *Logica*. Even in so special and technical a subject as this, his general knowledge of Wyclif's views and style has been of much assistance in the understanding of the text.

Chapter I (pp. 1—23). Wyclif begins by a general discussion of hypothetical propositions. They form seven species, according as two or more propositions are joined by the word *and* (copulatives), *or* (disjunctives), *if* (conditionals), *because* (causals), *more than* (comparatives), *where* (locals) or *when* (temporals). These, as Wyclif affirms, comprise all other species; for all, however complex, are reducible to these, and they spring from the essential relations between God and the creature. God is, *and* the creature is; either God is, *or* created being is not; the creatures are *because* God is; God exists *more than* the creature exists; God creates beings *if*, *when*, and *where* He chooses. These primordial truths, seven and only seven in number, are the archetypes of all hypothetical propositions (pp. 1—2).

This classification is to some extent arbitrary, it is true, but founded on the nature of things. It is not denied that these propositions might be set in another order, or deduced from the primordial truths in another way; but the order given here is the best, because it corresponds best to the order of the universe (p. 3, l. 35 to end; p. 4, l. 1—5). The words *and*, *if*, etc., are neither sufficient to establish the order here given, nor to classify the propositions (p. 4, l. 5—12). If it be objected that many hypothetical propositions are false, and that consequently truth, and particularly primordial truth, has nothing to do with their classification (p. 2, l. 20—35), Wyclif points out that every proposition must be true at least in a transcendental sense. If it means something false, it means a thing that is not, and therefore is true — negatively (pp. 4, 5). His classification depends properly, not only on those signs which render the propositions hypothetical, nor on the truth or falsity of the latter, but upon the peculiar sense given by those words to the propositions which they unite into one whole (p. 6, l. 30 to end).

They might indeed be classified according to the first principle of abstract Being. For instance: Whatever is, is, *and* it is; *if* anything is, it is; it is *whilst* it is, and so on (p. 3, l. 1—6; p. 7, l. 5—10). But God's existence is the first truth of all; no other can be known perfectly without it, and in that sense it is prior even to the principle of contradiction, though both are equally primitive as regards the truths which flow from them (pp. 7, 8).

Other words might be employed to form new species of hypothetical propositions (p. 3, l. 13—30). But they may always be analyzed into one of those already given. *Neither — nor*, for instance, means the same as *and* with a negative (pp. 8, 9). These propositions may be combined with each other to the number of 120; but this does not increase the number of primary species. For if I say, A is B if C is D, *because* E is F, it is a causal proposition; but if we have, A is B, *if* C is D because E is F, the proposition is conditional (pp. 9, 10). Here Wyclif solves a number of sophisms at considerable length. It was no doubt useful and even necessary for students of those times to know them; a the present day, most of us would, for all these sophisms, endorse our author's opinion concerning certain among them, and say with him: *sunt mihi odibiles* (p. 14, l. 5). It is, however, worth while to note his remark that a sentence, however, long it may be, is a proposition, provided it imply one predominant act of the mind; where there are several it is not one proposition, and can neither be affirmed nor denied as one. The affirmation or negation bears upon the hypothetical sign. *God exists, and you are an ass.* is denied without any reference to its component parts separately (p. 10).

But there seems to have been a personal argument, particularly directed against Wyclif's theory of universals, which may be noticed apart. We must remember that the universal "animal", in this theory, is a real thing or entity, identical both in men and in brutes. So we have: "You are now *whatever you would be*, if you were an ass; in that case you could bray; therefore you can now." This somewhat humorous syllogism is gravely discussed, for it entails grave consequences. Wyclif not only grants that the major premiss is true, but that the minor is necessary (p. 10, l. 35—41); but this is quite natural, if we refer to his theory. He answers, however, that though a man is identical with an ass, the identity is only partial. What would be necessary to conclude

that a man *is* an ass, is the identity of individuality, not that of a universal attribute. But he adds: "I know that this answer does not please sophists" (p. 16, l. 11—27).

The affirmative or negative nature of hypotheticals is then investigated. Any proposition might with truth be called both affirmative and negative, since all affirm God's existence, and deny whatever is contrary to their affirmation (pp. 16, 17). We must therefore consider how best to classify them. Some say that in any proposition composed of two, both propositions should be affirmative, or both negative, for the compound to be one or the other; so that, where this requisite is wanting, the resulting proposition is neither (pp. 18, l. 31—38). Others, that the *nexus* alone, affirmed or denied, determines the quality of these propositions (p. 18, l. 39 to end; p. 19, l. 1—9). Others again, with whom Wyclif partly agrees, say that they follow the quality of the first of their parts (p. 19).

As for the quantity, i. e. the universality or particularity of such propositions, the first three are said to have no quantity at all; but the last four (causals, comparatives, locals and temporals) follow the quantity of the first of their parts (p. 20). It may be objected (p. 21, l. 25) that these last are really categorical in meaning, since they may be expressed in a categorical form. This, however, is a mere matter of taste and preference. Some prefer the number three, others the number seven. Wyclif chooses not to eliminate the four last species, because every point in the universe, is touched by six, and only six other points: thus making up the number seven. We need not here explain this reason farther than to say that it is at the root of his cosmological system, in which the universe is built of mathematical points. In the next volume, we shall see the whole theory developed at great length.

Chapter II. After a few preliminary remarks about copulative propositions, with which the chapter professes to deal (pp. 23—26), Wyclif launches boldly into the problem of the Universals. One is at first puzzled to see how he manages to bring it in. It begins with the question (p. 26) whether or no a pronoun stands merely for its antecedent, a particular concrete being, or for its antecedent as affirmed by a preceding verb. For instance: "Socrates is an animal, and *it* is an ass;" do we mean by *it* an animal in general, or *that animal which is Socrates*? Here we notice that any copulative proposition in which one of the terms of the

latter half is the same as one of the former, may have the latter term replaced by a pronoun. As, *A is B and B is C*, or *A is B and A is C*, may be rendered: *A is B and it (meaning either A or B) is C*. This is the slight link by which the controversy is connected with the subject of the chapter; and here comes the tug of war between Universalists and Nominalists. Wyclif urges that if we say, "A certain man has stolen something, and *he* is a thief," we may very well be ignorant of the particular *he* who has committed the theft. *He* therefore does not stand, as Nominalists would have it, for the individual himself, but for the Universal "A certain man who has stolen this or that". Nominalists say they know this disjunctively: it is either *A* or *B* or *C*, &c. But this is an idle quibble: to know thus disjunctively is not to know (p. 26, l. 31 to end; p. 27, l. 1 to 20).

Now all this looks to modern readers — and since they are modern, they must of course be in the right — very much like mere loss of time and trouble; useless expenditure of brain-work. To the Oxford wranglers of those days, on the contrary, it must have been full of actuality and interest: for it was the very central point round which the battle raged, and Wyclif's unerring acumen, in thus coming to the point at once, is greatly to be admired, if we can for an instant forget our superiority as "moderns". The Nominalists flatly denied the existence of anything but the concrete. For them, a universal name was in itself a mere "*flatus vocis*", according to Ockam's famous expression; it had no meaning except when applied to its singulars. They therefore could not possibly admit that the pronoun *he* (or indeed any pronoun; *who* or *which*, for instance) stood for a universal Thing, nor even merely for the words which it replaced (which would still give universality of a certain kind). It had to stand for a singular object, an individual man or being. "But then," said the Universalists, "if it stands for only one individual, you must know who *he* is, when you say, *He is a thief*, as usual in such sentences. If you do not know, and deny that it stands for somebody in general, the sentence becomes a jumble of words, without any meaning". We are not here concerned in the Nominalist's reply, which must have been rather shuffling and embarrassed, at least for those of the extreme school of Ockam. But their attack upon Wyclif's position, and the staunch courage with which he stands up to defend it, is very noteworthy.

To put their attack into somewhat more modern language than the crabbed form of the text: If you say, "Socrates is an animal and *it* is an ass," you mean that the universal "Animal" is replaced by *it*. But suppose you substitute *vertebrate* for animal; the sense of *it* is at once altered. Substitute *mammal*: the sense varies again. Thus we have an endless series of different significations given to *it*, each of them more concrete, yet none ever reaching the ultimate limit of individuality. This would be the ruin of all science; for we could never draw any inference from the universal to its singulars; and between each of these *it*'s there could be found or imagined room for an infinite multitude of others. These constantly changing significations would destroy the possibility of deduction. "A is an animal; it (not A, but the animal) is a vertebrate; it (the vertebrate) is a mammal" — and so on. We can never conclude that A is this singular individual man (p. 27, l. 20—37). Wyclif answers (pp. 28—30) that, though less universal as a predicate than its antecedent, *it* has as a subject the power of standing for the same, and consequently for all the singulars which that antecedent represents. There is indeed an endless descent, because there is an infinite distance between any universal and its singulars. But, when we get to the lowest species of all, we have only accidents, that is, non-essential differences, by which the singulars are distinguished; so that makes no difficulty. If we say that one universal is infinitely beyond another, because it extends to more singulars, this does not mean that it is infinite, any more than a surface, infinitely greater than a line, would be infinite.

Beaten off on one side (as we may perhaps be allowed to suppose) the Nominalists return to the charge on another. "You say that *he* does not stand for an individual. Let us then suppose that two men, Socrates and Plato, are running." The proposition, "Somebody runs," will be true; but at the same time it will be true to add: "Socrates is not *he*, and Plato is not *he*." Now, what if no one else in the world is running at the time? (p. 27, l. 37 to end; p. 28, l. 1—12). This however is met (p. 30, 31) by denying that '*he*' has here the meaning of a universal man. It is clearly a singular, meaning *the somebody who runs* in both cases, and in one of the two it could not but be false.

The third argument is aimed more directly against universals. Each of them stands for all its singulars. But *he*, according to the supposition, is a universal. We may say of A, He is a king; and of B, He is a thief.

The same *he* stands for both, and is both. And if we know the universal 'Somebody', we also know — disjunctively of course; this is a retort against Wyclif's argument a few pages above — who has committed any action, however secret: it is *somebody* (p. 28, l. 13—29). Wyclif answers (pp. 32—34) by enumerating various species of universals. Some exist before their singulars, and are God's eternal ideas; some are mere passive potentialities; others are founded upon the individuals in which they exist; as, for instance, the idea of humanity. He then proceeds to deny that, when we apply the universal to its singulars, the supposition (application, or manner of using a word in a proposition) is other than personal. Now essential and personal suppositions are two very different things. When we say: "Humanity is animality together with rationality," we have essential supposition; when we say that humanity comprises the man A, the man B, &c. it is personal. In the first case the subject stands for all that is in the predicate; in the second, only for what is *common* to each of the singulars predicated. Thus, in the case aforesaid, '*he*' would not stand for all the attributes of A and of B; one might be a king, the other a thief; but *he* would have nothing to do with the kingship or the dishonesty of its singulars.

Such is, so far as I can understand it, the position taken up by Wyclif; though he observes that there are many different answers to this difficulty, some of which, in his opinion, amount to the abandonment of the Realistic doctrine (p. 34, l. 30—35). He no doubt alludes to the system of Moderate Realism, which, as it was followed by the immense majority of Schoolmen, and had, as our author himself admits, the advantage of avoiding great difficulties, I may here venture to state in as few words as possible.

When the same sign stands for a great many objects, and has exactly the same signification when applied to one as when applied to another, it is called a Universal. But *what* is Universal? Pure Nominalists say it is the word, and the word only; even the idea is different when applied to different individuals. Thus we do not mean the same thing by *man*, when we say, 'A is a man,' as we do when we say, 'B is a man'. Moderate Nominalists, or Conceptualists, admit that besides the universality of the word, we have also the universality of the idea; so that subjectively we do mean the same thing in the above instance; that is, we mean our idea of humanity. But nothing farther; there is nothing *in any*

way identical between the man A and the man B in their several natures. Is there any midcourse between this doctrine and that of such Realists as affirm that there is in man a humanity corresponding to our idea, and *really identical in all its singulars?* There is; it is the theory of Moderate Realists. To ascribe the universality of our ideas to a mere groundless fiction of the mind would destroy the objective value of all reasoning. To suppose that there exists a mysterious something, substantially identical in each and all of the singular objects that come under a general name, would land us in endless difficulties, with which we shall soon see Wyclif attempting to grapple. They therefore draw a sharp distinction between the Universal, as not seen by the mind, and as seen. The Universal, as formally existing in many singulars, is nowhere but in the mind. Everything that exists in nature is formally concrete, and singular in its essence. Thus the Universal, *as known*, is nothing but a mere abstraction. But, *as able to be known*, it is otherwise; it is real; in each singular it exists as a basis from which our mind is able to abstract the universal idea. Their definition says of the Universal (as known) that it exists *formaliter in mente, fundamentaliter in re*. They avoid defending a position which they consider unsafe, and take up one which it is very difficult to attack with any chance of success. Asked by Nominalists if the redness of the rose, the geranium, and the cherry, is a real universal, they reply: Its reality is formally in the objects, fundamentally in the mind; its universality is formally in the mind, fundamentally in the objects. Asked by those of Wyclif's school if there is nothing identical in two shades of colour in which there is no difference, they answer: Nothing but the aptitude they have for being grasped in one idea; that aptitude, in objects similarly coloured, *really* exists; and when our mind thus grasps them, it becomes actual — but only in the mind. This may seem obscure, but I can find no words to state it more clearly: and indeed this seems to me the true solution of the whole problem. I do not see what the most determined Nominalist could find to attack in this reply, if he understood it properly. It might perhaps not satisfy him; for it keeps up a strict relation between signs, ideas, and things, between the subjective and the objective order, and maintains the validity of human reason without restrictions, *in whatever sphere it may work*. But it avoids with the utmost care giving a handle to this most embarrassing objection: How can anything be real and yet not

concrete? Such caution Wyclif thought excessive; it now remains for us to see how he fought — most courageously and skilfully, it must be acknowledged — against this objection in its various forms.

Faithful to his accustomed method of showing a bold front to difficulties, and never shirking them, however weighty they may be, he at once proceeds to enquire, 1st How we can distinguish Universals from their singulars, and from each other; 2nd How the transcendent entity, Being, is common both to God and to His creatures; 3rd Whether a Universal can receive accidental attributes, and 4th Whether a Universal, taken together with its singulars, makes up a number.

First. Every Universal is all its singulars, and each of them. It would seem that if so, it cannot be distinguished from them, nor from any other Universal that might happen to be those singulars too (p. 34, end). We are free to deny that the Universal is its singulars; it is in them, but is not *they*, having no personal supposition, as they have. But it is preferable to admit that it is its singulars, and, thus considered, receives a different personal supposition in each. This supposition, which it has in its singulars and not by itself, is amply sufficient to differentiate it from them (p. 35). In some cases this difference may be merely logical or notional, but still it suffices for a distinction; as that between the one universal Phœnix and the one phœnix existing in the physical world. Each is identical with the other in all but the fact that the universal Phœnix is (at least successively) communicable to many, whilst the corporeal phœnix is not. Thus, as we see, even in this test case, there always remains, between the Universal and its singular, one difference, — communicability (p. 37).

Second. If God is Being, and the creature is a being, and Being is a universal reality, the same in both: then we come to the Pantheistic conclusion that there is something common to God and His creatures, and really identical in both (pp. 37, 38). And in fact, as the Nominalistic position logically ends in Materialism, so Realism — unless it carefully steers the middle course which has been mentioned — necessarily tends towards (though not necessarily *goes to*) the extremes of Pantheism. To answer the objection, we must note that transcendent being is not in God and in the creature as a difference; — for instance, in the way that rationality exists in all men — but as a *mode*. This mode is one in itself; but it exists in God otherwise than in the creature.

It would be a false argument to say: "Manhood is a thing identical with Socrates and with Plato: therefore, Socrates is Plato." In like manner, to say: "Being is God and is Not-God; therefore God is Not-God" — is false too (p. 38, l. 10—34). We may say: "*That which* (meaning, or as Wyclif says, pointing to, *demonstrans*, Transcendental Being) is Not-God is God;" but we cannot infer thence that the creature is God (pp. 38, 39). But to admit even the former proposition seems perilously near Pantheism: so we must not be surprised if Wyclif reverts to this point and supports his distinction with analogies drawn from the profoundest mysteries of the Christian religion.

Third. To grant that the Universal Man is identical with each of its singulars seems to imply its doing and being all that every individual does and is. It is thus at the same time awake and asleep, white and black, &c., together with countless other contradictory attributes (p. 39, l. 38 to end; p. 40, l. 1—14). This objection may be solved either negatively or in the affirmative. Man is that which is white and that which is black; but Man is not white and black. For, as a universal, this term can receive no predicates but such as are essential to human nature: and it is evident that neither whiteness nor blackness are thus essential (p. 40, l. 15 to p. 42, l. 6). But again, taking ideal humanity as the exemplar and prototype of each man, and consequently as the cause of each, we may grant that it does every one of the actions of each. So universals do receive accidents: not indeed in themselves, but in their singulars, with which they are identical: and the countless different attributes, which are or may be contradictory in their singulars, are not so in them (p. 42, l. 5—25). This explanation is similar to that of theologians, who deny that the Godhead suffered, although it was *that which* suffered, i. e. the person of Christ (p. 42, l. 28 to p. 44, l. 25). Several other objections are propounded and solved in the same way, by pointing either to the mystery of the Incarnation or to that of the Trinity; in the latter, the essence of the Deity is substantially the same in each of the three persons; yet the Three are really distinct. The Father is not the Son, although *that which* is the Father is *that which* is the Son. "To every sophism against Real Universals, you can find a parallel one against the Holy Trinity," says Wyclif (p. 46, l. 18—22). Very true; and it therefore follows that, *for a Christian*, the distinction is not meaningless, meaningless as it may seem. But the following would seem an obvious

reply: "The Trinity is a mystery; are Real Universals so? If they are, faith and not reason should make us believe in them. If they are not, they destroy the mysterious nature of the Trinity itself." It is perhaps as an answer to this objection, never stated in so many words, that our author in several passages of his works (and in particular a few pages further, pp. 51, 52) takes care to note the differences between the Universal and the Divine Essence. But he only points out other mysteries, and leaves the *that which* distinction untouched, as parallel in both cases. — The serious difficulty, viz., that universals must move about, as they are wherever their singulars happen to be, is taken into earnest consideration (p. 47). Wyclif inclines to think that they move; at the same time he denies that this implies localization of the Universal.

Fourth. The most difficult point of all, where the writer seems to be most uncertain, and which he probably developed and explained at a later period, is, "How the Universals can be said to make up a number with their singulars". If the individual man A and the universal man are identical, they are not two, but one; if, on the other hand, there is a real distinction between them, they must be two realities, and be counted as such (p. 48, l. 3—10). It seems impossible to get a satisfactory answer to this objection; at least that contained in the present work seems to me rather lame, so far as I have succeeded in understanding it; and when I collated the chapter of *De Universalibus*. "Quo-modo universalia ponunt in numero," I was too busy with the collation itself to pay much attention to the manner in which Wyclif supplements what seems wanting here. For a man of our author's skill and subtlety, it would have been very easy to wrap up his answer in a string of sentences impossible to understand, and signifying anything — or nothing; such a mode of proceeding would have been not without great precedents even in his time; and contemporary philosophers might perhaps tell us whether it has been quite abandoned at the present day. But Wyclif, often unintelligible when pursuing some of his favourite theories out of sight, is never so on purpose to embarrass an adversary. He may be lost in the clouds; he does not hide himself in mists. His sturdy English nature prefers momentary self-contradiction to wilful ambiguity, and remains in seeming absurdity until such time as he can get a satisfactory reply to what perplexes him. This, I believe, will appear a little further. I do not think that it takes anything away from the admiration due to his talent, and

it makes him respected from another point of view. He begins by enumerating different kinds of number (pp. 48—50), and for some he denies the possibility of ascribing them to a universal taken with its singular. If, however, number be taken to mean *all that can be counted*, then he admits that the Universal and its singular can be counted together, as the Godhead and the Three Persons of the Trinity. Such is the sense, if I mistake not, of the words “tunc concedendum est . . . quod quaelibet unitas quae est essentia substantiae singularis est trinitas suppositorum ejusdem substantiae . . . et sic [ut] homo communis differt ab homine singulari, ita essentia communis differt a personis non sic communibus” (p. 50, l. 20—28).¹ Here the mystery of the Holy Trinity stands Wyclif in good stead. While he takes care to point out the difference between the Godhead, as communicable to the Persons, and the Universal, as applicable to its singulars, he says: The numerical difficulty which you propose to me applies equally to the Divine Essence, counted with the Persons; *qui nimis probat nihil probat*? This would elude the difficulty; but Wyclif is not satisfied with that. Reverting to the above-mentioned case of the Phoenix, he affirms that the universal and the singular phoenix are not two, but one (p. 51, l. 16); for there are neither two universals, nor two singulars (l. 20—22). You cannot say *they*, pointing to both at once (l. 30). The universal Phoenix *is* in no wise other than (*aliud vel alia quam*, l. 27, 28) its singular, though they differ notionally (*secundum rationem* l. 29). This seems clear enough. Yet if the universal Phoenix is so identical with its singular that there is a mere logical distinction between them, and that we cannot even say ‘between *them*’ properly, can we continue to affirm that it possesses a distinct reality other than that of its singular? *We can*, answers Wyclif (“. . . duo distincta realiter,” p. 54, l. 10). Every universal and its singular are two things, really different from each other. This looks very like a contradiction in terms, unless (which is also possible) the text is corrupt. But I do not think so, on account of Wyclif’s sudden conclusion of the debate immediately after these words, his avowal that the difficulty is very great (l. 11, 12) and his pointing out two other ways of answering

¹ The text is slightly changed here from what it is in the treatise. I confess I understood it less at the time. Even now it is not quite clear, and some words are probably wanting.

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the difficulty, which might for a time be more satisfactory to some of his pupils. They were free to grant that universals might be counted apart from their singulars, though in reality one with them; or to deny it, because they are not different things. "But I," says Wyclif, at the close of the chapter, "stick to my first antwer" (l. 30). If the name of Doctor Evangelicus had not been given to him, he might have deserved, as well as if not better than Durandus, the title of *Doctor Resolutissimus*.

Chapter III. Under cover of investigating the nature of disjunctive propositions, Wyclif continues the debate on Universals, and now proceeds to carry the war into the enemy's country in a very practical way: viz., by asserting that the very idea of a promise demonstrates the truth of his theory. But we must first of all briefly note how he gets to this subject. The proposition which contradicts a disjunctive is a copulative of which both parts are contradictory to the former: as, A is B or A is C: *contr.* A is not B and A is not C (p. 56, l. 6, 7). Now *and A* may be replaced by *and it*: so here, as in the foregoing chapter, comes the question; for what do pronouns stand? In other words, ought the Realist or the Nominalist view to prevail? Only here the field of discussion is restricted and specified. I promise a penny. There is therefore a penny *which* I promise. Does this *which* relate to a universal penny, or to a singular one? Wyclif at once and of course chooses the first alternative. He says that, if anything singular is meant, not only philosophy, but political science and even all human intercourse must go by the board. And not only the act of promising becomes impossible, but purchase, sale, donations, acts of justice, rewards and punishments are rendered null and void. When I promise a penny, *a penny*, according to Nominalists, is a mere empty word, there being no universal penny, but only singular ones; and so the promise becomes ineffective (p. 58). One man owes another £ 20. According to Nominalists, even God's Almighty power could not make him pay. There may be and are particular sums called £ 20; but such a general promise of what is but a *status vocis* in itself can have no value. And so on with many other cases, which all result in constructive absurdities; constructive of course, for, rightly or wrongly, they were denied by the partisans of the opposite system. Wyclif therefore declares (p. 59, l. 20) that we are obliged to admit the ancient doctrine of Universals, and closes his case with

observations concerning the nature of promises and obligations (pp. 60, 61) with which he deals at some length. He then takes up a series of objections, in which absurdities, very similar to those of which he accuses his adversaries, are laid to his charge.

1. We are never obliged to give anything but what we have promised. If then the promise concerns only a universal penny, nothing obliges us to give a singular one! Besides, as we may suppose that the other party has a (universal) penny already, how can we give a man what he possesses? So the Realist, not the Nominalist, standpoint is the ruin of promises, obligations, and in short of all human intercourse whatsoever (p. 61, l. 26—37).

The answer is that we are indeed not obliged to give anything but a universal penny, since no other is promised. But *that* we are obliged to give; and since it cannot be given without the singular which contains it, any one of its singulars must be handed over. As to the man's already possessing a universal penny, that has nothing to do with the matter: he must possess it in reason of the promise made, even though he had it already, and independently thereof. He then will have it in one more of its singulars, i. e. more plentifully (*abundantius*). Wyclif adds, with a touch of dry and possibly unconscious humour, that the multiplied possession of a universal penny in its singulars is highly advantageous (*multum confert*). Thus, if a promise concerns the Universal, its execution regards its singulars (p. 62, l. 16 to p. 63, l. 5). That the common people know nothing of universals is quite false; they have a sort of confused knowledge of them. Even those who deny their existence cannot help contradicting themselves and agreeing with us in practice (p. 63, l. 15 to p. 64, l. 7).

2. "But," the adversary urges, "I for one deny the existence, even the possibility of a real universal penny. So, at least when *I* promise one, the promise must be that of a singular: I really mean to give, and I cannot mean what is in my opinion impossible. Thus universality is not necessarily implied by the words of the promise in my case; and if not in my case, in none" (p. 61, l. 37 to p. 62, l. 5). "Quite the contrary," replies Wyclif. "You may intend promising one particular penny — the one, for instance, that you will happen to give — but you cannot help implicitly meaning the Universal which it contains. No doubt it is promised vaguely in this case; still it is promised. That you have

it not in your mind, nay, that you positively exclude it from your mind, is an altogether irrelevant fact (p. 64).” If I may be allowed to clear up the meaning of this by an example, we may suppose that one man promises to give another a piece of land in which he is convinced that there are no mineral riches whatever. Now it so happens that he is mistaken: does the fact of his belief render it untrue that, in promising the land, he has promised all its mineral riches? When you say: I promise a penny — a singular one — you surely promise all that is contained in that penny: now we say that a Universal is contained therein, and that, willing or unwilling, you promise it. — Here Wyclif, in connection with the indefinite universal term, *a penny*, makes some remarks by the way about terms of the first and second intention and imposition respectively. If a singular penny is spoken of, the sense, primarily universal, is contracted by the term *singular*. The promising verb indicates universality, and that is promised in any case. For instance, I have two pennies, and promise you one of the two. That means *neither in particular*; and it follows that the object of any promise must be universal (pp. 64, 67).

3. A third difficulty, made up of several put together, runs thus: Transcendent Being is identical with everything, and at the same time with anything in the world: if I promise *something*, it follows that everything has been promised! And yet such a promise comes to nothing in reality. I buy a man; if the meaning of this be ‘Universal Man’, then it includes myself; yet I surely cannot buy my own person. And it might be proved in the same way that what is promised is not promised (p. 62, l. 5—15).

All this is mere sophistry. The promise of Something is valid; but the very smallest thing given fulfils it, and so it happens to be an idle one, legally speaking; but that is not because its object is universal. There are many such cases which judges would put out of court as frivolous. Notice, however, that when the singulars of any universal are of equal value, any one of them will do; when their values differ, we may not choose at will any one of the worst, but may be compelled by law to give one of average worth. (I suspect that Wyclif’s opponents might have found means to cavil here. You promise a horse; you give a hack only fit to be slaughtered; but you have given the ‘Universal horse’ with it just as well as if you had given a Derby favourite. Why should the

judge enforce an average value, when the value is totally irrelevant to the thing 'principally given'? But this is by the way.) — Some promises may be legally binding, but impossible to fulfil, and not binding in conscience. — We may go to market intending to buy something there; now some of our own goods being in the market, it follows that we intend to buy our own goods. There is nothing absurd in all this, unless we go with the explicit intention to buy what we know to be our own (pp. 67—69). But what absurdity, if a Universal be really nothing, for a Nominalist to express himself grateful to a benefactor who promises him *a* horse, *a* saddle, &c. (p. 69, l. 39 to p. 70, l. 11).

As to the last quibble: "I will give the (singular) penny which I do not promise to give (since I promise the Universal)." Such a promise is a falsehood, for by its very tenour it flatly contradicts itself. Or we may understand the words to mean: *that I do not promise to give as a singular*; but then the sentence has no difficulty (p. 70, l. 12 to p. 71, l. 35).

The chapter closes with a few observations about obligatory acts, mortal sins incurred by their omission, works of supererogation, and fasting.

Chapter IV. Here Wyclif discusses four difficulties raised, the first separately, as one of the ordinary objections against Universals; the other three together, as raising the question of the greatest number of things possible. There are consequently two distinct parts in this chapter.

1. Given four propositions, *a*, *b*, *c* and *d* (*b* contradicting *a*, and *c*, *d*) we find that *a* and *c*, and that *b* and *d* can coexist respectively; but that the couples *a b*, *c d* cannot. It follows that the four propositions, if thought of as coexisting, are at the same time incompatible and compatible with one another. On the same lines we may prove that all men are equal and unequal, friends and enemies, &c. (p. 73, l. 15 to p. 75, l. 7). But Wyclif easily points out that though such contradictory qualities really exist, they exist relatively to different objects, not to the same; which makes short of the whole objection. They are indeed all contradictory and compatible; but not all with all; *a*, compatible with *c* and *d*, is contradictory to *b*; and *vice versa* (pp. 75—78). And we come to the conclusion that opposite qualities, though they cannot be predicated of individuals, may be ascribed to universals, either essentially, or

separately. *Four* is even; four is three and one; three is odd: therefore four may truly be said in two different senses to be both even and odd. Christ is indivisible as God, and divisible, as man (p. 78, l. 35 to p. 79, l. 22). All this is explained at what I cannot help thinking needless length; but it is also quite admissible that a teacher may be trusted to have known the requirements of his pupils and the exigencies of his times somewhat better than those who read or edit his works five hundred years after his death.

2. Then comes the second question: Whether God is able to create the greatest possible number of creatures. The three difficulties raised at the beginning of the chapter are answered thus; for if God cannot create this greatest number, the conclusions given there are inevitable; whereas if (as Wyclif maintains) He can, then they are worthless (p. 79, l. 22—26). We are, however, not very well qualified to decide whether this is a logical inference, and must take the assertion for granted, most of these difficulties being stated in a very unintelligible form. Perhaps the third (p. 73, l. 10—12) alone is not totally obscure: “*Omnia quae Deus potuit facere possunt esse Deus, vel nihil potest differre ab alio.*” This is itself not very clear; but if I can discern a glimmer of meaning in it, it somewhat resembles the problem still in vogue amongst Neo-Scholastics: “Whether the most perfect creature possible *is* possible.” If there is no limit to the number of creatures which God can produce, there is either no limit to their perfection, and one of the infinite multitude is infinitely perfect, though a creature; or we must deny any difference of perfection between them. I give this, however, merely as a hint, not being sure that it is the very same question to which Wyclif alludes: “*Omnia . . . possunt esse Deus,*” stands in the way.

The adversary is supposed to deny that any greatest number of all is possible; for it would be infinite; and that is no less absurd than a being of infinite size. To create it would exhaust the whole of God’s power, which is inexhaustible. At the Resurrection there would be no room for an infinite number of men come to life again. Not one man more could possibly be created or perish. This, too, would lead to a denial of Free-will. Besides, if the term *man*, for instance, is a Universal, its signification cannot be exhausted, however, great the number of its singulars may be; it may always be supposed capable of having as

many more: which would not be true, if all possible men existed at any time (p. 79, l. 22 to p. 81, l. 6).

But this flatly contradicts Wyclif's principles. To answer the arguments levelled against him, he makes a very remarkable and peculiar use of the term 'infinite'. He indeed affirms the existence of an infinite number, but says that whatever exceeds our power of knowing distinctly, is infinite to us. Thus, to give his own comparison — a striking one — in a given line there is a definite and fixed number of points, known to God, but absolutely beyond our powers of apprehension. As a fact, we must admit the existence of continuous extension: now, how many parts are there in any such extended being? The more we divide it, the more of them we find, and we never can get to the end of our division. Yet God, who created them, knows each in particular, and the sum total of them all (p. 81, l. 6—33).

Would Wyclif have considered the multitude of stars in the sky, or that of the sands on the sea-shore, to be infinite? I think not; for they do not exceed our faculty of counting, but the time we have allotted to us, or the instruments we are obliged to use; if we had time enough, their aggregate would be represented by a number, finite even to us. He takes an instance of quite a different nature; — we might go on counting for all eternity the number of points in a line, or of parts in a given volume, however small. Yet he contends that as those points are *really there* (again a consequence of his doctrine; a Nominalist would get out of the difficulty by saying that they were mere *entia rationis*), it is impossible both that their number should not be known to God, and that it should be infinite to Him. It is therefore definite. To the length of each line corresponds a fixed number of points; a line double that length will have twice as many; numbers beyond all arithmetical calculation, but numbers nevertheless. The idea is not wanting in boldness and originality; but, like all speculations on these subjects, it is liable to a good many formidable objections.

Wyclif strengthens his position by observing that certain propositions which are evidently true must be denied if we refuse to admit this conception of the Infinite. A body certainly consists of *all* its parts; but, were there no definite number, there would be no *all*; the very term supposes them either counted or at least numerable. Again, in Genesis, "God saw all the things that He had made," i. e. with all their details,

which to us are infinite. A line consists of points; the duration of a sound, of instants; the whole is the sum of all its parts. All these imply countless parts — countless, that is, in so far as our mind conceives their multitude. And yet the adversary is driven to deny all this. "I protest before God," cries Wyclif, indignantly "that of all fallacies ever invented these seem to me the most worthless!" (p. 82, l. 6—28.) — If our opponents admit that God knows each part of the said infinite multitudes, he must grant that all these parts exist. Granting this, but refusing to admit that these parts are separately affirmable, he is at once met by the fact that, as they exist, they must be beings, singular beings, and as such affirmable separately. Suppose he takes refuge in saying that, separately affirmable, taken together they are not so; he is forced from that last refuge by the remark that in that case there must be a limit to the number of beings which God is able to cognize collectively; and, since a man could count up to any finite number, his knowledge would be equal to that of God (p. 82, l. 29 to p. 83, l. 28).

It follows therefore that there exists a maximum number of singular possible beings (men, for instance), to which nothing can be added; and this is true both for simultaneously and successively possible beings (p. 83, l. 29 to p. 84, l. 32). Peripateticians, admitting the eternity of the world, affirm the successive possibility of an endless multitude of men (p. 84, l. 33 to end). But Christians deny this; some (those of Wyclif's opinion) asserting a fixed maximum number of every being, all in ideal and necessary proportion, so that nothing in the world can be increased or diminished (p. 85, l. 11—24). This does not limit God's power, but affirms His infinite wisdom; how could more men be produced, when all those who are to exist, exist already? Here, however, two curious exceptions are made; one in regard to the number of inferior animals (possibly because, not having immortal souls, they would never simultaneously make up an infinite number), and the other concerning that of human actions, which depend upon free-will and thus cannot be fixed. *Not all future things take place by necessity* (l. 37, 38). This is an important sentence, for Wyclif, in his theological works, is known to have maintained a doctrine which seems to contradict this clear statement of his views. It may perhaps be interesting to some future student of this subject to inquire when and how the change of opinion took place, if it took place at all. It is quite possible that when

Wyclif speaks of necessity, he may mean that, given the fact of free-will and the actions resulting therefrom, things cannot be otherwise than they are; this, however, is often set forth in language which must have astonished the ordinary Catholic. In Buddensieg's edition of Wyclif's Polemical Works there is a tract entitled *De Perfectione Statuum*, in which (vol. II, p. 450, l. 5—18) a passage occurs that evidently supposes free-will. Now this tract, according to Buddensieg, dates from 1383, quite at the close of our author's life. But, on the other hand, this, as directed against the Friars, may be explained away as an argument 'ad hominem'. And in the *Dialogus*, when accused of fatalism, he might easily have destroyed the charge by the well-known distinction between absolute and hypothetical necessity. Yet he gives none, and simply admits the necessity of all things that happen (Dial. pp. 45, 46). That some change or other took place in Wyclif's doctrine is evident from the following passage in *De Ecclesia* (p. 107, l. 12 and seq.), in which he explicitly admits the fact: "Omnia futura de necessitate eveniunt Quando autem variavi ab ista sententia, non cognovi, ut modo, quomodo res habet multiplex esse, sed omne esse posui existentiam individuam rei in suo genere." How he reconciles this doctrine with free-will is not quite clear to me, as I have not been able to find a passage dealing with free-will at any length, except a very orthodox one in *De Ente Praedicamentali* (p. 247); but this treatise, according to Dr. Beer, could not have been posterior to *Logica* by more than a few years. But we must not rashly assume that he did not reconcile them. The Dominicans, in their great controversy with the Jesuits, affirmed that God predetermined all human acts, making all things act according to their nature; so that, as the nature of will is to act freely, human acts were at once predetermined and free! And this theory was not condemned by the Church! — Having thrown out these few hints which may possibly be of use, I return to the summary of Wyclif's arguments.

The distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic possibility has no real foundation. A seemingly possible soul is in reality impossible, if God has chosen never to create it. The number therefore of souls extrinsically possible is that of all those which at any time will exist in reality; it is consequently finite, though the abstract idea, 'Soul' contains an infinite multitude of singulars; for all those singulars to which their cause (i. e. God's will) is wanting, imply self-contradiction. Wyclif con-

siders as possible only such as are so in reality, and at one time or other must exist: this does away with all the difficulties that can be brought forward (pp. 86—88). The system in vogue at his time, refusing to limit God's power of creating all that is possible in the abstract, renders it necessary to deny that such a multitude is infinite. Wyclif, limiting God's power by His will, calls the fixed number of possible things that will be produced, infinite *to us* (p. 88 to end of chapter).

Chapter V. brings us to a discussion of causal propositions, after the writer's usual fashion, expounding his views on causes, accidents, modes of being, the identity of God causing Man with Man caused by God, and the origin of evil.

Of such propositions there are two kinds, the one affirmative, the other negative, and each is reducible to a categorical having the same sense. A conditional proposition does not imply causation, but only a nexus between two propositions, neither does a copulative, which means nothing beyond the coexistence of the two (pp. 90, 91). Accidents are caused by their subjects: *because* you are a man, you have such and such qualities. This is a proof that accident and subject are distinct entities, unless we deny the truth of causal propositions in general; but such a denial would be subversive of all science (p. 91, l. 12—39). 'Cause' cannot properly be defined, any more than 'being', because their spheres are equally universal. We can only state that the word signifies 'that which produces an effect', that of which the entity precedes the thing caused; whilst 'effect' is that other being produced, and of which the entity flows from that cause. All beings are causes and effects. Possibly there is no last being, but there is a first one; which is, according to Wyclif, not God, but Essence. This essence is *that which* is created (*unum creatum*); but it is itself neither created nor caused. In short, it seems identical with that Transcendent Being, of which we have already heard a good deal, and which is common both to God and to the creature; a conception so closely verging upon Pantheism that Wyclif avoids that conclusion only by his surprising skill in argument, and the constant employment of the highest mysteries of the Christian faith used as points of comparison and instances to maintain the value of his subtle distinctions (p. 91, l. 39, 40; p. 92, l. 1—18).

He then proceeds to enumerate the fourfold division of causes into material, formal, efficient and final, each of which is a cause either *per*

se or *per accidens*, a true cause or a mere occasion. We may pass over these details rapidly, only noting the conclusion: that the material exists for the formal cause, this latter for the efficient, and the efficient for the final cause. The ultimate End of all beings is that toward which all beings tend, and for which they all exist, whilst it exists for itself alone. Thus it can have no parts, but must be absolutely simple in its essence; for if it had parts, every one would be caused, and would exist only for the whole. Two beings may cause one another in different lines of causation, but not in the same (pp. 92—96).

Every causal proposition is reduplicative. For instance: You move, since you walk, means *Inasmuch as you walk, you move*. Therefore, though other propositions are also reduplicative (as: The more alike two things are, the less they differ), Wyclif takes the present occasion to investigate the nature of reduplicatives, and continues his investigation in the following chapter. Whenever such a proposition is reducible to a causal one, the predicate must be universal. If, for instance, Every man, *qua* man, is rational, then it also follows that Every rational being is a man. This is not always the case when the proposition cannot thus be reduced (pp. 96—98 to l. 6).

Here comes a difficulty. Suppose we say: *A man, in so far as he is white, does not build*: is this true, and may we consider that 'whiteness' is not a cause of his building? Some assert that we may not; for the whole man builds, and whiteness is an attribute of the whole man. Wyclif, on the contrary, thinks that the proposition is true. The connection between this apparently useless and meaningless subtlety and the profound mysteries of the Scholastic doctrine concerning the 'hypostasis', or essence of individuality, becomes clearer, when we ask, Did Christ, *qua* God, suffer and die? Did He, *qua* man, create the world? The answer given is in strict accordance with orthodoxy (p. 98, l. 6 to p. 99, l. 4).

This leads us to examine what such modes of being as whiteness, &c., added to the substance, are in themselves. Real they are no doubt, according to the general drift of Wyclif's opinions; but are they realities distinct from the substance to which they belong and which they modify? If so, every substance would, in each of its modifications, differ from itself. But the difference is merely modal, not substantial; only the modes differ: to be thus or otherwise, and to be existing, are

not the same. Size gives a man magnitude; quality gives him 'suchness', humanity alone gives him to be a man (p. 99, l. 4 to p. 100, l. 6).

But if so, another difficulty springs up. God, *as creating man*, has what is called an accidental mode, which is not identical with His essence, and therefore is posterior to Himself! And if we deny this; if we say that this mode is identical with God's essence, we fall into another snare: for the said mode (action and passion being admittedly the same thing taken from contrary points of view) is also identical with man *as created by God* (p. 100, l. 6 to end). Thus God and man would share in the same reality, or mode of existence; just as the hammer *qua* striking the anvil, is identical with the anvil, *qua* struck by the hammer. It is curious to note how this old-world objection has been reproduced and extended in modern times. Every student of Philosophy will at once recognize the system which says: "I think of an object: — therefore I am identical with the object, the Non-Ego. And the Non-Ego, thought by me, becomes identical with my Ego." What was formerly an objection, refuted in a few pages, has become the starting point and basis of many a volume of German metaphysical speculation, which, having spent its force and lost its interest in its own country, has lately found new life and men of talent to expound it in England. And yet this fallacy (to speak of it in the language of the Schoolmen) was well known even in Aristotle's time, Truly there is no new thing under the sun! But let us see how Wyclif refutes it.

First, he points out that an accident may signify a mere happening which does not in the least change the possessor's intrinsic nature: a rich man may become poor without any loss to his physical attributes. He then notes that not all relations are mutually real. A cause must be, in its essence, prior to its effect, though it is only properly termed a cause whilst the effect is being produced. This 'calling', or denomination, changes nothing in its being. So, the cause depends on the effect only in so far as a verbal change is implied, whereas the effect depends on the cause for its very being. A man, by means of his generative activity, produces a son: he is called a father as soon as his son exists. But the man existed before and independently; there is no real difference between the father and the man. Wyclif therefore answers that the likeness of me in God and the likeness of God in me, both produced by creation, are not identical. For the likeness of me represents me as

I am — i. e. — infinitely beneath God — and changes nothing in Him (pp. 101—103, l. 8).

And how would Wyclif, according to these lines, have answered the Hegelian puzzle of the Ego and the Non-Ego? With the utmost ease. My thinking of an object does not change the object in itself; it only makes it to be thought. The Non-Ego is the Ego — *in my mind*. Not otherwise. My Ego, in thinking — i. e. *mentally*, is identical with the Non-Ego; but only in so far. All this is merely a verbal, or if you prefer, a notional becoming. And the bubble is burst.

From this Wyclif concludes that no inherent accident has any existence of its own, or adds anything to its substance, as a substance (p. 103, l. 8—25); that every proposition of which the predicate essentially belongs to the subject infers a causal proposition, but not *vice versa* (for instance: *Man is essentially rational: man is rational because he is man*, but, *I exist because God wills my existence* gives no inference; p. 103, l. 25 to p. 104, l. 7); that a conclusion from a cause to the cause of that cause is a true one (p. 104, l. 7 to end); and that, while God's will causes my existence in the physical order, my existence causes God's will to be what it is in the intellectual order, i. e., a cause. One of the two gives the entity, but does not prove the existence of the other; whilst the latter proves the existence of the former, but does not give it entity (p. 105, l. 1 to p. 106, l. 9). It does not follow that either is prior to the other, unless in two totally different orders: that of being, and that of cognition (p. 106, l. 9—25). Nor that God's will, being a mere relation between the Creator and the Created, cannot cause anything (l. 26—34). Nor that any creature, to be willed, must first of all exist (l. 34—37; p. 107, l. 1—8).

But can we draw the following negative inference from a causal proposition: "*I do good because God wills it; therefore, if God does not will it, I do not good because God does not will it?*" It is the very same form of syllogism as the conclusive one which follows: *The day exists because the sun shines; therefore, if the sun does not shine, the day does not exist because the sun does not shine.* Some deny this; others explain the inference, noting that we may suppose the sun not to shine on the earth¹

¹ I have here slightly developed what I believe to be Wyclif's meaning. In other places, I have not scrupled to add a comparison or a line of explanation of my own, to render the sense clearer.

because of clouds that arise from the earth itself. In like manner, God's not willing me to do good (if He willed it, I should do good without fail) would proceed from an obstacle on my part — my non-reception of His grace; just as in the case of the sun's rays. What is not received cannot possibly be given. But I am responsible for not receiving it through my fault (p. 107, l. 8 to p. 108, l. 20).

So far, sin and its possibility and origin is explained in the orthodox way, and reconciled with God's First and absolute Causality. But Wyclif closes the chapter with one or two sentences which, even if defensible, have a somewhat strange sound. God cannot but be the First Cause of all; and therefore, though indirectly, of every act, including sin: of the eternal truth that whatever is able to sin may sin at some time or other; of the creation of such peccable beings; and also of the very happening (*contingentiae*, p. 108, l. 33) of the act, which is thus radically dependent upon God. We must, however, remark that there is no attempt to fix the sinfulness of any act upon God. On the contrary, says Wyclif, in so far as God is the author of sin, sin is good. Whatever is true is good; and the possibility of every sin depends upon the everlasting truth already laid down. Thus we have a logical deduction as follows:

A, B, C . . . Z are severally able to sin.

We suppose the *creation of A, B, C . . . Z.*

Also that, in Wyclif's system, *what is able to sin* means *what* (at one time or other, or [in one subject or other]) *will actually commit sin*; for *able to* does not signify mere abstract possibility, but the necessity of a future happening.


Then we necessarily have that *either A, or B, or C . . . or Z will at some instant or other of all time* (either the instant *a*, or *b*, or *c* . . . or *z*) *actually commit sin.*

Here we see, not only that there is no necessity for any of the given singulars taken in particular A, B, C, &c. to sin at all, but also that it is not necessary that the sin should take place at a given instant of time. And as contingency is the opposite of necessity, we now see what Wyclif means when he says that sin is of the extremest contingency (*summa contingentia*); for the truth would be verified if only one of the multitude A, B, C, &c. sinned but once.

Chapter VI professes to deal with those reduplicative propositions in which there is a comparison implied; but it in reality discusses only one of these propositions, viz.: *In so far as two things are like each other, in so far they differ.* Which means that the greater anything is, the smaller it is, for the magnitude of its smallness is so much greater; and so on of all qualities which are comparable with each other. Man of common sense would at the present day no doubt solve the question with a shrug, and they would treat no more respectfully a problem which I myself heard propounded by one of the lights of Philosophy: What becomes of matter in the intervals of sensation? If all men and beasts were sound asleep at the same time, where would the world be? The problem discussed here at length by Wyclif is certainly not more absurd. He gives three different answers which profess to solve the difficulty, and proposes a fourth of his own. The arguments on either side can hardly be of much interest, dealing with such flimsy sophisms that we can hardly conceive their being seriously set forth by any man in his senses; but we must remember that during the Middle Ages the right understanding of the spirit of mathematical science was in its infancy. Two points however deserve to be noticed here.

Why does Wyclif trouble himself so much about this question? Had it been, as it seems, a mere exercise of ingenuity in verbal juggling, he would probably have dismissed it with a few words of contempt, as he dismisses others, by no means more puerile in themselves, calling them Christmas jokes, "more joculantum in Natali" (p. 14, l. 10). But the fact is that, absurd though it may be, it is directed against his system. In Wyclif's theory, the universe consists of a multitude of real universals, shared by their singulars in varying degrees. Not only humanity, amongst the rest, is thus shared, but also merit, demerit, size, and in short everything intelligible almost; certainly every quality which allows of comparison with another. The Universal Man, if I may be allowed a simile, is thus, with regard to its singulars, like a straight line of a certain length, containing a number of points, infinite so far as we know, but fixed and known to God's omniscience alone. These points represent the number of really possible men; and their position on the line, the degree to which Universal Humanity is shared in by each individual man. And, to carry the supposition further, this line, produced further, would represent Animality, which includes Humanity and all its

singulærs, Life, including Animality; Substance, including Life; and the infinite line would stand for Transcendent Being, including *all*. The following figure will sufficiently show my meaning:



Singulare of the Universal Man, or Humanity.

But it is quite clear that this objection goes to make Wyclif contradict himself. In so far as any man shares more perfectly in humanity, in so far he shares in it less perfectly! Of course the arguments are all grossly fallacious; but the subject itself is too important to let them pass without careful refutation.

In the second place, we may notice the tendency of Scholastic philosophy to apply the mathematical method to metaphysical reasoning. We have seen cases somewhat similar to this in *Logica* before; but nowhere does Wyclif mark it so strongly as here. He even goes the length of supposing numbers set down to denote the entitative perfections of diverse species (pp. 119, 120) and points out the fallacy of reasoning upon such numbers, if they do not stand for homologous things — I had almost said, quantities: for he evidently has in his mind the intensity of essential perfection, when he numbers them thus. This seems to have been a tendency more or less to be found in philosophers of all ages, who could not help admiring the fruitful accuracy of the mathematical method, and contrasting it with the barren vagueness of their own speculations. Not to speak of the ancients, of the school of Pythagoras, and of several curious passages in Plato and Aristotle, we find a good many traces of this spirit in the works of modern philosophers. Spinoza and Wolff attempted to reduce two very different systems of philosophy to a series of theorems, deduced one from the other, like those of Euclid. At the present day, De Morgan, Boole and

Jevons have in turn endeavoured to adapt Algebra to Logic or Logic to Algebra; whilst Abbé Gratry, in France, has tried to prove God and the Creation by the interpretation of certain mathematical formulae. And, to restrict myself to Mediaeval Scholasticism, we by no means find Wyclif alone in his way of looking at ideas — or rather at their universal objects — as though they were measurable things. Here I must regret not having taken note, in times gone by, of several passages of St. Thomas, in which he distinctly speaks, for instance, of the *distance* between the most perfect brute and man as greater than that between the former and a plant. Here we see an explicit comparison between two entitative differences. There are also in his works certain arguments which, though referring to pure abstractions, might very well be represented by an algebraical equation, if we admitted the assumption already mentioned. I equally regret not being able now to find the passages I refer to; but life would be too short to look through the multitudinous folios of the Angelic Doctor; I had to glance here and there, where I thought I had most chance to find them. One argument, I remember well, struck me as being based on the implicit assumption that “when two variable quantities (or objects of ideas) are always equal to each other as they approach the constants by which they are respectively limited, those constants are also equal to each other”. And we may fairly believe that if, in the days of Schoolmen, mathematics had attained the high degree of development at which they stand now, there would have been wrought a complete transformation of Metaphysics; not perhaps to its disadvantage.

Setting aside the detailed examination of the debate, as useless and uninteresting to us, we may however notice by the way what Wyclif, in his answer to the fourth objection, remarks concerning goodness (p. 122 to and of chapter). Utility has no intrinsic element of goodness; it is good only extrinsically, and varies according to the demand for the thing that is useful. But reversely, whatever possesses intrinsic goodness possesses utility too; so does also that which is bad in itself; for even sin has its use in the world. Intrinsical goodness is divided into two species: that which is physically and that which is morally good. The latter is always useful, at least to some extent; virtue never can be badly employed; yet it may at times be less useful than what is merely extrinsically good. The same division of evil must be made; it is either

merely disadvantageous, or physically or morally bad. God is in no wise evil; He is of use to all; even his punishments are not injurious. Nor can he commit moral evil. Wyclif here (p. 124, l. 34 to p. 125, l. 15) corrects or qualifies what he said at the close of the foregoing chapter. God cannot make a man to sin; but when He permits evil, He gives it an element of goodness by the very fact. A man sins; therefore it is true (and consequently good) that he sins: God makes the inference, but does not posit the premiss. Good to all (p. 125, l. 15—35), He is infinitely good in Himself, and finitely so to His creatures. Many things that we call evil are in reality good; as, for instance, punishments and misfortunes (p. 126, l. 15—20); and in many cases we mistake the value of things, which varies according to supply and demand (l. 22—25). These never can be exactly regulated. Even should the variation in price not spring from the wickedness of men, it is impossible to fix prices exactly. We must leave that to nature; the real worth of anything is its utility in the universe.—This is a clear and far-seeing condemnation of the many attempts to fix or keep up prices which were so common during the Middle Ages, and are far from abandoned even at the present day. In these few sentences we find Free Trade in its germ.

'Hindrance' and 'obstacle' generally mean the reverse of utility; but in a certain sense they may not be evils. If, for instance, God is said to hinder any one from attaining eternal bliss, it is in order to work out His plan of the world, in which predestination plays a principal part. The natural tendency of all things is to sink to the centre; but some must be impeded in their descent, or the order of the universe would perish. Wyclif, however, speaks very guardedly here (*forte . . . difficultates plurimae*, p. 128, l. 34—36) and brings the chapter to a close without going into any details on this subject.

Chapter VII. Here our author, availing himself of comparative propositions, his nominal subject-matter, deals *ex professo* with the question whether there is for every faculty, or active power, a maximum and a minimum of intensity beyond which it cannot go either way. Of course he asserts that there is, and in his answer to the objections, he discusses various and very diverse questions, including God's omnipotence, the limits to human strength, size, and knowledge, the beatific vision, and our natural faculty of sight.

The problem is ushered in according to Wyclif's usual fashion; but it is not dragged in, as occurs in too many cases. Comparative propositions easily lead to the question whether, wherever there is a *more* and a *less*, there is not also a *most* and a *least*, not only existing (which is generally allowed) but even possible (p. 129; p. 130, l. 1—15). As preliminaries to the solution, several principles are laid down concerning God's power and His concourse in every act of His creatures. All things proceed from God, and every act of every creature requires an accompanying act of the Creator, without which that act could not possibly take place. There is also in Him a distinct and special power for every being, which, when that being has perished, exists no longer; but this takes away nothing from God's perfection, for it would imply absurdity that He could act with that which does not exist (pp. 130—132, l. 30). This power of concourse is a relation in God, but a purely logical one (p. 132, l. 30 to p. 133, l. 11). If there is no maximum intensity of an act, God cannot elicit it; and if there is, as we assert, such a maximum, His power itself cannot go beyond it (p. 133, l. 11—25). As God *could* do, absolutely speaking, things which *cannot* really be done, Wyclif objects to the theory which distinguishes His absolute from His ordinary power; the former cannot be *exercised* alone, and therefore is inadmissible. In any case, every being has power to act only so far as it is possible for God to coact with it (p. 133, l. 25 to p. 135, l. 10).

Every finite power or active faculty must have a maximum of activity, beyond which it cannot go. Being finite, it is limited, and the very idea of limit implies a maximum (p. 135, l. 21 to end). We may suppose it to be variable, increasing uniformly during a certain time; it then will become successively twice, three times, &c., as great as it was at first: that is, its limit of maximum performance lies twice, &c., as far as before; so, even in this case, it still has its limit (p. 136, l. 16 to end). The modern mathematical notion of a limit — that which a variable quantity may approach indefinitely, but never reach — finds scant favour with Wyclif. What cannot be done is not the limit of what can. A given weight — say, a stone — that I am unable to carry is not the limit of my strength; unless indeed it be the least weight that I cannot carry, and that is an assumption impossible to prove (p. 138, l. 7—23).

Objections. 1. An army that can defeat a great power can defeat any smaller one; an army that can be defeated by a small power will

be defeated by any greater force. This is the difference between active and passive power. Now, in the sense pointed out, either of these powers is without limit. — Wyclif replies that, in the sense given, passive power is a mere imperfection. If understood to mean receptivity of forms (as in the case of matter, primordial or other) without doubt there is a limit to that receptivity. Sense-impressions have likewise their limits, and produce a wrong judgment when the senses are too strongly stimulated in one particular way. Thence it is clear that our intellect, which perceives all things, cannot perceive them by means of any bodily organ; and also that there is a maximum of receptivity for each of our senses. Thus, whether active or passive, the power at work is in every case a form; and this form cannot be indefinitely perfect (p. 138, l. 23—30; p. 140, l. 23 to p. 142, l. 35).

2. God's power would be restricted by this theory; for then, even by a miracle, He could not make any creature go beyond the maximum of its power (p. 138, l. 30—38). — *Answer.* It is one thing to know that there are limits even to miraculous assistance, and another to know what those limits are. God certainly could not, even by a miracle, make a stone think. His assistance is necessary in every act, and miraculous assistance only displaces the limit, but does not destroy it (p. 142, l. 36 to p. 143, l. 32). Is there such a thing as the most rapid movement possible? Wyclif asserts that there is. As time is made up of indivisible instants, so movement also consists of indivisible degrees of velocity, and the most rapid movement possible is that which increases at every instant by one such indivisible degree. This is however, even from Wyclif's point of view, not the most rapid, but the most rapidly increasing motion possible; and surely we may suppose that at every instant the movement might increase by *two* degrees of velocity. That would certainly give us a more rapid motion: but the passage is not very clear, and I am not quite sure I have understood it rightly. — As for infinitely rapid movement, Wyclif at once sets it down either as impossible (as in the hypothetical case given by Aristotle, of movement *in vacuo*; for a vacuum is an absurdity) or else as not being properly a quantity. Here our author probably alludes to the instantaneous nature of the movement of light, a doctrine universally believed before the discovery of the telescope had rendered possible the celebrated observations on the eclipses of Jupiter's

satellites (potest . . . aliquid subito moveri et multiplicari per quotlibet loca (p. 144, l. 2—4).¹ We have to consider, not what assistance God could absolutely give to His creatures, but what He gives them naturally and according to His Divine plan. To this there must be a maximum limit; it is that of the creature's ability to act with such assistance (p. 145, l. 13 to p. 146, l. 12).

Can God create worlds indefinitely? If He could, then we are compelled to posit an infinite and absurd vacuum beyond our world. These worlds, however multiplied we may conceive them to be, would form a body infinitely small in comparison with the enormous vacuum surrounding it. We should then find one infinite magnitude to be greater than another: which is a flat absurdity. This difficulty is absolutely unanswerable. An endless vacuum entails quite as many absurdities as the hypothesis of a body infinitely great. Yet God, though thus seemingly limited in power, remains Almighty, for His power is limited only by Himself. He eternally produces an infinitely perfect act (the Word); and above all, creation implies omnipotence. Yet creation could not take place but at a certain fixed point of duration; nor could the world be larger or smaller than it is. Some, refusing to admit these limitations, lay down as a principle that God's omnipotence extends to everything that we are able to maintain that He can do; and that He can thus grant an indefinite amount of assistance to any created faculty. This, as Wyclif points out, is a grossly unfair method of reasoning. He does not however deny that God *could* render such assistance, *if* He chose; but says that, not choosing, He cannot (pp. 146—152).

3. Supposing that a given power A can sustain a weight B during a certain time C, this being the maximum which it can bear, it could evidently bear a heavier weight for a shorter time; again, during this

¹ It is curious to note with what absolute certitude one of the greatest thinkers of old sets aside the true explanation of what light is, while he gets to the right, though vague, conclusion 'that it is not a body'. "Si lumen esset corpus, illuminatio esset motus localis corporis. Nullus autem motus localis corporis potest esse in instanti: quia omne quod movetur localiter, necesse est quod prius perveniat ad medium magnitudinis quam ad extremum. Illuminatio autem fit in instanti; *nec potest dici quod fiat in tempore imperceptibili*. Quia in parvo spatio posset tempus latere, in magno autem non posset. Statim enim cum sol est in puncto horizontis, illuminatur totum hemisphaerium usque ad punctum oppositum." (St. Thomas, Sum. Th. 1^a Pars, qu. LXVII, art. 2.)

shorter time (C') a smaller power, A', would be able to bear this same weight B; this, in the opinion of the adversaries, would prove that no power has a special maximum of its own (p. 138, l. 38 to p. 139, l. 9). Wyclif answers here at great length (pp. 152—162), giving many different senses of the word 'difficulty'; but we need not go into them. The gist of his reply (p. 159, l. 4—10) is that the notion of a maximum must here be considered with regard to the time, and not apart. We may, however, in this long and discursive reply, note several striking sentences, some paradoxical, some quaint, and some proving a considerable knowledge of mechanics, as then known. "Of all difficult things — i. e. of those which deteriorate the agent that does them — mortal sin is the most difficult (p. 155, l. 26, 27)." "In the sense of 'something to be mastered', the universe is a difficulty to God Himself (p. 156, l. 20—25)." "Without God's aid we should find it as difficult to move a bean as to make a world (p. 157, l. 29—31)." "In the act of sustaining, much depends on the manner of application of the weight, An egg will not be crushed even by a considerable force; a sail will bear up against a strong wind; and experiments with levers prove this abundantly and in a marvellous way (multa . . . mirabilia facere, p. 160, l. 25—34)." "The least weight a man cannot sustain is the greatest that he can (p. 160, l. 34—37)." "Weight implies distance from the centre, or from the proper sphere of each element; water in its own sphere has no weight, as divers tell us, and I suppose that it is the same for the earth too (p. 161, l. 14—16)."

4. The biggest or the smallest man possible is impossible. If the former got a bump (*tunctionem*), he would then be too big to exist. If the latter lost a hair (*quamlibet ablationem partis superfluae*), he would be too small. — This humorous argument is answered on p. 167 (l. 34 & seq.) where it is pointed out that, though the greatest possible giant could not assimilate any more food, so long as his body remained of that size, a swelling would not render his organism, as a living body, any the larger. And a similar train of reasoning would apply to the smallest dwarf. But before this reply, we come to a very interesting digression (pp. 162—166). Wyclif, admitting a minimum of size for all bodily substances, implicitly asserts the existence of atoms from the very outset (*minima naturalia*; p. 162, l. 11); and a few pages later, he openly gives them their right name (*athomorum* p. 166, l. 32). It is too ge-

nerally believed that Schoolmen denied the existence of atoms. It would be more correct to say that they passed them over. They of course combated the systems of Democritus and Epicurus; and, finding that the system of matter and form sufficed to explain in metaphysical terms all that was then known of natural phenomena, they generally did not trouble themselves to enquire if atoms were or were not true in any other sense. St. Thomas, however, certainly says that there is and must be a limit to the divisibility of any corporeal substance; but he goes no farther.¹ Wyclif, with his principle that a limit not reached is not a limit, cannot help admitting atoms (p. 163, l. 13—22). He grants, in answer to objections made, that the combination or decomposition of two atoms is instantaneous; but this does not prevent the chemical change of the whole from taking up a certain time (p. 163, l. 23—31; p. 164, l. 13—31). To the well-known difficulty, urged even in our days by Ultra-Thomists against such Neo-Scholastics as believe in a 'minimum naturale', viz., that such a theory would reduce compound bodies to mere aggregates, similar to so many heaps of sand, he denies the conclusion in the case of organic bodies, which have a supervening form that gives unity to the whole; but whether homogeneous inanimate substances are mere aggregates is, he says, a doubtful point (p. 163, l. 31—41; p. 164, l. 31 to p. 165, l. 37). Division is favourable to chemical change; and on that account alchemists calcine metals, to give them the more perfect forms (v. g. that of gold, or 'aureity'). But, as this calcination does not reduce the metals to their ultimate parts, the successful result of their experiments is ever a matter of chance. — We have thus: 1st, the elementary forms in the atoms, and 2nd, those of the compound: simple in themselves, these forms are to a certain degree extended in the bodies of the lower animals, which accounts for their continuing to live, although divided into several parts. As for monsters with double organs, they are properly two animals joined in one, and possess two forms, or vital principles (p. 165, l. 37 to p. 167, l. 34).

5. It is objected that, at least in the sphere of learning and knowledge, there can be no limit; for the more we know, the more able we

¹ "Quod etiam dicunt . . . quod corpus est in infinitum divisibile, vanum est. Non enim corpus naturale in infinitum dividitur, sed usque ad certum terminum." (Sum. Theol. 1^a Pars, qu. LXVIII, art. 2.)

become to increase our knowledge. Nor can there be any limit to the raising of a pile indefinitely high (p. 139, l. 19—30). — All this is absolutely denied. We know by faith that the Saints in Heaven do really attain their maximum limit of possible knowledge by means of the beatific vision of God. The question *how* this can be — a favourite one both with Mediaeval and with modern Scholastics — is discussed at some length. The blessed are not infinitely more perfect than we; for their knowledge is an accidental privilege, not an essential attribute. Wyclif inclines to think that they see all things in God; but, however this may be, the essence of felicity consists in the sight of God Himself; even were they ignorant of something, they would none the less be perfectly happy (p. 168, l. 10 to p. 174, l. 18). As to the raising of a pile indefinitely high, of course the higher it went, the more difficult it would be to raise it any further; and there would come a point at which it would exhaust all the powers of the whole human race to get even one more stone to the summit. Thus, Nature imposes a limit to men in all things; excessive increase of anything, for instance, of *Church ceremonies and possessions*, is hurtful. This is a seed which at a later period developed into an enormous tree (p. 174, l. 33 to p. 175, l. 22).

6. A minimum of visibility is absurd. Seeing a surface, we see the whole of it, and therefore we confusedly see all its parts, even to the infinitely small. — But Wyclif posits as an evident principle that whatever is seen confusedly might, under other circumstances, be distinctly seen. This takes all the force out of the objection. A mathematical point cannot be seen distinctly under *any* circumstances; for the smallest thing visible must be the base of a pyramid having its apex in the eye. The chapter comes to a close with some details on the structure and organism of the eye, which may be curious as representing the state of optical science in those days; but I am not in a position to discuss them thoroughly; scarcely at all. As Wyclif avowedly takes most of what he says from the works, not only of Alhazen, but also of the famous Vitellio (Ciolek) of Cracow, one of the most celebrated opticians in the Middle Ages, I should have liked to compare his anatomical description with the summary given by our author. Unfortunately, the work in question was not in the Jagellonian Library when I asked for it, having been lent out at some distance from Cracow; but the English

student will no doubt find Vitellio's works in any great library.— One of Wyclif's mistakes struck me. He denies that the visual rays cross each other in the centre of the eye. If they did, he says, *they would form an inverted image!* This shows how little philosophers of that time cared for experimental tests; for nothing would have been easier, even then, than to examine the image formed and find out that it really was inverted (p. 175, l. 22 to end of ch. VII).

Chapter VIII. Of Conditional Propositions. Wyclif deals rather more at length with them than with the others; but he soon turns away to the problem of individuation, and thence to the question of the so-called *Insolubles*.

Logicians generally hold that such a proposition as, *If A is B, C is D*, does not posit the existence of anything, but merely affirms a connection between two propositions (p. 186, l. 14—16). Wyclif denies this rule, though granting that it possesses an element of truth (l. 23—31). Every proposition of this kind is either necessary or impossible. If necessary, its truth implies God's existence, on whom all truth depends; if impossible, it implicitly denies that He exists. Here occur some details about necessary truth. A truth may be at different times both true and false; and even at the time when it is false, its *having been true* is an eternal truth. The signification of the present may be extended to the past and the future. A thing true in the abstract may be untrue at a certain time and imply false inferences. If I move my hand, I produce a truth, new as to its present actuality, false in the past and the future, and again everlasting truth in an abstract present (p 188, 189, l. 1—16).

But, what individualizes such propositions as *A will be, was, can be, &c.*? That is, what makes one among such propositions uttered in various circumstances to be true, whilst another of exactly the same form is false? It is the difference of time, say some. What is eternal in itself has a particular (not abstract, but individual) mode of being in time; and it changes accordingly (p. 189, l. 16 to p. 190, l. 3). But if so, this would infer a continual change in truth; nothing would remain the same. For time is constantly changing; no one temporal truth could hold good for more than one instant. And on the other hand, everything would be everlasting truth: before *I am* born, and for ever, *I am not-born*; therefore it is everlasting truth that *I am*. And the same

conclusion might be drawn from every proposition (p. 190, l. 4—30). Wyclif's opinion is that individuation itself proceeds only from the cause of each individual, and finally from God; but that we know the difference between two individuals by their difference in time. Suppose, for instance, that two sparks exactly alike are struck from a flint successively, we know their difference because one was struck before the other (p. 190, l. 30 to p. 191, l. 7). But even God Himself cannot create the same thing twice over; nor, by the same reason, can anything be annihilated (*et per idem videtur nihil posse annihilari*, p. 192, l. 8, 9). Here is the first hesitating assertion of what was later to become so firm a doctrine, resulting in a new theory of the Eucharist.

After this, Wyclif comes to the grand question concerning certain propositions called *Insolubles*, on account of the great difficulty which their solution offered to logicians. They may in general be put under the form of a conditional, as follows: *If the present proposition be true, A is not A.* This therefore is the best place to deal with them. Before succinctly giving Wyclif's solution, it may be interesting to state various forms of so-called insolubles, and the answer which I fancy a modern logician would give, if he troubled himself to find any solution at all.

If the present proposition be true, A is not A. Grant that this is exact: an absurdity follows. Deny it, and you have another: *It is false that, even if the present proposition be true, A is not A.* We see that a mere denial of the nexus lands us in a contradiction connected with the antecedent; whereas its admission grants the contradiction which its consequent contains. This dialectical puzzle, as is well known, dates from very early times. In the days of the Greek sophists it took a form somewhat like this: A certain philosopher said that all Cretans were liars; but he was a Cretan himself: did he lie, or did he not lie? If he lied, he spoke the truth; and if he spoke the truth, he lied. To say that a liar may speak the truth sometimes does but elude the difficulty: for he might have said: "All Cretans *always lie.*" and added the words "myself included", to exclude the possibility of an exception being made in his favour.

This may be expressed much more briefly. Suppose a piece of paper, with nothing written on it but: *What is written here is false.* This proposition, admitted as true, denies its own meaning; denied as

false, it proves itself to be true; and consequently false; and so on for ever. How shall we get out of this?

To make the case plainer, by contrasting it with one somewhat similar, suppose it is said: *No proposition is true.* If granted, the proposition itself is not true; and being false, some propositions must be true. Yes, but if denied, no difficulty follows. This is simply an absurdity akin to the Sceptical position: *It is indubitable that every proposition is doubtful.* It is only on one side that such utterances resemble insolubles: the essence of the latter consists in their being equally impossible to deny or to affirm.

Does a man who swears that he is committing perjury forswear himself or not? Not unless he speaks the truth; and if he is speaking the truth, how can what he says be perjury? Can any one believe that he is mistaken in that very belief of his mistake?

The puzzle seems still more intricate when a decision has, one way or the other, to be taken in consequence. A certain Greek rhetorician taught his art to a young man. Half his fee was paid down in advance; the other half was to be paid when, and only when, he gained his first suit. Time went by, and the young student, having ended his course of Rhetorique, and not appearing to plead, was called before the judges by his teacher. "If," said the latter, "you win this suit, you must pay me according to our contract; if you lose it, the sentence itself compels you to pay me." The pupil retorted: "If I lose, our agreement sets me free; if I win, I shall be free by the decision of the Court."

Or the following: A tyrant sets men at a bridge which is his property, with the order to ask every passenger whether he will pass or no, and allow only those to pass who answer truly. If he says: "I shall pass over," he can either be allowed to pass, or be turned back, and proved thus to have told an untruth; but what of the man who says: "I shall not pass?" If they turn him back, he has spoken the truth, and they fail in their duty; if they make him pass, they fail equally, for he has uttered a falsehood.

One last instance. A man has two slaves A and B. He decides to free them both, under the following conditions: A is to be free, if the first man he meets is a slave; B is to be free only if the first he meets is a free man. Now it so happens that A and B meet each other before

anybody else. A, meeting B who is a slave, is free that very instant; therefore B is also free, meeting a free man; therefore A is also a slave. And so on.

Debates on such questions have practically been dead for many centuries; they are considered as mere useless subtleties. And to speak quite frankly on this matter, they really seem ridiculous enough, even to a man pretty well versed in scholastic lore. But the greater the temptation for men of culture to endorse the sweeping judgments of that proverbially narrow-minded individual — the man in the street — the more they ought to strive against it. They well know that most of the present philosophical debates, though not apparently now so ridiculous, because fashionable, will appear so in the course of a few hundred years. All that we can say of them with certitude is that they serve to sharpen the wits by going as deep down into the principles of things and the laws of thought as it is possible to go. If these old world discussions then served the same purpose, they are worth studying at least from a historical point of view. And at any rate, the reader will perhaps feel some interest in the solution to these puzzles, given from what I should conceive to be the modern standpoint. I say, *I should conceive*; for I have been able to find nothing directly referring to them in any modern work of Logic, not even in the Neo-Scholastic text books of Liberatore and Tongiorgi, nor in that of the Thomist Goudin who, in the 17th century, argued with overwhelming violence to prove the immobility of the earth.

We should, I fancy, make but short work of all such propositions. The main point of the difficulty is that every proposition must be either true or false; the subject affirming of the predicate either the thing that is or the thing that is not. Now, taking any one of these propositions, we are compelled by overpowering evidence to admit that it is impossible to call them either true or false. Well then, what follows? Why, *that they are not propositions!*¹ They are mere strings of unmeaning

¹ A Scholastic friend to whom I showed this said to me: "What would you answer to *What is written here is a proposition?* It could be admitted without danger; and if you say that it is not, then by affirming its contrary, you admit that it has meaning." This was subtle. I answered that it could be admitted without danger, but that, belonging to the same class of sentences, it had logically to be not denied, but set aside. It chances that by thus ignoring, I apparently denied it;

words having the looks of propositions, but not their nature. They are not absurd merely; an absurdity is not quite unmeaning; *This square is round*, clearly means an impossibility, and its denial is evidently true. Not incoherent: *The number three is fragrant*, does not even seem to mean anything but the raving of a lunatic, which no one cares to deny. Not mere gibberish: *Blitri is Blathro* may be equally well denied or affirmed, nobody knowing what they are. The so-called propositions in question are in reality a peculiar class of pseudo-propositions: words which appear to have a meaning, but which falsify both themselves and their contradictories. And this, I think, would be quite enough to satisfy modern students of logic.

The idea of so simple and easy a solution did not, it would seem, strike any of Wyclif's contemporaries; and he himself, though coming nearest to it in my opinion, does not quite hit the mark. Some of them affirmed that such propositions were neither false nor true (p. 194, l. 24—37). Some, that they were both true and false (p. 194, l. 38 to p. 195, l. 14). Others, that they were in reality exceptive propositions, as no proposition can include itself in its own meaning (p. 195, l. 14 to p. 196, l. 20). Some said that the words implied contradiction if understood as they were, but they did not explain how they were to be understood otherwise (p. 196, l. 20 to p. 197, l. 20). And others again denied that such words as *proposition*, *true*, *false*, &c., could receive universal extension (p. 197, l. 20 to p. 199, l. 9). Several other opinions are enumerated besides (pp. 199—203). Wyclif taking the material or grammatical side of the definition of a proposition, saw that both subject and predicate had meaning apart, and that they were joined by a copula; he naturally could not see his way to denying that in such cases there was no proposition. But then, how could it be one, if it had no meaning, if it neither affirmed nor denied anything? Wyclif's answer (p. 203 to end of work), comes to pretty nearly the same as the one I have given above. It is *not a proposition* in the ordinary sense of the word, for, in this ordinary sense, it has absolutely no meaning. But it exists. Whatever exists, means its own existence. In that sense, every such proposition is

but I do not really. "What is written here is not a proposition" *in my mouth* does not contradict "What is written here is a proposition" *on the paper*, any more than *I am a man* spoken by one person is contradicted by *I am not a man*, spoken by another. (See Wyclif's acute remarks on this subject, pp. 240 and 241 to l. 11.)

true; true, because it is an existing thing. When we inquire if it has any truth beyond this, we are forced to reply in the negative. A proposition reflected, so to speak, back upon itself, can mean nothing but itself; and in so far as it seems to mean something else, it is false. Thus every such proposition is both true and false, though in different ways (p. 205, l. 35, 36). In the case of the tyrant and his bridge, Wyclif cuts the Gordian knot by shortly stating that such a case would never happen; and that if it did, the man should be made to pass over (no doubt because in either case the attendants would fail to do their duty, and it mattered not what they did). As for the two slaves, mentioned above, it is doubtful whether they have not fulfilled the conditions of freedom imposed by their master; and as the law is in favour of liberty (*eo quod jura faveant libertati*) they ought both to be set free (p. 208, l. 8 to p. 209, l. 24).

A little further, Wyclif explains his theory more clearly still. Let *C* stand for the proposition: *The meaning of C is true*. This is true in the sense that *C* exists. True also, in that it means something, viz., *itself*. But false, if it be taken to mean anything further (p. 216, l. 14 to p. 219, l. 5). Here it is clear that Wyclif, saying that such a proposition is unmeaning in the third sense, says what amounts to affirming that it is no proposition at all, as we understand the word nowadays. For him, the word has a far wider extension. Every *thing* is a proposition (Log. vol. I. p. 15, l. 12—22), because it signifies itself, and makes itself known; he cannot therefore refuse to call an ‘insoluble’ by that name. But what he says, stripped of the numerous intricacies and subtleties which render this part of his work very difficult to understand, comes, I think, to the same.

One word more before we conclude. It is easy to be seen, from many different answers given to this question, that at Wyclif’s time it was considered to be a very important and difficult problem; and also that Wyclif, having laboured hard, and in the main successfully, to solve it, is entitled to the just praise which he felt that he deserved. His closing words, both modest and dignified, may be quoted here.

“This matter has given me more trouble and occupied me for a longer space of time than any other part of Logic. Nor do I doubt that every one of the authors of the six above-mentioned theories has also bestowed much care on the truths which they have discovered relative

to this subject. Yet little praise should be given to such as find out these truths; for it is certain that, both on account of the intelligible nature of truth (which manifests itself to whoever seeks it) and by the motion of Him Who is the First Truth teaching us, every one finds out at last, by dint of scrutiny, certain truths of which he was formerly ignorant. Therefore may full praise be given to the Lord of Truth!"

At this point the volume now edited comes to a close. It is, so far as I have been able to calculate, about the middle of the third treatise. Of the seven sorts of hypothetical propositions, five have already been dealt with; in the next volume, local and temporal propositions are alone discussed, but at such great length that they might each be separately considered as a treatise; and indeed, according to the indications given by the catalogues, many of Wyclif's adherents seem to have considered them as such. The question *De Insolubilibus* was also copied out and studied apart.

TRACTATUS TERCIUS.

CAPITULUM PRIMUM.

B 33^a Sequitur de speciebus ypoteticarum, ut prius promiseram, in isto tractatu tertio pertractandum. Et primo supponatur VII esse species ypothetice, scilicet tres cum notis coniungendi mere quodammodo syncategoricis: ut copulativam, disiunctivam, et condicionalem; et quatuor cum notis coniungendi quodammodo kategoricis: ut causalem, comparativam, localem et temporalem.

10 Et potest sufficiencia numeri istarum specierum sic convinci: diversitas specierum ypoteticarum capienda est secundum diversitatem modi significandi veritates diversas significabiles per easdem. Sed VII sunt species huiusmodi ypoteticarum. Maior patet ex hoc, quia 15 species ypoteticarum vel sunt diversificande solum ex diversitate signorum, vel solum ex diversitate signatorum, vel solum ex diversitate modi significandi, vel mixtim. Duo prima non sunt danda: ergo, relinquuntur alterum posteriorum; sed non est possibile modum diversificari, 20 nisi presupposita diversitate significabilis. Ergo relinquuntur 4^m membrum. Et minor patet ex hoc quod omne verum primarie significabile per ypoteticam est veritas 2^m aliquam habitudinem ex veritatibus aggregata, vel equivalenter; sed tantum VII sunt species talium 25 habitudinum: ergo, tantum VII sunt species ypoteticarum. Minor patet ex hoc quod, posita prima veritate (que est *deum esse*) consequitur coniunctione vel copulacione prime veritatis causate (que est *ens esse*); et istis positis, sequitur non solum quod deus est, vel ens est in 30 communi, sed quod est dare veritates disiunctas vel

Of hypothetical propositions; they are seven in number, three with syncategorical signs: copulatives, disjunctives, and conditionals; and four with categorical signs: causals, comparatives, locals, and temporals. There are so many, and no more; for there are only seven modes of hypothetically expressing truth. The signs alone are not sufficient to diversify them, nor the truths signified, nor the modes alone; so it must be the modes taken with those truths. And these together are seven in number; copulative, from the union of the two primordial truths: the existence of God

1. Cap. deest MS. 2. Initial S in red ink MS. 20. dm^{te} sig't B.

and of caused differentes. Et 2^m talem coniunctionem vel disiunctionem Being; ^a sunt copulativa et disiunctiva exemplate, significando disjunctive inferred from these by their difference; istis veritatibus inmediate sequitur quod, quia deus est, causal, as Being exists because of God's existence; deum esse quam ens causatum esse; et sic, habendo which, considered together, imply alias species hypothetice: scilicet, causalem et comparativa; tivam.

and conditional, local and temporal, because God has power to produce if, when and where He chooses. And all other hypothetical relations can be reduced to one of these.

Quibus 4 habitis, manifestum est sequi, *deum posse 10 producere causatum si wult, quando wult, et ubi wult;* et sic habemus tres alias habitudines: scilicet condicionalem, localem et temporalem. Nec est possibile invenire aliquam habitudinem hypothetice pertinenter quin sit aliqua istarum vel ad talem reducibilis. Ideo sequitur 15 quod sub septenario convenit ponere species hypothetice. Omnis autem hypothetica est copulativa, disiunctiva, causalis, comparativa, condicionalis, localis, vel temporalis. |

B 33^b

Objections.

1. Many hypothetical propositions are false; truth has, therefore, nothing to do with their classification, but form alone.

The first truth: God exists, can be expressed by all the different forms of propositions; and here clearly only the form makes them differ.

2. And the stated order of dependency between them does not exist; for the principle of identity can be expressed just as well under any other form.

Sed contra ista sic instatur: Multe sunt hypothetice 20 que significant falsitates: ergo, veritates non sunt cause hypotheticarum specierum, sed solum modi significandi; et cum alium modum significandi in specie habet signum unius speciei, et alium, signum alterius speciei, sequitur quod secundum naturam et speciem signorum 25 sunt species hypotheticarum. Confirmatur per hoc quod eadem veritas simplicissima est significabilis quacunque specie hypothetice, ut patet hic: *deus est et deus est; deus est vel deus est; quia deus est, est ita bonus sicut est; deus est si est, ubi est, et dum est.* In quibus VII 30 exemplis patet quodlibet illorum precise primarie significare illud quod significat hec categorica, *deus est.* Ex quo videtur relinqu quod, non a significatis suis, sed a signis parcialibus, specificantur hypothetice.

Item, quo ad veritates numerales, patet quod non 35 sit ordo inter illas, ut signatus est, quia eque primo est veritas disiunctiva, condicionalis (et sic de ceteris propter ordinem talium veritatum est ordo et numerus 40 specierum hypotheticarum. Assumptum patet per hoc assumptum B.

2. ex te B.
talium twice B.
assumptum B.

10. mai^a B.
32. circa causata (?) pro categorica.

29. quia deus est ita B.
30. ordinem
40. am pro

quod prima omnium veritatum causatarum est nichil simul esse et non esse; et illa est necessario; vel veritas disiunctiva, et eque primo cum illa sunt ille veritates: si aliquid est, aliquid est, aliquid est dum aliquid est, 5 quia deus est aliquid est, aliquid potest esse ubi aliquid potest esse, deus potest esse melior creatura. Ymmo in eadem specie veritatum est dare infinitas species eque primo, ut patet de veritatibus condicionalium et causalium. Ymmo, si ponatur aliqua prima veritas, ab illa 10 procederet veritas posterior per viam causacionis; et sic, arte imitante naturam, foret talis prima species hypothetice. Ymmo disiunctiva precederet copulativam.

Item est dare multas alias species ad modum coniunctionum copulancium kathegoricas ad invicem, 15 preter illas VII; ergo, cum ab illis sorciuntur hypothetice suas species, sequitur plures esse species hypotheticarum quam VII numeratas. Et idem videtur de hypotheticis negativis oppositis affirmativis, que videntur esse disparium specierum valde ab illis, cum regule que deserviunt ad 20 cognoscendum veritates hypothetice affirmative non docent cognoscere veritatem negative. Et consimilis est difficultas in commixtione hypotheticarum ad invicem, ut, miscendo disiunctiva cum rationali vel aliter quomodo- 25 cunque. Non enim videtur racio quare talis proposicio foret unius speciei quin per idem foret mixtim alterius speciei; quia prioritas vel posterioritas signi contingentis non facit ad hoc, ut post probabitur. Et ex commixtionibus VII specierum foret secundaria species simplicis mixtionis, 30 et duarum ad invicem. | Et conformis est difficultas B 34^a de qualitate et quantitate hypotheticarum.

Ad istud dicitur quod non repugnat alias species hypothetice sub istas contineri, cum iste non sunt species specialissime; sed tales VII species hypothetice sunt ponende, ad quas omnes alie habent reduci; et hoc sufficit pro intento. Nec moveret racio facta purum logicum ad inevitabiliter asserendum conclusionem; sed pocius diceret quod est ex voluntaria ordinacione, sine causa ulterius querenda, quod sunt VII species hypothetice.

And in these different kinds there are infinite kinds (as in conditional and causal propositions) which are equally primitive.

If any species of proposition were to be put first, it should be the causal species; and the disjunctive should precede the copulative.

3. Besides, there are many other species, according to the conjunctions employed; negative hypotheticals, requiring other rules to prove them, cannot be classed with their affirmatives; and hypotheticals can be combined together, forming new kinds. Their quality and quantity give rise to like difficulties.

General answer:

These seven are not particular species, and, therefore, they may contain other kinds, but they are all reducible to these.

The reason why there are seven classes

23. ^{**} voli pro vel B. 28. ^{***} pro secundaria B. 35. pur⁹ pro purum B.

23. *Racionalis* seems to mean two propositions united by the particle *ergo*; but Wyclif uses the word sometimes for causal, sometimes for conditional propositions. See p. 8, l. 38.

need not be sought; they are made arbitrarily by man, but their order is based on the nature of things.

We deny the conclusion of the first argument: i. e. that the signs alone can serve to classify propositions.

1. We must remark that the words *truth* and *falsehood* have various significations. They may mean respectively the same as *being* and *non-entity*, or more properly, falsity signifies truth negatively, having no meaning by itself.

They, however, add to this meaning a relation with the tense of the verb employed: *I said the truth*: i. e. *I said something that then was*.

Again, *false* is sometimes part of a modal proposition; as: *It is false that . . .*. Sometimes it means the defect of correspondence between the sign and the thing signified.

Sed certum tamen est quod non est ordinatum ab homine, quod sit naturaliter exemplatum, et a ratione priori, ordinacione hominis, causatum; quia aliter non est ordinacio, sed deordinacio; nisi illud quod promulgat prius naturaliter esset naturale. 5

Ad primum argumentum negatur consequentia, quia quamvis prima pars conclusionis sit particularis negativa vera, alia tamen est pars exceptiva falsa, cum modi significandi signorum auditibilium sunt diversi in specie a modis significandi visibilium, et visibilia diversa in specie habent naturales modos significandi diversos in specie; et totum hoc est impertinens diversitati speciei hypothetice.

Sed pro ulteriori responsione sunt 3^a notanda, primo quod isti termini, *falsum*, et *falsitas*, sunt equivoce; 15 sicut *verum* et *veritas*. Quandoque enim omnis entitas veritas dicitur, sicut et omne ens dicitur verum; et iste terminus, *falsitas*, contradictorie significat convertibiliter cum illo termino, *aliqua non entitas*. Et talem falsitatem credo non posse significari, cum omne significans 20 significat entitatem, et per consequens veritatem. Et sic iste terminus, *falsitas*, significat omnem veritatem negative. Sed isti termini, *verum*, *falsum*, et *veritas*, superaddunt super ens nominaliter intellectum temporis verbi; ut: *dico vel credo veritatem*, si dico: *ens* (quod 25 est proposicio) *significat verum vel falsum*; hoc est, ens *quod est vel ens quod non est*. Et tunc dixi verum vel *I said the truth*: veritatem; quia tunc dixi ens quod tunc fuit, et falsum *i. e. I said something that then was*. Ita *verum* et *veritas* sunt passiones entis, significando 30 ens quod vere est, fuit, erit, vel potest esse. Sic autem non ille terminus *falsitas*. Unde, si credo veritatem, credo ens quod est; si credo falsum, credo ens quod non est.

Falsum quandoque sumitur tertio modaliter respectu 35 dicti propositionis quodammodo negative; ut "*hominem esse asinum*" est *falsum*, hoc est, *illud non est*. Et sic non utrobius ille terminus, *falsum*, convertitur cum illo termino, *falsitas*. 2^o capitul veritas per adequacionem signi ad suum primarium significatum, et *falsitas* per 40 defectum huiusmodi correspondencie. Et huiusmodi

veritas vel falsitas est in signo tantum, cum sit formaliter denominans ipsum esse verum vel falsum. Et omnis talis falsitas videtur michi esse veritas, et posse significari. Sic ergo *significare falsum* est significare ens quod non est; ut ista: *homo est asinus*, significat quod homo est asinus, et illud non est, et ideo est falsum et impossibile | quia non potest esse; sed talis proposicio: *hoc est falsum*, et cetere simplices, significant falsitatem, que est forma privativa qua signum 10 denominatur esse formaliter sine suo primarie significato.

In this sense,
false expresses
a truth, and
has meaning
by itself.

B 34^b Et talium falsitatum aliisque sunt contingencies, aliisque impossibilitates. Falsitatem vero, acceptam primo modo, claudit contradiccionem esse; quia tunc esset aliqua non entitas. Nec mirum, si talis terminus significat omne 15 ens et non significat non entitatem, sicut ille terminus *intelligibile* significat omne intelligibile et non significat unintelligibile. Omnis ergo proposicio falsa primarie significat falsum, quia ens quod non est, sed non falsitatem, nisi forte significando privacionem; ut talis: *hec 20 proposicio: "deus est", est falsa*.

Some of these
are contingent,
some represent
impossibility.

But *falsity*
taken in the
first sense,
cannot possibly
be anything.
So a false
proposition
signifies what
is false, i. e.
something that
is not; but not
falsity,
except as
a privation.

2. Signs have
been called after
their
significations;
often inexactly.

A sign is
universal, when
it stands for a
universal; it is
singular when
it signifies what
is singular;
it is a *genus*, it
expresses the
determinable
essential part of
a being;

a *species*, when
it signifies the
whole essence;
a *difference*,
if it expresses
the determining
part that

Secundo, notandum quod omnes denominaciones positive signorum respectu suorum signatorum fuerunt principaliter capte a suis significatis. Sed communiter, apud communiter loquentes denominantur signa false 25 denominacionibus huiusmodi, dum defecerunt sua significata propter similitudinem in modo significandi signorum. Videtur [quod] signum vere denominatur universale, quia est signum primarium universalis a parte rei; et dicitur singulare, quia est signum singularis. Est enim 30 signum genus, si primarie significat universale *in quid* predicable, demitis differentibus specie. Et voco predicable, quod habet aptitudinem ut predicetur. Nec est ficticia quod universale predicatur, quia vere et realiter, *predicari est inesse*. Ut *animal* copulative predicatur de quolibet suo *in quid* inferiori. Dicitur eciam signum species specialissima; quia primo significat universaliter precise communicabile singularibus *in quid*. Et dicitur differencia, dum primarie significat universale per se, et essencialiter predicable in quale de specie de

8. ceteri B. 23, 24. gunt' pro communiter B. 26. modi pro modo significandi B. 27. Vir (Vi?) B; ib. quod deest B. 32. predicator B. 34. rar pri B.

separates different species; a *property*, if it stands for a quality always present in a genus or species; and an *accident*, if for a quality that only happens to be present. differentibus. Et signum vocatur proprium, quod primo significat proprietatem vel passionem generis vel speciei, qualis per se 2^o suo subiecto inest. Et signum dicitur accidentis, dum primarie significat universale quod per accidentis et non per se inest subiecto suo. Et sic iudi- 5 candum est de aliis denominacionibus. Si autem signo defuerit tale significatum, vel non vere denominatur huiusmodi, vel aliter equivoce. Alique tamen denominaciones plus capiuntur ex modo significandi, ut quiditates, quantitates et qualitates proposicionis; iste tamen origi- 10 nantur aliquibus significatis.

3. The primordial truth — God's existence — may be expressed in many different ways, but it is the same truth; we may thus know it as God does, simply; or in a complex way.

We proceed by combining and dividing; God knows all in one infinite act.

Thus we do not take the division of hypotheticals from their false significations, nor merely from their true ones, but from their joined, disjoined, etc. senses, according to the case. We often find that order is unconsciously

Tercio notandum quod prima et simplicissima veritas, que est *deum esse*, significatur nunc primarie, per terminum incomplexum, nunc per qualemcumque affirmative, kathégorice vel hypothetice speciem. Sed non est 15 diversitas in illo significato, sed in signis et in modo intendendi. Verum tamen coniunction localis, causalis, temporalis equivoce significant in exemplis propositis, supposita veritate eorum; et sic contingit cognoscere eandem veritatem, ut *deum esse*, incomplexe et non 20 complexe, ut deus cognoscit se; et contingit cognoscere eandem veritatem complexe, 2^m quotlibet res et modos significandi. Nichil tamen complexe quicquam cognoscit, nisi quod componit vel dividit. Ideo, quod nos non sufficiimus quicquam distincte cognoscere sine discursu, 25 vel compositione vel divisione, cognoscit prima veritas sine discursu vel actu distincto infinitum perfectius. Nos tamen nichil cognoscimus nisi ad minimum novimus illud esse.

Non ergo fuerunt species hypotheticarum exemplate 3^o 2^m sua significata falsa, nec immediate 2^m sua significata simplicia, sed 2^m sua significata, correspondenter | B 35 copulata vel disiuncta, etc. si quis ipsa cognosceret. Frequenter enim contingit quod ordinans literas, ydiomata, vel alia signa habet communem influenciam et 35 veritates alias moventes; et ipse, ignorando ipsarum voces, putat quod ipse sit primaria causa huius ordinationis. Unde instituens istas VII species movebatur forte

3. *pe pro* per se B; *ib. m̄e pro* inest B. 8. $\overset{1}{cre}$ *pro* equivoce B.
9. $\overset{1}{modi}$ *pro* modo significandi B. 17. *calis calis* B. 18. *ffut pro*
significant B. 22, 23. $\overset{1}{modi}$ *pro* modos significandi B. 26. *p'avls pro*
prima veritas B. 35 *cōc; pro* communem B.

tali ratione. Tales VII sunt ponende, et superfluit ponere speciem que non sit aliqua illarum; ideo ille numerus nec est superfluus, nec diminutus. Ex istis ergo tribus notatis patet responsio ad materiam primi argumenti.
 5 Ad 2^m dicitur quod non est magna utilitas ad propositum numerum de ordinacione veritatum, quia certum est quod qualescumque cathegorice vel hypothetice contingit esse eque primo quo ad consequenciam cum prima veritate, eo quod sunt quotlibet huiusmodi veri-
 10 tates quas claudit contradiccionem non esse. Verumtamen necesse est deum esse primam veritatem. Ipse enim non est veritas universalis vel singularis, presupponens aliam inmediate, ex illa sequitur "ens esse"; quia veritate contradiccionem claudit esse priorem causatam vel nobis
 15 noscibiliorem; illa enim veritas est transcendens cui- cunque noscenti. Primo omnium nota quo ad tempus, quo ad naturam, quo ad instinctam noticiam, et quo ad facilitatem noscendi. Et sub illa noticia confuse noscuntur que discemus in posterius; et principalissime
 20 sub illa cognoscimus *deum esse*. Illam enim veritatem primo omnium noscimus quo ad tempus, sed confuse quo ad causam; quia ipsa primarie movet ad eius noticiam.

Ymmo, non est possibile nobis quicquam aliud
 25 cognoscere perfectissimo genere cognoscendi nobis possi- bili, nisi prius temporaliter specialiter cognoverimus deum esse. Quodlibet enim aliud est noscibile nobis noticia *propter quid*, que presupponit dei noticiam. Unde, quamvis *deum esse* analogice contineatur sub transcen-
 30 dente, ipsum tamen non ingreditur eius compositionem quidditativam, nec presupponitur sibi, sed econtra. Nam, dato primo, tunc esset genus, et per consequens pre- dicaretur *in quid*, distingwendo subiectum ab aliis per eius inexistenciam: quod est impossibile, cum nichil
 35 distingwatur ab alio per hoc quod est *ens*; sed per hoc certificamur de prima questione, *si est*, et non de 2^a *quid est*. Si autem detur 2^m, tunc veritate transcendentie non esset veritas prior, cum tamen essencia, communis multis singularibus, est causata. Est ergo prima veritas
 40 extra omne genus, cum nec sit universale nec singulare, sed omnia talia causat.

influenced by that which is ordered. These seven classes are neither too many nor too few, and any other would be superfluous.

Answer to Obj. 2.

It matters little what order of deduction we follow: all truths flow equally from the first, which is God.

But He is not an abstract truth from which the conclusion — the existence of Being — flows.

by means of another that comes before it: He is transcendent Truth; first in time, nature, intuitive knowledge, and ease of attainment.

And we can know no other truth perfectly unless by means of this one.

All cognition of a thing by its cause, must suppose God's existence. Thus, though this truth is analogically contained in that of transcendent being, the latter does not properly contain or precede, but is implied by it. Thus this First Truth is not included in any genus, and is neither universal nor singular.

5. vi^{is} *pro* utilitas B. 19. p'ncime B. 26. ff^r *pro* specialiter B.

So we have first a copulative proposition (God is, and Being is); then a disjunctive (God is or Being is). But all these truths are equally primitive *qua* conclusions, and their order has besides little to do with the present debates; therefore let it be admitted.

Prius ergo videtur esse veritatem copulativam, que est: *deum esse et ens esse*; quia est *ens esse*, quia *deus est*, eo quod *illam esse causatam* presupponit *illam esse*. Et per idem, intelligendo *deum esse vel ens esse* tanquam veritatem disiunctam, patens est quod illa presupponit *ens esse* tanquam communissimum; et per consequens presupponit *deum esse et ens esse*, cum nichil possit presupponere 2^m nisi presupponat utrumque. Omnia tamen istarum specierum veritates sunt eque prime quo ad consequenciam; cum ergo disputacio ordinis istarum 10 veritatum non multum pertinet huic loco, | accipiatur, B 35^b ut sic, suppositus numerus et ordo specierum hypothetice supradictus.

We may add that the truth of the principle of contradiction, negation of the impossible, is equivalent to infinite truths in existence, but not in causality. Et ulterius dicitur quod veritas primi principii est negacio illius impossibilis: *idem simul est et non est*,¹⁵ que negacio non est primo nota, cum impossibile sit ipsam cognoscere, nisi per cognitionem illius aut communis, *ens est*. Distingwo enim inter *esse et non esse*, antequam assencio huic negacioni. Veritas ergo primi principii convertitur, quo ad subsistendi consequenciam,²⁰ cum infinitis veritatibus, quia cum omnibus necessitatibus; sed non quoad essendi predicacionem; et sic sunt omnia talia eque primo natura quo ad consequenciam, sed non quo ad causalitatem.

Answer to Obj. 3. There may be more than seven species of hypotheticals, but all are reducible to these. For this reason the only adverbs used are those of time, place, and comparison; and only a few conjunctions can be employed — copulative, disjunctive, causal and conditional. Some conjunctions are closely allied Ad 3^m dicitur, ut prius, quod non obest plures²⁵ quam VII esse species hypotheticarum, dum tamen sint ad illas reducibles. Unde non cum quibuscumque adverbii sunt hypothetice, sed solum cum adverbii loci vel temporis, vel cum adverbii comparandi, ut sunt *ubi, dum, donec, usque, magis*, etc. Nec cum 30 quibuscumque coniunctionibus sunt dispariter hypothetice correspondenter 2^m distincionem grammaticorum; quia iste coniunctiones, *nec, neque,* sunt copulative negative 2^m logicos; et maior pars coniunctionum quas grammatici ponunt expletivas, tales habent reduci ad copula-³⁵ lativam; et breviter omnes vere coniunctiones habent reduci ad copulativam, disiunctivam, causalem vel racionalem; que et condicionalis potest dici. Alique tamen sunt coniunctiones adverbiales, et alie ad rhetoricae

1. *co^{us}* pro copulativam B. 12. *fusup^{tus}* B. 17, 18. *a^{colis}* pro
communis B. 22. *" pcom* B. 30. *mgf* pro magis B. 31. *dispit* B.
30. *rchoes* pro rhetoricae B.

deservientes; et aliisque mixtum significant circumstancias diversarum specierum; sicut patet advertenti exempla prioris modi. Hec ergo coniuncio, *sed*, superaddit ad copulativam excessum, excepcionem vel aliam circumstanciam; et sic habet reduci ad copulativam. Iste vero coniunctiones *vel*, *et*, *ne*, quandoque ponuntur in oracionibus rhetoricis et non proposicionibus, et quandoque significant circumstanciam esse; et ita omnes coniunctiones incident in aliquos modos significandi coniunctionaliter supradictos.

with adverbs;
some are used
in oratory;
some signify at
once several
hypothetical
circumstances.
But is an
instance of
these last.
All can be
reduced to one
or other of the
seven species.

Tria tamen sunt dicenda pro materia argumenti. Primum de mixtionibus hypotheticis, si componant novas species; 2^m de qualitatibus earum, et 3^m de quantitatibus earum.

Three heads of
enquiry: I. of
combinations of
hypotheticals;
II. of their
quality; III. of
their quantity.
I. There are
120 sorts of
compound
hypothetical
propositions,
obtained
according to
Porphyry's
method of
combining
universals.

Quantum ad primum, patet calculanti, si non fallor, 15 quod sunt 120 combinaciones distincte in septenario.

Nam iuxta conceptum Porphyrii, sunt ex coniungacionibus quinque universalium 643 821, sic illa speciebus hypothetice sunt 21^a combinaciones binarie, comparando sexies copulativam ad VI species residuas; 5^{es} disiunctivam ad quinque residuas habentur 10; combinando eciam copulativam et disiunctivam ad quinque residuas et post 2^m alias combinaciones, trium habebunt 35 combinaciones; combinando eciam 4 ad invicem habebuntur 35; combinando autem quinque ad invicem, 25 21 habebuntur; et combinando 6 ad invicem habebuntur septem; que coniuncta septennario constituit 120.

B 36^a Sed de istis | mixtionibus tria exempla satis est adducere pro intento. Primo coniungendo condicionalem et copulativam cum racionali, ut sic: *Si tu es asinus, tu es caper et tu es asinus: ergo, tu es caper.* Illa magna

Examples of
these
compounds:
1. If A is B,
A is C and
A is B.
It is much
employed by

2, 3. ex ps¹ pro exempla prioris modi B. 11. p̄ m̄ pro pro mater B.
16. coniunctiones B. 19. co¹⁸ pro copulativam B. 24. ad¹ pro ad-
invicem B. 26. a^{em} pro septem B. 30. cap^{*} pro caper before et and
before Illa.

26. Some of the numbers here seem to be wrong; at least I cannot account for the 10, nor for the expressions used. But the total is right; thus: any 7 objects, combined two and two, give 21 combinations; three and three, they give 35; four and four, 35; five and five, 21; six and six, 7; and there remains one combination of all seven: these numbers, added together, give 120. As for Porphyry's combinations of the five universals — genus, species, difference, property, and accident — with each other, I quite fail to see how, *on the same system* (iuxta conceptum Porphyrii) they could amount to the number 643 821, though it is unmistakably plain in the MS., as the other numbers are too.

sophists to prove an absurd conclusion by contounding the place of the comma:

If A is B,

A is C and

A is B:

therefore,

A is C.

For the first proposition is true, when *A is B* is absurd.

2. *A is B or*

C is D and

A is not B.

Here sophists take a necessary proposition,

A is B, an

absurd one,

C is D, and

changing the

place of the

comma, say:

A is B or

C is D, and

A is not B:

therefore

C is D.

Some employ this method to show that anything can be deduced from an impossible proposition; but wrongly, for they change the consequence in arguing.

3. You are now what you would be if you were causali copulativa et rationali: ut sic; quicquid esses si an ass; in that case you could

say:

therefore, you

can now.

Here the minor est condicionalis necessaria. Et maior patet ex hoc is necessary, the major too; quod nunc es et omne illud, et solum illud quo esses, looks like a true si esses asinus. Talibus autem modis multis miscent syllogism,

consequencia videtur tenere per illam regulam; argumentando a condicionali ad suum consequens cum constancia sui antecedentis, tenet consequencia. Et antecedens illius consequentie est necessarium cum contradiccionem claudit *te esse asinum*, nisi sis et caper⁵ et *asinus*. Et illa arte utuntur sophiste ad probandum quodlibet impossibile, capiendo unum quod includit contradiccionem, et inferendo ex illo copulativam, cuius prima pars est proposicio quam intendunt probare, et 2^a pars est impossibilis primo sumpta. Secundum exemplum est copulando disiunctivam et copulativam cum rationali, ut sic argumentando: *deus est, vel tu es asinus et non deus est: ergo tu es asinus.* Nam ista magna consequencia tenet a disiunctiva ad alteram eius partem, cum opposito relique partis; et antecedens condicionale est una disiunctiva, cuius prima pars est necessaria. Et illa arte 2^o utuntur sophiste ad probandum quicquid voluerunt, capiendo primo unum necessarium, et disiungendo sibi unam copulativam cuius prima pars est proposicio quam ipsi intendunt probare; et 2^a pars erit oppositum necessarium primo sumpti. Ymmo ista arte utuntur quidam volentes deducere quodlibet ex impossibili. Sequitur enim: *tu es asinus; ergo, tu es asinus, vel baculus stat in angulo et ex consequente* tu es asinus *vel baculus stat in angelo et tu non es asinus.* Ex quo sequitur vel tertius, quod *baculus stat in angulo.* Ideo a primo, si *tu es asinus*, tunc *baculus stat in angulo.* Quamvis autem conclusio quam intendunt sit vera, verumptamen a primo ad ultimum modus argumenti inducit in errorem, cum consequentie intermediate sint variate, eo quod consequens media consequentie fiat disiunctive, et consequens ultime consequentie fiat copulative; et sic contingit probare quodlibet impossibile. Tercio miscetur condicionalis cum what you would be if you were causali copulativa et rationali: ut sic; quicquid esses si an ass; in that case you could

say: asinus: ergo, rudibilis nunc es. Tota magna consequencia videtur esse syllogismus hypotheticus in *darii*; et minor Here the minor est condicionalis necessaria. Et maior patet ex hoc is necessary, the major too; quod nunc es et omne illud, et solum illud quo esses, looks like a true si esses asinus. Talibus autem modis multis miscent syllogism,

5. cap^o pro caper B. 33, 34. quod hoc pro quodlibet B.

sophiste proposiciones ad probandum *hominem esse asinum*, vel aliud impossibile; ut sic: *si dico te esse animal dico verum; et, si dico te esse asinum, dico verum;* et cum solum dico hoc ut pono, sequitur quod *tu sis asinus*. Et sic miscent copulativam cum condicionali, causali et rationali; ut *si tu es idem asino et tu es animal, quia tu es homo; ergo, tu es asinus*.

B 36^b Non enim valet dicere quod tales oraciones non sunt
10 congrue verum vel falsum significans; ergo proposicio.

Aliter enim syllogismus non esset proposicio, et per consequens non necessarius aut verus; nec oppositum consequentis repugnaret generaliter antecedenti, eo quod nullum signum est verum vel falsum, nisi proposicio; 15 nec proposicio repugnat alicui nisi proposicioni; nec esset concedendum tale antecedens negandum, vel dubitandum, vel ponendum, cum tamen omnia illa concedimus de oracionibus mixtis. Sunt ergo proposiciones, sicut convertuntur cum propositionibus, et habent significaciones congruas propositionibus sine impedimento ex parte multitudinis signorum vel alio signando. Ideo concedendum est quodlibet signum, quamcumlibet longum, univoce subordinatum actui complexo principali vero vel falso, esse propositionem; et, si fuerint quantumlibet pauca signa, signancia alicui complexe sine habitudine ad unum actum principalem, non sunt propositionio; et sic non intelligit homo pro eodem instanti distinete et principaliter nisi unum; et quotlibet alia intellexerit, hoc erit sub habitudine ad illud unum, et 30 secundarie vel confuse. Scienzie autem multe in sunt que sunt impertinentes ad invicem, nec sunt partes alicuius totalis sciencie. Ideo dicit Aristoteles ad hunc sensum quod plura scimus et tantum unum intelligimus. Possimus tamen successive elicere intellecciones super- 35 tinentes ad invicem vel alicui tercio, dum tamen credimus. Sensus enim decipiuntur de simultate actuum quo ad tempus.

Ulterius notandum quod non propter tales mixtiones habebuntur nove species ypothetiarum, cum quelibet talis proposicio mixta sortitur speciem ypothetice, 40 2^m quod subordinatur actui ypothetico principali; et sicut repugnat eundem habere de eadem propositione

Many other similar compound arguments are used, now with one form of hypotheticals, now with another.

To reply to them, it is useless to deny that these are propositions, for they come under that definition; a whole syllogism is a proposition, though compound; it is impossible to deny their truth except by their opposite, a proposition; and we could neither deny, nor doubt, nor posit them. Their length makes no difference here; whenever there is one principal act signified, whether true or false, there is a proposition, however long; and where that fails, however short, the sentence is no proposition. All depends on the one act of simultaneous knowledge of things interdependently. We have, however, the knowledge of many things independently of each other. Note that these compound propositions do not form new species; for the act signified by the principal verb is one of

28. distincta B; *ib.* quot est *pro* quotlibet. 42. proposiciones B.

the seven, and dispares actus principales, ita repugnat eandem proposi-
specifies them.
And if one man understands the principal act in
one way and another in another, we have no longer a proposition;
thus a compound sentence may be either several propositions or one, as it is understood; and if one, either impossible or necessary, according as they are joined in the mind.

cionem mixtam esse copulativam, disiunctivam, etc. eidem homini. Si autem diversi equivocaverunt de eodem signo, tunc vel erit oratio equivoca et non proposicio; vel aliter de possibili erit uni proposicio vera et alterius falsa; quod est michi probabilius. Ut intendendo talem proposicionem: *tu es asinus vel deus est vel aliquid est*, stat successive intelligere illud sine habitudine ad actum principalem; et sic intelligenti non est una proposicio, sed forte multe; et stat post successivam et disiunctam inteleccionem parcium ad invicem intelligere totum simul sub habitudine actus copulandi principalis. Et sic intelligenti foret copulativa impossibilis. Et stat confundendo intellecciones confusas parcium ad invicem intelligere totum actu principali disiungendi. Et sic intelligenti signum foret disiunctiva necessaria.

This answers the first sophism. We admit the consequence as a rational, and deny the minor.

A rational proposition (with the sign therefore) amounts either to a conditional or a causal.

As for the antecedent, we then must deny it; for it was only admitted as part of the consequence, not separately; and as a part

of the consequence it should be copulated with but, not with and.

If having one sense true, we should admit it in that sense; but then it would no longer give us the conclusion.

There are, therefore, many propositions that must be

magna consequencia est concedenda tanquam racionalis, cum habeat unum sensum primarium verum; et minor est neganda. Nec credo quod racionalis est nova species hypothetica; quia vel coincidit cum condicionali vel causali in sentencia; | differt tamen in multis ponere illam notam *Si*, et illam notam *Ergo*, ut est in consequentiis hypotheticis exemplatis. Vocatur enim syllogismus hypotheticus, cuius premissae sunt hypothetice. Et si queratur de toto antecedente prime mixtionis, utrum sit concedendum, dicitur quod post concessionem magne consequencie, est ipsum negandum, eo quod concessio veritatis primarie significare per magnam consequenciam limitat antecedens ad sensum copulativum; et propter illum sensum limitandum communiter copulantur alie cum illa nota *sed*. Proponendo ergo antecedens per se foret ipsum concedendum, cum habeat unum sensum condicionalem verum; sed ex isto sensu non sequitur conclusio. Unde multe tales proposiciones sunt extra obligacionem, cum aliquibus partibus concedende et cum aliis partibus forent negande, sine hoc quod fiat mutacio de suo primario significato; ut patet in proposito. ubi sensus copulativus limitatur per adicionem conclusionis. In omni tamen bona responsione respondendum

11. adi^e pro adinvicem B. 14. adi^e pro adinvicem B. 16. foret signum B. 18. q^a pro consequencia. 23, 24. q^{uotid} pro consequentiis B. 36. p^{ibz} pro partibus B. 37. p^{bz} pro partibus B.

est principaliter ad esse significati, et per consequens respondendum est homini et ad eius signa. Sic ergo homo principaliter dicit et intelligit primarium significatum signo et consequenter ^{2^{arie}} illud signum. Sed ille concessiones sunt equivoce, cum concedere vel negare significatum est concedere vel negare id esse; sed concedere vel negare signum est concedere vel negare quod habet primarium significatum. Minor ergo prime mixtionis est falsa; et sic totum antecedens negabitur, et cessat efficacia argumenti.

Per hoc patet ad 2^{am} mixtionem quod magna consequencia est concedenda et minor est neganda, sicut et totum antecedens est negandum; et principaliter sensus secundum quem antecedens infert consequens. Et tamen illud antecedens, per se propositum, foret concedendum tanquam disiunctiva necessaria. Nec est talis modus arguendi a primo ad ultimum laudabilis, nisi stante univocatione sensum propositionum. Nec est antecedens magne consequie verum et consequens falsum; quia iuxta dicta, dum magna consequencia est concessa, statim limitatur antecedens ad sensum copulativum et impossibilem, et suum similem esset concedendum ad alium sensum. Et quia gloriantur sophiste coram vulgo habere talem apparenciam, ideo debet logicus caute interimere altercaciones et conclusiones sophistarum; ut si querat utrum antecedens sit verum, dicitur satis vere quod ipsum, cum fuit vocale prolatum, non potest esse verum nec aliqua similis; alia tamen, talis qualis ipsa fuit, est vera, et alia talis qualis ipsa fuit est falsa. Ymmo, scripta tota consequencia, est antecedens impossibile: sed antecedens forte erit verum: Ideo *impossibile* est concedendum; sed non *significatum impossibile* est dignum concedi. Magne ergo et infructuose fiunt altercaciones de veritatibus et concessionibus talium signorum; ut stat, 4^{or} bene respondencium sine obli- gacione ad eamdem propositionem, unum concedere illam, alium negare, tertium | dubitare illam et 4^m dicere quod non cognoscit satis illam ut respondeat ad eandem.

denied when taken in connexion, as a whole when they should be granted, if separate. To answer well, we should always reply in the sense of the questioner; but such replies are ambiguous.

As to the second sophism we likewise admit the whole as a consequence and deny the minor and the whole antecedent in the sense of the conclusion. Yet the latter may be true, taken apart; but as soon as we grant the consequence, we limit its meaning to the sense that is false.

And to cut short disputes with sophists who want to show off their acuteness, we may say that this antecedent is not true, but that another proposition in the same form is true, and yet another is false.

We, therefore, grant what is impossible, but not as meaning the impossible. But there are many useless disputes and various ways of answering in this matter.

2. homī B; ib. Sic B. 14. a^s pro antecedens B; ib. g^s pro consequens B. 18. vñō^e pro univocatione B. 19. a^s pro antecedens B.
10, 20. qñs^m pro consequens B. 22. silem z|t pro similem esset B.
25. intr'ine' pro interinere B.

Again, when we say "*This thing*" is

Robert; it is impossible that the signification of "this thing" should be

Robert. I do not approve of such useless quibbles.

V. g. to say: *You are an ass or my hand is closed*. As the hand is closed at the time, this is granted.

Then, opening both hands, he says: *But neither of my hands is closed*. Here it is clear that there is no conclusion to be drawn, since the principal act of the whole antecedent is not true at any time.

Grant the consequence, deny the antecedent, and stop the debate as useless.

In the third example deny the whole as a consequence.

We have a monstrous paralogism: two conditional premises (*maj.*) *If you were an ass, whatever you are now, you then would be*) and a categorical conclusion.

The conclusion should be: *If you were an ass, you could Bray now*.

Et patet de illa proposita: *hoc est Robertus*; sed hoc esset impossibile de significato; ideo equivocaret in sensibus. Inter alias alteraciones sunt huiusmodi disputationes de signis; et huiusmodi demonstraciones singularium michi odibiles, quia indoctuales. Conformatim dicitur ad talem syllogismum: *Tu es asinus, vel manus mea clauditur; sed nulla manus mea clauditur; ergo, tu es asinus*. Concedenda enim est consequencia, et antecedens est negandum. Et si verificetur maior pro tempore sue prolacionis, claudendo manum, more ioculancium¹⁰ in Natali, et pro tempore prolacionis minoris verificetur illa, aperiendo ambas manus, illud nec probat antecedens esse verum nec fuisse verum; quia pro nullo instanti foret actus principalis tocius antecedentis verus: quod tamen requireretur. Unde non sequitur: *utraque pars illius copulative fuit vera; ergo, et copulativa*. Nec oportet ambas eius partes esse simul instanter veras; quia de copulativis vocalibus est hoc impossibile. Nec est color ibi, si seorsum maior conceditur, dum manus clauditur, et alia vice minor conceditur, non clausa²⁰ manu, concludere conclusionem pro tertio tempore. Satis ergo est concedere consequenciam et negare antecedens, et interrumpere intendentis probare tanquam frustracione innitentes.

Ad tertium negatur magna consequencia, tanquam non habens unum sensum verum, cum maior est universalis affirmativa de condicionato subiecto et categorico predicato, et minor sit condicionalis necessaria et conclusio categorica de inesse. Ideo patet quod non est syllogismus, sed monstruosus paralogismus decipiens³⁰ incautos. Ergo oportet in tali modo arguendi addere quod condicio sumpta sit possibilis ad concedendum conclusionem de inesse. Ut sic argumentando: *Quicquid es, si es episcopus, illud nunc es, existente possibili te esse episcopum; sed episcopus es, etc., ergo quod potest esse episcopus nunc es*. Vel capiendo in maiori quod cuiusmodi tunc essem si essem episcopus nunc es, sequitur cum paribus quod nunc sis episcopus. Et ex primo antecedente sequitur illa condicionalis, *rudibilis*

4. dem¹onstracionib², pro demonstrationes B. 19. minor; maior above B.

24. fruct³o⁴ pro frustracione B. 27. t⁵o to pro categorico B. 35. ergo etc. ergo B. 37. t⁵ = tenet pro tunc B.

11. Natali. Christmas games are alluded to here. See English works of Wyyclif, p. 206.

nunc es, si nunc es asinus. Sed pro condicionato breviter notandum quod debet dari per negacionem prepositam toti: sic videlicet: *Non est ita ut quicquid esses si esses asinus, illud nunc es,* quod est falsum; hoc tamen est verum, quod *aliquid non esses, si esses asinus quod tamen nunc es;* quia, si esses asinus, tunc *solum esses quod nunc es et non solum esses quod nunc es,* cum antecedens infert contradiccionem. Ideo, propter ambiguitatem sensus multiplicis tollendam in talibus, proponenda est 10 negacio cum illo termino, *est ita;* et illa universalis, B 38^a *Quicquid esses,* debet exponi per secundam exponentem talem: *| nichil nunc es quod non esses si esses:* quod est necessarium. Et tamen, intelligendo proposiciones condicionaliter, necessarium est quod aliquid esses quod 15 nunc non es, si esses asinus. Nec contradicunt illa, cum contradictorium talis affirmative conditionalis dandum est per negacionem negantem actum categoricum, qui est priori contradictorius et actus principalis eius; et idem iudicium est de similibus quibuscumque.

We may note that the opposite of the antecedent taken by placing a *non* before the whole is in one sense false, implying contradiction, and in another true.

The fact is that the antecedent itself is ambiguous: either hypothetical, or categorical with a conditional term.

In the latter case the proposition is true but contingent;

in the latter it is necessary.

20 Alii autem distingwunt huiusmodi proposiciones ultra hoc quod oportet. Verumtamen tota equivocatio talium stat in hoc quod possunt sumi hypothetice conditionaliter, vel cathegorice de condicionato extremo. Et in aliquibus refert quo ad veritatem, in aliis autem non 25 refert. In aliquibus est limitacio ad sensum kathegoricum, et in aliquibus potest proposicio sumi ad libitum concipientis; ut sic, dicendo *quicquid esses si esses asinus, id nunc es;* intelligendo illam cathegorice, ita quod ultimum eius verbum sit verbum principale, est proposicio vera sed contingens, cum ponit te esse. Intelligendo vero extorte illum sensum, *si esses asinus, quicquid tunc esses illud nunc es,* necessarius est sensus, cum actus conditionalis sit actus principalis, et proposicio nullum contingens ponit. Attendendum est ergo 30 principaliter ad actus principales proposicionum in respondendo, in dando conditionalem vel convertibile in tali materia.

As for the other sophism (*si dico te esse asinum, dico verum*) it is a fact that, every falsehood being truth, nothing false

Ulterius, quo ad aliam mixtionem videtur michi, sicut omnis falsitas presupponit veritatem, ymmo omnis 40 falsitas est veritas, sic omnis diccio falsi presupponit dicere veritatis. Ideo non possum dicere *te esse asinum* nisi dixerim verum, non solum quia necessario omnis

can be said without its being true; everything affirms its own existence with truth. And even for the thing signified, some arc of opinion that the saying is true in itself, but that its object may be non-existent. As for the last (a man is identical with an ass) the consequence is false; there is only partial identity. They are both indeed identical with a third (the universal animal) but only to a certain extent.

Sophists, however, are displeased with this answer, admitting the Universals: which are, however, necessary. It is possible to touch the most difficult subjects, while dealing with trivial fallacies. II. Of Quality in Hypotheticals. Any proposition might, I think, be called affirmative or negative; each implying the existence of God, and denving infinite other things. And since they are called affirmative or negative because of affirmation or negation, they may receive either name.

res dicit se esse, et sic deum esse verum; quia notabiliter, sic proferendo dico et intendo ens esse in communi, etsi non proferam illud verbum. Si autem restringitur dicere ad primarium significatum per proposicionem prolatam, adhuc, secundum volentes partes 5 proposicionis prolate esse proposicionem veram, dicendo quod tu es asinus, dico verum: sed maior esset ad illum sensum falsa, quia potes tu non esse.

Et sic ad ultimam mixtionem dicitur quod magna consequencia non valet. Maior est vera, quia omnis 10 homo esset idem asino, cum sit idem in genere; et sic omnis homo est idem commune quod est asinus; sed nemo est asinus. Unde non sequitur: hoc quod est asinus est homo; ergo, asinus est homo. Sed si res singularis 15 incommunicabilis sit tam homo quam asinus, tunc homo est asinus; quod tamen non oportet, si ydemperetur alicui 3º communi utriusque; sed sicut sunt idem tertio (quia genere), sic sunt proporcionaliter idem inter se. Et patet quod [sic], demonstrando per illum terminum, hoc, communem. Etenim non sequitur: hoc est homo 20 et hoc est asinus, ergo, homo est asinus, quia medium non est ultimum singulare. Scio tamen quod sophistis non placet illa responsio, quamvis tam necessarium sit universalia esse, quam necessarium est neminem esse asinum. Sic ergo in communissimis formis sophismatis 25 possunt introduci materie difficillime; | quia omnes B 38^b veritates et opinabilia sunt connexa.

Quo ad 2^m, videtur michi quod omnis proposicio, sive kategorica sive hypothetica, tam affirmativa quam negativa rationabiliter dici potest; quelibet enim talis 30 implicat satis formaliter deum esse et infinitas alias negaciones. Cum ergo hinc dicitur proposicio affirmativa, quia subordinatur actui affirmandi, et negativa, quia subordinatur actui negandi; sequitur quilibet talen esse tam affirmativam quam negativam. Non 35 tamen dicitur proposicio hypothetica una, universalis, particularis (et sic de aliis denominacionibus), propter significacionem 2ariam, etsi fuerit affirmativa; quia affirmare et negare sunt impertinencia ad esse affirmati et negati; et ad multitudinem vel proprietatem significantis. 40

5. pp^{ets} pro partes B. 9. ulam pro ultimam B. 12. cone pro commune B. 17. alicuius B. 19. sic deest B. 31. alia B. 40. figt^p pro significantis B.

Sed veritas proposicionis requirit esse significati; et alie proprietates sequentes requirunt certas condiciones signorum esse, preter significantes propter quos condiciones sunt huiusmodi. Logicus tamen, distingwens 5 actum affirmandi et actum negandi ex opposito, et correspondenter ad proposicionem affirmativam et proposicionem negativam, vocat actum affirmandi actum complexum, per quem principaliter veritas affirmandi est. Talem autem philosophi vocant actum componendi, 10 et proposicionem illi subordinatam vocant proposicionem affirmativam. Actum vero negativum vocant actum complexum per quem principaliter veritas est negata. Et talis dicitur actus dividendi. Proposicionem vero illi actui subordinatam vocant proposicionem negativam. 15 Unde significata primaria talium proposicionum vocat Aristoteles nominibus actuum, affirmaciones et negaciones.

Sic ergo, loquendo de proposicionibus affirmativis et negativis, sunt 3^s modi dicendi, quorum primus solum 20 attendit ad signa, 2^s solum ad significata, et 3^{ns} mixtim. Primi dicunt quod hec proposicio, *homo est*, significando primarie quod *nulla chimera est*, est affirmativa, et hec: *nichil est*, significando primarie *deum esse*, est negativa. Ista tamen responsio est nimis vocalis, cum 25 nullum tale signum de se habeat quod sit affirmativum et negativum, sed a significato vel modo significandi.

Ideo dicit 2^a quod ista: *ita est quod nulla chimera est*, est negativa, et hec est affirmativa, *non est ita quod deus non est*. Prima enim primarie significat illam 30 negacionem: *nullam chimeram esse*, et cum idem sit *illam negacionem esse ens*, et illa negacio. Et per idem diceret hanc esse negativam *deus est nemo*, vel *non homo*, cum primarie significat *neminem esse deum*, et sic primarie significat negacionem, et per idem quelibet ypo- 35 thetica foret sic affirmativa, cum quelibet significat primarie veritatem. Et sic nulla esset negativa composita. Cum enim ens et veritas convertuntur, et quelibet proposicio primarie significat ens, et per consequens *ens esse*, quelibet proposicio primarie significat veri- 40 tatem esse.

Yet a hypothetical proposition is not called universal or particular, etc. because its being depends merely on the nexus and not on the secondary signification, even when affirmative.

Logicians, opposing the affirmative and negative acts to one another, call affirmation the whole act by which truth is chiefly affirmed, but philosophers call these the acts of combining and dividing.

On this point, there are three opinions. One maintains that a proposition is affirmative according to the form of expression alone; but the form must depend on the signification.

The second takes the meaning alone, and would say that: It is true that *No chimera exists*, is negative, and that *God is not non-existent* is affirmative. It would follow that no hypothetical proposition could be negative, since they all primarily mean what is true.

3. figies pro significantes B. 24. necessaria B. 25. q̄t pro quod sit B. 36, 37. q̄pōt pro composita B.

I adhere) asserts that the mode of signifying of the principal verbs must be particularly attended to. For the same sense may be rendered under different forms, affirmative or negative, and this causes a difference in the propositions. So there may be a great number of hypotheticals, signifying the same primary object without any difference.

And every negative is convertible with an affirmative as to its fundamental meaning. Thus: the affirmative affirms truth — negative or affirmative or impossible; in like manner every negative denies truth.

There are three opinions as regards the different quality of hypotheticals.

i. They are affirmative only when both propositions together with the *nexus* are affirmatives; negative only when both, with the *nexus* are denied.

So some would be neither negative nor affirmative: as, *A is not B, and C is D*

Tercio autem dicitur quod maxime attendendum est ad modos significandi verborum principalium pro qualitatibus proposicionum iudicandis, quamvis primarie ceperunt proposiciones tales denominaciones ab affirmationibus et negacionibus significatis. Sicut ergo actus ⁵ componendi, *deum esse*, | est complexus, et actus apprehendendi essenciam divinam est incomplexus, quamvis idem sit obiectum et eadem potentia, sic actus componendi, *deum esse*, est affirmativus, et actus dividendi: *non esse ita quod deus non est*, est negativus, et tamen ¹⁰ utriusque actui eadem veritas correspondet; sed talibus equipollentibus, ubi est unicum verbum, ut *non nullus homo currit*, differenter contingit actus affirmativos correspondere. Et contingit illis correspondere actus negativos geminatos; et sic de conformibus terminis ¹⁵ contingit habere proposiciones cathegoricas vel hypotheticas ad placitum, sine distinctione obiecti principalius apprehensi. Ut in istis: *sic est quod si tu es, aliquid est*, etc. *si tu es aliquid est*. Modicum enim variantur termini, et utrobique idem est significatum ²⁰ primarium. Unde, sicut quelibet hypothetica est convertibilis cum cathegorica et econtra, sic quelibet negativa est convertibilis cum affirmativa, quo ad essendi consequenciam. Unde vere dictum est quod per actum affirmandi veritas affirmatur, sive illa veritas sit ²⁵ negatio, sive affirmacio, sive non possit esse. Et per negativam veritas negatur, sive possit esse, sive non; veritas enim est communis ad omne significatum propositionis cathegorice vel hypothetice. Et affirmacio similiter, ut videtur; et isti vie ego innitor. ³⁰

Quo ad qualitates hypotheticas, sunt tres modi dicendi. Primi dicunt quod de qualibet specie hypothetica alia sit affirmativa et alia negativa. Affirmativa, quando utrumque coniunctorum et nota coniungendi affirmatur; et negativa, quando utrumque coniunctorum et ³⁵ nota coniungendi negatur. Et sic aliqua est hypothetica que neque est affirmativa neque negativa. Ut talis: *tu non curris, et ego corro*.

Sed ²⁰ dicitur quamlibet hypotheticam cuius actus coniungendi, qui est actus eius principalis, affirmatur, ⁴⁰ esse affirmativam, et solum talem; ut sunt tales: *tu es,*

et asinus non est; si deus non est, tunc ipse est; tu non es vel deus non es. Sed proposiciones hypotheticas istis contradictorias, in quibus actus principales coniungendi negantur, vocant hypotheticas negativas, ut sunt tales: *non est ita quod tu es et quod asinus non est; non, si tu es asinus, tu non es homo.* Et sic, ut dicunt, hypotheticce sunt quodammodo equivoce affirmative et negative cum kathegoricis.

Sed 3^a via dicit quamlibet copulativam, disiunctivam, 10 vel condicionalem de partibus independencium significancium esse et qualem et quantam, more kathegoriarum, secundum qualitates et quantitates primarum parcium; ut hec est universalis affirmativa: *omnis homo currit ubi vel quando vel quia deus nult sic esse.* Et 15 sic de istis: *omnis homo est maior quam est milium, omnis homo est substancia et illa non est asinus vel illa non est asinus.* 4 enim note coniungendi sunt cathegorice; et alie, propter dependenciam sensus relativi, sorciuntur qualitates et quantitates primarum parcium; sed non 20 condicionalis. Videtur tamen michi probabile quod solum 4 species hypotheticarum supradictarum sunt quales 2^m qualitatem prime partis, ita quod talis hypothetica non sit qualis, sic: *Sor non est qui est albus.* Nec est de ratione hypothetice quod ambe partes sint per se significantes sine habitudine ad invicem, nec negatur uter- B 39^b que actus in tali: *Sor | non est qui est albus*, cum iste sit eius intellectus: *Sor non est et ille Sor qui non est, est albus.* Verumptamen hec est negativa, *Sor non est ille qui est albus.* Hec autem est amphigorica, *Sor non est qui est albus*; ex hoc quod potest habere sensus prioris propositionis, vel relativum inmediate referri ad subiectum. Et tunc convertitur cum copulativa impossibili.

Quo ad contradiccciones hypotheticarum, notandum quod istis quatuor speciebus que sunt quales more 35 kathegoriarum, sunt contradictoria, et cetere significande proprietates, sicut kathegoricis; sed cuiilibet copulative, disunctive vel condicionali contradicit cathegorica negativa; ut isti: *Si tu es homo, tu es animal* contradicit ista *non est ita quod, si tu es homo, tu es animal.* Omnim enim contradictiorum actus principales sunt contradictorii; et vocantur contradictorii,

2. The notion of affirmation or negation comes from the *nexus* alone, denied or affirmed; and hypothetical and categorical propositions are thus somewhat on the same line.

3. All follow the quality and quantity of the first of their parts; for in four cases they are merely connected categoricals, and in the others the relative member follows the quality etc. of the other.

But I think that only the four first species really do so; for we find propositions which cannot be called either affirmative or negative, unless by changing the form into another less ambiguous.

These four have contradictions, and the other properties of categoricals; but they are contradicted by a categorical: It is not true that . . .

Many propositions are equivalent to contradictrories without being so formally; and the rules of contradictrories based on the contraposition of *being or non-being*, are the same for all.

actus affirmandi et negandi primarie de eodem. Et patet quod multe proposiciones equivalent contradictoriis que non contradicunt; quia solum tales et omnes tales que habent actus principales contradictrios contradicunt. Disiunctiva ergo facta oppositis parcium 5 copulative, repugnat eidem quodammodo contradictorie, equivalenter ad contradiccionem. Cum ergo omnium oppositorum eadem sit disiunctiva, patet quod regule que deserviunt ad noscendum veritatem vel falsitatem qualiscunque hypothetice, deserviunt directe vel in- 10 direkte ad noscendum veritatem aut falsitatem sui oppositi; et tanta de qualibet hypotheticarum.

Quo ad tertium, dicendum de quantitatibus hypotheticarum, videtur michi probabile quod nulla trium priorum hypotheticarum sit alicuius quantitatis, quam- 15 vis qualiscumque quantitatis sit kathegorica de tali hypothetico extremo. Quatuor autem alie species possunt dici quante a primis partibus, sicut prius dicta sunt 2^m partes illas esse quales. Nota tamen quod sophista concederet omnem hypotheticam, sicut et kathegoricam, 20 esse tam qualem quam quantam; ut *longa* hypothetica, in hoc quod longa, est *quanta*. Et in hoc quod est quantitate denominata, est qualis. Illud tamen dictum procedit ab equivoco, cum logicus non attendit ad quantum molis vel duracionis proposicionis logice, sed 25 ad universalitatem, particularitatem, indefinitatem vel singularitatem. Unde indefinitam kathegoricam contingit esse hypotheticam scriptam, et cathegoricam contingit esse hypotheticam, tempore longiore, et utramque pulcrum, acutam aut aliter qualitatem; sed hoc est impertinens 30 intencioni logice, restringentis qualitatem ad eius affirmationem vel negacionem superius expositas.

Et hic communiter dubitatur quam longa oracio possit esse proposicio; et videtur michi probabile quod est dare maximum tale: quod sic esse proponam. Sicut 35 totus mundus rationaliter potest dici proposicio, sic quantumlibet magnum artificiale secundum formam artis dispositivam potest esse proposicio. Nec requiritur intelligere omnes partes proposicionis simul, sicut patet de propositione vocali futura, sed successive, unam post 40 reliquam. Superfluus tamen et in debitus esset grandis liber iste super quem non scriberetur nisi negativa

III. Of
Quantity in
these
propositions.
I think that the
three first kinds
of hypotheticals
have properly
no quantity;
but that the
others
(comparatives,
locals, and
temporals) have
it by reason of
their first
members.

A sophist would
say: All these
propositions
when written,
having length,
have *quantity*,
and quantity is
a *quality*.

But logicians
means quantity
as concerns
universality, etc.

The same
reason would
give every
proposition
many qualities,
that are quite
foreign to our
intent.

Can a long
speech be one
proposition?
Probably there
is a maximum
of possible
length. The
whole world is
a proposition,
and so is any
artificial
disposition of
things, however
considerable.

propositio; sicut indebite loqueretur qui, intendendo dicere quod *Sor scribit*, narraret totam genealogiam eius usque ad primum hominem. Est ergo in talibus dare maximum 2^m mensuram debitam proporcionatum, quod 5 constitueret propositionem artificialis cum proporcionata concepcione. Nam contingit intelligere brevem oracionem sine habitudine proporcionali; sicut communiter intendunt truffantes cum pueris, proponendo illis claudendo manus talem disiunctivam: *Tu es asinus*, 10 *vel mea manus clauditur*, qua concessa, utramque manum aperiendo, proponunt illam negativam: *nulla mea manus clauditur*; que etiam est concedenda; tunc concludit 15 conclusionem. Sed tota oracio precedens non intelligitur sub habitudine unius propositionis; vel si sic, ipsa est neganda.

Aliam autem evasionem habent sophiste, concedendo quod *totum est sue partes*; et sic dicunt copulativam esse universalem et particularem, affirmativam et negativam; et tanen nec est universalis nec affirmativa, 20 sed est ille partes. Sed illud non placet michi, tum quia fundamentum est falsam, tum etiam quia quelibet ypotetica habet notam coniungentem, que neutrius categorice est pars. Ideo ypotetica non est ille categorice, sicut nec quique sunt 4.

25 Sed 3º obicitur evidencius quod quatuor species, que dicte sunt esse quales et quante, sunt categorice et non ypotetice. Alter enim non esset hec categorica: *A est, significat sicut est, est maior Platone*, et sic de similibus. Sed quo ad illud videtur michi quod sicut 30 affectus numero septenario reducit omnes species ypo- thetice ad VII, sic affectus numero ternario reducit omnes illas 3^s ad 3^a. Sicut enim ad omnem punctum intrinsecum mundi circumstant solum 6 puncta ipsum tangencia secundum tres differencias posicionis (propter 35 quod numerus septenarius dictus est numerus universitatis), sic omnem veritatem kategoricam circumstant 6 veritates ypotetice, que cum illa constituunt veritatem copulativam. Sic enim completa est quelibet

But as superfluity destroys this art, there must be a maximum of length, beyond which no proposition can go, and with which it is grasped in one corresponding conception. A very short group may be deficient in this last quality; v. g. the fallacy of opening and closing the hand.

Sophists say: A whole is its parts; so a copulative will be universal, particular, affirmative and negative at once, like its parts.

But the principle is false, and besides, the *nexus* is an element which exists in neither of the component categoricals.

Another objection: These four kinds said to have quantity, are in reality categorical; if not, many propositions accounted as categorical would be so no longer.

But I think that he who likes 3 reduces all to 3, and he who likes 7 reduces all to 7. Every

13. *pccns* B. 14. *fīe* B; *ib.* ipsum B. 15. negandum B. 23. 1^e B.
23, 24. *kaeo* B. 24. *fīt* B. 28. A enim (?) *pro A est B.* 32. 3^a ad
3 B. 38. *cova* B.

32. *Ad omnem*. We shall find a good deal more of this, in Wyclif's theory of the Extended, later in the work.

point in the world is surrounded by 6, and 7 is the number of the universe. And as every reality can be reduced to three elements, all hypotheticals can be reduced to three; for causals, comparatives, locals and temporals are directly reducible to copulatives. Examples.

essencia, sive corporea, sive incorporea in natura absoluta, que est communis tribus suppositis; et omnibus illis insunt proprietates, et communiter accidentia et oppositiones. Et sicut non est dare realitatem que non sit reducibilis ad aliquod trium suppositorum,⁵ sic non est dare hypotheticam quin sit reducibilis ad copulativam, disiunctivam vel condicionalem, cum omnis causalis, comparativa, localis, vel temporalis, directe reducitur ad copulativam: ut idem est *te esse animal quia tu es homo*, et *te esse animal, et causam eius esse quia tu es homo*. Et idem est *A significare siquid B significat*, et: *A significare unum ens et B significare illud idem*. Verum tamen ille terminus, *sicut*, quandoque dicit similitudinem in modo significandi et quandoque ydemptitatem significati; et idem¹⁵ est dicere *tu es ubi rel quando Sor est* et dicere *quod tu es in aliquo loco | rel tempore et ibi rel tunc B 40^b Sor est*. Et sic posset quamlibet talem dici esse copulativam. Nec est possibile aliquam esse hypotheticam que non sit aliqua istarum trium specierum. Verum-²⁰ ptamen eadem est sententia utrobius; quia reducendo illas 4 ad copulativam, habentur quinque species copulative. Nec sequitur, si sunt quales et quante, quod sint kategorice. Et sic primum exemplorum propositorum est hypothetica, et secundum est proposicio kate-²⁵ gorica. Et tanta de hypotheticis sint dicta hic, quo ad suas essencias et accidentales proprietates in genere.

Thus all belong to one of these three classes; but it comes to the same, for we then have 5 sorts of copulatives. And it does not follow that they are categoricals on that account.

5. supp^re B. 14, 15. modi B.

CAPITULUM SECUNDUM.

Sequitur de copulativis pertractandum; supponendo primo, quod omnis hypothetica subordinata principaliter actui hypothetico copulandi sit copulativa; et solum talis. Ex quo patet quod ex quibuscumque kathegoricis contingit copulativam componi; et quelibet copulativa, loquendo universaliter, tunc est vera, quando primarie verum significat. Et specialiter discernitur ex hoc esse vera, quando ambe partes principales sunt vere. Nota tamen quod propositionem equivocam copulativam stat esse necessariam, et ambas eius partes impossiles; ut patet te ista: *non est ita quod deus est et tu es asinus*. Potest enim hec intelligi kathegorice, ita quod negacio cadat super actum principalem copulandi, et consequenter super utrumque actum partis; et sic est kathegorica negativa et necessaria, contradictoria copulativa. Vel potest intelligi copulative, ita quod negacio cadat super primum actum solum; et talis sensus est impossibilis: conceditur tamen propter sensum verum.
Nec ex hoc sequitur quod *tu es asinus*, quia antecedens non infert te esse asinum, nisi ad sensum copulativum. Hic tamen dicitur communiter quod oportet addere talem coniunctionem *quod*, ad hoc quod negacio neget utrumque actum; ut sic: *non est ita quod*, negacio cadat super actum copulandi principalem, et communiter super utrumque actum partis; et sic est categorica negativa et necessarie, contradictoria copulative, quod *tu es asinus* et quod *deus est*; tunc enim est limitatus sensus kathegoricus, de copulato predicato. Ista enim: *homo est, et deus hoc scit*, significando primarie [per hoc] quod *chimera est*, non est copulativa, sicut nec proposicio mixta ex

Of copulatives.
We assume that every hypothetical of this class is subordinate to the mental act of combining. A copulative, true whenever it primarily signifies truth, is so when both its parts are true; but its negation, equivocally copulative, may be true and both its parts false;

unless the preceding negation falls on the first part alone.

To avoid ambiguity, it is recommended to add *that*; as: *It is not true that A is B and that C is D*. This is a necessary categorical, proposition.

Signs and sense must correspond, or the proposition is not truly

1, 2. Cap. and Initial S desunt B. 7. v^r pro universaliter B.
16. n^o B. 27. after copulative B: vel potest intelligi copulative, ita quod negacio cadat super primum actum solum et talis est impossibilis, conceditur tamen propter sensum verum, etc. 30. per hoc deest B.

copulative, as happens in many cases.

copulativa et alia hypothetica, cuius actus principalis non est actus copulandi, nec proposicio simplex significans primarie eandem veritatem quam copulativa significat; quia ad esse copulative requiritur correspondencia signorum et sensuum. 5

The negative might very well apply to both verbs of the connected members; but it is better to add *that*, as above.

Certum tamen est quod satis debite potest negacio negare utrumque verbum in talibus, quamvis propter evitaciones sophisticas excludendas, expressius sit ponere illum terminum, *quod*, respectu ambarum parcium; tunc non est copulativa, sed kathégorica negativa de copulato predicato. Nec obest propositionem esse hypotheticam, cum hoc quod 2^a pars dependenter significat ad aliam, quia sic est de copulativis quarum parcium posteriorum extrema referuntur ad extrema | propositionum priorum; ut hic, *Sor currit et ille moretur.*¹⁵

As a rule, the relative in such a proposition refers to the whole preceding proposition.

Unde regulariter in talibus refert relativum suum antecedens sub habitudine ad totam significacionem prioris propositionis: ut idem est dicere: *omnis homo est Sor, et idem est masculus*, ac si diceretur *ille Sor qui est omnis homo est masculus*; et sic de similibus quibus- 20 cunque. Nec dubium attendenti ad experientiam quin tali propositioni correspondat actus hypotheticus copulandi; sed isti oracioni, *ita est quod Sor currit et moretur*, correspondet actus categoricus, cum tota veritas copulative intelligitur, ut una de qua componitur, quod 25 illa est. Et si queratur cuius quantitatis sunt huiusmodi categorice, dicitur quod sunt multe, cum ille terminus, *ita*, demonstrat veritatem communem convertibiliter cum ente. Idem enim est dicere: *Ita est quod ego non sum*, et dicere: *ens est me non esse.*

Sometimes, when the sense of the second member is included in that of the first, the proposition is copulative only in form; as *A is BC*, and

A is B. The term *ita* is generally understood as demonstrative; but such propositions as employ it thus are equivocal.

It does not matter in compound hypotheticals which of the hypothetical signs comes first;

Sed ille terminus, *ita*, in propositionibus copulativis accipitur communiter demonstrative, ut: *ita est sicut ego dico*, cuius unus intellectus est talis: *illud ens est, quod ego dico*. Tales enim oraciones sunt equivoce, et 35 ideo respondendo ad illas sufficit sensus primarii comprehensionis. Et ita illa est concedenda, *tu es, vel deus es, et tu non es*, cum sensus disiunctus est verus. Nec prioritas vocem impedit, quin contingit illam intelligere copulative; quia, ut prius dictum est, in mixtionibus intelliguntur huiusmodi antecedencia copulative. Et in 40 talibus mixtionibus ex copulativa et condicionali, nota

25. int^a B. 33. int^b B.

contradiccionis communiter facit ipsa esse condicionalia, ut hic: *tu es homo et tu es asinus si tu es asinus*; et sic est in racionalibus, ubi argumentatur a tota copulativa ad alteram eius partem communiter in syllogismis hypotheticis, ubi possunt indifferenter specificari a nota priori et a nota posteriori. Nec curo sive negata fuerit talis proposicio, sive concessa in sensibus equivocis. Ego tamen elegi concedere illas, supposito uno sensu vero. Et, si argumentans probare voluerit sensum ¹⁰ alium, licet, et satis convenientiam quod arguatur ad sensum illam.

Unde probabiliter potest ista dubitari: *non est ita quod deus est vel rex sedet*; cum, intelligendo illam hypothetice disiunctive, est eque dubitabilis sicut 2^a pars. ¹⁵ Sed intelligendo illam kategorice negative, contradiceret disiunctive ponenti principaliter veritatem disiunctivam. Et si queratur quare proposicio convertibilis cum contradictorio alterius non eque contradicit sibi sicut suum convertibile, dicitur quod in propositionibus convertibilibus est dare gradus. Unde solum in convertibilibus, quorum utrumque ponit explicite omnem veritatem quam ponit reliquum, intelligitur quod, si proposicio contradicit uni talium, contradicit utriusque. Constat autem quod multe sunt propositiones convertibles, tam 2^m predicacionem quam 2^m consequiam, quarum una ponit explicite veritatem quam 2^a non sic ponit; ut patet de istis: *homo est risibile; 3 duplum est, duplique dimidium est*, etc. Proposicio autem nichil significat explicite, nisi quod ipsa vel aliqua eius pars significat primarie; ut patet de istis, *Sor est et Plato est, et ita est quod Sor est et Plato est*.

^{B 41^b} Sicut enim idem est *homo* | et *humanitas* et *esse hominem*, quamvis significatur nunc collective, nunc abstractive et nunc complexe; sic eadem veritas significatur, nunc kategorice, nunc hypothetice; et nunc complexe, nunc incomplexe. Et hinc videtur quod quelibet proposicio, cum ponit veritatem quam primo significat et asserit, quod sit affirmativa; sicut et videtur quilibet actum complexum esse actum componendi et copulandi. Diversitates enim talium actuum propter defec-

v. g. when we have *A* is *B* and *C* is *D* if *E* is *F*, it is usually considered as a conditional.

And if such a proposition is equivocal, it matters little whether it be granted or denied; but I prefer the former.

A negative proposition, contradicting disjunctive, may have two different meanings, either denying the propositions as separate, or denying their disjunction.

But how is it that each of the disjuncts, convertible with the contradictory of the other, is not that contradictory?

Because propositions may be convertible either without adding any explicit meaning on either side, or adding such meaning.

The very same truth may be expressed in different manners, and these different manners add a shade of meaning. Every act that posits a truth is that of affirming; we do not conceive a positive proposition under a negative

10. licet B. 27. ut ³ *pro* ut patet B. 30. ut ³ *pro* ut patet B.

33. ^e gttive = completere? B. 39. quelibet A.

form in the same way as when its form was positive. Yet they may be both convertible with the same proposition.

This shows the truth of the rules, arguing v. g. from the whole copulative to one of its terms, and not conversely.

We must now examine those sophisms which concern pronouns.

Some express identity, others difference, the latter connoting it in different ways, and the former referring to universal or personal identity.

Logicians do not agree whether or no the pronoun stands for its antecedent as affirmed by a preceding verb.

If not, we could not know that a man had committed a theft without knowing who that man was: which is evidently false.

tum nominum facilius possunt concipi quam explicari; ut nullus dubitat quin alium modum concipiendi habet de tali, *ita est quod non est ita quod deus est et chimera est*, et alium de tali: *non est ita quod deus est et chimera est*. Et tamen significata primaria convertuntur, 5 prima existente affirmativa et alia negativa; et tamen utraque illarum convertitur cum ista disiunctiva, *deus non est vel chimera non est*. Et tamen illa non contradicit copulative, quamvis equivalenter opponitur; quia contradiccio debet esse prima et maxima opposicio, 10 cuius non est medium. Ex ipsis patent regule de modis argumentandi a tota copulativa ad alteram eius partem, et non e contra, nisi forte fuerit pars convertibilis vel antecedens ad reliquam. Et sic de aliis regulis veritatum in illa materia.

Istis premissis, restat videre materiam sophisticam contingentem in terminis grammaticae relatis, explicatam communiter intra copulativas. Sunt ergo talium relativorum aliqui termini relativi ydemptitatis; ut *ille*, *ipse*, *qui*, *is*, etc. Alii autem sunt termini relativi diversitatis; ut *aliter*, *alius* et *alter* et *cetera*. Et differunt isti termini 2^m connotacionem; ut alii connotant disparitatem essencie; ut *aliud*; alii connotant disparitatem qualitatis; ut *alter*; et alii indifferenter cuiuscunque accidentis; ut *aliter*. Et relativa ydemptitatis quandoque 25 referunt sua antecedencia simpliciter pro communi, et quandoque referunt relatione personali; sicut aliqui sunt termini interrogativi pro personis; ut *quis?* et alii interrogant pro essentiis; ut *quid?* Et sic de multis famosis apud grammaticos.

Est tamen una regula grammaticae in qua dissenciunt logici; scilicet, quod omne relativum refert suum antecedens sub habitudine alicuius actus verbi sui antecedentis; sic omne tale relativum limitacius se habet quam suum antecedens; ut idem est dicere quod *Sor 35 est animal et illud est asinus*, ac si diceretur quod *illud animal quod est Sor est asinus*. Et patet ista significacio ex modo loquendi. Nam nemo dubitat quin sit possibile unum abstulisse furtive bona, vel talem actum particularem fecisse, cum hoc quod ignoret *quis* fuit 40 ille. Ipsi tamen qui dicunt omne relativum convertit

18. *qit' cous*; intra *deest* B. 34. scilicet *pro se* habet B.

cum suo antecedente, concedunt quod si sciunt quod aliqua res fecit aliquem actum bonum vel malum, tunc non ignorant que fuit illa; quia quamcunque rem sciunt fuisse, sciunt fuisse illam, cum omnem talem sciunt 5 fuisse rem, nec ignorant fuisse rem. Sed ista est satis patens pompa sophistica, qua dicitur quod *ego disiuvcte scio quis fuit ille* qui commisit illud furtum, vel quodcunque factum occultum. Et ideo ostensio talium occultorum non est digna nisi premio sophistico. 10 Querendo ergo a tali sophista *quis fuit ille* qui fecit talem turpitudinem, diceret quod *ego et quilibet homo B. 42^a mundi est ille*: | ideo, cum accusabit se de quoconque furto, significabit se suspendi; vel promittendo sibi quantamcunque rem pro revelacione sua vel labore 15 quoconque, dando sibi quocunque bonum vel malum, habet ipse contentari; quia promittebatur sibi aliquid, et illud datum est sibi. Omnia ergo ista sunt ignorancium grammaticam sine fructu altercaciones bombarie.

And to say
that it is known
disjunctively
is a mere verbal
quibble.
A sophist
would say: "It
is either I
or another
man;"
perhaps
himself, and he
should be
hanged for it;
or his reward
should be
the promise of
something
disjunctively;
i. e. of
anything —
good or bad.

20 Sed pro ista opinione arguitur. Si enim quelibet intencio correspondens tali relativo fuerit inferior intentione sui antecedentis, tunc inter quascunque intentiones duas, ordinatas 2^m superius et inferius, contingeret esse intencionem. Et sic communitas termini 25 consistenter vere in latitudine, et per consequens esset processus in infinitum, tam ascendendo quam descendendo in generibus et speciebus cuiuscunque predicati; et per consequens periret omnis demonstracio vel sciencia, cum nulla foret species specialissima nec ordo 30 universalium. Deduccio patet ex hoc quod, capto quoconque termino quantumcunque remisse communi, contingit ipsum antecedere ad relativum minus commune illo; et sic inter terminos communes, secundum minimum suorum significatorum esset dare terminos medios, ut 35 inter terminum communem ad 3 et terminum communem ad 4.

Arguments pro.
1. Suppose that
the pronoun is
less universal
than its
antecedent;
this implies an
infinite
multitude of
pronouns
between the
former and the
latter, all
varying in
universality,
and each of
them
antecedents of
the foregoing
one; which
would be the
ruin of all
science.

Similiter, posito quod non sint homines currentes nisi isti duo, Sor et Plato; et dicat tertio utroque horum audiente, quod *aliquis homo currit*, et adiungat Sor: *Sor non est ille*, et asserat Plato cum illis quod *Plato non*

2. If only two
men, A and B
were running,
each of them
denying that it
was he,
supposing that

3. sunt pro fuit B.
23. fri'g pro superius B.

6. ds'te pro disiuncte B.
32. conē B.

18, 19. borē B.

both of them *est ille*; tunc videtur quod si terminus relativus sit spoke the truth and that *he* was inferior ad suum antecedens (ut pono quod *aliquis* less general *homo currit et Sor non est ille, nec Plato est ille*; quia than its antecedent, quilibet illorum trium dicit verum; vel, si uterque somebody would still run; for there can be currencium dicit falsum, quia dicit quod *Sor non est* ; assigned no reason for believing either that they both lied, or that one was to be believed rather than the other. *ille qui currit vel Plato non est ille qui currit etc.*) sequitur cum veris quod *chimera non est animal et tu vides illud; aliquis homo currit et Sor non est ille, et aliquis homo currit, qui non est Sor*: quod est contra grammaticam. Nec dicetur racio quare *Sor* dicit verum ¹⁰ in casu cum Ciceronis dicto, quin per idem *Plato* diceret verum cum eodem.

3. Argument ad hominem.

If there are universals *ex parte rei*, every pronoun would simply stand for its antecedent. The universal *he* would be a thief and a king at the same time, since it stands for the universal, *Man*. And knowing the universal, *Somebody*, we should know disjunctively who committed any secret action.

Similiter iuxta sepe dicta, est dare universalia ex parte rei, que sunt singula suorum inferiorum. Ex quo sequitur relativum converti simpliciter cum suo ante-¹⁵cedente, et omnes conclusiones reputare false forent concedende; ut concedendum est quod *aliquis homo est turpissimus et indignissimus latro*, et rex esset ille; quia homo communis est omnis homo. Et sic *aliquis fecit peccando maximam materiam in mundo*, et deus ²⁰ est ille. Et sic, si quis fecit quantumcunque occultum factum, tu scis disiuncte quis fuit ille, quia disiuncte scis quod *Sor vel quecumque alia persona fuit ille*, in sciendo quod fuit *aliquis*. Et sic non fieret sola vel differencia inter ista; *omnis homo est animal quod est 25 racionale, et omnis homo est animal et illud est rationale*. Et sic de multis scole communium incredibilibus similibus.

Answers. 1. We must note that any mental proposition means either its signs or the things signified; when we know a language we generally mean both, the former subordinate to the latter; and the acts of the mind are called propositions, even when the objects for which they stand have no existence.

Ad illud dicitur, sicut prius, quod generaliter tenet regula supra dicta. Et pro materia primi argumenti ³⁰ sunt 3 dicenda. Primo, quod contingit proposicionem anime componi ex intentionibus signorum vel intentionibus signatorum. Et communiter scientes ydiomata habent proposiciones de intentionibus ydiomatum subordinatas proposicionibus de intentionibus naturalibus ³⁵ signatorum. Et tertio, actus anime vocantur proposiciones eo quod illi in immediate ponuntur pro veritatibus signatis, etsi non significant. Per hoc dicitur quod quilibet terminus relativus proposicionis in anima primo modo est intencio significans ad placitum rem ⁴⁰ 37. mete B.

1. sic pro si B. 4. utrique B. 7. vel's B. 11. cic'onis B.
18. indignissim' B. 20. maxim' ma'm B. 22. dρto B. 32. am'e B.

signatam per accidens, et omne significatum per totam propositionem antecedentis: et sic contingit ipsam converti quo ad consequenciam cum antecedente. Ut hic: *animal potest esse et illud est Sor*; ista enim con-⁵vertuntur quo ad consequenciam: *animal erit animal quod potest esse*. Et contingit relativum esse inferius subiecto quo ad predicacionem; ut; *hic homo est albus, et ille est Sor*. Nam *hominem esse album* est inferius ad *hominem esse*, quamvis plura significet; sicut communiter ¹⁰ facit relativum. Sed, loquendo de propositione anime ^{2¹} modi, tunc termino relativo correspondent multe intenciones, quarum aliqua est forte illud antecedens. Non enim sunt intenciones anime primo de eodem generate; sed per eandem intencionem contingit ¹⁵ frequenter tam vicissim quam simultanea diversis actibus concipere illud idem; et sic contingit talēm propositionem anime ^{2^m} subordinacionem diversis actibus esse kategoricam et hypotheticam, affirmativam et negativam, veram et falsam, ymmo contradictoriam sibi ipsi. Sed secus est de propositione vocali et de ²⁰ propositione anime facta ex intencionibus signorum; nec sunt actus tales nobis notissimi aliquales, sed sunt accidentia de genere actionis, firmantes intenciones et generantes habitus per ipsorum frequentem eleccionem; ²⁵ de intencionibus ergo non habemus experientiam, sicut de actibus.

Secundo notandum quod contingit terminum esse inferiorem reliquo aut superiorem, vel quo ad predicationem, vel quo ad significacionem. Unde patet ex dictis quod relativum communiter est inferius suo antecedente quo ad predicacionem, et superius quo ad significacionem, sicut communiter sunt inferiora per accidens, per appositionem aggregata ex signis diversorum generum. Unde sic loquendo de inferioritate, videtur ³⁰ michi quod contingit in infinitum descendere, cum non contingit capere commune quin per aliam accidentalem adiectionem potest intelligi limitacius. Ex hoc tamen non sequitur quod non sit dare speciem specialissimam; quia sub specie specialissima contingit habere quotlibet

In meaning every pronoun is deductively the same as its antecedent, but it is as a predicate less universal.

When we say: This man is white, and he is A, he stands for the man who is white; which is less universal than man.

But in the second sense we may have many different meanings, and one of them may be antecedent.

Thus the same mental proposition may be widely different, and even self-contradictory; and as for the acts themselves, they are mere accidents that serve to fix the objects in our mind.

One term may be called inferior to another in predication or in signification and the pronoun is inferior in the first way, not in the second. And thus there is, it seems, an infinite descent; for however much we may add to the antecedent, we shall never reach the individuality of this.

14. geminanti B. 15. filia^{nō}? B. 22. a¹ g⁸ pro aliquales B. 35. in fimum B.

32. *Predicacionem — significacionem*. We should say to-day: *extension — intension* (or *comprehension*).

Yet we can get intenciones accidentium; et inter speciem et suum
to the last species, for genus proximum. Sed talia non erunt illius coordinatae
after this point cionis cum connotabunt encia diversorum predicamentorum;
is attained torum; ens, cum est communissimum, quo claudit
there are accidents which may be added; contradiccionem esse communius, cum omne posse sit 5
but these do not interfere.

The terms *inferior*, *prior*, and *more universal* mean the same among logicians: as any term has more signification, they call it more common: We must, therefore, admit an infinite, signifying more in latitudine, than any other. But a universal term is more common when it can be predicated of more individuals: and the relation of universality cannot be known to us. If one is infinitely more universal than another, it does not follow that it is infinite. 2. The example given proves nothing: the proposition, so stated, is meaningless, there being no one act of the mind by which we may grasp it. Note that some man is more singular than the indefinite man, and it implies personal supposition. Not, however, in the highest genera of all, nor as regards logical entities.

Sed 3º notandum quod logici habent pro eodem terminum esse inferiorem reliquo, priorem, universaliorum et communiorum; et unum dicunt reliquo communiorum quo ad significacionem, 2º quod plura significat. Et consequenter ponendum est unum vocatum infinitum, in quacunque proporcione propter suum significatum dicitur terminus universalis primo significatum dicitur communior, quo suum primo significatum dicitur communicabilis; et sic communitas termini non consistit 15 in aliqua proporcione numerali nobis cognita. Et communitas termini solum finita significantis nobis est alterius rationis quam communitas termini significantis nobis infinita. Ideo non sequitur, etsi una sit 20 reliqua infinitum maior, quod sit infinitum magna; sicut dicitur de maioritate superficie ad lineam. Ista autem dicta circumstant dubia cuicunque.

Ad 2º dicitur quod conclusio non sequitur, nec foret illa oracio mixta proposicio, cum deficeret sibi significatio proposicionis, eo quod nemo intelligit illam proporcionaliter, cum cuilibet proposicioni oportet correspondere unum actum principalem preter actus correspondentes partibus. Pro materia tamen illius sunt aliquis homo, personaliter, habetur communiter cum intencione speciei intencio de aliquo singulari homine. Et ideo dicit Aristoteles quod aliquis homo est singularis. Et logici ponunt quod signa particularia limitant ad suppositionem personalem, cum aliter viderentur superfluere si non suppperadherent ad indefinitas. In transcendentibus tamen generibus et terminis 2º intentionis supponunt termini cum signis particularibus pro communibus et singularibus indifferenter; ut substantiarum, vel universalium encium, quoddam est universalium quoddam est sale, quoddam singulare. Et universalium quoddam est genus, quoddam species. Sic ergo intelligendo aliquem

hominem, limitando ad certum singulare, sicut communiter intelligunt plebei et negantes universalia, foret verum quod *aliquis homo currit et Sor non est ille qui currit*; sed tunc referret relativum suum antecedens singulariter pro homine communi; quod conceditur ab aliquo currente dicere. Quod si intelligatur antecedens incontracte, tunc cum paribus foret talis proposicio falsa; sed hoc foret verum: *ille non est Sor*, sicut *ille homo qui currit non est Sor*; dum falsum est *quod Sor non est ille qui currit*.

Et ex istis patet 2º quod sophismate componente sic: *aliquis homo currit, et ille non est Sor, et ille non est Plato*, false componitur; ymmo false componeret referendo ad eundem, sic componendo: *aliquis homo currit, et ille non est Sor, et ille non est Plato*; geminando tamen propositionem antecedentis, vel per unum intelligeret, vel per diversos, foret talis copulativa vera, sicut et esset, intelligendo illum terminum, *ille*, demonstrative. Et sic Socrates aliter intelligeret, intelligendo totum simul, quam duo intelligentes seorsum, geminando primam propositionem. Nec est inconveniens, ymmo communiter convenit, quod simillimis signis correspondent diverse veritates primarie significate; et specialiter intelligendo terminos communes contracte ad aliqua singularia; ut communiter faciunt moderni, vocantes singulare pro quo componunt predicatum. Et illis foret idem, *aliquis homo currit et Sor non est ille*, ut si componeret quod *aliquis homo currit qui non est Sor*; sed aliter intelligentibus non sic esset.

3º Tercio nota quod relativum quandoque refertur ad terminum pro suo significato, et quandoque ad totam

B 43º propositionem pro suo significato ad terminum; | ut in exemplis propositis ad propositionem, ut hic: *chimera non est animal et tu rides illud*; potest enim intelligi quod *tu rides illam veritatem que est "chimeram non esse animal"*; vel aliter quod *rideres animal quod non est chimera*; et in multis differunt tales sensus. Quandoque tamen oportet relacionem fieri ad totam propositionem pro suo primario significato; ut hic: *Sor currit et hoc placet michi*. Potest enim placere michi de *non esse rei*, et de eius suspensione, aut alio eventu, et si illa non placeat michi. Ideo patet quod ille veri-

And understanding by *some man* a certain individual, it might be true that *some man runs, and A is not he*; but then he would mean a certain individual, not a common term.

And if understood in general, the proposition would be false, but *A is not he*, true. Thus we can not admit the proposition *some man runs, and he is not A, and he is not B*; for we cannot refer *he* to the same individual man, unless we repeat the proposition. And it is quite possible for two very similar signs to mean different singulars.

The pronoun may stand for the term it signifies, or for the whole proposition relatively to that term;

and such senses are very different; sometimes it must necessarily stand for a whole proposition, for I may like v. g. certain qualities in an

individual,
and not the
individual
himself.

tates distingwuntur. Possum enim odire quod ille peccat, vel peccatum illius, quod idem est; et tamen non odire sed amare ipsum. Et sic possum ignorare quod ille est pater, vel paternitatem eius, quod idem est; et tamen non ignorare ipsum esse, quod est eius essentia⁵ et ipse. Videlicet tamen quod ego non diligo hominem esse in fovea, nisi quodammodo diligam eum dilectione confusa naturali, vel aliter inordinata. Nec cognosco Petrum nec aliquod accidens subiecti, nisi cognoscam ipsum subiectum, cum omne tale accidens sit *subiectum*¹⁰ *aliqualiter accidentaliter se habere*. Sed de istis actenus sufficiat.

3. We answer that, according to Grosseteste, there are five species of universals: some exist before their singulars, and are not founded in them but in God, in the Angels or in the heavenly constellations; and they bear different names. The first are the eternal ideas, which assume only God's existence and His power of producing creatures.

They are in God as an extrinsical pattern for Him to produce by;

they measure the being of things, and we cannot know things rightly without knowing them.

Ad 3^m dicitur quod est dare universalia ex parte rei, et hoc secundum quinque gradus, ut docet Lincolniensis primo posteriorum. Aliqua enim sunt universalia¹⁵ priora, singularibus corruptibilibus, non fundata in ipsis. Et hoc dupliciter: vel quod sint raciones fundate in deo sine alterius indigencia, vel in intelligentiis, vel 3^o in constellationibus celestibus. Omnes enim manieres universalium vocantur ydee, vel forma exemplares, vel 20 raciones, numeri, aut principia producendi aut causandi ista corruptibilia. Et prime sunt idee eterne, et vocantur a Lincolnensi concreatrices rei, nec ponunt aliud nisi deum esse, et talia posse produci a deo secundum ordinem debitum et mensuram, ut producibilitas hominis in deo esset, quamvis non esset alia 25 essentia preter deum, cum sit coetera et correspondens producitiati dei, sicut coetera cum deo est talis veritas: *ista possunt ordinate produci*. Nec potest illa veritas poni, nisi in deo qui est plenus veritate, nisi forte 30 equivoce sit in aliis, in quibus est deus. Et notum est quod illa racio est exemplar extrinsecum iuxta quod deus producit, cum non possit producere illas, nisi secundum suam producivitatem. Ideo sunt cause principiantes et numerantes, hoc est, mensurantes *esse* rei; et 35 illas oportet cognoscere cognoscendo res. Quis, rogo, cognosceret hominem debite, nisi precognoscendo quod est causabilis a deo 2^m debitam habitudinem ad alias partes mundi? et illa causabilitas est ydea primi modi.

11. a'qua^r acci^r B. 16. corrupti^{b9} B. 21. (p*n*a¹) *pro* principia B.

23. f'r^tl *pro* rei B. 26. esse B. 28. produc*t*e B. 34. c*c* *pro* cause B. 35. r'r^t *pro* rei B.

Causabilitas vero correspondens causativitati intelligentie est universale ^{2^o} modi. Sed causabilitas correspondens causativitati orbis celestis est universale ^{3^o} modi. Unde universalia primi modi dicuntur nunc in ⁵ predicacione materiali esse deus, quia nullum alium ponunt esse, nunc distingwi ^{2^m} rationem ab invicem et a deo, cum sint raciones formaliter diverse, sed nec substancialiter nec accidentia; et nunc dicuntur esse homines, quia sunt potentie ex quibus homines fiunt.

B 44^a Et ad istum sensum dicunt philosophi | quod quelibet creatura fuit eternaliter in deo in sua ratione.

Sed preter illa tria est dare universales substancias fundatas in singularibus: ut *esse hominem* est veritas, ymmo necessitas communis cuilibet hominum: et illa ¹⁵ veritas est species specialissima. Sed plebei et bruta, cognoscendo hominem in suis accidentibus, ut per figuram, vocem et alias proprietates accidentales, etsi cognoscant confuse hominem seu speciem illam, tamen primo cognoscunt accidentis vel proprium, posterius ²⁰ specie; et illud vocat Lincolniensis universale ^{5^o} modi.

Et de aliis speciebus universalium Porphyrii et suis distinctionibus dictum est superius.

Nec dubito quin, concedendo veritates correspondere quibuscumque propositionibus veris, concedendum est ²⁵ communiter illa universalia esse; ut hec proposicio necessaria, *homo est*, significat primarie veritatem; et, cum sit necesse illam esse, patet quod oportet distinguere tanquam priorem a quacunque tali veritate, *illum hominem esse*. Et illam veritatem suppono esse essentiam, naturam, vel speciem humanam. Et propter ignoranciam talium universalium lapsi sunt moderni in multos errores; ut aliqui negant terminos universales, aliqui dicunt quod non est signare quid talis terminus communis significat: et sic nulla talis proposicio significat primarie sicut est. Aliqui dicunt quod illa proposicio, *homo est*, singulum hominem significat esse; et sic quelibet proposicio significat primarie sicut non est. Alii dicunt quod est dare qualiter ex parte rei primarie significat talis proposicio, sicut illud, *qualiter*, ³⁵ non est ens. Sed ipsi peccant in noticia significacionis

The second and third species are passive potentialities. The first universals are in one sense identical with God, in another distinct from Him and from one another, but neither substances nor accidents. There are also universal substances founded upon individuals; as humanity is common to all men; but the people and brutes know man only by his external activities, which knowledge produces a fifth kind of universals.

These universals must then be granted; for the necessity of man's existence must be distinguished from the fact of this or that man existing. Ignorance of this has led the moderns into many errors. Some say that Man exists has no signification; others that it signifies a singular man; which denies it to mean as it is. Others admit that it means as it is;

1. *cath^o* pro causativitati B. 3. *cav^o* B. 5. *mlij* pro materiali B;
ib. nullam aliam B. 6. *pou^o* B. 9. *pou^e* B. 21. *pori* B.

but say that as termini, cum ens sit commune ad omne ens predicable, et omne significatum propositionis; ut patet 4^o metaphisice 2^o, et 5^o metaphisice capitulo de ente; et 6^o metaphisice c^o 2^o.

We, therefore, deny the three first conclusions of the last argument, because the supposition of the antecedent is personal and not essential. But we admit the last: there is no difference in saying *That man is, is necessary; or It is necessary for man to be;* for the supposition is not personal, but essential.

Suppositis ergo omnibus istis delineatis a logica, patet 5 quod tales veritates, *hominem esse producibilem, hominem esse* etc. sunt; et illas suppono denominari per talia abstracta, *producibilitas hominis, essencia hominis*, etc. Et illa sunt universalia que ego pono, sicut et antiqui concorditer posuerunt. Et tunc ad 3^s primas conclusiones dicitur quod sunt negande, eo quod antecedens relativi stat personaliter per limitacionem signi particularis et predicti personalis. Ideo relativum refert ipsum personaliter et non simpliciter. Sed ultima conclusio est concedenda, cum eque contingit intelligere 15 terminum communem supponere confuse tantum a parte subjecti sicut a parte predicti, precedente termino confundente; sicut conceditur quod *hominem esse*, est necessarium; sic quod necessarium est *hominem esse*. Et talis supposicio in sensu composito, ubi non est 20 signare singulare pro quo proposicio verificatur, sed propter primarium significatum termini, est una manieres suppositionis simplicis. Sicut ergo predicacione speciei *plures homines sunt unus homo*, quia communis homo, sic *animal est omne animal*, sicut omne animal est 25 animal. Et sophismata que videntur sonare in oppositum sunt in onus logico, impediencia eum ad breviter et faciliter loquendum, et intelligendum sapienciam antiquorum. |

And in this sense many men are one, and an animal is every animal.

Different authors have answered these objections differently; and as some abandon the position because of the difficulty of answering, I will subjoin the usual problems and solutions.

I. How can we distinguish universals from each other and from their singulars?

Sed ulterius notandum quod diversimode inventi sunt B 44^b auctores respondere ad evidencias factas contra illam posicionem. Et credo quod difficultas distingwendi probabilius in ista materia, et apparentia inconsonancie conclusionum sequencium quo ad vulgus, fecit multos dimittere illam posicionem. Unde recitabo communes 35 rationes et responsiones in illa materia, ut veritas magis appareat. Videtur quod, si tale universale sit quodlibet eius inferius, tunc non distingwuntur universalia ad invicem vel a singularibus; cum omne singulariter sit species specialissima, genus intermedium et 40

5. delnat^o B. 12. p^r pro personaliter B. 16. tm pro tantum B.
27. in on^s pro in onus B; ib. eu, or^{eu} B.

1. See *De Ente Predicamentali* p. 1, l. 1, 2; p. 2, l. 27.

genus generalissimum; et per consequens conversim e contra non est genus vel species, nisi singularis. In illa materia est duplex responsio. Prima negat universale esse singulare et speciem esse genus generalissimum, 5 vel sic mixtim; quia, cum termini tales 2^e intenciones limitant ad suppositionem simplicem solum pro illis que primo significant, patet quod, sicut raciones illorum significant seu differunt, sic et illa; nec sunt illa universalia a singularibus separata, sed insunt illis; non tamen sunt 10 illa. Et illa responsio satis tollit evidencias supradictas.

Sed alia est responsio, concedens omne universale esse quocunque eius inferius, quia termini tales 2^e intencionis possunt supponere suppositione simplici generali, ut hic: *animal predicatur*, demptis speciebus; vel suppositione simplici speciali, ut hic: *animal est species specialissima*; suppositione personali; ut hic: *animal est Sor.* Nec impeditur termini 2^e intencionis tales suppositiones, existentibus aliis extremis, proporcionatis ad tales suppositiones. Et isto modo invenies auctores 15 sepe loquentes, ponentes universalia multiplicari numerosius in suis singularibus. Et totum universale per hoc differt a toto integrali, quod ipsum est eius pars subiectiva, et non totum integrale est eius pars; quia aliter non vere predicaretur genus de sua specie, nec 20 universale se haberet ad sua singularia sicut essentia trina se habet ad sua supposita. Et sic, demptis evidenciis, quantum ad eleccionem responsionis in illa materia, non dubium quin intricacio non est in reipsa, sed in signis. Nec dubium quin ille due responsiones 25 non contradicunt; sed eadem est sentencia tenendi utriusque. Teneo ergo 2^{am} responsionem, que est communicacionis; et cum hoc dico quod est differencia universalium, ut prius dictum est.

Unde, pro responsione notandum quod tripliciter 30 accipitur differencia: primo modo, pro quacunque accidentalis proprietate, sive separabili, ut accidentia generum, sive inseparabili, ut passiones per se inexistentes. Secundo modo accipitur pro speciali qualitate, que 35 non est substancia, sed principium substancie, sicut *racionalis*. Sed 3^o modo accipitur pro relacione, que est, unum differre a reliquo. Et sic differencie duorum

Some say that singulars are not properly species and genera, since these cannot receive personal supposition. Thus these universals are *in them*, but are not *they*.

Another solution is that the universal is each of its particulars, but with different suppositions.

It is in this sense that the Universal is said to be multiplied in its individuals. A universal whole is a subjective part of an integral whole, and not vice versa.

So the difficulty is not in the things themselves, but verbal and though both answers come to the same, I prefer the second as more convenient in debate.

Difference may mean any accidental property, or any specific quality, constitutive of a substance, or the relation of non-identity between two things.

33. 8^o (d^o?) pro differencia B. 37. 9 grūn B.

35. See *De Ente Predicamentali*, p. 32, l. 5.

Again two may priorum modorum affirmant differenciam ^{3ⁱⁱ} modi. differ totally, as ^{2^o} notandum quod tripliciter dicuntur aliqua differre individuals, or ab invicem: vel totaliter ^{2^m} essenciam, sicut duo individua vel due species incomunicantes, ut *Sor* et *Plato*, *homo* et *asinus*; vel ^{2^o} parcialiter, ut ¹ vel duo ⁵ particulariter, ut singularia que communicant in partibus ^{B 45^a} integralibus, et universalia que communicant in partibus subiectivis: quomodo differunt *corpus Sortis* et *medietas Sortis*, et *animal* et *homo*. Sed tertio dicuntur aliqua differre secundum rationem, quando eadem est ¹⁰ essencia utriusque, sed raciones formales sunt diverse: ut quantitas eiusdem subiecti, et figura, et superficies, et eius concavitas. Sicut enim curvitas accidit linee, sic concavitas superficie. Et sic sunt isti tres modi differendi specie specialissime differenciarum, cum ali- ¹⁵ qua differunt primo plus quam genere, ut *deus* et *homo*, alia genere, ut *homo* et *albedo*; aliqua specie, ut *homo* et *asinus*; aliqua numero, ut *Sor* et *Plato*. Aliqua etiam differunt ^{3^o} modo in genere et sunt idem subiecto singulare: ut *figura Sortis* et *eius quantitas*; eadem tamen ²⁰ est essencia utriusque, quia *Sor*. Essencia enim famose vocatur substancia que potest per se subsistere, licet quandoque cuiuscunque predicamenti species vocetur essencia, sicut et substancia, respectu sui accidentis. Aliqua autem differunt et secundum rationem, dum ²⁵ sunt idem singulare; ut *memoria* anime, et *ratio* eiusdem. Memoria enim, racio et voluntas, sunt una anima in numero et differunt inter se. Aliquando non differunt ^{2^m} rationem, dum unum sit subiectum alterius, sic quod forma dicit idem subiectum et superaddit modum ³⁰ vel rationem; sive forma sit accidentis accidentaliter inexistens, ut *albedo*, sive accidentis per se inexistens, ut *passio*, sive substancialis qualitas per se ^{1^o} inexistens;

Some differ more than generically, some generically, some specifically, and some individually.
And some, though differing specifically, may be identical with the same subject.

Some differ only logically, while they are the same singular being; as the mind is memory, reason and will.

1. Multipliciter aliqua different in marg. B. 5, 6. Another handwriting from the words vel duo partici^m B. 13. sua pro eius corr. B. 14. ut^e pro et sic B. 25. in; a' above B. 28, 29. Aliquando — alterius in marg. B.

5, 6. The second handwriting (from f. 45^a to f. 122^a) is illegible rather on account of its being very close and much abbreviated than from careless penmanship; while the third (f. 122^a to 176) is just the contrary. The first is fairly good. From f. 45^a to 122^a there are many marginal notes, very few of any value. — *Ut vel duo particulariter* is evidently a duplication, including a mistake. I have left it in the text because the page begins with those words.

ut *racionalitas* inest homini; et quodlibet illorum dicit eandem essenciam in numero.

Sed 4º dicuntur aliqua secundum rationem [differre,] etsi dicant precise eandem essenciam et predicentur de 5 se invicem, secundum equum ambitum. Sed raciones diverse insunt illis; ut existente unica fenice, tunc fenix universalis differt a illa, non subiecto sed racione, cum illa sit incommunicabilis et fenix communis est communicabilis et illa apud aliquos vocatur distinctio et 10 non differencia. Et per ista dicitur quod genus differt a sua specie secundum partem, cum sit reliqua species, que totaliter dividitur a priori specie; sicut homo communis per aliquid singulare differt a Sor, et tamen est Sor; et econtra Sor differt ab homine communis, 15 non secundum suppositum, sed secundum rationem, cum sit communicabilis, et homo communis est incommunicabilis; et sic homo communis dupliciter differt a Sorte, quia et secundum suppositum et secundum rationem.

Et si dicatur quod si Sor differt ab homine communis, 20 tunc non est homo communis, iuxta exponentes dictas tractatu proximo; dicitur quod ibidem exponitur differencia primi modi et non complete ista differencia, quia paulatim oportet ascendere in tales subtiles materias. Unde sicut prius dicitur [quod] oportet resol- 25 vere primum terminum in exponendo huiusmodi proposiciones; ut ista: *Sor differt a specie* debet exponi resolvendo hoc verbum *differt*, significans confuse ad differencias supradictas; ut si *Sor aliqua differencia differt a specie*, ergo *Sor differt a specie*. Et antecedens 30 patet ex hoc quod Sor ratione incommunicabilitatis differt a specie. Et tunc ista proposicio: *Sor ista incommunicabilitate differt a specie*, debet exponi, ut superius dictum est: *Sor ista incommunicabilitate est, et species est, et Sor ista incommunicabilitate non est species*. 35 Igitur etc. Nec sequitur: *ista incommunicabilitate vel individuatione Sor est ille homo*; ergo, *secundum illam est species*; et conformiter dicitur ad omnia similia.

2º dubitatur si ens transcendens sit commune ad deum et ad omnia creata, ut supra dictum est. Et

There is yet another difference (called also a distinction without a difference), as between the universal and the individual phoenix; there can be only one of each, but the former is communicable to successive singulars, and the other not. It is by this difference that the genus differs from its species, and the universal from the individual man.

According to the last treatise, if A differs from the universal man, he is not the universal man; but I then purposely avoided going into all the details of these differences, on account of the difficulty of the matter. But it is clear that A must differ, if he is incommunicable and the universal not; as may be set forth by exposition.

H. Iv
transcendent
Being common
both to God
and creatures?

2. *ea*⁵ pro eandem B. 3. *differre deest* B. 4, 5. *de se*⁵ = *de se ipsis?* B. 16. *incommunicabilis* B. 23. *paulatim* B. 24. *quod deest* B. 26. *sse* (= *specie?*) B.

21. See Logica, vol. I, p. 122, l. 4—16.

If so, then videtur quod non, quia sic foret alia ydentitas quam there would be identitas generis, speciei vel numeri, et per consequens beyond that of summa diversitas vel differencia non excluderet idem genus, species or number, ptitatem, sicut summa magnitudo excludit parvitatem; which can coexist with the et sic de omnibus similibus infinitis denominacionibus 5 greatest possible diversity; and God would be caused by Himself, since He caused all being and is all being.

But on the other hand, the universal can belong to its particulars in two ways; either as a difference or as a transcendent mode of being. The first must be denied; but the second is univocal, since it signifies the same by the same sign. It does not follow that anything besides God is

God: that which is God is indeed other than God; but this is a subject of transcendent being.

So also, the universal man is *that which is A*, and that which is other than A.

All deductions to the contrary are mere paralogisms.

5. similibus underneath omnibus B. 11. *Ex* B. 17. *eo pro*
codem B. 27. nec above ut B.

16. *Univoce*. In the great question of the Analogy of Being, moderate Realists abhor using the very term *univoce*; but their *analogia proportionis secundi generis*, as Suarez calls it, does not seem to differ very substantially from Wyyclif's position. Yet the slightest differences are important here.

ergo *Sor est aliud a Sor*; nec est talis deduccio syllogismus expositorius, sed paralogismus syllogismo expositorio oppositus, sic argumentando: *hoc est deus, et hoc est aliud a deo; ergo deus est aliud a deo*, posito quod iste terminus, *hoc*, convertatur cum transcendentem. Argumentatur enim affirmative a superiori ad suum inferius. Pronomen enim non est demonstrativum in proposito, nec vere pronomen, sed terminus convertibilis cum ente. Et si intenditur eius significatio demonstracio, tunc aliud demonstratur in maiori, aliud in minori. Sicut ergo *Sor est illud quod est Plato*, ita *quodlibet est ens transcendens, quod est deus*; sed non est deus. Nec sequitur, si *deus est illud quod est creatura vel creatum*, *quod deus sit creatura vel creatum*. Deus tamen necessario est supremum causatum, sicut est creatura per naturam assumptam, ut narrant theologi. Non est vis, sive ponatur illa conveniencia in transcendentie idemperitas, sive non; ideo consequens. Philosophus tamen loquitur de idemperitate in genere et non alia.

Ex istis patet quod illi qui dicunt nullum individuum esse speciem ad illum sensum quod nullum individuum potest communicari multis individuis separatis, et illi qui dicunt quodlibet individuum esse quodlibet suum superius, et econtra, intelligendo per terminos 2^e intentionis sua denominata confuse, non contradicunt; sic nec illi qui concedunt quod homo est species et nullus homo est species. Prima enim significat quod esse hominem est communicabile cuicunque individuo hominis; 30 et 2^a significat quod nulli individuo hominis contingit sic communicari. Nam communissime, cum terminis significantibus per se idem significatum sed variatis in suppositione vel modo significandi, propositiones sunt valde disparium sensuum, ut hic: *homo est homines et homo est homo; A videt hominem, et hominem videt A; homo communis est omnis homo, et homo singularis est omnis homo*.

Sed 3^o dubitatur si universale recipit accidentalem predicacionem; ut conceditur quod homo communis 40 comedit, dormit, et facit quidquid singularis homo

"This" is God; "this" is other than "God". Nothing follows, for "this" has only meaning as the pointing to something; now there are two distinct pointings here; or if it be not a demonstrative, it means transcendental being, which is not God. Nor does it follow that God is caused: though God, by the Incarnation, is really caused.

To deny that an individual is a species, because of its singularity, and to admit this in the sense of belonging to a species, is not contradictory: we grant that the essence is common, and deny that the individual is so. Propositions may have very different significations, according to the supposition given to them.

III. Can a universal receive accidental attributes?

3. sic argumentando *in marg.* B. 9, 10. ut dem^{ra} B. 15. spp = supremum B. 32. P^e pro per se B. 38. dūt^r pro dubitatur B.

It so the *universal man* facit, sicut derisorie arguant illi quibus deficiunt ar-
 eats, drinks, and gumenta in ista materia. Et videtur quod non, quia
 has many sic idem esset album et nigrum, sedens et non sedens;
 opposite generaretur et corrumperetur; et esset maius et minus
 qualities at once; se ipso; et sic de multis inconvenientibus. Videtur 5
 if not, tamen quod suscipit | predicaciones accidentales, quia B 46^a
 universals are aliter superfluerent universalia, nisi aliquid possent
 of no use; facere vel ad aliquid deservirent. Nec haberent uni-
 besides, versalia accidentia subiecta illis proposita, nisi inessent
 universal substanciis 2^{is}, que ideo minus sunt substancie quam 10
 accidents would then have no subjects. substancie prime secundum doctrinam Philosophi; quia
 subjects. minus substant accidentibus quam substancie singu-
 lares.

To answer this, we may first deny that they receive such attributes.

Predication is either (1) essential,

or (2) accidental by *inherence* of a form; this latter is to be denied: humanity is not white, but it is that which is white.

Or (3) by connection with a cause; or (4) as a mere extrinsical relation.

Why these are to be denied. If the essence received

Pro illa materia notandum quod duplex est responsio, sicud in prima materia. Aliqui enim negant tales pre- 15 dicaciones accidentales formales de substanciis universalibus, distingwendo primo de 4 generibus predicationum. Alia enim est predicacio secundum essenciam, quando predicatum inest subiecto, sed non per formalem inexistenciam suo subiecto; ut hic: *homo est animal*, 20 *species est album*, et generaliter quando predicatum significatum est nomen substantivatum per subiectum. Alia est predicacio per inherenciam forme, ad quam contingit esse motum, vel inexistenciam quam con- 25 sequitur per se mobilitas; ut quando predictantur verba adiectiva, vel nomina adiectiva substantivata per substanciam; ut hic: *homo quantificatur*, *qualificatur*, *agit*, *patitur*, *locatur*, *durat*, *sedet* vel *ditatur*. Et tales predicationes negantur de universalibus et de terminis ultimate abstraccionis: ut *humanitas non est alba*, nec 30 *essencia generat*. Et sic de similibus predictatis personalibus. Humanitas tamen est *album*, et essencia est *generans*, intelligendo in negativo genere substantivato.

3^{us} modus predictandi est predicacio secundum causam, ut hic: *dies est lacio solis*, *motus est mobile*, et sic de 35 aliis. 4^a predicacio est secundum habitudinem; ut *homo intelligitur*, *similatur*; et sic de aliis relacionibus differentibus. Et tales predicationes recipiunt universalia.

Causa autem quare negantur predictata particularia de terminis abstractis, est ista. Termini abstracti ordi- 40

3. a^m pro *album* B. 17. j^o prō primo B. 26. na^a pro *nomina* B.
 28. *sedet in marg.* B. 33. īne^o pro in negativo B.

nantur ad significandum simpliciter veritates abstractas quas primo significant, eo quod aliter sequitur confusio locucionum distinguencium huiusmodi veritates; ut, cum aliud sit esse hominem, et esse album eciam aliud (et sic de ceteris), quomodo cognoscentibus haberentur signa distingwencia huiusmodi veritates? quoniam, dicens quod ^{1^a} est qualitas et eciam albedo vel albacio, modo, si isti termini supponerent concretive, sicut homo est album; tunc sicut homo est albus, ita humanitas esset albacio; nec esset distinccio accidentum a substancia. Non ergo sequitur: humanitas est ille homo, et ille homo est albus; ergo, humanitas est alba, quia humanitas est essencia hominis; que si esset alba, tunc esset albedo; talem enim sensum limitat subiectum, supponendo abstracte.

Unde aptissimum medium inveniendi differenciam vel distinccionem aliquorum est regula Aristotelis: Si aliquod ens inest uni quod a reliquo removetur, tunc ista differunt; ut, quia esse hominem potest manere cum hoc quod esse album tollatur iam ipsis existentibus; ergo, quod est esse hominem et quod est esse album differunt. Et illam differenciam nomino supradictis abstractis. Quando tunc unum est communius ad reliquum, tunc non sequitur simpliciter negacio superioris de suo inferiori; ut non sequitur: ista potencia est incommunicabilis et illa essencia est communicabilis; ergo illa potencia non est illa essencia; sed bene sequitur quod illa que sunt illa potencia et ista essencia differunt. Nec esset possibile tollere illam regulam condicionalem.

Infinitive tamen oraciones sunt concrete, nec convertuntur cum abstractis, ut: hominem cecum esse est hominem esse, et per consequens homo. Cecitas autem non est homo; ideo non convertitur. Verumtamen in re cecum esse est esse cecum et per consequens cecitas; sed signa non convertuntur, ut dicit Aristoteles. Universalia ergo causant individua, et per consequens multum deserviunt in universitate. Nec sequitur; universale facit illum cursum; ergo currit; sicut non sequitur de deo. Homo communis ergo facit quicquid

accidental attributes (such v. g. as whiteness) it would be essentially white,

and there would be no distinction between accident and substance.

Aristotle's rule for knowing whether two things differ is the possible absence of the one, the other remaining; whiteness differs, therefore, from humanity.

A quality may be the essence, but that which is the essence and that which is the quality are different.

The universals cause the individual, and therefore are of great use; they sustain universal accidents only, not particular ones, and are therefore less of substances than their singulars.

3. Iacu $\widehat{\text{com}}$ pro locucionem B. 5. quo $\widehat{\text{o}}$ B. 9. et pro est before album B. 11—13. est ille — est essencia in marg. B. 22 no $\widehat{\text{o}}$ B.
25. $\overset{\text{m}}{\text{po}}$ usually passio B. 27. po $\overset{\text{m}}{\text{B}}$. 28. po $\overset{\text{m}}{\text{B}}$. 29. qdilema pro condicionalcm B. 31. et pro est B.

homo singularis facit, cum causat illud efficienter; et tamen non loquitur, generat, comedit, et sic universaliter substat accidentibus universalibus tantum; sed singulare substat tam singularibus quam universalibus accidentibus, et ideo est magis substancia. 5

Secondly, we may grant that they receive accidents in their particulars, since they are what their particulars are. The Universal would not then be simply greater than itself, but greater than in one or another individual. By this means, it can have infinite different attributes, positive but not negative; or at least negative only in this or that individual.

Alia vero responsio admittit terminos tales in suppositione personali, concedendo quod homo communis currit, sicut et ille homo; et est eiusmodi cuius est aliquis singularis homo. Nec sequitur ex hoc quod sit sapiencior vel maior se ipso: sed bene sequitur quod sit sapiencior vel maior quam est in isto vel in isto supposito. Nec sequitur, si generatur et moritur vel corrumpitur, quod non est, sed bene sequitur quod incipit vel desinit non esse in isto vel in isto subiecto. Et sic ridet cum ridentibus et flet cum flentibus. Nec sequitur quod sit monstrum, quamvis habeat infinita capita et omnia organa hominis singularis, quia non in eodem supposito, sed in diversis habet illa. Sed negative negantur, ut non sequitur: *iste homo non sedet, et iste homo est homo communis; ergo homo simpliciter* 20
vel *homo communis non sedet.* Sed bene sequitur quod non sedet in illo supposito. Sed alii concedunt quod *homo communis non sedet;* nec ex hoc sequitur simpliciter quod *nemo sedet,* sicud nec ex affirmativa sequitur quod *omnis homo sedet.* 25

I note these answers, because there is often much confusion, among authors admitting and denying the same thing in different senses; for my own part, I think both are good, but prefer the wording of the former, according to which theologians deny that the

Istas responsiones recito, ut concipientur auctores qui quandoque locuntur secundum unam et quandoque secundum aliam. Nec contradicunt, sed equivocant in suppositione. Ego autem elegi utrumque sensum et utramque sentenciam, sed utor verbis prioris responsionis, quia non dubium quin Aristoteles negaret quod *essencia hominis albatur,* etsi ille homo *qui est illa essencia albatur:* ut theologus [non] habet concedere quod divine essencia est mobilis, divisibilis, paciebatur etc. quamvis sit illud quod paciebatur, moriebatur etc. sed est passum, divisibile, creatura; et sic de predictatis substantivis. 30

Godhead suffered, although it was a person who suffered.
Examples of similar

Nec debent talia recitari pro argumentis: *hoc albatur, et hoc est illa essentia: igitur illa essentia albatur;* *Sor et hoc est Plato: igitur Sor est Plato.* 40
Omnis natura universalis hominis est Sor; omnis Plato

8. cuq3 pro cuius est; est above B. 11. existo vel B. 17. argar pro organa B. 31. ner^o pro negaret B. 33. non deest B.

est natura hominis universalis hominis: igitur, omnis Plato est Sor. Nullus Plato est Sor: omnis natura hominis specifica est Plato: igitur nulla natura hominis specifica est Sor. Et sic de infinitis in vanum multiplicatis. In omnibus enim talibus est variatio suppositionis alicuius termini terminorum principiatiivi syllogismi; ut in primo argomento quod sinistre vocatur syllogismus expositorius, supponit *ly* ‘hoc’ in maiori pro supposito vel persona compositi; et, sub ratione qua illud suppositum [est,] sibi inest albedo vel albescietas; et in minori supponit absolutius pro essencia, que, ut illa essencia, non est albedo. Ideo idem est ac si existitis premissis concluderetur quod *illa essencia est albedo.* Cum enim terminus abstractus supponit similipli citer pro *esse hominem*, et oppositum predicatur formaliter, dependenter substantivatum ad subiectum, oportet ipsam supponere abstracte, ut ille sit sensus: *esse hominem est esse album.* Sed si predicatum per se supponeret sine dependencia ad subiectum, tunc contingenter ipsum intelligere personaliter: ut hic: *illa essencia est album;* et illa conclusio sequitur bene ex illis premissis, sed alia non. Unde conformiter dicunt theologi quod et persone sunt *eterne* et tam res quam persone *eterne*, et tamen non sunt *eterni*; quia adiectivum professionis per se supponens supponit similiter pro essencia, ipso significante proprie illud quod est commune tribus.

Quo ad 2^m, patet argumentum quod non est color
in deduccione, cum medium sit commune. Ac si sic
30 argueretur: *Sor est homo et Plato est homo; ergo Sor est Plato.* Et eodem modo non sequitur: *Illa potencia, vel illa materia est illa essentia et illa forma vel ille actus est eadem essentia: igitur, materia illa est forma illa.* Sed bene sequitur ex premissis quod *materia sit*
35 *illud quod est illa forma;* quod est verum, cum illa essentia sit communis ad materiam, formam et compositum ex hiis. Unde, sicut theologi concedunt quod
7^a mobile et divisibile est immobile et indivisibile, | cum homo sit natura divina, et tamen ille homo non est
40 indivisibilis, invisibilis, increatus, quamvis sit illud quod

objections, all solved in the same way:
In all these the supposition of the middle term varies from the major to the minor;

if the supposition is kept the same all through, the conclusion is not against us. Thus, for the *first* example, we admit that the essence is, not white, but something white; which distinction occurs in the mystery of the Trinity.

For the second we cannot argue, from the fact that two things agree, that they are identical, v.g. matter and form are each of them the compound body; yet matter is not form.

Man is the divine nature (in Christ), yet he is not increase, and thus the communicable universal is

I. hominis in marg. B.

15. appō pro oppositum B. 29. om̄e ero commune B.

S. homo pro hoc B.

10 est deest B.

29. *quæ pro commune B.*

incommunicable in its subjects, but not in its nature

And thus, immovable in itself and movable in its subjects; and when we say: *that nature is extended, seen, &c.*, we should convert it so: *the nature that is extended, seen, &c., is that nature,* and the adjective, attributed thus to the subject, makes one verb.

est huiusmodi; sic communicabilis universalis, quia natura communicabilis, est incommunicabilis, quia tam res quam persona incommunicabilis; et tamen illa natura communicabilis non est tantum natura incommunicabilis. Et conformiter conceditur quod illud quod non potest 5 moveri est mobile, quia res mobilis; et tamen illa res non est mobilis. Unde illa proposicio debet sic converti: *natura mobilis est illa res;* et illa: *natura extensis, visa etc. est illa natura.* Et eodem modo de 10 negativis, ut est illa: *nulla natura communis est incommunicabilis,* debet sic converti: *nulla essentia incommunicabilis est natura communis,* quorum utrumque est verum. Cum tamen illa natura est res incommunicabilis, quia persona incommunicabilis, quia quandoque adiectivum 15 appositum substantivatur per suppositum, tunc equivalet ac si verbum adiectivum predicaretur in adiacens: ut, si *homo est quantus, albus, relatus, etc.* tunc *homo quantificatur, albificatur, refertur, etc.* Sed hoc non oportet, quando predicatum substantivatur per se. Unde 20 peheles in absoluto dicit quod ex significato adiectivi appositi et significato substantivi suppositi implicatur fieri una *usia*, sicut fit ex materia et forma, non sicut quando predicatum non substantivatur per subiectum. Et illud est cum diligencia inprimendum. 25

For the third: Quo ad 3^m argumentum, patet quod non sequitur; it is quite true that of two sed ex illis premissis bene sequitur quod *omnis Plato individual men, A and B, both sit idem Sorti vel illud quod est Sor,* et hoc est verum; are *that which* sed non sequitur, si *Sor est illud quod est Plato;* ergo but not that *Sor est Plato,* sicut non sequitur: *materia est illud* 30

A is B, no more than for matter and form. *quod est forma: ergo materia est forma.* Nec sequitur: *illud est omne quod est ille; ignis est illa ignetas; ergo* The nature v. g. of fire, being made up of three different factors, we cannot conclude that each of them is forma. Unde, quamvis ille ignis sit *alius* quam sua igneity;

4. tam B. 15. [¶] pro persona B. 16. fbstm^a pro substantivatur B.

20. fbstm^a B. 21. pehelie B. 25. ip'q B. 26. Quō pro Quo B.

21. *Peheles.* I can find no meaning to this word. *Peri Hermeias* seems too far-fetched, unless this is a conventional abbreviation for an often recurring title. 32. I am not quite certain whether we ought not to read here *ille;* *ille;* or *ille ignis: ille ignis.*

materia, non tamen est *aliud*, licet *hoc* sit aliud (demonstrando istum ignem). Nam ille terminus, *aliud*, in neutro genere substantivatus dicit alietatem essencie subiecte vel nature. Et aliter non oportet, quamvis aliqua dicta antiquorum sonant quod unus homo est *alius* quam reliquus, sed non *aliud*; quia tunc, ut dicunt, non essencialiter eadem natura singularis vel universalis. Probabile tamen videtur quod est dare alietatem essenciarum singularium, que sunt eadem essencia universalis: ut *ego sum aliud a Sor*, quia alia natura singularis; et *materia illius ignis est alia ab illa forma*, quia aliud suppositum; et tamen illa non est aliud, quia non est alia essencia. Unde illa exclusiva est falsa: *Tantum aliquod illorum est essencia ignis*, demonstrando per *ly* "illorum" omnes formas ignis, habebit illam universalem affirmativam convertibilem: *omne quod est essencia ignis est aliquod illorum*; quod est falsum, cum tam materie quam composita sunt essencie ignis. Et sic corruptibile est incorruptibile, quia essencia et materia incorruptibilis; et tamen ille ignis non est incorruptibilis, cum possit naturaliter corrumpi. Nec sunt illa opposita: *res corruptibilis et res incorruptibilis*, sicut nec ista, *corruptibile et incorruptibile* convertibiliter significantes. *Quilibet enim homo est res incorruptibilis*, quamvis non *quodlibet sit incorruptibile*. Unde, sicut non sequitur: *Ego sum natura universalis, et illa est incorruptibilis; ergo ego sum incorruptibilis*; ita non sequitur: *ista ignis est ista essentia, et ista essentia est incorruptibilis: ergo, iste ignis est incorruptibilis*. Nec sequitur ex isto quod *homo sit non homo, album, nigrum, vel quocunque reliquum inconveniens*. Album enim est illud commune quod est nigrum, quia suppositum nigrum; et tamen illa res communis nec est alba nec nigra.

B 47^b 35 Quo ad exemplum 4^m, dicitur quod non sequitur: sed bene sequitur ex illis premissis quod *nulla natura specifica est Sorteitas vel individuacio Sortis*; quod est necessarium. Nec sequitur, *nullus Plato est Sor*, ergo *- nullus Plato est illud quod est Sor*; sicut non sequitur: *40 nullum album est nigrum; ergo nullum album est illud quod est nigrum*. Si enim *album esset nigrum*, tunc res

and though fire
is different
from one factor
(v. g. its
matter), it is
not a different
thing.

There may be
otherness
amongst those
singular
essences which
are identical
with their
universals; but
this otherness
does not make
them other
things.

Thus it were
false to say:
*Only one of
these forms is
the nature of
fire*;

for then we
should have to
exclude the
matter, and the
whole
compounds.

Many
expressions
therefore,
apparently
contradictory,
are not
really so.

And so none of
the above-
mentioned
absurdities is
to be met with
in this theory.

As for the
fourth
instance; it
follows merely
that no specific
essence that is
A is the
individuality
of *B*:
as in the
foregoing
examples.

alba esset res *nigra*, sicut res corruptibilis esset res incorruptibilis; sed hoc non potest verificari pro re singulari, quod res singularis *alba* esset res singularis *nigra*; et cum nulla res universalis sit *alba* vel *nigra*, patet quod non verificaretur, qualitercunque extrema 5

If it is urged that the universal man is 'able to laugh' and yet cannot, we again distinguish: able to laugh in its subjects, in those beings which it is.

alba esset res *nigra*, sicut res corruptibilis esset res incorruptibilis; sed hoc non potest verificari pro re singulari, quod res singularis *alba* esset res singularis *nigra*; et cum nulla res universalis sit *alba* vel *nigra*, patet quod non verificaretur, qualitercunque extrema 5

supponerent. Et si obiciatur quod natura specifica, puta *animal risibile* ex hoc quod potest ridere, tamen sit nichil, dicitur quod illa natura non est *risibilis*, sicut nec potest ridere, sed est *omne risibile* et *omnis homo risibilis*. Nec sequitur: *omnis homo est risibilis*; 10 *natura specifica est homo*: ergo, *natura specifica est risibilis*; sed bene sequitur quod *illa sit risibile*: quia in maiori medius terminus supponit personaliter, et in minori simpliciter. Et eodem modo negantur paralogismi 3ii medii; ut sic argumentando: *Quicquid est 15 illa essencia est immobile*; *iste filius est aliquid quod est illa essencia*; igitur, *iste filius est immobilis*; sed bene sequitur quod *ille sit immobile*. Et breviter, non est aliquis paralogismus negandus in materia de trinitate increata, quin proporcionalem contingit habere tam 20 in materia de universalibus quam in quacunque materia de trinitate creata. Et ideo expedit cognoscere logicam de universalibus.

All these fallacies come under the heads of figures of speech, or of the accidental. As: you are now what you were yesterday; fallacia: *Omnis quale est qualitas: omnis homo est quale: yesterday you were sitting; ergo omnis homo est qualitas.* Notum est consequens 30 esse falsum; et minor foret vera, et subiectum supponit simpliciter sicut predicatum limitat. Et conformis fallacia est hic: *omnis pater est relativus; omnis essentia increata est pater; ergo omnis talis essentia increata est relativa;*

There is a mean between *per se* and *per accidens*.

illa tamen essentia nec per se nec per accidentis est 35 pater, quia est dare medium inter *per se* et *per accidens*, ut dictum est superius; et sic omnis substantia etc. significat *quale quid*; ut quidditatem vel aliam essentiale qualitatem; et quando variantur suppositiones commutatur quid in *quale*, ut sic: *omnis* 40

19. a's B. 20. quin above cum B; ib. cōporē B. 30. negandum: nōtu above B. 37, 38. fā z B. 20. gumiār B.

homo movetur; natura universalis est homo: ergo, natura universalis movetur.

Dubitacio tamen est si universale potest moveri. Et videtur quod sic, quia potest esse ubi prius non fuit, et, motis subiectis, moventur omnia que causaliter illis insunt. Cum ergo universale non est nisi ubi est aliquid eius singulare, sequeretur quod universale fuerit ubi prius non fuit, [ut] et singularia sunt ubi prius non fuerunt aliqua huiusmodi singularia.

Can the universal move? It seems so, for it is where its singulars are, and as they move, so must it.

10 Pro isto supponatur omne universale esse ubique ubi est aliquod eius singulare, et sic universalis substancia, universale corpus (et sic de quotlibet accidentibus) sunt ubique et semper. Alia autem sunt ubique ubi sunt sua singularia; tunc videtur michi probabile quod sicud 15 universalia possunt esse ubi prius non fuerunt, sic possunt moveri localiter, sed non augeri vel alterari. Unde modus localis predicatur secundum habitudinem aliter quam alii motus. Contingit ergo universale duplicitate acquirere locum: vel secundum sui individui 20 generacionem, sicut deperdit locum ad sui individui corrupcionem; et isti motus vocantur multiplicaciones vel deminuciones universalium; quando scilicet numerosius vel paucius insunt suis singularibus. Sed 2^o modo contingit universalia acquirere vel deperdere loca per 25 suorum singularium motionem localem; ut, Sorte currente ad designatum locum, sit homo universalis ibi, tam per cursum Sortis, quam formaliter per motum communem. Sed universalis punctus, linea universalis, et cetera que necessario sunt ubique, non possunt B 48^a moveri. | Nec sequitur: *Sor non movetur, et ipse est homo communis: ergo homo communis non movetur;* quia repugnat quod moveatur et non moveatur, sicut repugnat quod sit album et non sit album. Moto autem subiecto, movetur quodlibet quod inest, ratione motus 35 subiecti acquirentis novum locum. Nec oportet, si natura universalis est alicubi, quod illa sit ubicacio, cum sit proporcio secundum habitudinem in qua predicatorum transcendentis connotando circumstanciam communem universali et singulari; ut *esse in loco, esse in tempore, esse intellectum, animatum, etc.* Natura ergo 40

The principle that it is wherever its singulars are must be granted; but some universals are wherever any of their singulars are, and do not move: as, v. g. substance, or body.

But setting these aside, I think it probable that, as the others can be where they were not, they can also move with their singulars; which gives us a two-fold species of movement;

except for points, lines and all those things which necessarily cannot move. But we cannot conclude from the non-movement of a particular, that its universal does not move. Yet this movement does not imply localization of the universal, but a mere relation of identity between it and its singular.

8. *ut deest B.* 9. *fi'stnt pro fuerunt B.* 13. *eius above sua B.*

25, 26. *currere B.* 33. *igitur above autem B.* 38. *infn pro transcendentis B.* 40. *Item pro intellectum B.*

universalis est iustus, grammaticus, et sic de ceteris adiectivis professionis que per se supponunt.

IV. *Do universals, taken with their singulars, make up a number?* V.g. are there three men when there are only two individuals, A and B? For where there is one man there are two beings one universal, the other singular, but each is a man. The usual reply is that as number is properly a multitude of singulars, the universal cannot count; and things specifically distinct are not said to differ in number but in kind. But number can be understood in a wider sense, for any multitude that we can count. Now when a number is added to a term of the first intention, it is understood in the first sense, and consequently the supposition must be personal. The universal, having no personal supposition distinct from that of its particulars, cannot be counted thus. So there are not two men where there is

Sed 4º dubitatur de logica cum terminis numeralibus; ut dubitatur si universale ponitur in numerum cum suis singularibus. Ut, si dicatur quod sunt 3 homines, non 5 existente aliquo singulari preter *Sor* vel *Platonem*. Et ita, si alicubi est unus homo, ibi sunt duo homines; sic igitur sunt due res vel due substancialia, quarum A and B? For where there utrumque est homo, cum veritas universalis detur a singulari, et utraque illarum veritatum est homo. In 10 isto communiter dicitur quod numerus stricte sumptus non est nisi multitudo singularium, eo quod specifice diferencia, non numero, sed specie dicuntur differre is ab invicem. Sed largius sumendo numerum, tunc quo- rumcunque numeratorum multitudo dicitur numerus; et 15 isto modo quinarius est numerus specierum universalium, senarius est numerus specierum politici regiminis; et sic de ceteris numeris communium.

Tunc dicitur quod terminus numeralis, additus termino prime intentionis, limitatur ad significandum 20 numerum primo modo dictum. Unde, sicut terminus distribuens limitat speciem specialissimam ad suppositionem personalem, ita ille terminus numeralis limitat terminum prime intentionis, et specialiter speciem specialissimam ad suppositionem personalem. Cum ergo 25 homo communis sit quilibet hominum singularium, non ponit seorsum in numero cum illis; ideo existente *omni homine, Sorte vel Platone*, non superest 3^{us} homo communis ab illis, sed est uterque illorum, et non esset 30 tertius, nec esset 3^a persona hominis. Et per idem non oportet, ubique ubi est unus homo, esse duos homines. Nec sequitur Sortem esse tot substancias quot universalia sunt eius partes; quia *Sor* est *homo communis, animal commune, corpus commune, substancia communis*, et *ens commune*: ideo singulare non est 35 multa sed unum in omnibus illis; e contra tamen universale est multa, cum universale sit omnia eius singularia. Et sic duo sunt 4 et 5. Et sic de quocunque

4. ponit B. 7. sibi pro ibi B. 8. sicut pro sic B. 22. dist'us pro distribuens B. 24, 25. s'r s'mm' B. 33. p's pro partes B.

3. All this looks like another and aggravated form of the difficulty stated thus by Biondello (*Taming of the Shrew*): *A horse and a man is more than one, and yet not many.*

numero finito vel infinito assignando. Nec ex illa one; nor is A sequitur quaternarium esse quinarium, et sic de aliis speciebus numeri, formaliter dicti, quia talis numerus non est ille res numerate, sed ipsarum accidentis. Sicut plus a man, plus an animal, plus a body, plus a substance;

5 enim quantitas continua est continuum esse quantum, sive sit corporeitas, que est substanciam esse corpoream, sive superficietas aut superficies, que est substanciam esse superficialem, sive linealitas, que est substanciam esse linealem, sive punctalitas vel punctus, qui est substanciam esse punctalem: sic numerus vel numeracio est substancias esse multas: quod dividitur ab illis et quolibet illorum. Aliter tamen multiplicius accipitur numerus.

Similarly with the different kinds of quantity as, v.g. number is the multitude of substances; volume is the voluminousness of a substance, etc.

Sed sic loquendo impossibile est unam speciem numeri esse aliam. Ymmo, sicut impossibile est aliquod moveri 15 sine motu, ita impossibile est alias substancias esse multas sine tali numero, et sic necesse est tales numeros esse; sic quod claudit contradiccionem numeros ydearum non esse. Unitas igitur a qua unaqueque substancia una dicitur, est in qualibet substancia secundum 20 individuam veritatem, est simplicior et prior puncto, cum est in intersticiis, et punctus superaddit posicionem. Sed species puncti, multiplicata secundum puncta indivisi-bilia, linealiter posita, principiat lineam tam secundum speciem quam secundum genus; et species linee, multi- 25 plicata secundum lineas individuas superficialiter positas, principiat superficiem tam secundum speciem quam secundum individua; et sic de corporeitate quo ad superficiem. Et sic omnis quantitatis principium est unitas, sicut docet lincolniensis 1º posteriorum 15º.

Now in this sense it is impossible for one sort of number to be another. The unity by which every substance is called one is in each substance prior to the special points which compose it, and make up lines, surfaces and volumes.

B.48^b Sic ergo ascendendo | in universaliora invenietur pau- citas, et descendendo in inferiora, invenietur pluralitas; ut, omnes homines individui sunt unica species, et omnes species animalium sunt unicum genus; et sic omnis multitudine reducibilis est ad unum, non solum 35 secundum communitatem sed ad unum separatum in genere causandi. Et vere layci iniciati in ista materia ad pauca respicientes de levi pronunciant veritates quas doctores signorum balbuciendo referunt sompniantes.

So that unity is the principle of quantity; plurality being found as we descend to the particular and unity as we ascend to the Universal.

Really laymen, who study this subject know more about it than these stammering Doctors of Signs!

Nec sequitur quod homo communis sit populus, etsi 40 sit illi homines divisim, qui collectim sunt populus.

It does not follow that the universal man is a people; for he is each individual separately, and

1. signando B. 7. ar = ant! B. 11. &c. vii B. 21. int'cos B.
20. ff'm B. 30. v'e B; ib. initii B; ib. losi = layci B. 38. syff signisto
in marg. B.

the people is so *Populus enim est multi homines civiliter connexi*. Et
collectively. sic illi homines per accidens sunt populus, sicut in-
made of points: telligent ipsi qui concedunt quod totum est sue partes,
is not a species containing ut collectim componentes. Et sic negatur quod species
points; and that one species is puncti est linea, etsi sit illa puncta que componunt
many things, lineam; quia non credo quod aliquod continuum sit
does not prove that unity is eius pars. Nec sequitur, si una species sit multa diversa,
multitude. Different sorts quod unitas sit multitudo, vel quecunque species numeri
of unity: reliqua. Pro quo nota quod sicut unum est transcen-
transcendent and numeral. dens, convertibile cum ente, sic unitas est convertibilis
As numeral, it cum entitate et cum veritate. Sed quandoque sumitur
is the principle of number in a substance, which is *one*: substanciam esse unam; et sic striccius significat quam
this is a stricter sense than transcendens. Sicut ergo falsum est *quod sub-*
transcendental *stanciam esse unam est substanciam esse quadruplicem*,
Being. et sic de aliis numeris; ita falsum est quod unitas est
quaternarius, vel quilibet alias numerus.

But if by number we mean anything sive sicut accidentia, sive partes quantitative substancie, that can be counted, we must grant that the unity, essence of the individual, is the trinity of its supposita.

Here there are many difficulties, all of them concerning the Holy Trinity as well as the Universals.

Thus, God the Father differs from God the Son, i.e. God from God and the universal from the singular man.

And then, following up the comparison, there would be three singulars of the universal, God.

Extendendo autem numerum ad quecunque numerata, sive partes qualitative, tunc concedendum est ad sensum equivocum quod quelibet unitas que est essentia substancie singularis est trinitas suppositorum eiusdem substancie. Et hic multiplicantur multa argumenta apud theologos in materia de trinitate increata, ut aliqui arguant quod deus a deo differt, quia deus pater a deo filio differt; et sic homo communis differt ab homine singulari. Ita essentia communis differt a personis non sic communibus. Et per idem trinitas incommunicabilis non est essentia communicabilis, nec persona. Et sic essent queque distincta, quorum quod libet esset deus. Si enim omnis deus est pater, tunc tantum est deus pater, et communicabile. Et illud quod "nec spirat nec spiratur", ut essentia divina, tantum esset spirans vel spiratum; quia tantum est aliqua illarum trium personarum; et breviter nullum esset argumentum in illa materia, quin contingit proportionale facere in materia cuiuscunque trinitatis create.

22. *tintas B.* 30. quandoque *B.*

22. Wyclif here alludes to his theory, developed at greatest length in *De Materia et Forma*, that in all things the essence corresponds to the *Godhead*, the matter to the *Father*, the form to the *Son*, and the compound to the *Holy Ghost*. These three he calls the *Created Trinity*. 33. *Nec spirat nec spiratur:* allusion to the words in Deer. Greg. Dist. I cap. 1: Firmiter.

Quantum ad primum, videtur michi probabile quod ille terminus, deus, nunquam supponit personaliter nisi per limitacionem appositi nocionalis; ut deus pater differt a deo filio, deus genuit deum, etc. Nec sequitur: *5 gignens a genito differt, et uterque est deus: igitur, deus a deo differt*, propter limitacionem suppositorum.

Pro secundo, notandum quod in parte est similitudo inter universale et sua supposita, et essenciam divinam et sua supposita; et in parte dissimilitudo. Similitudo, *10* in hoc quod ipsum est singulum suorum suppositorum; et dissimilitudo in multis. Primo in hoc quod natura illa habet supposita sibi accidentalia, ut sic, inter se; nec illa participant communis denominacione secundum magis et minus; ut homo communis potest carere quo-*15* cunque supposito corruptibili, et unum istorum potest esse sine reliquo; sed contradiccionem claudit essenciam divinam esse sine omnibus suis suppositis, vel unum illorum esse sine quolibet illorum. *20*, universale maius, melius, et quomodo cunque dispariter accidentatum sup-*20* positum habet hic, et opposito modo accidentatum suppositum alibi. Sed contradiccionem claudit unum suppositum increatum distare a reliquo, esse maius, potencius, sapiens, vel durabilius reliquo. Primum tamen est causa secundi, et ambo sunt una causa *30*; *25* et sic est quasi prioritas, non nature, cum sit eadem *B 49^a* natura singularis, sed prioritas originis inter illa. Sed longe similior trinitati increase est trinitas cuiuscunq*ue* essentie create, cum in qualibet tali contingit habere proporcionalē proprietatem, cum contradiccionem *30* claudit aliquam talem excedere vel deficere a ternario suppositorum parium quo ad omnia in quibus communicat.

Racione ergo illius diversitatis utendum est diversis terminis et diversa logica in materia de trinitate et in materia de universalibus; ut 3 persone hominum sunt 3 homines, sed non sic 3 persone divine sunt 3 dii vel nature divine; nec deus est triplex, sed trinus; nec multiplex sed singularis, cum non habeat universale superius. Nec discrepancia vel numerus est inter illa,

6. imitationem B. 20. h̄ B. 24. ca' B. 25. sint B.

24. Causa. This word, applied to the Uncaused Being, is generally disliked by Scholastics. They prefer the more general term *principium* — *id a quo aliquid fit vel est.*

But 1. The word *God* has a personal supposition only when applied to the persons; therefore the syllogism is faulty, and God does not differ from God as such.

2. The comparison between the Universal and the divine Essence as to their *supposita* obtains only in so far as each is its *supposita*; but in the former case these are accidental to it and to each other; in the latter, absolutely essential; in the former case, they may be unequally perfect and modified in different, nay, contrary manners; in the latter, this is impossible. The priority of the Father to the Son and of these to the Spirit, is priority not of nature but of origin.

But the similitude between the increase and the created Trinity is far more perfect than between the Universal and its singulars. We have to use other expressions in dealing with the Trinity and the universals.

Three persons
are three men;
three persons
are not three
Gods, etc.

And we say,
not that the
Godhead
differs,
but that it *is*
different from
each of its
persons.

This difference
is the
communi-
cability of the
Divine Nature.

The Trinity
is also an
essence, but a
plurality; not
a person, but
persons.

Communicable
may be said
either of an
essence,
or of a person,
in different
senses.

Some grant
that the
Godhead differs
logically from
each person,
which it is
nevertheless;
and that only
the Godhead
which is the
Father is God,
and yet not
only the Father
is God;
that the Father
and the Son
'spirate' the
Holy Ghost
as one
principle, the
cause being
equally each of
the persons,
yet not the
Holy Ghost,
as nothing can
cause itself.
And so each of
the three are
one Cause;
yet there are
several
causal agents.
The Cause of
the Spirit is
that of the Son;
yet the Son is
the Cause of
the Spirit and
not of himself.

sed diferencia et pluralitas. Et sic de multis singni-
ficacionibus et differenciis terminorum, ad que labo-
riosum est pertingere. Sic ergo, propter excellenciam
idemperitatis personarum in eadem essentia singulari,
negatur quod illa essentia ab aliqua illarum differt,
sed est a quacunque illarum *differens*. Et hoc concludit
communicabilitas conveniens essentie et non personis;
ut, quia ista essentia est communicabilis, et ista per-
sona non sic; ideo, quod est ista essentia non est ista
persona. Et quia trinitas est pluralitas et non sic¹⁰ per-
sona, ideo talis nulla trinitas est persona, sed per-
sonae: est tamen illud quod est quelibet illarum per-
sonarum. Nota tamen quod *communicabile* accipitur pro
communicabilitate ad personas; ut essentia communi-
catur; et accipitur pro communicabilitate ad naturas,¹⁵
sicut una persona est multe nature; scilicet, natura
humana et natura divina; et sic de termino opposito.

Alii autem concedunt quod essentia differt secundum
rationem a persona, et tamen est illa persona; sicut
trinitas incommunicabilis est essentia communicabilis,²⁰
sed non persona: ymmo, persone. Ulterius conceditur
quod tantum essentia que est pater, est deus, sicut
omnis deus est pater; sed non tantum pater est deus,
quia quod non est pater est deus. Ulterius conceditur
quod pater et filius sunt unum principium spirans²⁵
spiritum sanctum, et unus spirator, una causa spiritus
sancti, sicut et est una spiracio activa. Unde eadem
causa que causat omnes creaturas, causat filium et
spiritum sanctum: et illa causa est tam pater, quam
filius, quam spiritus sanctus; et tamen causa spiritus³⁰
sancti non est ille, cum nichil immediate et essencialiter
causat se. Nec causa filii est filius: et sic tria sunt,
quorum quodlibet est causa; *causa*, et non multe cause;
quamvis sint multi causantes et multa causancia;
sed non cum predicatis substantivis. Unde omnis causa³⁵
spiritus sancti est causa filii; et tamen aliquod suppo-
situm est causa spiritus sancti quod non est causa
filii; sicut patet de filio. Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod
aliquid vel aliqua sit causa spiritus sancti quod non
est causa filii. Filius enim, sicut non est aliud vel⁴⁰
alia res quam pater, sic non est alia causa quam pater.
Aliud enim, si non sit contractum per terminum per-

sonalem, dicit diversitatem essentie; ut filius est alius quam pater, sed non aliud, est nec alia res. Nec argumenteratur ab inferiori ad suum superius: *hec est alia persona: ergo, hec est alia res;* sicut non sequitur: *hec est alia persona: ergo, alia essentia.* Sed nec econtra: *hec non est alia essentia: ergo, non est alia persona.* Sed in istis lapsus sum gratis, tum quia proporcionaliter discordum est in logica de aliis trinitatibus, tum eciam quia materie sunt connexe; superesset [ut] juvenis, postquam sapuerit materiam de universalibus regendam, pretereat ad materiam de trinitate eiusdem essentie subtilius cognoscendam.

Redeundo ergo ad propositum, concedi potest principaliter quod quamvis aliud sit fenicem esse, et aliud illam fenicem esse, cum universalitas differt a singularitate, tamen non sunt due fenices, quia tunc essent duo singula. Nec sunt due res, due substancie, duo corpora vel duo animalia quorum utrumque est fenix; quia non sunt due sed una fenix singularis: quia vel oportet quod terminus talis supponatur simpliciter vel personaliter; et secundum utrumque sensum, falsum esset quod sunt due fenices. Nec sequitur: *A fenix B 49^b differt a B: ergo A et B sunt duo supposita differencia,* cum terminus numeralis limitat terminum prime intentionis ad suppositionem personalem. Ideo non sequitur quod aliquot differencia sunt illa, quamvis illa sunt differencia. Nec sequitur quod fenix universalis sit *aliud*, vel *alia*, quam fenix singularis, etsi differat ab illa secundum rationem; sed erit aliud singulare quam est illa. Et per idem negandum est quod *ille fenices sunt*, demonstrando fenicem universalem et singularem; sed

In this matter we can neither argue from the particular to the general, nor vice versa.

This digression is excusable by the connection between the Increate and the created Trinity.

Return to the main subject. There is indeed difference between the existence of a phoenix in general and that of this particular phoenix.

But they are not two, but one for all that. We must give the term a supposition, either essential or personal; in either case, there is but one phoenix.

The difference between them is not a difference of *supposita*, nor of otherness of essences: it is a logical distinction.

7. *gtf.* 9. *Srf3 (?) B; ib. ut deest B.* 9, 10. *cum; postquam in marg. B; u possint in marg. B.* 10. *regia B.* 11. *pr (?) B.* 14. *quodvis B.*

11. *Superesset.* This sentence presents extraordinary difficulty, as is seen by the readings, which however are obviously insufficient. Mr. Matthew suggests that *regendam* being the technical word for certain obligatory lectures which the 'Magister' has to give after inception, the sentence may mean that he should first be qualified to lecture on universals, before studying the more difficult matter of the Trinity. 29. *Racionem.* This word seems to imply that Wyclif abandons his Realism in presence of the difficulty; but a few lines below he says that they are *really* distinct.

We must also deny any plurality between them, so as to say:

These Phoenixes.

Yet they are really distinct from each other: for every suppositum is of two natures.

There are two other answers

To this considerable difficulty; one consists in granting that universals can be counted, and are many in one individual, but yet are only one with their singulars; another in denying that the universal differs really from its singular.

Let which opinion pleases most be chosen; I choose the first.

cum termino indefinito facienda est divisio; ut sic: rerum alia est universalis, alia particularis; substancialium alia prima, alia secunda; causarum alia universalis, alia particularis. In quibus exemplis Aristotelis supponit terminus indefinitus mixtum, pro universalis et singulari. Et ita respondendum est ad quotlibet media que implicant universale, ut sic, ponere in numerum cum suo singulari.

Conceditur tamen quod omne universale substantie et eiusdem singulare sunt duo distincta realiter; quia omne suppositum est due nature. Sed propter difficultatem et apparentiam illius conclusionis sunt duo alii modi dicendi, quorum primus concedit universale ponere in numerum cum suo singulari, eo quod utrumque potest demonstrari, et universale causans singulare est eius causa et prius singulari, et habet multa que non habent singulare. Et sic in cuiuslibet hominis veste sunt tria animalia: scilicet *animal* singulare, *animal* species specialissima, et *animal* generale; et ita de aliis sequentibus. Et ita unum singularium est multa communia, sicut unum commune est multa singularia. Omnia tamen illa communia communicant in parte subiectiva singulari. Secunda via dicit quod nullum universale differt a suo singulari, quia per idem argumentum essencia in divinis foret res differens a persona secundum rationem communicabilitatis; et sic loquendo facile est videre quomodo universale non ponit in numerum cum suo singulari. Eligat ergo logicus unam, quia sentencia de universalibus est necessaria tam a plebico quam a philosopho implicata; ego autem elegi primam responsionem. Et tanta de copulativis transgrediendo sint dicta.

6. *quecunque*; *quotlibet above B*; *ib. mea B.* 18. *aliam pro animalia B.* 28. *va B.*

CAPITULUM TERCIUM.

Sequitur de disiunctivis tertio pertractandum: superponendo primo omnem yhypotheticam subordinatam principaliiter actui disiungendi esse disiunctivam; et solum talem. Proposicio enim de disiunctivo extremo, et proposicio subordinata actui kathegorice quomodo cunque composita non est disiunctiva; sicut nec kathegorica disiunctive significans. Nec proposicio mixta cuius principalis actus est actus hypotheticus disiungendi; ad esse enim disiunctive requiritur proporcio signorum et significacionis. Verumtamen de proposicionibus disiunctivis in anima, factis ex intencionibus rerum, non oportet illum ordinem observare, cum ibi non sit intencio de sinkategoricis distincta, contra intencionem signi. Ymmo quotlibet accidentibus, tam simul quam successive, potest eadem intencio subici. De hiis ergo non directe tractat logicus, sed de proposicionibus sensibilibus et suis significatis.

Patet ergo ex dictis quod a quacunque parte principali disiunctive ad ipsam, tenet consequencia, cum ad eius veritatem sufficit veritas alterius partis. Sed econtra non tenet consequencia, nisi forte pars ad quam argumentatur fuerit sequens ad reliquam; ut sic: *tu curris vel tu moveris; ergo, tu moveris.* *Tu es homo vel tu es asinus: ergo tu es homo;* et sic de aliis. Patet etiam quod quam vera est altera pars disiunctive, tam vera vel verior est ipsam disiunctiva; non quidem verior quo ad adequacionem signi ad suum significatum, cum equacio non suscipit magis vel minus; sed verior proprietate sui significati, sicut unum ens dicitur reliquo realius. Istud patet ex hoc quod falsitas partis

1. Cap. deest. 2. blank space for initial S. 9. non est B
14. de signalis; corr. in marg. B. 17. 18. 1Bth. B. 27. 1pam9 B.
30. quomodo; sicut above the line B.

Every disiunctive vere non facit ad disiunctive falsitatem | vel B 50^a
 disjunctive made of two inconcedibilitatem eiusdem. Et universaliter hoc: que-
 contradictories libet disiunctiva facta ex contradictoriis contingentibus
 that are contingent is est necessaria, sicut et quelibet disiunctiva facta ex
 necessary, as also of a more consequente et opposito sui antecedentis, ut hec; *tu es* ^b
 general proposition and *coloratus, vel tu non es albus.* Cum enim cuiuslibet
 the opposite of disiunctive contradictiorum equivalet copulative facte
 one more particular; as: ex oppositis parcum, et e contra; patet quod cuilibet
A is C, or A is tali disiunctive repugnat copulativa impossibilis.
not BC.

And of all such Ex quo patet ulterius, cum tam vera est proposicio 10
 the opposite is quam falsum est eius contradictorium et econtra, quod
 an impossible disjunctive. quilibet talis disiunctiva est necessaria, dum neutra
 Thus the parts are less true eius pars fuerit ita vera. Et si queratur a quo capit
 than the whole, talis disiunctiva suam necessitatem, dicitur quod a qua-
 being less necessary. cunque eius causa, et a sua significacione ac necessi- 15
 Whence comes this necessity? tate quam primo significat. Non tamen est dare partem
 From the very meaning of the prius necessariam, secundum quam ipsa est necessaria;
 proposition; sed ipsa est primo necessaria, sicut primo significat
 for it means more than its illam necessitatem.
 parts.

There are, therefore, some necessities and impossibilities more obvious than others; *A is, or A is not,* can be at once seen; but that *A is sitting or A is not,* does not appear so clearly, and we may be deceived. It we take the opposite however: *A is not sitting and A is not,* we see that *A cannot be sitting if he is not.* We can often see the falsity of a proposition than the truth of its opposite. These principles laid down, we shall deal with fallacies concerning pronouns, especially relatives.

Ex quo patet quod sicut necessitatum una est reliqua 20
 patencior; ita impossibilitatum. Nec correspondent sibi iste impossibilitates ex opposito. Quilibet enim disiunctiva facta ex oppositis significat veritatem facillimam ad cognoscendum de natura veritatis; ut nullus sciollus ignorat quin *hoc est vel hoc non est,* quoconque 25
 demonstrato. Sed necessitas disiunctive facte ex con- sequente communiori et opposito sui antecedentis in- feerioris est occulcior. Non enim est aliqua facilitate notum michi quod necessario *Sor non sedet vel ipse est.* Incauti autem decipimur admittendo in deposito- 30
 cionibus huiusmodi disiunctivas, et tamen in utraque est par necessitas, quia quam impossibile est *hoc esse et hoc non esse,* tam impossibile est quod *Sor sedet et tamen ipse non est.* Prima autem istarum opponitur prime disiunctive noscibiliiori, et 2^a opponitur 2^c minus 35 cognite. Frequencius ergo est falsitas date propositionis evidens quam est veritas sui oppositi; et frequenter contingit oppositum quod est ex habitudine naturali-scientis ad scibile.

Premisis istis generalibus de disiunctivis, superest trac- 40
 tare materiam sophisticam cum terminis relativis factam,

15. ea B. 28. anima (z) pro aliqua B. 30. enim: autem above the line B.
 33. non sedet B. 36. frequenter B. 36, 37. date — veritas in marg. B.

ut superficialiter tactum est in priori capitulo. Maior ergo pars sophisticacionum in ista materia exsurgit ex hoc quod relativum in eadem proposicione vel in proposicione disparata refert suum antecedens stans confuse tantum, 5 vel sinkathégorice disiunctum. Unde negantes universalia statuerunt sibi, tanquam regulam faciendi sophismata, quod quandocunque relativum idemppitatis refert suum antecedens stans confuse, et indeterminate, facienda est copulativa ex duabus proposicionibus consimilium ter- 10 minorum et contradictorie qualitatis. Ut, *promittendo denarium*, cum nulliusmodi singularis sit, *ille promittitur denarius qui non promittitur*, sicut et *ille non promittitur*; et *omnis homo est animal quod illud non vidit*; et sic differencia non ponitur inter tales proposiciones 15 ubi relativum in eadem kathegorica refert suum ante- cedens, et proposiciones in quibus relativum ponitur in disparata proposicione a proposicione sui antecedentis. Ut hic: *omnis homo est animal quod est rationale*; Yet and . . . it does not appear *homo esse animal quod est hoc*; et sic de simi- 20 libus verificatis in sensu composito, sicut patet per exponentes earum. Sed aliter in sensu diviso de simi- libus terminis sunt false; ut falsum est quod *omnis homo est animal et illud est rationale*; sicut falsum est de auricalco quod *apparet hoc esse aurum*, et *illud aurum 25 est hoc*.

Sed patet ex dictis superius quod maior pars sophis- matum in ista materia est neganda, et disiunctive facte ex oppositis parcium sunt concedende. Ymmo, sicut conceditur quod *omnis homo est animal quod est racio- 30 nale*, quamvis illud non sit dandum, sic concedendum esset de possibili quod *promitto tibi denarium quem tibi promitto*, quamvis ille non sit dandus. *Promittere* enim facit sensum compositum, cum potest fieri in communi circa aliquid cum hoc quod nullum eius. 35 singulare terminent istam promissionem; ut, *promittendo sub istis verbis, dabo tibi denarium quem promitto*.

2. in ex above the line B. 4. desperata B. 8. tere B. 11. non B.
13. ille? B. 17. despata B. ib. a proposicione before sui in marg. B.

21. alie B. 35. terme B.

4. *Disparata*. Here I have slightly changed the text; but later we find the words *proposicio desperata*, meaning one that entails great logical difficulties.

These sophists cannot deal with philosophers, politicians, or any men capable of speech; their assumption would go to prove the wildest absurdities,

and destroy the very idea of promising, buying, selling, gift, justice or obligation,

and all possible merit, or action worthy of reward.

All this is impossible.
Every meritorious deed receives its reward.

Patet ergo quod | maior pars sophismatum conces- B 50^b
sorum a sic opinantibus reputarentur apud antiquos impossibilis. Nec communicaret sic sophisticans cum philosophis, cum politicis aut cum quoconque exprimendo conceptum suum; ut patet de istis: *promitto tibi aliquid quod non possum tibi dare; vado Romam ad videndum hominem quem scio non posse rideri; ego iuste et provide emi vel vendidi equum quem scio et sciri continue non posse emi vel vendi. Sor debet michi viginti libros, et deus non potest facere ipsum satisfacere pro debito quod sic debet. Sor racionabiliter obligavit se ad faciendum penitenciam ad quam non potuerit obligari, cum non potuit illam perficere nec deus illam exigere. Sor est dicio ex promissione Platonis quam est Cicero, vel quam ipse prius fuit; sic quod sibi est ius aquisitum valens 20; et tamen si ex hoc in aliqua proporcione esset dicio, ipse est in infinitum dives. Promissio, emcio, vendicio, dotacio, iusticia, obligacio, et cetera huiusmodi possunt esse cum hoc quod non ad obiecta terminantur, nec sint de materia 20 vel de ente signando. Requiritur vel oportet ad hoc quod homo equitet vel habeat equum qui non potest portare eum; sicut, ad hoc quod cattus moveat caudam suam, requiritur ipsum caudam habere, que non differat a duabus. Sor meretur amando hominem et tamen deus 25 nec scit quod amat, nec scit sibi apparare premium quod meretur; posito quod Sor noscat in universalis multos concretos esse homines, et faciat actum universalem volendi, vel amandi, quod concretus est talis, qui sit omnis actus voluntatis Sortis; et mereatur ex nunc 30 habere premium, sed nullum premium exinde mereatur habere; sic enim operarii merentur mercedes, sed nullas mercedes merentur.*

Et tunc patet conclusio iuxta principia illius opinionis, que indubie est impossibilis; quia pro omni merito 35 ordinat deus premium quod scitur esse proporcionatum merito. Nec Sor amat hominem, nisi ametur homo; et

4. poli^e B. 8. igit^e B. 16. aq^m B. 22. eq^{t3} B. 25. 2^b. B.
26. ap^r B. 27. noscatur B. 30. exuc^t B. 31. exm^t B. 35. Tdu^r B.

5. We must remember that *a penny*, as promised, is a universal; and Nominalists, denying these, denied that anything was promised, unless in particular.

tamen actus verbi non cognoscitur nisi precognoscatur substancia actus. Patet quod si amatus vel amatum est tale amabile, tunc illud amat, sicut *hominis esse* amat, et illud est homo; quia *hominem esse* vel *natura humana*. Actus ergo amandi Sortis terminatur specialiter et capit suas condiciones ab amato; et tamen solum a signo in anima; ymmo *amare hominis* est in amato sicut honor est in honorato, quia aliter non differret ab amancia. Nec esset talis benevolencia hortata, nisi esset

Love cannot exist without an existing object; if we love this; that a man is, we love humanity or human nature. It is in the loved one that the act of love is terminated.

And as all well regulated love corresponds with God's love of any person, He at least would know who was the object of love.

Sophists turn the tables on themselves; their subtlety merits, without meriting, a reward to which they are insensible. Let us then admit the old doctrine of universals; we shall see that all these conclusions are absurd.

Note that a promise is an assertion that something will be given; it exists only in reasonable beings, and may be conditional on another promise, or not; but it must imply the future.

B

51^a

ut

carta,

voce,

vel

alio

signo

promissionis

primo modo

dicte.

Et

3º modo

accipitur

pro illo

quod

promittitur.

35 Dividitur autem promissio in confusam et distinctam;

in universalem et particularem. Confusa promissio est

[qua] promittitur omne singulare universalis primo, prin-

cipaliter, et distincte promissi.

Ex quo patet quod non oportet omne promissum dari

40 satisfaciendo pro promissione; sed sufficit quod detur

7. amari? B. 9. $\alpha\alpha\eta\alpha$ B; ib. ozta B. 10. am; B. 13. Eieco? B.
13. 14. d^r stiu^r B. 17. sic cum in marg.; ib. ergo sic above the line B.
31. q^roil missio B. 37. qua deest B.

13. *Eiecus*. Probably the name of an imaginary man.

It is not illud quod est explicite vel implicite promissum; ut, necessary to give *all* the essence promised; only what is promised explicitly or implicitly. It is enough to give one legal penny, if a penny has been promised; thus I shall have the 'universal' penny in its singular. Note also that

I promise includes a verb in the future, and may be expressed in many different ways; some of which imply obligation.

'Obligation generally signifies to be obliged' for a benefit; but there are three natural significations of the word:

1. When a person obliges himself without any necessity but his own will; this belongs to God alone.
2. When the obligation proceeds from a superior.
3. When it proceeds from need of a superior towards whom one is obliged: this implies servitude.

There are also obligations between man and man, parallel to the three former:

6. est deest B. 15. debito insurgente et in marg. B. 19. qvns B.
27. fr̄c̄tia B.

indiget servo vel benefacto suo ad eius servicium vel exercicium in virtute.

Alie autem sunt obligaciones coactive, non exemplate in natura; sed pocius sunt non debite obligaciones, cum sint violente contra naturam.

Alie vero sunt obligaciones logicales, que non sunt nisi posiciones casuum; ut ponitur quod tu tenearis concedere *hoc* et omne sequens ex illo; vel quod debeas negare *hoc* et omne antecedens ad illud; et sic de aliis, que logici observant in posicionibus et depositacionibus; ubi [posicio] non est aliud nisi cognoscere quid sit possibile, et omne tale admittere; et post cuiuscunque talis posicionem concedere ipsam et quodlibet ex concessso sequens, et negare quodlibet bene concessso repugnans. Et ad impertinens (hoc est, quod non sequitur nec repugnat) respondendum est secundum suam qualitatem, sicut foret absque casu. In depositione vero, negandum est depositum et omne antecedens ad illud, vel ad bene negatum; et ad impertinens respondendum est secundum 20 sui qualitatem. Ista tamen bene cognita sufficient pro obligacionibus sophisticis; quia imposicio ipsa non est nisi posicio significacionis signi, cui imposicioni est significatum impertinens. | Ideo, post imposicionem significacionis proposicionis, respondendum est ad illam ut ad 25 impertinens.

B 51^b Sed dimisso isto, argumentatur tripliciter contra dicta. Primo per hoc quod, si solum denarius communis promittitur tali communi promissione, et solum ille est iuste vendicabile ex promissione quod promittitur eidem: sequitur quod solum commune est vendicabile in placitis casuum promissionum; consequens est falsum, tum quia communia habita sunt per ante, si possunt haberri, et solum dare vel promittere quod habetur non valet; tum eciam, quia promissiones sunt practice, que solum 35 fiunt per singularia, cum vulgus non cognoscit talia communia.

Similiter, esto quod promittens promittat sub hiis verbis, *dabo tibi denarium singulare*, vel *alterum illorum in altera manuum mearum*; tunc non solum commune 40 promittitur, sed singulare, sicut patet ex verbo promissionis; et tamen non potest convinci quod est illud

violent obligations: but these are not properly obligations; and *logical obligations*.

These are merely positions to be maintained, admitting a proposition and all that follows from it, or denying one, and all its antecedents; always supposing that it be not self-contradictory; and answering any irrelevant proposition as it should be answered in reality.

The affirmative course is called position; the negative, deposition.

Three objections.
1. If I promise a universal penny, I am not obliged to give anything but a universal one; but I cannot give a man what he has already, i. e. a universal penny; a promise is a practical matter, to be fulfilled by singulars.
2. Suppose that I promise somebody a particular penny,

6. non *pro* vero. 11. posicio *debet* B. 31. pmisionū B. 33. v, B.

35. aliqua *pro* per B.

neither I nor sic compromissum. Potest enim uterque compromittens the other man credere et velle quod non sit aliquod tale universale, admitting the existence of universals; nec quod de tali fiat compromissio. Non ergo voluntarie no universal penny can be promised in that case.

3. If I promise something, I promise everything; yet cum non oporteat dare optimum nec medium promissor, anything given sed quidlibet dando foret satisfaccio. Non ergo homo tuus my promise; emit seipsum et omnem hominem, etsi emat hominem if I buy a man, [in] communi; et sic de vendicacione, accusacione, et I do not buy myself, and conductione, et talibus que fiunt in universali circa therefore not a 'universal man'. hominem. Sic ergo necessario est aliquid quod non And if I do, then I promise what I do not promise. Ita, promittitur aliquid in casu quod non promittitur. 15

Anwers. 1. We grant the first conclusion: Ad primum dicitur quod conclusio est concedenda, cum nemo placitans pro communi promissione denarii vendicat illum denarium vel illum, sed vendicat quod demanded in justice is a universal penny, not this or that particular one. debetur sibi denarius: quod fuit promissum. Sed quia But it cannot be given, unless tunc sequitur ipsam, dando universalem, impleri pro by means of a particular one; missionem. Non enim potest quandoque dari vel pro so it must be paid down. mitti singulare, nisi in sic faciendo involvatur universale;

The receiver had, we suppose, a universal penny before, but not on account of the promise: if he could have missione, ideo vendico illud commune michi dari ab it thus without illo qui sic promisit; quia, si posset michi dare illud one, it would do. sine denario singulari, placet michi. Sed cum non

And it is a great advantage to have a universal penny many times repeated, unless that be hurtful from another point of view. potest, ex dacione sua multiplicius habebo illud communem mune. Quotquot enim denarios quis habuerit, tottundis pliciter habet communem denarium, ut si infinitos denarios habet, infinitupliciter habet communem denarium; 35 sicut infinitis vicibus dando denarium, infinities daretur denarius. Talia enim adverbia numeri significant vicissitudines, et alia adverbia numerum suppositorum. Et sic multum confert dare et promittere, more magnatum,

1. \widehat{c} above the line B.
qu^ā B. 27. habitum B.
39. mag^ū B.

ii. in deest B: ib. accusat^e B. 23. pt
28. habitum B. 35. habet tunc B.

denaria in communi, etsi illa habita sint per ante, quia exinde multiplicius habebuntur; et in duplo plus valet habere denarium communem duplicius, supposito quod habitus ille non aliunde noceat.

B 52^a 5 Ulterius patet quod tam actus iusticie coniunctive quam actus iusticie disiunctive, sicut et actus liberalis, magnifici et quomodolibet aliter virtuosi | fiunt circa universalia. Execucio tamen actuum respicit singularia; sicut lex est de universalibus et execucio legis de singularibus. Potest enim dominus promittere vel dare michi dextrarium, etsi non habuerit tale, et dacio valet michi multum. Sed subserviens non deliberabit michi dextrarium nisi singularem habuerit, executive michi dando.

15 Nec dubium quin plebei naturaliter confuse cognoscunt universale; sicut patet de incantantibus et tam animatis quam inanimatis naturaliter intelligentibus universalia. Unde bruta naturaliter cognoscunt quod album, dulce, vel tale sensibile est; ad hoc enim sufficit sensus interior. Et sic negantes universalia, ignoranter conveniunt in sentencia cum ipsa ponentibus; ut nullus negabit sensum talem, *hominem esse est necessarium*. Et ad hoc quod homo sit, nullum singulare hominis requiritur; sed sufficit quod unum singulare sit posterius aliquid et illud, quod sine aliquo homine potest esse; et est tam necessarium et permanenter volitum a deo et intentum a natura; salvatur in diversis succedentibus; et sic est eternum, necessarium, incorruptibile quid, commune cuiilibet eius supposito et ubique fuerit 30 aliquid eius suppositum; et sic de aliis que philosophi breviter locuti sunt de universalibus.

Nec dicet grammaticus quod hec est incongrua: *hoc est multiplicatum*, demonstrando per *ly 'hoc'* primarium significatum huiusmodi propositionis, *homo est*; nec 35 dubium quin verbum sit pariale; et bene sequitur: *hoc est multiplicatum; ergo, hoc est hoc*. Verumtamen pronomen in proposito appellat communiter, cum demonstrat universaliter illud quod est multa; et sic non proprio est pronomen. Et sic invenimus de omni sentencia 40 quam ponunt philosophi de universalibus. quod omnes

So acts of justice, liberality etc. concern universals, but the execution of such acts regards singulars.

A lord may promise me a steed, though he has none; but his groom will not deliver it to me, unless there is a steed to deliver.

We deny that the people knows nothing of universals: incantations prove the contrary. Even brutes know them to some extent; even those who deny them will not deny that humanity is a necessary essence, without any singulars of men being required to make it up.

It is willed by God and intended by Nature; eternal, unchangeable, and present in each of its singulars.

To say: *This is multiplied* is not against grammar, if this means the being of man. And it is then not properly a pronoun.

2. pro inde. 10, 20. vel-universalia *in marg.* B. 28. quod B.

35. pale B. 39. inveniens: B.

All men grant sciolli conveniunt in sentencia, sed errando discrepant this in reality, but some deny it in words; and there are secret depths of this doctrine that acute logicians and metaphysicians alone can know. scioli conveniunt in sentencia, sed errando discrepant in verbis. Sunt tamen multe subtile斯 consideraciones de universalibus, quas plebei et clerici ignorant in particulari, que subtilibus logicis et metaphysicis reservantur. Wulgus ergo, sicut ut brutum, cognoscit sibi conveniens in specie et naturaliter afficitur sibi ex congruencia specifica, que non fundatur in signis.

2. Even when a man promises one particular penny, he promises a universal, because the universal is here included in the singular; only he promises it vaguely. Ad 2^m dicendum quod promittens sub tali forma verborum, promittit communia; quia sicut non potest esse commune sine singulari, nec econtra, sic nec pro-¹⁰ mitti. Verumtamen secundum quotlibet gradus potest tam singulare quam commune promitti; ut confuse et confusius. Nam promittendo singulare primo et distincte, promittitur universale secundarie et confuse, et econtra. Sicut ergo sequitur: *A significat homo, ergo significat animal, ita sequitur: promitto tibi illum denarium; igitur, promitto tibi denarium.* Unde in casu limitato promittitur denarius in universalis contractius, et promissione sic confusiori quam si promittitur cum paribus suis hiis verbis, *dabo tibi denarium.*

20

Universal and singular are terms of the 'second intention'. A term is of the 'first intention' when it does not connote either universality or the reverse in the thing signified; of the second when it has. *Nam isti termini, universale et singulare,* sunt termini 2^e intencionis, connotantes communicabilitatem et incomunicabilitatem. Vocatur enim signum, terminus prime intencionis qui significat suum significatum, non connotando rationem universalitatis vel singularitatis; ut isti 2^e termini: *homo, animal* etc. Et vocatur terminus 2^e intencionis qui connotat alterum istorum, ut isti termini *universale, singulare, genus, species, substancia prima, et substancia* 2^a.

A term is of the 'first imposition' when it has not been artificially created; of the second, when it has. These two sets of expressions neither include nor exclude each other. And the terms *genus, species* universal, singular, are analogously employed for all predicamental beings, and are above them all. *Sed terminus prime imposicionis vocatur terminus* 30 *quicunque, significans primarie significatum quod non est signum artificiale, ut sunt isti termini: universale, homo, etc. Et terminus 2^e imposicionis vocatur terminus significans signum humanitus inventum, ut sunt talia: nomen, verbum, etc. Ex quo patet quod terminus* 35 *2^e intencionis est terminus prime imposicionis; et multi termini prime imposicionis sunt termini prime intencionis. Patet eciam quod isti termini: genus, species, universale, singulare, sunt analogia encia circum decem genera, et sunt superiora ad quemcunque terminum prime* 40

8. dr above the line B. 18. *īvīs* or *īvīs* B. 19. s' pro sic abovethe line B. 21. *āqui* B. 39. *c'eu'c'ēy* B.

intencionis per se in genere; cum omne singulare sit genus, et species, et omnis species est genus, et econtra; sed ratione differunt, ut prius dictum est. Unde iste raciones |
B 52^b vocantur res 2^e intencionis; et res significate per ter-
5 minos prime intencionis vocantur res prime intencionis.

Dicitur ergo quod cum verbis primo significatis promittitur denarius universalis; sed iuxta prius dicta, ille terminus singularis 2^e intencionis contrahit terminum communem ad supponendum limitate pro de-
10 nario singulariter dando, sicut et faciunt signa particulaaria. Ideo non est idem dicere: *dabo tibi denarium*, et *dabo tibi denarium singularem*; quia intendendo primam, feruntur intencionis universaliter incontrakte in denarium; sed intendendo 2^{am} feruntur intencionis
15 indifferenter in unum singulare; et illud principaliter est promissum. Et sic contrahitur eciam illacio per illum terminum: *alterum illorum*. Ideo ex ista pro-
missione est dare denarium qui specialiter promittitur; sed solius promittentis est discutere quis sit ille. Ideo
20 sufficit legi quod cogatur dare unum denarium, vel alterum istorum. Nam, iuxta prius dicta, est dare in-
finitos gradus contrahencium communium suis quacunque specie specialissima, ex limitacione accidentalis pro-
prietatis adiecte speciei; ut, *vir* est specialior quam
25 *homo*, et *anglicus* quam *vir*; et commune ad utrumque istorum est specialius quam *anglicus*. Ita tamen non sunt species substancie, quia ponunt formaliter acci-
dencia substancialium.

Et faciliter patet quid promittitar quacunque tali
30 promissione primo et principaliter; quia illud quod primo et principaliter significatur verbis promissionis; ut commune ad utrumque illorum promittitur, quando sic promittitur: *dabo tibi alterum istorum*. Ista tamen signa partitiva: *aliquid*, *alterum*, *singulare*, *duo*, *unum*,
35 et quotquot similia, limitant ad intellectum pluralem; et ita limitant verba predicata, ut: *intendo emere bovem*, *conducere equum* vel *apararium*, etc. intenditur parti-

We, therefore,
answer that the
words, as they
signify,
promise a
universal
penny; but
they are
contracted by
the 'second
intention' of
the word
singular, etc.

So the
meaning is
indeed
different.

Here, therefore,
there is one
particular
penny to be
given; but
which it will
be must depend
on the giver,
and the law
cannot do more
than force him
to give some
penny or
other.
There are
infinite
degrees of
individuation of
a universal
term.

What is,
therefore,
promised?
That which the
promising verb
principally
signifies, i. e.
the universal.

17. ex ista and dare very illegible B. 22. ^{qm} pro contrahencium B.
37. *apariū* B.

13. *Primam*. And. (l. 14.) 2^{am}. I do not know to what feminine substantive this refers, and therefore leave the words as they stand.

25. *Cummine*. Wyclif evidently means '*combinatum ex utrisque*', i. e. *vir anglicus*; but I do not think the MS. is wrong.

37. *Apararium*, I believe, means *apparel* here.

culariter de illo quem non habeo, et de quo potest esse racionabilis commutacio; quamvis logicus diceret hoc non oportere.

It may be said
that *man*
is an equivocal
term if it
signifies at once
the universal
and the
singular.
'Man' —
including a
painted 'man'
and a living
one — is indeed
an equivocal
term: not so
this.

How can
species differ
specifically
from their
individuals?
There would
be another
species
including
both, and so
on for ever.

I do not
admit that
mortal belongs
to the
definition of
man;
corruptibility
and
incorruptibility
may be
differences
found among
things of the
same species.
The Corruptible
and the
Incorruptible
differ very
widely; yet not
all things that
are one or the
other differ
so much.

A singular *man*,
denotes
incommuni-
cability; a
universal *man*,
the reverse;
man denotes
neither.

Et si argumentatur quod iste terminus, *homo*, sit equivocus, cum significat homines singulares et hominem communem, qui differunt plus quam genere, cum unum sit corruptibile et aliud incorruptibile; nec est illa vera diffinicio, cum unum sit mortale et aliud immortale: dicitur quod iste terminus, *homo*, est equivocus, significando hominem et ymaginem hominis pictam, sed non significando universale et eius singulare; et sic eundem terminum contingit nunc esse equivocum et nunc univocum, secundum diversitatem intendendi per illum. Nec esset possibile quod species differret specifice ab individuis suis, quia super ipsam speciem quodlibet illorum. Nec est dare speciem specialissimam communem speciei, sibi et illis singularibus, nisi cavendum ne sit processus in infinitum. Et cum species sit quodlibet eius individuum, patet quod est *omne animal rationale et mortale*, et per consequens communicat in diffinizione cum eius individuis.

Credo tamen quod *mortale* non est propria diferencia hominis, quia est accidentis privativum; ymo, stat res eiusdem speciei specialissime differre corruptibilitate et non corruptibilitate: ut patet de celestibus et sublunaribus, et de accidentibus eorum; ut numerus, linea, superficialitas, corporeitas, lumen, figura; et quotlibet talia accidentia in celo incorruptibilia sunt eiusdem speciei specialissime cum accidentibus corruptibilibus sublunaribus. Et sic, quamvis corruptibile et non corruptibile differunt plus quam genere, non tamen omnia huiusmodi plus differunt. Sed corruptibile et incorruptibile differunt ipsis proprietatibus, et non solum genere logico, nec solum genere suorum subiectorum, nec pluri differencia quam differencia generis. Non tamen oportet quod differant plus quam aliqua que genere differunt.

Sic ergo iste terminus, *homo singularis*, de sua particulari significacione significat naturam hominis incommunicabilem multis personis; et *homo universalis* significat eandem naturam, ut communicabilis est. Et

15. frpā ē B. 35. pli B.

iste terminus, *homo*, neutram istarum rationum connotat. Frequenter tamen termini 2^e intencionis significant similiter sine connotacione rationis huiusmodi; ut patet in istis: *Ego sum species, ego sum homo communis.* Et 5 frequenter connotant tales raciones; ut in istis: *singulare differt ab universalis.* Ideo, sicut supra dixi, in talibus que videntur contradicere non est repugnancia sententie.

Et si obicitur quod contingit intelligere alterum 10 istorum, sicut et *singularem*, non contracte, intelligendo unum singulare pocius quam quocunque, sicut experientia docet; dicitur quod sic intelligentes abutuntur significacione termini; et frequenter cogitat homo confuse de singulari, dum tamen ignoraverit; ut cogitando 15 quod *rosa est pulcer flos*, et *homo est elegans creatura*, communiter intelligendo illas species sub conceptibus ymaginabilium que notacius in una specie sunt in ymaginativa mea. Et sic facit maior pars hominem, que non habet intellectum elevatum sufficientem ad intelligendum universaliter illas abstractas essencias, sicut docet Lincolniensis. Intelligendo ergo sic similiter non repugnarent illa: *Alter istorum denariorum promittitur*, et *neuter istorum prouidetur*; quia sicut hic non est contradiccio, *homo est species* et *nemo est species*, 20 propter suppositionis singularis mutationem in pluralem; sic nec in proposito, cum eadem sit causa, ut dicitur. Sic ergo, etsi nolim quod sit universale, non eo minus erit, me invito: ymmo, sequitur me illud promittere communi promissione, etsi velim oppositum. 25 Ad tertium dicitur quod talis promissio non valet ad lucrum illi cui promittitur; quia etsi esset dare invisibile, minime valens, cum tamen illud non potest per se dari, deficeret execucio iuris in talibus casibus. Ideo iurista reputaret omnes tales casus frivulos, sicut 30 et casum quo ponitur Sor mereri cum Platone per horam uniformiter gradu meriti ut 4^{or}, sed mereatur Sor usque ad finem inclusive et non ultra, et Plato usque ad finem exclusive. Certum est quod nullus iudex mortalis sciret proporcionare illa premia suis meritis 35 totalibus correspondenter; sicut nec testes possunt per experientiam proporcionare, vel docere quod de facto unus

But these adjectives are not always necessary to make the word man mean one way or the other.

To say that a singular means one particular singular, is an abuse of language; we often think by imagination of some particular which we do not know to exist. Such are the thoughts of most men, whose intelligence is not sufficiently lofty to understand abstract essences.

There is, therefore, no real contradiction between: One of the two, and neither, is promised; and the promise will have a universal object, even in spite of me.

3. The promise of 'something' is a valid promise, but a useless one; it could not be judicially enforced, as the smallest of things cannot be given.

As in the case of two men meriting a reward, but one during only one indivisible instant less than another: no man could settle the

difference between their merits; nor could the fact be proved.

sic alium excessit in merendo. Sic ergo quodlibet, promissum tali promissione, valet; sed promissio talis non est utilis propter defectum executionis de mere nobis cognito possibili. Deus tamen scit si promittens teneatur dare ex promissione tali quiddam, et quomodo tenetur dare.

When we promise to give a universal of which the singulars are of equal value, any of those singulars will do, but none of less value; when the value ut plumbeum vel aliter equivoce bonum. Quod si varies, we are bound to give an average one and the judge's duty is to see that, as nearly as possible, this is done.

When a man promises *every* animal, or all the gold in the world, we may say that the promise is logically obligatory,

but ethically he would not be obliged, because in all such promises it is understood that the thing promised must be possible.

So every impossible promise or vow is null and void.

Nota tamen quod, pro promisso de aliquo communi inter eius individua non differencia in valore, satis est dare quocunque individuum; ut promittendo denarium in communi, satis est solvere quemcunque denarium ari-¹⁰ genteum non peccantem in pondere vel figura; sed non est satis dare denarium peccantem in aliquo istorum, stancias promittentis et persone cui promittitur; quod relinquo politicis secundum epiketiam iudicandum. Ut, promittendo lignum vel bovem in specie, habet iudex proporcionare valorem individui dandi ad circumstan-¹⁵ cias [et] particularitates []. Et in talibus satis est quod iudex arbitretur, iuxta suum credere, arbitrio propinquu veritati, quia non tenemur, cum non sufficiamus arbitrari iustum simpliciter. Et taliter arbitrandum est quando promittitur aliiquid in genere; ut si sic: *dabo tibi unum animal*. Et, si queratur quantum debet dari, pro-²⁰ mittendo universaliter, distributo termino significante promissum: ut sic dicendo: *dabo tibi omne aurum mundi*, dicitur quod multe promissiones huiusmodi sunt inanes. Ideo sufficit logico dicere quod de veritate significacionis esset solvendum. Sufficit ergo quod pro tempore con-²⁵ gruo detur omne aurum quod fuerit in mundo pro tunc. Et patet quante differt universaliter promittere aut confuse. Et si ulterius queratur utrum illud quod non potest esse potest promitti, dicitur quod sic. Ideo diceret logicus quod sic promittens: *omne aurum mundi dabo tibi*, ³⁰ aurum quod non potest esse promittit; quia omne aurum significatum per terminum promittit et infinitum magnum significatur per terminum, *aurum*. Sed politicus diceret quod, quando sub communi includuntur aliqua ad intelligenda ³⁵

^{7.} promissio B. ^{8.} non est B. ^{18.} hone B. ^{20.} et deest B.
^{26.} v^m pro universum B.

est tacita condicio de possibilibus; ut in quocunque voto vel obligacione alia intelligitur: *si illud potest fieri*. Vana ergo est huiusmodi promissio universalis, et alia quecunque, que non potest impleri.

5 Ulterius conceditur quod fatue emendo bovem in ^{An ox, bought} communi incontrakte, universalis bos distincte emitur, ^{in general, without any specification;} et quilibet singularis bos confuse. Et sic de vendicatione, accusacione, conduccione, que sunt in universali; nec est inconveniens quod quis improvide vadat ^{the universal ox, or any one of its singulars.} 10 ad forum ad emendum vel conducendum res proprias; ^{Is it absurd to go to the market to buy anything in general,} quia intendit hoc, sed confuse; principaliter enim et distincte, si discrete intendit tali commutacioni subcibilia quibus indiget; et sic contraccius intenditur quam speciem; et sic non secuntur inconveniencia adducta. 15 Nota tamen quod facientes sophismata cum talibus verbis, negando universalia et actus confusos, habent cum quocunque gerundivo talia facere sophismata, rationi verbi inclusi; ut: *vado ad videndum*, est sensus: *vado pro videre*. In omnibus enim talibus gerundivis 20 intelligitur actus proponendi, vel actus intendendi. Et si dicatur quod inconveniens est concedere quod homo ^{it is, therefore, false to say that} intendit vel proponit emere res proprias, dicetur quod non loquendo de intencione vel proposito confuso inordinata; sicut non est inconveniens hominem scire 25 illud quod nunc ignorat et cum difficultate adiscit. ^{false to say that going out to buy in general, we explicitly intend to buy our own things.}

Et si communiter delectant restringere tales actus ad distinctos, tantummodo respectu illorum ad que principaliter terminantur, tunc concedendum esset quod homo bovem emit, sed nullum singularem; sed et vadit ad 30 emendum alloc, sed nullum alloc vadit emere. Vel ^{If they choose to restrict our acts to particular objects, then a man, going to buy an ox, would go to buy none; or he would implicitly suppose certain conditions to individualize it; or such buying would be mere foolishness.} 2^o oportet dicere quod in omnibus commutacionibus subauditur "taliter commutabile". Vel 3^o commutacio illa. ^{They think our point of view absurd; but how much more is theirs!} Mocitica est irrationalis; ideo fatuitas sequitur ex illa. Mociterni ergo, reputantes superiorem modum loquendi absursum, modicum attendunt quomodo absurdius esset dicere quod vadens ad forum ad emendum victualia nescit quid emat; ymmo, emit pisces et cetera multa, et tamen nec deus nec ipse scit quid emit, quia nichil B 54^a emit. Ymmo, unus dedit sibi equos, sellas, et multa | talia 40 donaria, et tamen non debet sibi regraciari pro donatis,

12, 13. *sbici*lia** B. 18. *errantes* est sensus errantes B. 20. *ppodi* B.

25. *indiffinite*; corr. in marg. B; ib. non *pro* nunc B. 26. *commune* B;

ib. *delcat* B. 30. *alloc or aleoc before* sed B. 39. *sellas telas* B.

has been given, cum alius nichil dederit sibi: ymmo, utroque oblivis-
if v. g. A horse
is given.
Such sophistry
would arouse
the anger of
their
benefactors.
Accusation
concerns
singular facts
alone.

cent donacionis, vanum esset laborare rememiniscendo
vel referendo quid donans vel magnificus dedit sibi,
sicut vanum esset querere de specie, magnitudine, boni-
tate, et ceteris accidentibus huiusmodi donacionis. Ta-
liter enim sophisticans ex sua sophistica incurreret indi-
gnacionem suorum benefactorum promulgando illam
logicam suam. Accusacio autem est de singularibus; et
de querela in casu de universalibus, ut dicitur, pre-
datus conquiritur de latronibus, et post evidentem ro
noticiam de personis predantibus, accusat eosdem.

Though a thing
may necessarily
not be
necessary, it
does not follow
that what is
promised is not
promised:
because
necessarily
alludes to
the whole
proposition;
and we must
also have
something —
universal or
singular — that
is promised.
I may know
in general that
a planet exists,
without
knowing the
existence of
any one in
particular.

And this
knowledge,
even referring
to particular
instances, is
distinct, i. e. in
its principle;
but not distinct
as to the facts
it may or may
not include.

Sed pro ultimo dicto est notandum quod sicut ne-
cessario aliiquid est contingens, ita necessario aliiquid
est quod non necessario est. Sed non ex hoc sequitur
per locum *a simili* quod possibile sit hominem pro-
mittere aliiquid quod non promittitur; quia actus termini
mobilis fertur super veritatem significatam per illam
propositionem: *Aliquid erit quod non necessario erit.*
Sic ergo, si similitudo esset ad propositum, signifi-
candum esset illud quod promittitur. In omnibus ergo 20
talibus veris sophismatibus est dare commune, vel sin-
gulare, super quod fertur talis actus: ut distinete scio
planetam esse quem non ut sic distinete scio esse;
posito quod distinete sciam quod planeta est, et quod
omnem planetam ignorem esse, tunc scio planetam 25
esse quem non distinete scio esse: est unum com-
mune quod distinete scio, sed nullum eius singulare sic
scio; et cum commune non sit dandum nisi aliquod
eius singulare sit dandum, patet quod si distinete
quemlibet planetam cognovero esse planetam, tunc falsum 30
est quod distinete scio planetam esse quem non sic
scio esse. Infinitas tamen partes celi non distinete scio
esse; et tamen, quacunque michi ostensa, sic quod sim-
certus illam esse partem celi, statim scio distinete illam
esse. Unde planetam aliqualiter scio esse, qualiter nescio 35
istum planetam esse; quia distinete scio *hoc* esse, de-
monstrando rationem; et tamen non distinete scio illum
planetam esse, cum ignoro utrum sit planeta sicut pono.
In proposito autem non est dare denarium quem non

2. bonum vanum at top of page B. 3. i above the line for vel
after donans B. 10. em^{tem} B. 23. que = quem: B; ib. sicut B.
25. scio B. 26. que = communem B.

promitto super quem fertur talis promissio, cum omne singulare communis denarii promittitur confuse. Si autem promittam sub hiis verbis: *dabo tibi denarium quem tibi non promitto*, adhuc communem denarium confuse promitto. Et sic falsum dico; nec excusor per hoc ne teneat solvere denarium, quia in illo falso implicatur *quod dabo tibi denarium*; ad quod teneat, cum sit possibile.

Unde in talibus obligacionibus sunt tria: scilicet casus, actus obligacionis, et verba obligandi. Quodlibet autem illorum trium est possibile per se: sed primum est incompossibile cum duobus sequentibus: ut ponatur quod ego obligem me sub hiis verbis sic sequentibus, et quod dabo denarium quem non promitto; quia, si sic non obligem me, tunc omnem denarium promitto. Si autem sub hiis verbis obligem me: *dabo tibi denarium quem non distinete promitto*: certum est quod in solvendo universaliter promissum, generaliter verificatur tale dictum.

B 54^b Unde in tali casu: *promitto tibi denarium quem non distinete promitto*, et ille est dandus, quia quilibet denarius singularis est talis; et tunc sophisma est simile priori, ut cum distinete scis aliquid esse quod non scis esse. Sed in omni tali casu illud est dandum, nisi quia quid distinete promitto in tali casu, dicto quod denarium quem non distinete promitto; sed nec illum nec illum sic distinete promitto. Et si obligem me sub istis signis: *dabo tibi alterum istorum et quem non teneor tibi dare*, satis bene admittitur casus, quia teneat multa facere que nunc non teneat, cum succedente oportunitate temporis, vel alia variacione circumstancie, insurget nova obligacio. Unde deperdicio, consumpicio, vel alienacio unius promissionis obligat me ad dandum reliquum ex debito. Multiplex tamen est obligacio tenenda, vel debitum secundum variacionem modi obligandi.

35 Unde, secundum theologos, aliqua debeo facere sub pena peccati mortalis, et aliqua sub pena parva amissionis antiqui meriti, cuiusmodi sunt opera super-

I cannot give the penny that I do not promise, for there is none such.

And if I say, *I will give the penny that I do not promise*, I tell a falsehood, and yet the object is

universal, and I am bound by my promise.

Three factors here: the particular case, the obligation, and the words: the first is incompatible with the two others.

But if I say: *I will give the penny that I do not distinctly promise*, there

is no difficulty, for any particular penny is such, and we return to the previous case (of distinct knowledge).

Also, if I say: *I will give the one of these two that I am not obliged to give*; for I may be obliged to give it hereafter.

Some acts are obligatory under pain of mortal sin, and others, of loss of merit.

12. *pōr* puta B. 10. *qp* || *que* B. 22. *ut above the line* B. 36. *vā* or *pā* pro *parva* B.

37. *Meriti*. According to the Catholic Church, merit can be lost only by mortal sin. *Antiqui* is very likely a mistake; perhaps *maioris* (*aris*) would be the right word.

As we cannot always do what is perfectly right, we sin continually. We ought not to oblige ourselves to do anything in the future; and I am not obliged to fast on any particular day; for it might be that my fasting would be more acceptable on any other. Thus I ought to do many things which I am not absolutely compelled to do; and if I gave them up for a year, I should sin continually. Another answer to the foregoing difficulties: I am obliged to give a particular thing; which? God only knows.

All this is but an introduction to the difficulties of this subject.

errogacionis. Unde non est possibile non bene omnia hic facere que debemus. Ideo continue peccamus, licet non mortaliter. Unde obligans se et heredes suos ad dandum annuatim 10 in perpetuum non debet infiniti-pliciter; nec debet dare 10; sed debebit isto anno dare 5 decem. Et ex isto patet quod non est possibile quod rationabiliter sim obligatus ad iejunandum aliquo die huius anni quo tenebor iejunare; quia, si bene iejunabo aliquando, tenebor tunc iejunare; nec potest esse rationale quod obliger sub pena mortalis peccati iejunare illo 10 die, quo non tenebor sub pena mortalis peccati iejunare; quia tunc deventus ad ultimum dierorum limitatorum, essem perplexus, et per idem ante illum diem. Multa ergo sunt rationaliter fienda ad que deus non potest obligare me sub pena peccati mortalis: ut rationabile 15 est quod faciam multa ad que non obliger sub tanta pena. Ymmo, si per annum cessavero a faccione talium, ego continue peccarem mortaliter.

Alia responsio est, concedens quod deus scit quod singulare universalis teneat dare, cum non potest esse 20 indifferencia quo ad deum. Sed ego ignoro illud; et ita est dare singulare quod debo dare, quamvis individuum humanum deficiat. Et ignorancia istius inducit omnes illas frivolas conclusiones supradictas. Negando ergo formam casus ponentes in datoribus in talibus 25 commutacionibus.

Ista autem iam dicta erunt occasionalis introduccio ad inveniendum latentes difficultates in istis materiis.

2. 9^{te} in marg. B. 4, 5. ^{inf}up^r B. 8, 9. al^η B. 25. potes B;
ib. d^{ro}b, B.

CAPITULUM QUARTUM.

Sequitur de sophismatibus ortis de relatione relativi idemperitatis ad antecedens pluralitatis, discretum pro suppositis quorum non est dare totalem multitudinem. Continuation of the same subject: solution of sophisms.

5 In talibus enim fiunt huiusmodi sophismata.

Primum: omnia compossibilia illorum 4 contradictiorum sunt scripta, que vel sunt deus, vel illa non possunt esse. 2^{um}. Omnes homines quos deus potest producere, possunt esse chymere, vel illi non possunt esse producti ab aliquo si non a chymera. 3^m Omnia que deus potuit facere, possunt esse deus, vel nichil. 10 B 55^a 4^m] Aliqua possunt fieri; et si ipsa, vel aliquid illorum esset factum, deus differet a se. Et sic de quotlibet similibus sophismatibus.

15 Primum autem probatur, significando ista 4 contradictoria: *tu es, tu non es. Ego sum, ego non sum*; que sunt a, b, c, d, scripta secundum ordinem; et tunc patet quod prima pars est vera, sicut et sue exponentes; et secunda pars est vera, eo quod repugnat aliqua 20 esse omnia compossibilia illorum. Si enim aliqua duo dentur omnia compossibilia, supersunt alia duo compossibilia istorum: non ergo data sunt alia compossibilia istorum et 3^a istorum sunt omnia compossibilia istorum: tum quia quecumque istorum iam 25 dentur, illa sunt incompossibilia, tum eciam quia perinde alia 3^a essent compossibilia istorum. Nec 4^{or} sunt omnia compossibilia istorum, quia nulla 4 sunt istorum, sed ista, et illa 4 non sunt compossibilia.

Et isto modo probatur quod omnes homines universales similes, equales, socii, vel adversarii, currunt, et nullus illorum movetur. Et omnes ille conclusiones

I. Four given written contradictories are either God or impossible. II. Impossibility of the production of man by God. III. All is God, or all things are identical. IV. God would differ from Himself by creation.

L.

Demonstration. Take four such; A is B, A is not B; C is D, C is not D. A and C, B and D are two couples that can coexist; but the couples A and B, C and D cannot coexist.

Thus the four: A, B, C and D are and are not possible at the same time.

This reasoning, extended, applies to universals that must exist at the same

1. Cap. *deest*, space for initial S. 3. pl^ūis B. 9. chy^e B. 10. chy^a B.

12. ab al.B; ib. 4^m *deest* B. 24—26. istorum—essent in marg. B. 26. pū, B.

time; yet the coexistence of some of them at the same time implies contradiction.

probantur per hoc quod nulla talia possunt esse omnia talia qualia exigent conclusiones. Contra illas conclusiones argumentatur supponendo duo: primo quod omne relativum restringit suum antecedens ad kategorice supponendum. Aliter enim non plus posset esse 5 suum antecedens quam adverbium vel aliud synkatheticum. Et hoc pretendit illa posicio, ponens vere quod omne relativum idemtatis reflectans significacionem super suum antecedens significat idem quod suum antecedens; ut si omnis homo est animal et ille 10 currit, tunc ille qui est omnis homo currit. Per hoc enim probatur quod falsum est omnia compossibilita istorum esse, et illa esse finita vel infinita, eo quod tunc illa que sunt omnia compossibilita istorum sunt huiusmodi et finita: illud fundat omnes conclusiones 15 huius materie.

Every object of thought may be indicated by a demonstrative pronoun: if not, these and those are to be excepted; which is itself an indication.

2°; supponatur quod quecunque significanda sint, sive finita vel infinita, sive possibilia sive impossibilia, sunt demonstrabilia, ut illud patet expositorie; quia aliter esset dandum de aliquibus quod illa non sunt 20 demonstrabilia. Sed, negando quod illa possunt demonstrari, vel concedendo quod *illa non possunt demonstrari*, satis implicatur per subiectum huius propositionis 'demonstrari illa que data sunt non posse demonstrari.'

Ideo tam expositorie quam inductive patet supposicia.²⁵

Things that cannot exist, may be thus indicated, since they can be known to the mind.

These may be pointed out in particular, and infinite others. For the number of things compossible is infinite.

Similiter, aliqua que non possunt esse, possunt demonstrari, cum possunt intellectui notari; et eadem ratione omnia que non possunt esse: ergo nulla impossibilitas existendi impedit demonstrabilitatem. Et ex istis patet quod hoc verbum *demonstrari*, est summe 30 ampliativum, ita quod sequitur: *omnes homines demonstrantur, igitur omnes homines qui possunt esse vel qui non possunt esse demonstrantur*. Et forte deus necessario demonstrat alicui omnia demonstrabilia, et per consequens infinita que non possunt esse. Similiter,³⁵ secundum precipuos philosophos, unus numerus infinitus est reliquo maior, sicut tota universitas causatorum est infinita. Sed nulle tales propositiones essent concedende, vel negande, nisi infinita possent demonstrari illorum. Sive enim sit verum sive falsum quod 40 unus numerus infinitus est reliquo maior, dande sunt

23. implicatur; *ex above* B. 27. uori B.

singulares talium, per quarum subiecta bene intellecta demonstrari habent infinita. Est ergo firmissime tenendum quod si aliqua possunt intelligi, ipsa possunt demonstrari, et per consequens, cum necessario infinita intelliguntur, necessario contingit demonstrari infinita.

B 55^b Quibus habitis, argumentatur tripliciter contra primam conclusionem. Primo sic. Ista sunt *omnia compossibilitia* istorum; ergo, aliqua sunt *omnia compossibilitia* istorum. ^{These propositions are all that are compatible, understanding by *these*, all that can coexist, and only those; for I am free to take which I like.} ^{Yet it is not so.} ^{Et demonstro per *ly*, 'ista', omnia que sunt *compossibilitia* istorum, et solum illa que sunt *compossibilitia* istorum. Cum enim possum demonstrare quecumque voluero iuxta secundam suppositionem, et sine dubio libenter volo sic demonstrare, patet quod possum sic ^{And thus the whole aggregate is compatible.} demonstrare. Sicut ergo impossibile est rationale non posse intelligere quicquid voluerit, sic impossibile est rationale non posse demonstrare quidquid voluerit. Possibile est ergo demonstrare hoc aggregatum, sive possit esse, sive non. Et antecedens patet per hoc quod omne demonstratum per *ly* 'ista' est istorum, sive sit multitudo, sive unitas; ut patet ex casu. Hec ergo proposicio: *ista sunt omnia compossibilitia* istorum, primarie significat sicut est.}

Similiter, ista sunt, cum quodlibet istorum est, ^{Again, these exist, for no things can be called *these* unless they exist; therefore their number is finite, and is theirs;} ^{co} ^{for number is distinct from its subject.} ²⁵ quod nichil demonstratur per *ly* 'ista' nisi quod est; et cum ista non sunt infinita, sequitur quod sunt finita, et omnia finita de aliquo numero sunt quo ipsa formaliter numerantur. Ergo et ista sunt de tali numero. Et quicunque detur, patet quod istorum ³⁰ numerus sic est istorum sicut et ista habent illum numerum. Sic enim est idem numerus 10 canum et 10 equorum; nec forent ista formaliter multa, nisi haberent numerum, sicut suppono, cum omnis species quantitatis distinguitur a subiecto. Quod si loquamur ³⁵ de numero pro rebus numeratis, patet idem, cum singula illorum sunt de istis, et partes numerales illorum; nec habet alium sensum hec proposicio apud bene intelligentes: *Ista sunt [omnia compossibilitia] istorum.* Similiter, ista 4 sunt A B C D; sed illi duo binarii ⁴⁰ sunt *compossibilitia*: ergo ista 4^r solum sunt illa que ^{Again, call these propositions A, B, C and D, A and C, and}

13. sppōm B. 29. demonstratur dēr B. 38. *omnia compossibilitia deest* B.

B and *D* can be sunt compossibilia, et per consequens, sicut sunt illa coexistent, and these couples alone.
But these two couples are the four contradictories, which are therefore compatible;

It is not necessary that each proposition should possibly coexist with the other, or there would be no contradictories.

Answer.
I consider this conclusion as impossible.
That each of the 4 is coexistent with the others, I admit; they are those that they are, and yet differ from those that they are.

The four, and not only three of them, can be coexistent.

Just as well as we can say that these four are contradictory, we can say that

they are compatible;

they are contradictory and compatible, two and two.

Note again the subjects and predicatorum; quia 4 proposiciones sunt convertibilia et predicates; the subjects are different, but the predicates either identical or contradictory. We grant that all things compatible

duo paria compossibilia, et illa duo paria compossibilium non sunt nisi duo et duo, que sunt illa 4. Aliter enim non cognoscerentur plura compossibilia quam A; et sic, posito quod ista 4 essent omnes proposiciones, et sic prime essent tot compossibilia quot sunt binarii vel paria possibilium; scimus tamen quod BD sunt alia compossibilia quam AC. Ideo Deus conservans omnia compossibilia, conservat et cognoscit 10 plura compossibilia quam A et C. Non enim oportet quod singulum compossibilium sit compossibile singulo, quia sic non contradicerent proposiciones, nec converterentur, nisi singula sic se haberent ad singula illorum; quod est contra dicta tractatu proximo. 15

Videtur ergo michi quod prima conclusio, sicut et quelibet consimilis, est impossibilis. Ymmo conceditur quod ista sunt 4 compossibilia istorum, quia singulum istorum est compossibile alteri; nec est inconveniens quod ista sunt istorum et tamen sunt ista, sicut ista 20 sunt ista et tamen differunt ab istis. Potest enim quelibet talis proposicio dupliciter sumi; in sensu positivo vel diviso, tam ratione subiecti quam ratione predicati. *Ista 4 ergo sunt compossibilia*, et non 3^a istorum sunt omnia compossibilia. Nec sequitur ex istis 25 quod 4 contradictoria sunt unum istorum vel quod unum 4 sunt pauciora quam 4. Et si obiciatur quod 4, inter se contradictoria, sunt compossibilia, conceditur conclusio.

Unde pari evidencia qua conceditur ista 4 contradicere inter se vel sibi ipsis, concedendum est quod 30 sunt compossibilia inter se vel sibi ipsis: Sicut enim bina et bina contradicunt, sic bina et bina sunt simul; et sic de ceteris que diversim, reciproce, vel alternatim, existent, 4or vel quotlibet pluribus. Attendum tamen est ad numerum subiectorum et ad condiciones 35 et predicitorum; quia 4 proposiciones sunt convertibilia et predicates; the subjects are different, but the predicates either identical or contradictory. We grant that all things compatible

Ymmo, conceditur quod simul sunt possibilia, et sic admissibilia; et concedo quod stat in casu ita 4 bene admitti ab ipsa ponentibus sic primarie significando; quia stat unum par bene admitti ab uno et 5 aliud par bene admitti pro eodem instanti a
B 56^a reliquo. | Ymmo stat eundem bene admittere ista duo paria pro eadem mensura a diversis hominibus. Non tamen oportet quod si ista sunt compossibilia vel possunt simul esse vera, quia possibile sic et illa simul 10 esse vera, quia 4 sunt duo paria possibilium que possunt simul esse vera; sed non est possibile quod simul sint vera. De duobus tamen non sic sophisticatur secundum sensum compositum et divisum. 4 enim sunt compossibilia, quia duo paria compossibilium; et eadem 15 4 sunt duo paria incompossibilium.

Nec sunt aliqua incompossibilia. In 4 enim sunt 6 coniugaciones binarii possibilis, iuxta dicta de duobus; ergo sequitur *ista sunt compossibilia; ergo possibile est quod simul sint vera;* sed de 4 non sequitur, propter 20 combinaciones binariorum in 4 quales non sunt in duobus. Nec tantum dicuntur combinaciones compo- sibles, quamvis sint possibles pro eodem instanti, sed quia significata primaria illarum stat simul esse pro eodem instanti. Multe autem sunt proposiciones com- 25 possibles que, ut secum convertibiles, possunt esse vere pro aliquo instanti: ut patet de istis; *nulla proposicio est, et hoc instans est,* et multe possunt esse vere pro aliquo instanti que non possunt simul esse vere; ut iste due possunt esse vere pro medio instanti crastine 30 diei: *Ego sum et ego non sum,* quia utraque istarum in sensu diviso potest esse vera pro illo instanti; et tamen neutra simul potest esse vera cum altera istarum, continue sic primarie significando sicut iam significat primarie.

35 Et si 3^o obiciatur quod iste 4 proposiciones non sunt composibiles, nec possunt simul esse vere, eo

may be admitted, and that these are together possible; one couple may be admitted by one person, another by another at the same time. But if they are possibles that may be true, yet it is not possible that they be true at the same time. These sophisms can not be made with one couple only: Four — i. e. two couples of incompatibilities, and compatibilities — are required. In these four propositions we find six separate compatibilities which can together be true; but it does not follow that all the four propositions can be true together.

Many propositions may be true at a given instant, and some, true at a given instant, cannot continue true; as the fact of an existence that ceases to be.

Is may be objected that if these four could be true at

3. b̄η ad i p mitti ad b; place of words here very doubtful. 4—5. ab uno — admitti in marg.; instanti a reliquo bottom of page B. 9. quod; quia above B. 25. n^o pro ut B. 26. ut — instanti in marg. B. 32. cum altera istarum in marg. B. 33, 34. sicut — primaria in marg. B.

17. 6. A is B; A is not B; A is C; A is not C; and so on. Of these pairs of propositions, six are compatible: A is B; A is C, A is D, B is C, B is D and C is D. But the six negatives (A is not B, etc.) are also compatible with each other.

one time they would be compatible; but it seems inconsistent to say that at the same time they are compatible and incompatible.

one time they would be compatible; but it seems inconsistent to say that at the same time they are compatible and incompatible.

We repeat that they are compatible two and two, and incompatible likewise.

Thus four men may be friends and brothers, enemies and strangers, each to each, but not each to every one; like coalternate angles.

So 4 contradictions may be true at a given time; but not two.

Thus two couples of contradictions are not necessarily contradictory; it is enough for one member be opposed to one in the other couple.

Opposites cannot be predicated of individuals, but they can of universals;

^{1.} Essentially: *divisis bene possunt*. Et hoc tripliciter. Primo modo as of Christ, twofold and yet indivisible: *et hoc est indivisibile*, demonstrando Cristum, qui est

10. sic B. 26. eq'pone B. 30—31. et — ergo *in marg.* B. 40. 2^m above per B.

due nature. 2º modo de eodem ternario numerali predicantur duo opposita ad sensus equivocos; ut, *4 homines sunt similes, et idem 4 sunt dissimiles.* Et 3º modo coniunctum, ut: *ista 4º sunt numerus par et numerus 5 impar.* Sed duo contradictoria inconnexa non predi-
B 56º cantur per se divisim formaliter de eodem | ; ut, quamvis illa 4 sint incompossibilia, non tamen sunt *non* compo-
sibilis; quia tunc sunt illa que non sunt compo-
sibilis; et per consequens ad nullum sensum sunt compo-
sibilis. Sed termini privativi non sic negant.

2. Separately, with different meanings;
four men are like and unlike.
3. Together: four is at once even, and includes an odd number.

Et si dicatur quod tenet consequencia ab affirmativa de predicato privativo ad negativam de predicato infinito, dicitur: est ut sic, et est ut non. Nam in terminis de plurali, ubi multi sensus sunt negandi, non 15 oportet predicatum privativum inferre sic predicatum infinitum quod plus negat. Nec valet subtiliatio illorum qui dicunt quod si iniustum est, quod tunc non iustum est, et nullum iustum est. Innumerabilia ergo contingit fieri sophismata secundum diversas combinaciones 20 sensuum, et denominacionum cum terminis de plurali; sicut hic et in fine tractatus proximi est videre.

We may say: these four are incompatible, but not *not* compatible; privative terms deny separately, but not together, like negations. It may be urged that privations imply negations. Yes and no. No, when plural terms are affected by them. On this point there are countless fallacies; see the end of the foregoing treatise.

II. Can God create the greatest possible number of creatures? If so, an infinite number of men could be produced, and exist together; but an infinite number is impossible; so is infinite bulk.

Quo ad 3ª alia sophismata, restat videre si aliqui possunt esse omnes homines, vel omnia que deus potest creare. Si non, tunc illa tria sophismata et quecunque 25 similia sunt vera. Et si sic, tunc omnia talia sunt impossibilia. Argumentatur ergo 1º de hominibus, quod non est dare omnes homines qui possunt produci; quia significatis illis, si possunt produci, tunc possibile est quod illi sunt vel erunt. Posito ergo quod erunt, 30 querendum est utrum pro quolibet instanti vel tempore erunt infiniti vel non. Quomodo cunque dicetur, sequitur inconveniens; quia impossibile est quod sit magnitudo universitatis infinite vel multitudo encium actu infinita. Et si continue, omnes tamen erunt simul 35 infiniti; tunc deus continue creabit homines secundum ultimum sue potentie et sic terminaretur sua potentia ad valde parvum, quod foret maximum in quod posset; et tunc nemo possit producere suum simile, nisi qui de facto producet; nec posset accelerari produccio alicuius,

God would exhaust His power in this infinite multitude, which is yet very little. No man would be able to beget his like, unless he actually did so, and with his

14. universaliter pro ubi? B.

21. *Videre.* In *Logice Continuatio* 2nd part, last chapter.
22. This is a favourite question amongst Schoolmen, bristling with difficulties, whichever answer be given.

ultimate effort there would be God's infinite power exerted to the utmost.

Again, if a general resurrection is possible, all these infinite men could exist together and the world would be infinite, or God vel in potentiam dei ad faciendum quamlibet creaturam maiorem; quod de facto est. Sequitur eciam

creature. And then not one man more could either be created or perish.

The positing of this greatest possible number would lead, by the same reasoning, to the denial of free will.

Take the word man, and take that greatest number of men possible; it is certain that man includes infinitely more;

we cannot exhaust the signification of a general term;

nor suppose that man may signify some individuals that

God cannot possibly produce.

For what reason could he not produce them?

nisi forte desperdatur potencia producendi hominem pro tempore futuro. Primo sic quilibet applicaret se ad producentem suum simile tam efficaciter sicut posset; et preter hoc deus tantum multiplicaret creaciones hominum sicut posset.

Similiter, quicunque homines possunt esse, possibile est eos simul esse, cum resurreccio generalis sit possibilis. Cum ergo omnes isti possunt esse, possibile est eos simul esse; et tunc haberetur mundus infinitus; posset nullus 15 istorum prodest producere suum simile, nec

essent primo dati omnes homines qui possunt esse. Ymmo verisimiliter vel ex dubio sic ponenti *quotquot homines possunt produci sic producentur*, et per idem ex simili dubio: *omnia que evenirent inevitabiliter evenirent*, et nichil casualiter, nec aliquid posset mereri vel demereri 20 et tolleretur omnis contingencia ad utrumlibet et libertas.

Similiter, certum est quod iste terminus, *homo*, significat infinitos preter istos vel aliquem istorum; sed

quemcunque iste terminus significat, deus potest producere. Ergo infinitos preter istos potest deus producere. Maior patet ex hoc quod non solum contingit

ymaginari vel intelligere quod infiniti alii ab istis erunt, verum eciam contingit probabiliter credere quod alii ab istis erunt. Et certum est quod sic intelligens conciperet per talem terminum, *homo*, istos alios ab 30 istis vel aliquo istorum; igitur talis terminus, *homo*,

non solum significaret istos vel aliquos istorum. Et iuxta illud videtur sequi quod non est dare omnia que terminus communis quicunque significat. Et minor argumenti videtur, ex hoc quod caret omni ratione 35 significare aliquem hominem quem impossibile esset

deum producere; cum quoslibet homines quos ymaginor esse infinitos, | deus potest producere. Ideo aliud B 57^a est dicere quod deus non potest producere talem

essenciam, et aliud est dicere quod deus non potest 40 facere ipsam esse huiusmodi. Theologo ergo videtur

esse difficile fingere rationem quare deus non potest producere illum hominem; vel annichilatis istis omnibus, producere in toto novos, quia aliter, anichilatis omnibus possibilibus preter deum, non esset possibile esse 5 aliiquid preter ipsum.

Talia ergo argumenta et multo potenciora contingit facere ad probandum quod non sit possibile omnia que possunt esse, fore in tempore eterno; quia contradictorie veritates contingencium ad utrumlibet possunt esse sive 10 fore: etsi una erit reliqua non erit; ut sunt quotlibet tales: *hoc fuit futurum*, et *hoc non fuit futurum*, demonstrando filium meum. Caret ergo omni apparencia probabilitatis quod nullus relativus vel eius significandum posset causari ab homine, vel ab aliquo, nisi id quod 15 de facto erit esset.

In oppositum argumentando, suppono prima aliqua esse infinita; sed quia istud communiter negatur, probo illud supponendo 1º quod, si sunt aliqua quorum numerus non sit distincte a nobis noscibilis, tunc illa 20 sunt naturaliter infinita. Ut, si aliqua sunt omnia puncta illius linee, non est nostrum distincte scire quot sunt, nec in qua proporcione se habent ad 4^{rum} vel ad quemcunque numerum nobis finitum. Quo supposito, argumentatur intentum sic: aliqua est universitas rerum, 25 sicut et aliquis est mundus; sed neutrum potest ponи, nisi aggregatum ex numeraliter infinitis: ergo aliqua sunt taliter infinita. Similiter contingit demonstrare quecunque infinita, ut patet ex predictis demonstratis; ergo, omnibus partibus que componunt hoc continuum, 30 et solum illis vel aliquibus illarum. Non est racio negandi quod isti sunt, aut quod ista sunt ista, cum proposicio solum significat illa esse que de facto sunt singulariter.

Aliter sequitur quod infinitum multa sunt corpora que deus non cognoscat nec essencialiter, et per consequens valde multa sunt corpora que non sunt cognita vel causata. Antecedens patet per opinionem concidentem quod non tot corpora possunt esse. Cum ergo sequitur: *infinitum multa corpora sunt*: ergo *aliquot corpora sunt*; et cum antecedente stat, ymmo sequitur.

6. S|| before talia zt³ in marg B. 13. re^a B. 33. Silr = similiter B. 33. al^r above; argumentatur B. 35. cor^a — con^a in marg. B. 40. at^e B.

30. The general sense is sufficiently clear, but some words are probably wanting in this place.

Such arguments go to prove that in eternal time all that can be, will not be;

and that our principle concerning relatives is false.

To answer, we assume firstly that some things infinite exist.

Whatever multitudes exceed our power of distinct knowledge, are infinite. We cannot v. g. know how many points there are in a line.

As we must grant that the world exists, so we must grant things infinite; for as already shown, we must assume that the parts of a continuum are so;

and that each part exists separately.

If not, we are driven to deny that God causes these parts or even knows them; and yet they are proved to exist!

quod deus non causat illa: ergo cum consequente stat quod deus non causat illa. Nec alia, vel plura significat antecedens unius relativi in una propositione quam in reliqua: ideo relacio ad diversa antecedencia non facit diversitatem. 5

We also have to deny all propositions that imply the infinite, among which several are evidently true.

And in the case of lines, sounds and such things in general of which no ultimate element makes up the whole, but only a part, we must deny that they have a cause. The whole is no longer the sum of its parts, for then it would be infinitely great. I protest, these seem the poorest of all sophisms.

Similiter, iuxta istam viam neganda est quecunque affirmativa in qua predicatum implicat kathégorice infinita, ut tales: *hoc corpus componitur ex omnibus suis partibus; deus cognoscit omnia que ego cognosco; deus videt cuncta que fecit;* et sic infinita conservaret, quorum nullum potest conservare, cum nullum illorum potest esse bonum vel non bonum. Ymmo, si ipse conservaret omnia corpora que ego conservo, tunc esset infinitum potencior quam est modo. Ymmo, quando infinita successive concurrunt ad aliquid causandum, sic quod nullum illorum faciet totum, sed quodlibet suam partem, sicut contingit de linearibus, de sonis, et aliis tam permanentibus quam successivis; tunc illud causatum non causabitur ab aliquo, nec ab aliquibus causacione univoca. Et sic ubi auctores ponunt totum esse omnes eius partes, vel saltem causari ex illis, ista via dicit quod si aliqua earum esset complete compositum ex omnibus eius partibus, ipsa esset infinitum; et tantum pompat de suis diviciis, quod deus non potest cognoscere omnia bona sua propter multiplicatatem. Sed, deum contestor! inter omnia sophismata unquam inventa videtur michi quod ista minimum valent.

And the answers given are of no value. Some say that there is an infinite multitude, known by God separately; but then this infinite multitude really exists.

Others, that these (infinitely numerous parts) are; but cannot be separately affirmed; but if they are, they are beings; and therefore, these singular beings, or nothing.

Nec valent responsiones devie que dantur | ad B. 57^b salvandum ista dicta; ut aliqui concedunt quod infinitum multe res sunt, et deus cognoscit eas in sensu diviso; sed hoc est contra primam suppositionem, que declarat quod ista implicat quod deus cognoscet illas res que sunt infinitum multe; et hoc bene concedit opinio. Alia via concedit quod *ista sunt* (demonstratis infinitis), sed *ista non sunt ista*: Sed certum est quod si *iste numerus est*, tunc *ista que sunt iste numerus sunt*; et per consequens aliqua sunt iste numerus; et sic ista sunt ista. Sequitur enim: *ista sunt*; ergo, *encia sunt ista*, per conversionem. Sed que encia, si non 40

1. *quante pro consequente* B.

8. *componi* B.

15. *gffuo* B.

17. *Imby* B. 22. *aliquid* B.

ista? Si enim solum demonstrarentur per *ly* "ista" *illa que sunt*, et illa demonstrarentur per *ly* "ista", sequens est quod ista sunt ista que sunt. Tercia via dicit quod omne demonstrantur per *ly* "ista" est, sed non omnia demonstrata per *ly* "ista" sunt. Sed ista via, sicut et priores, dicit in devium; quia contra istam viam stant raciones priores. Si unum omne demonstratum per *ly* "ista" est, tunc omnis numerus vel multitudo demonstrata per *ly* "ista" est.

10 Nec habet colorem quod omnia visa a me videntur a te et tamen, si deus cognosceret quod nos videmus illa, ipse annihilaret nos ambos; Sor tamdiu numerabit materias primas quo usque deus non possit ipsas cognoscere; et tamen quelibet quam numerabit est eterna;

15 quelibet res intellecta a Sor est: et tamen si aliquis numerus esset omnium istarum, tunc ipse esset asinus, quia impossibile est quod sit aliqua multitudo que non sit pars alterius multitudinis. Similiter sequetur quod Sor promisit infinitos denarios et deus non potest satis-

20 facere pro illo per se vel alium; sed Sortes satisfaciet promissioni, solvendo quemlibet denarium quem promisit, posito quod Sor in loculo habeat denarium cuius aliquam partem continget inferre residuo, existente legali denario. Tunc patet quod Sor in illo infinitos

25 denarios communicantes habet; promittat ergo Platoni omnes denarios qui sunt in loculo suo, et solvat omnem partem illius.

Supposito ergo quod quecunque infinita sunt demonstrabilia, argumentatur quod aliqui possunt esse omnes homines. Nam *isti homines possunt esse* (demonstrando omnes homines qui possunt esse et solum illos). *Nulli non possunt esse, nisi omnes homines: ergo, aliqui possunt esse omnes homines.* Minor patet ex hoc quod omnes homines demonstrati per *ly* "isti" possunt esse, sicut quilibet illorum potest esse. Sicut ergo omnes res collectim sunt omnis res, sic omnes homines collectim possunt esse omnis homo, cum ipsi non possunt esse alii. Similiter maxima significabilitas humane nature est danda, cum data parte, dandum est suum totum. Sed illa non esset danda, nisi esset danda maxima multitudo hominum quibus potest communicari: igitur etc.

Others, that each separate part is singularly affirmable, but not together in the plural.
But if each, then all.

Absurd consequences of the latter hypothesis.

As, therefore, each individual in this infinite number can be pointed out, some certain men are all men.

As each of them can exist, so can the whole multitude: and as all things are everything, so all men are every man.

We must admit a maximum of significance of the term "man"; if so, a maximum of individuals to which it can apply:

6. ducunt B. 13. mas B. 38. ficas B.

or we should
not know to
what extent
God can actuate
the possibility
of man.

And God
Himself, not
knowing the
number
producible
would not know
the essence of
man perfectly.

Every
individual
signified by the
term must be
possible, or the
term would
signify what it
does not.

There is,
therefore, a
maximum of
men possible.
And if of men
possible, of
men
simultaneously
possible.

If not, the
indefinite
number would
imply a world
that might be
infinitely great,
and, therefore,
an infinite and
useless vacuum
surrounding
our world.

This is a
problem of far
more depth
than the
preceding
sophisms. It is
answered:

By
Peripateticians,
granting an
infinite number
of men to exist
in an infinite
time and an
eternal world:
but not at the
same instant.
By *Christians*,

denying the

Aliter enim non esset dare quam productivus esset deus hominum, cum non sit precise tam causativus hominum sicut est conservativus hominum, nec tam conservativus individuorum alicuius speciei quam voluntivus est conservare eadem; quod repugnat omnino potencie divine; et per idem non cognosceret deus gradum communicabilitatis illius termini *homo*, cum non cognosceret quot ad maximum significat. Nec cognoscit in qua proporcione sit iste terminus, *animal*, eo ipso communior: et similiter, cum omne quod iste terminus *homo* significat potest esse, sequitur quod omnia que iste terminus, *homo*, significat possunt esse. Et certum est quod non plura nec altera, nisi illa vel aliqua illorum significatorum possunt esse homines. Ergo est dare | maximum numerum hominum qui possunt esse, sicut est dare totalem multitudinem quam iste terminus, *homo*, significat. B 58^a

Ymmo cum omnes homines qui successive possunt esse possunt simul a deo conservari, sicut est dare quot homines possunt simul esse ad maximum, sic est dare quot homines possunt esse ad maximum. Si enim non est dare maximum numerum hominum possibilem simul, tunc infinitum magnus posset esse mundus, et per consequens esset vacuum infinitum extra mundum plus capax corporis quam aliquid esset causativum corporis; quod claudit contradictionem, cum tunc quilibet pars illius vacui superflueret, et per consequens esset causatum a deo et non causatum a deo. Et similiter, consimilibus mediis, contingit arguere quod omnium specierum vel generum est dare maximam multitudinem individuorum possibilem.

Quoad istam difficultatem, patet quod longe aliud quam istam sophisticam requirit declaracio illius materie. Unde varie responsiones, secundum quod diversimode sic opinantur materiam se habere. Per 35 patetici autem ponunt generacionem rerum eternam esse a parte utriusque extremi; et illi ponent quod impossibile est omnes homines qui possunt esse, fore pro aliquo instanti. Verumtamen, ampliando verbum, bene possunt esse in tempore eterno. Cristiani vero 40

1. *productio* B. 2. *catiō* B. 8. *qualia pro quo*: B. 11. *pī* B.
33. *item* sop^a B.

vere ponunt quod impossibile est mundum esse eternum a parte ante, cum necessarium sit quod omnes partes mundi pro certo instanti inceperunt esse, et pro certo instanti cessabunt generaciones sublunarium, cum mundus habebit ultimum eius complementum.

eternity of the world, and the continuation of generation after a certain instant.

Et utraque pars oppositionis est bipartita. Nam primorum aliqui ponunt nulla posse esse, nisi que sunt vel erunt; et sic omnia ponunt inevitabilitate naturali evenire. Aliqui vero ponunt contingenciam ad utrumlibet, vel ratione materie, vel ratione libertatis prime cause. Et sic de 2^{da} secta. Aliqui ponunt quod deus terminat se ipsum maximo numero possibili numerorum punctalium, ex quibus fit mundus, et sic nichil potest annichilare, nec mundum maiorare vel minorare; sed animas usque ad certum numerum creare et non ultra. Et sic terminat se ipsum, secundum raciones ydeales maximo numero individuorum subtancie possibili. Et specialiter de partibus mundi eternis. Quo ad illas enim ordinat numerum simpliciter congruum; ita quod superaddendo excederet, et diminuendo deficeret a proporcione debita, sicut est de magnitudine, figura, etate, et numero mundi, cum suis partibus.

Of the former, some posit absolute necessity, and others admit a contingent happening.

Of the latter, some say that the maximum number of men corresponds with that of the punctal atoms of the world; and that nothing can be destroyed, increased or diminished, God's power terminating itself with this maximum number; and as all things are in ideal and necessary proportion, He can change nothing in the world.

This limitation proceeds not from finite power, but from infinite wisdom, doing all that is best; just as God is almighty, though He cannot make a man to be an ass, or a round line straight. No more men can be produced, when all that should exist, exist. As for brutes etc., and human actions, they are not subject to this absolute rule.

Nec est talis limitacio propter defectum potencie, sed propter infinitatem sciencie, mensurantis talia secundum ultimum et optimum sue factibilitatis; sicut deus non est impotens, quamvis non posset facere hominem esse asinum, corrigere circulum vel aliud factum secundum ultimum sue complecionis. Et ita cessabit homines producere, cum sciverit tot esse productos quot esset conveniens produxisse; nec plura posset superaddere, quia non potest agere omnimode superflue, et omnes tales partes mundi servabit in eternum post datum tempus i. e. post diem iudicij: bestie tamen et alie substancie corruptibilis cum accidentibus hominum possunt diversificari in numero, magnitudine, loco, et tempore, et aliis circumstanciis. Et sic non omnia futura inevitabiliter evenient; cum illa que subiacent humanis actibus possunt impediri ex quotlibet causis fortuitis

11. ¹² *ce pro cause B; ib. 2^a pro 2^a B.* 24. *po^e B.* 35. *acci⁹ horum hominum in marg. B.*

11. *Aliqui ponunt.* This is Wyclif's opinion

Thus, not all future things are inevitable: events that depend upon the human will may be prevented or not.

In the state of immortality, there will be no generation of men, for the very reason of that state.

If, therefore, God's power is said to transcend these limits, it is dependently on His will;

that anything can exist it is necessary to have a cause able to produce it; and of two seemingly possible souls, the one that will not exist is impossible, because God cannot will it to be.

And so of any other creature.

It is impossible that all these beings are or will be these singulars; separately they may be; but together, one excludes the other.

Thus, without denying the infinite multitude of possibles, without denying

vel iuvari, nec est de imperfeccione hominum, cum fuerint sic incorruptibles, quia tunc non poterunt producere sibi similia; nec deus tunc continueret generationem rerum secundum illum ordinem. Tunc enim erunt homines inmortales sicut celum et intelligentie; per consequens ad perfectionem illorum carebunt indigencia producendi sibi similia pro se salvandis vel perficiendis, cum hoc non sit perfectione | sic nisi secundum dum quid, ponens imperfectionem evacuabilem.

Quo ad dicta hominum quibus est credendum, 10 dicitur quod, si ponunt quod deus potest in plus, intelligunt conditionaliter: *si voluerit*. In hoc enim stat omnipotencia sua, quod, si iubet aliquid fieri, tunc illud facit: quod impossibile est competere alteri ab illo: et ista negat secundam conclusionem sicut et 15

primam. Sed concedit alia duo sequentia; quia contradictionem claudit quod omnia que ego vel quecunque alia res potest facere sunt vel erunt, cum a quocunque tali veritates possunt et fieri; et si una illarum fieret, reliqua non fierit. Ut patet de talibus: *Ista anima erit*, et 20 *ista anima non erit*. Nam iste [sunt] due veritates que possunt esse, et tamen nec deus nec aliud a deo potest creare ipsas, quia non possunt esse causate, nisi ab aliquo quod non potest causare illas. Et sic: *ista possunt causari*, demonstrando omnia creabilia; sed non 25 est possibile quod *ista creabuntur*, nisi aliquid potest causare ista; et sic ista ambo possunt esse, sicut utrumque illorum potest esse, quia utrumque potest esse de numero quo ista possunt numerari. Sed non

est possibile quod *ista sunt vel erunt ista*; quia si 30 unum erit, reliquum non erit; et ista deus potest causare, quia utrumque divisim; sed non potest causare *ista*. Et sic multa sunt cognoscibilia, sed deus non potest cognoscere illa, quamvis illa potest cognoscere; ut patet de istis: *Ego fui producturus filium*, et ego 35 *non fui producturus filium*.

Non ergo negandum est aliqua esse infinita; nec repugnat signare quecunque deus potest facere. Ymmo, conceditur quod ista possunt esse ista divisim; et

3. optet B. 10. una utre B. 21. sunt deest B. 23—25. ipsas — causari in marg. B.

quando ponitur quod *ista sunt vel erunt*, negandus est casus. Nec videtur michi verum quod infinita numeraliter sunt finita numeraliter. Sed infinitum multa sunt finitum multa, ut patet per exponentes; sed hoc non antecedit ad priorem propositionem, cum illa sit infinita cuius quodlibet singulare est impossibile, nec est aliter particulariter verificabilis. Non enim est dare quanta sit, si non infinita; nec quomodo dispariter significabit subiectum eius a subiecto multiplici de 5 similibus terminis.

Est ergo signare aliqua infinita, quorum aliqua possunt esse et aliqua non possunt esse, cum numerus numerat aliqualiter que non possunt esse: non sic quod mensurat quot sunt, sed mensurat quot vere intuemur. 10 Et illa solet antiquitus concedi intellectualiter. Et si dicatur quod in aliis terminis talia convertuntur: *Ista possibile est esse et: possibile est ista esse; Ista deus potest cognoscere et: deus potest cognoscere ista, vel ista cognoscere*, quod idem est; dicitur quod hoc est 15 gracie materie, quia multa verificantur de infinitis que non competunt finitis; et aliquibus finitis multa possunt competere que reliquis non possunt competere. Quandocunque hoc verbum *potest* (vel equivalent) precedit affirmative oracionem imperfectam, impli- 20 catur potentiam posse in suum significatum; ut, *si deus potest ista cognoscere*, tunc est potencia vel possibili- 25 tatis ad ista cognoscendum. Sed quando mediat, tunc sufficit quod ad illa divisim est potencia cognoscendi.

Addit eciam illa posicio quod ille terminus, *homo*, non significat infinita, sed solum illa que possunt esse, sicut nec aliquid significat: *inintelligibile* vel: *melius deo*. Isti termini iuvant ad significandum *hominem*, vel aliquid absolutum, aliqualiter se habere qualiter non possunt se habere; ut iste terminus, *homo*, consignificat 30 in casu hominem esse iusinitum magnum, et ipsum esse omnes res, vel infinita supposita, et quotlibet modis se habere, non per se, sed racione adjuncti. Primo ergo et per se significat naturam illam, et secundarie significat quotcunque individua, quibus 35 ipsa potest communicari; et 3^o, racione adjuncti, significat quecumque volueris, ut in ista: *Tot possunt esse*.

that certain in particular are causatively possible, and even that all may be so, it is denied that all will be so.

An infinite multitude is, therefore, finite, though an infinite number is not.

Of this multitude some can, some cannot exist.

These things can be; therefore, it is possible for these things to be.

True, if by 'these things' the abstract objects of thought alone are meant; they are infinite.

The place of *can* or *possible* in a sentence, may in many cases change the sense.

In this theory, man does not signify an endless multitude, but merely those that are really possible; the rest imply self-contradiction.

So it means in the first place, human nature; in the second, all individuals that can have that nature; and

thirdly (with an addition) anything whatever.

This last meaning is, however, quite irrelevant to the universality of the term.

thirdly (with an addition) anything whatever.

Thus God knows the precise degree of extension of each term, and the individuals each contains; and I much prefer this opinion.

Another system is now more in vogue, which refuses to limit God's power to anything below the Infinite exclusively. For this reason, an infinite multitude has been denied not only to exist, but to be individually affirmable as such. Without this denial, there would be an infinity of things that God could not produce. So God cannot distinguish what He can and what He cannot do; though He understands both. These things are possible, though God cannot cause them;

homines quot possunt esse animalia significat iste terminus, *homo*, causatam multitudinem hominum quanta potest esse animalium; ymmo illam naturam per se, et homines qui possunt esse, primarie significat; sed secundarie posse esse tot homines quot possunt esse animalia. Sed talis significacio est in pertinens communis termini, cum attenditur penes communica | B 59^a bilitatem sui primo significati et non penes multitudinem, cum ymaginabile est ipsam communicari; quia ymaginabile vel intelligibile est hominem esse omnia que possunt esse, vel ydemptificari cuilibet.

Ideo, ut superius dictum est, deus scit gradus communis terminorum, sicut scit quot ille terminus, *homo*, significat; nec significat ille terminus, *sol*, multos soles; nec iste terminus, *ly* "chymera"^b multas chymeras, cum talia multa possint esse, vel forte ex adiuncto. Et tenendo istam viam, que est michi valde opiniabilis, tollerentur faciliter instances supradicte.

Alia autem est responsio famosior modernorum que abhorret terminare divinam potentiam ad aliquod finitum, sed ultra omne finitum potest; sic quod potentia sua terminetur ad bonum intellectivum, ad infinitum exclusive. Et pro isto defendendo inventa est illa improbabilis logica, que dicit quod nedum nulla sunt infinita, sed nulla infinita possunt demonstrari. Dicit ergo quod signatis omnibus illis in que deus potest, sequens est quod signerentur infinites infinita que non possunt. Nec esset possibile omne signare omnia que possunt [esse], nisi signarentur aliae que non possunt. Unde deus, quamvis intelligat omnia illa que possunt, et omnia illa que non possunt [esse], tamen nescit distincte discernere inter ista, nec demonstrare illa seorsum ab aliis. Sic ergo, quantumcunque homo velit intendere distincte possibilia per se, ignoraret et non intenderet impossibilia. Nec sequitur: *quemlibet hominem quem ego intelligo deus potest causare*: ergo, *omnes quos ego intelligo deus potest causare*; quia multos intelligo quorum nullus potest esse, quamvis tamen quilibet quam ego intelligo possit esse. Et talis

6-7. qm̄ B. 7. p̄s B. 8. p̄s B. 13. qm̄ B. 20. modernum in marg. B. 23. bōm B. 30. esse deest B. 32. esse deest B.

copulativa conceditur: *Omnis homines intelliguntur a me et illi non possunt esse*, quia non possunt esse omnes homines possibles, cum oportet, demonstrando omnes homines qui possunt esse, condemnari 5 homines qui non possunt esse. Et sic deus non potest intelligere omnes homines qui possunt esse; quia tunc isti possent esse; aut saltem non potest cognoscere omnes causas cuiuscunq[ue] hominis, et tamen omnia que ego nosco.

10 Cum tamen solet dici quod ad perfectam causati noticiam requiritur cognoscere omnes eius causas, et quod deus docet hominem primo in cognoscendo omnia que ipse cognoscit; ideo non dubium quin iste conclusiones, sicut quotlibet similes, repugnant isti 15 opinioni et veritati. Si enim aliquos significaret terminus, *qui non possunt esse*, potissime foret de multitudine infinita hominum, quod talis non est demonstranda, ut dicit opinio. Ymmo si esset demonstranda, adhuc illam posset deus successive producere, et potest anichilare, 20 iuxta sic opinantes. Ymmo simul posset in totam multitudinem, sicut et signabilem eius partem, vel saltem deus posset illos indivisim producere, etsi non posset producere illas. Non ergo possum demonstrare homines aliqualiter se habere, qualiter non possunt se habere; 25 et tunc non significat iste terminus complexus, infinitos homines; sed finitos significat esse infinitos. Nec potest intelligi *homo*, nisi aliquis illorum, demonstrando homines qui erunt, et illos oportet necessario fore; sed non sic omnia. Eligat ergo philosophus sentenciam sibi plus 30 placentem.

we can know objects that are impossible; v. g. the existence of all men.

But God cannot, or they would be possible by His knowledge of them.

All this is false; to know a thing perfectly we must know its causes, and God's knowledge is the cause of ours.

If an infinite multitude of men were affirmable, God could produce them successively and annihilate them.

In short, *infinite men* means a certain fixed number, which is the Infinite, or maximum possible.

Let the philosopher choose which system is the best.

8. 23 *in marg.* B. 20. 10^m u^{bm} B. 21. 9^m B.

5. We must here note the Scholastic distinction between intrinsic possibility, or mere non-absurdity, and extrinsic possibility, or being causable. We can think of an infinite multitude of men as possible in the first manner and not in the second. But if God saw them as possible in the first manner, He would also see Himself to be their cause, i. e. they would be possible in the second too. Which would involve contradiction in the case of those who will never exist.

CAPITULUM QUINTUM.

Of causal propositions :
definition ;
propositions related by the idea of cause.

Divisions,
affirmative,
in which one proposition is affirmed to be the cause of another;

and *negative*,
in which such causality is denied; the negative or affirmative form of the component propositions being irrelevant.

So to every causal we can substitute a categorical proposition with the verb *to cause*.

A causal, therefore, differs from a conditional, because it affirms both of its parts; and from a copulative, because it adds the idea of causation.

Sequitur de causalibus pertractandum. Ubi primo supponatur omnem yppotheticam, subordinatam principaliiter actui yppothetico causandi, esse causalem; utputa quando due kategorice coniunguntur ad invicem cum 5 nota cause.

Sunt autem causalium talium quedam affirmativa et quedam negativa. Affirmativa, quando significatum primarium antecedentis significati prioris consequentis asseritur esse causa; ut hic: *quia tu curris, tu moveris.*¹⁰ Ista enim asserit tuum *currere* causare tuum *moveare*. Et vocatur antecedens, proposicio immediate subsequens notam cause; et alia vocatur consequens. Vocatur autem causalis negativa yppothetica | per quam negatur B 59^b principaliter huiusmodi causacio. Ut hic: *non ideo tu es animal, quia tu es asinus.* Unde stat esse affirmativam, quamvis utraque eius pars fuerit negativa, ut hec; *paries non respirat, quia non habet pulmonem.* Attendum est ad negacionem actus yppothetici principalis.

Ex istis patet quod quelibet causalis convertitur cum 20 kategorica, in qua predicatur terminus significans veritatem consequentis, de termino significante veritatem antecedentis, mediante verbo causandi. Ut idem est dicere: *tu es animal, quia tu es homo*, ac si diceretur: *humanitas tua causat animalitatem tuam.* Non *quia tu times, tu curris*; et non *timor tuus causat cursum tuum*, et sic de aliis. Et sic de ceteris patet quod talis longe differt a condicionali et a copulativa. Causal is enim ponit utriusque partis significatum inesse, sicut non facit condicionalis. Et quamvis in hoc conveniat cum 30 copulativa, superaddit tamen causacionem unius partis

1. Cap. *dicitur*: blank space for initial S. B. 7. q. B. 8. q. B.
18. p. B. 27. de ceteris in marg. B. 29. potest B.

per reliquam. Unde mirabiliter abutuntur tam grammatica quam logica, qui concedunt quilibet copulativam converti cum causalit. Ut si *ego sum, et baculus stat in angulo*, tunc *ego sum, quia baculus stat in angulo*; et econtra. Nam sic ponentes ignorant grammaticam, que ponit huiusmodi coniunctiones ideo esse causales quia sunt note causandi. Et ad talem sensum vocant logici yppotheticas causales. Per idem enim dicerent quod amodo existens cum reliqua causat ipsum.

10 Grave est ergo semper stare in significacionibus terminorum, communicando cum ignorantibus.

Et ex isto patet 3º, noscentibus istam grammaticam et logicam, quod species et genus differunt sicut subiectum et eius predicacio. Ymmo quocunque subiectum et eius accidens sequitur manifestissime differre ab invicem; ut: *quia tu es homo tu es animal et risibile et quantum et coloratum*. Ideo animalitas et humanitas differunt; et per idem risibilitas et quantitas et coloratio, et [cetera] huiusmodi differunt ab humanitate a qua 20 causantur. Et ista puerilis consideracio de causalibus est medium electum ad probandum quecumque accidentia esse, et distingui a subiecto. Quis enim negaret quin aliqua causa sit quare substancia est quanta, qualis, relata, agens, paciens, locata, temporalis, posita, et 25 habens? Nec dubium quin quicunque concedit aliquam unum talem causalem, habet consequenter concedere accidentia talia esse, et distingui a subiecto. Ut, si *Sor ex hoc sedet quia placet sibi, tunc placere sibi Sortis est causa sessionis sue*. Ideo vel negent tales causales vel 30 concedant; quod sequitur consequenter. Sed negatis causalibus, vanum est philosophari, cum ad hoc adiscimus ut sciamus causas rerum; nec aliter arbitramur nos quicquam cognoscere. Vanum ergo esset querere rei causam, quare animalia habent membra secundum talem 35 anathomiam ordinata; et sic de omni ordinacione nature. Non enim ageret natura, nisi propter finem, cum non posset esse causa quare natura aliqualiter ordinaret. Sed omnia talia corrumpunt bonam doctrinam.

Supponendo ergo ista tria corollarie illata, restat 40 describere causam in communi. Sed forte non potest

Some absurdly deny this last difference; according to them, coexistence and causation are the same.

Such an assertion contradicts both grammar and logic.

This shows clearly how species and genera, subject and predicate, differ from one another; i. e. causally.

This childish discussion, therefore, leads us to prove the existence of accidents distinct from their subjects.

Causals ought either to be denied, or the doctrines that follow from their admission allowed. But without the former all science would perish, and nature would no longer work with a purpose; an utterly false doctrine.

What is a cause? As its

signification is describi *a priori* vel nociore, cum sit analogum as wide as being, it cannot be described *a priori*, but *a posteriori* as that which causes its effect, and effect as that which is caused by a cause.

It follows that all beings are causes and effects.

If not a last, there is a First Being; which is Essence.

Four sorts of causes: material, formal, efficient and final. The material cause is either analogous or proper; if proper, it is either that out of which, that about which, or that of which anything else is.

The formal cause is either intrinsic or extrinsic: either that by which or that according to which the thing is.

The efficient cause is what makes anything to be; in a wide sense every cause is

conveniencie cuilibet enti. Ideo oportet colligere noticiam cause *a posteriori*, sicut cognoscimus universale experimentale. Sicut ergo qualitas est accidentis denominans formaliter substanciam accidentaliter qualem, sic causa est ens causans suum causatum; vel ens cuius esse antecedit ad aliud; et causatum e contra est ens cuius esse sequitur ad aliud.

Ex quo patet quod omne ens est causa; sicut omne ens est illud quod est causatum. Primum patet, ex hoc quia dato ultimo ente adhuc illud cognoscitur confuse a me et multis aliis. Et sic habet infinitas denominaciones sibi accidentales quas omnes causat. Ex quo videtur patere quod est dare primum ens si non ultimum. Primum tamen ens est essentia que est ²⁰ creata, et per consequens est unum creatum, quamvis illa essentia non causatur nec est creata.

Sunt ergo 4 genera causarum, scilicet, materialis, formalis, efficiens et finalis. Causa materialis est causa ex qua est suum causatum. Et hec est duplex, scilicet proporcionalis et propria. Proporionalis, ut genus est causa materialis cuiuscunque sui per se inferioris. Si propria, hoc est tripliciter; vel quod sit pars rei ex qua et in qua est sua forma, sicut est materia prima elementi et materia proxima elementi; vel quod sit materia de ²⁵ qua, sed non in qua formaliter sit forma illa; ut subiectum de quo est sciencia est eius materia; vel ³⁰, quod sit materia de qua sed non ex qua fit parcialiter suum causatum; ut subiectum accidentis causat ipsum materialiter.

Causa formalis est causa a qua formaliter est suum causatum; et hoc dupliciter: vel quod sit causa intrinseca que est pars qualitativa rei; ut ignetas est forma ignis, vel aliter, causa formalis extrinseca; ut formula est causa exemplaris formati; ut deus est causa exemplaris cuiuscunque essentie causate vel create. Differencia etiam communis est causa formalis speciei; et omnem universale dicitur forma.

Causa efficiens vero, large loquendo, dicitur esse quodcumque causans; omne enim causans facit suum causatum esse. Sed specialiter, restringendo terminum,

B 60^a

30

solum agens vel conservans active rem in esse dicitur esse causa efficiens; qualiter solum substancia activa potest efficiere; et illa vocatur causa unde motus.

Causa finalis est causa gracia cuius est suum causatum, et hoc dupliciter: vel quod sit finis extrinsecus, sicut deus est finis omnium rerum causatarum; vel finis intrinsecus, sicut felicitas est finis operacionum humanae.

Ista ergo confuse dicta non docent ignorantem cogitare causacionem; sed cognoscendo de quounque ente quod ipsum est requisitum ad esse alterius, cognoscitur quod est causa eius. Ut video quod species lignorum et lapidum requiruntur ad esse domus, quia ipsis pereuntibus perit domus et non e contra, exinde cognosco quod sunt cause domus. Et sic cognosco sollem causare lumen, et obstaculum, umbram. Multe tamen sunt habitudines causandi quas non cognosco per sensum; ut causacionem qua unum universale causat reliquum, et causacionem qua unum universale eternum necessario causat reliquum; ut deus causat universitatem encium; pars materie causat suum totum, ut compositum; et sic de multis causacionibus insensibilium.

Nec sufficit cognoscere quod unum sit reliquo prius natura ad cognoscendum causacionem; quia, cum quelibet pars materie prime sit eque primo natura sicut alia non communicans cum illa, videtur quod sicut materia ignis est ipso prius natura, sic quelibet materia prima esset prius illo igne in natura; et tamen non quelibet est eius causa, quia non quelibet requiritur ad esse istius ignis, nec antecedit ad esse eius. Nec sequitur: deus necessario requirit quotlibet veritates pro causacionibus inferiorum, ergo ille veritates requiruntur ad esse dei; cum ly 'ad' consignificat circumstanciam causandi. Infinita ergo sunt sine quibus ego non possum esse, que non requiruntur ad mei esse, quia non conferunt ad hoc. Si ergo vis videre quid iuvat ad esse alterius, [oportet] discurrere per 4 genera causandi supra dicta cum suis membris, et videre ex quo vel de quo, unde vel a quo est, secundum quid est vel quid est, 40 gracia cuius vel propter quid est; et si nullum istorum

efficient; but it is restricted to the principle causing movement. The final cause is that for which anything is: it is either extrinsic or intrinsic.

When we know of anything that it is necessary the existence of another, we know it as a cause,

either by sensible cognition, or otherwise.

Yet mere priority of nature, or the circumstance of being required, does not give us the proper idea of cause; it must have a real influence on the being it causes.

We must, to know if anything is a cause, enquire if it belongs to one of the above-mentioned genera of causes.

5. qpt pro quod sit B. 23. non abore nec B. 26. a'g above B.
37. oportet deest B.

4 possit invenire, nec causacionem quesiti invenies. Et, si aliquod illorum inveneris, illud genus causandi invenisti. Sic igitur ad inveniendum istas raciones causandi deserviunt regule quas invenerunt philosophi.

Priority of
nature can be
understood in
two senses;
in the order of
perfection and
in the order of
cognition.

Nota tamen quod duplice aliquid dicitur nocius; vel prius natura; vel quia ipsum est principalius intentum tanquam perfeccius in natura, sicut omne totum est prius ens et cognitum in natura quam est aliqua eius pars; vel quia ipsum precedit in ordine cognoscendi, qualiter | omnis pars naturaliter precedit suum totum; et sic est ordo naturalis inter materias primas omnium, cum prima quo ad primum modum, sit maxima materia ex quo mundus constat, et prima omnium quo ad secundum modum, est materia punctualis; et sic aliis quantis.

15

There are
many divisions
of causes; but
for brevity's
sake we shall
only take the
first: a cause
per se or per
accidens.

Per se has three
meanings here,
as in the case
of Being;
applying it
either to all
causes, or to a
principal cause,

or to a cause of
which causality
is predicated
from a certain
point of view.

Sunt ergo istorum generum causandi multi modi; ut aliqua est causa per se et alia est causa per accidens; alia est simplex et alia composita; alia in actu, alia in potentia; alia parcialis vel incompleta, et alia totalis et completa. Et de quolibet istorum modorum alia est causa universalis et alia est causa particularis. Sed propter brevitatem tantum loquendum est de primo modo. Sicut autem tribus modis aliquid dicitur per se ens, sic tribus modis dicitur aliquid esse per se causa. Magis tamen famosa accepcion est, vel large accipiendo pro quaunque causa requisita, vel striccius pro causa requisita cum qua non concurrit ex equo alia in eodem genere causandi: ut tota materia ignis per se causat ipsum, vel 3º quando causans sub ratione alicuiusmodi causat, utputa, quando sibi inesse causat per se 2º modo predicandi per se; ut edificator per se edificat, medicus per se sanat, statuicaturus qui per se statuicat: et sic de aliis. Nec refert sive iste terminus, *per se*, precedat, sive subsequatur, dummodo terminus supposuerit simpliciter. Et iste modus loquendi est crebrior apud philosophos qui accipiunt verba significancia tales actus, ut significant aptitudinem ad actus; ut *edificare* est esse *edificatrum*; et sic de aliis. Nec sequitur:

3. al. Et *abore* sic igitur B. 9. *ordn^e* B. 12. *om.* B. 15. *2nd*
q^tatis B. 18. *alii abore the line* B. 23. *quinque 2 bus above* B.
24. *quinque 2 bus above* B. 26. 27. *vel — requisita in marg.* B.
27. *exeqⁿ* B. 28. *aco<* B. 30. *causare* B. 32. *statu^{re}ro* B.

edificator per se edificat; omnis edificator est homo; ergo, homo per se edificat. Terminis tamen supponentiibus personaliter, utrobique bene corresponderet de dicto.

5 3 bus etiam modis dicitur aliquid causa per accidens alterius: primo modo, ex hoc quod causanti accedit datum causatum causare, sicut deus accidentaliter causat me. 2º modo, ex hoc quod causato accidit causari a dato causante; et illo modo individuum corruptibile causat speciem incorruptibilem, cum species possit esse sine illo. Et 3º modo dicitur aliquid per accidens causare causatum, quando ipsum non ut huiusmodi causat causatum; ut musicus per accidens edificat, sed non ut musicus. Et sic idem est per accidens musicum esse edificativum, et musicum per accidens edificare, ut termini supponunt simpliciter. Nec sequitur ad illum sensum: musicus per accidens edificat, et omnis musicus est edificator: ergo edificator per accidens edificator.

20 Ex ipsis patent aliisque veritates. 1º, quod stat eidem querere rationem cuiuscunque generis causandi; ut deus est finis omnium finitorum, forma exemplaris est, efficiens vel conservans continuatatem eorumdem, et est materia vel subiectum sapientie. Non tamen est possibile quod componat tamquam partes rei; sic enim materia non coincidit cum forma, vel cum movente, vel cum fine illius materiali. 2º patet quod totum genus esse intrinsece materialis est propter formam, et totum genus esse formalis intrinsece est propter agens, et totum genus compositorum agencium est propter finem. Ex quo patet quod impossibile est quicquam habere causam, nisi habererit causam finalem que sit per se causa; nec est ratio causandi materialiter vel formaliter intrinsece perfectionis simpliciter, sed ratio causandi efficienter vel extrinsece finaliter. Et 3º patet quod ultimus finis simpliciter non habet partes integrales qualitativas, quidditativas, vel subiectivas. Et per consequens est omnino indivisibilis, unicus et eternus. Si enim haberet aliquas partes, tales causarentur, et per consequens haberet causam finalem, et sic non esset finis ultimus. Et eodemmodo sequitur quod non sunt multi

Per accidens
has also three
significations;
either that it is
accidental for
a given cause
to produce a
given effect; or
that a certain
causation is
accidental to
the thing
caused;
or that a given
cause,
producing its
effect, does not
produce it as
such.

We thence
conclude,
1. That the same
being may be
several causes
in different
ways at the
same time, but
not when those
causes are
tantamount to
parts of a
whole.

2. That the
material exists
but for the
formal cause,
this for the
efficient and the
efficient for the
final cause.

3. And that the
ultimate End
of all things can
have no parts;
for if it had,
they would be
for the whole,
and thus would
not be the
ultimate End
of all: likewise
it is unique and
eternal.

3. torret B. 23. qti^m; in marg. qti^g B. 27. mati B. 38. in-
divisibile B.

tales fines, nec possunt fieri; quia sic haberet universale suam causam, et efficiens quod ipsas generat, ipsas conservans continue. Quamvis enim necessarium sit aliqua causare se reciproce in generibus diversis causandi, hoc tamen est impossibile in eodem genere causandi, sicut et impossibile est idem causare se.

Causal propositions follow the same divisions as the causes which they signify; some being *per se* and complete, others *per accidens* and incomplete, etc.

And this also holds good of reduplicative propositions;

some signifying the same as cause, and some the proportional accompaniment of one fact by another.

When they signify causality, they are said to have four exponents: Because *A* is *B*, *C* is *D*, i. e. *A* is *B*, and *C* is *D*, and every *B* is *D*, and if anything is *B*, it is *D*. But one of these last is surely redundant. These exponents cannot be applied to reduplicative propositions that are not causal.

Notatis istis preambulis, notandum quod conformes | B 61^a sunt divisiones proposicionis causalis, sicut dictum est de divisionibus eodem modo, cum de qualibet causa et suo causato contingit facere causalem veram; ut dividenda est causalis per se et completa, cuius antecedens infert suum consequens; ut quia deus wult me esse, ideo ego sum. Et aliqua est causalis particularis et incompleta: ut, Sor currit, quia frigescit; et sic de aliis, ubi antecedens est causa consequentis, sed per accidentis, 15 incompleta vel remota. Et sic proporcionaliter dicendum est de divisionibus causalium, ut dictum est de divisione causarum; et cum omnis talis causalis sit reduplicativa, et non econtra, patet quod conformis est divisio reduplicativarum. Aliqua ergo reduplicativa re- 20 duplicat gracia cause, et aliqua gracia proporcionalis concomitancie. Gracia cause, ut hic: *In quantum tu curris, tu moreris*; gracia proporcionalis concomitancie, ut hic: *proporcionaliter vel in quantum vel de quanto vel prout aliqua magis convenientur, minus differunt: et econtra*. Et ista est yppothetica comparativa et non causalis.

Quando ergo sunt causales, tunc dicuntur habere 4 exponentes, ut ista: *Ex hoc quod tu es homo, tu es animal*, dicitur debere sic exponi; *tu es homo et tu es animal et omnis homo est animal et si aliquid est homo, ipsum est animal*. Sed revera illud videtur michi superfluum et non sufficiens, quia sequitur: *Tu es homo et si aliquid est homo ipsum est animal: Ergo tu es animal et omnis homo est animal*. Ideo certum est quod due 35 illarum superfluerunt, quantum ad istam exposicionem. Multe etiam sunt reduplicative in quibus insunt tales 4 exponentes signande; ut patet de talibus: *In quantum deus est, non idem simul est et non est; in quantum deus wult me esse, ego sum; et sic de aliis*. Ymmo ista est 40 falsa, tenta causaliter: *In quantum tu es nichil tu es*

^L - gloriose: conformes below B. 11. feta car B.

homo; et tamen exponentes sunt vere; nec exponunt iste exponentes sensum reduplicandi gracia proporcionis concomitancie.

Et ideo notandum quod terminus reduplicativus quandoque tenetur reduplicative, quandoque simpliciter, et quandoque comparative. Reduplicative, quando tenetur sinkathegorice et mobilitate terminum connotando completam causam, ut hic: *In quantum numerus aliquis est senarius, est numerus perfectus*: quod tantum valet ac si diceretur quod esse senarium est per se et complete causa quia ipse est numerus perfectus. Vel secundum volentes exponere sufficit capere causalem et condicionalem, ut: *quia Sor est homo est animal*; et si aliquid est homo ipse est animal, ergo *Sor, in quantum est homo, est animal*. Et sic sequitur expositio: *quia deus est, nichil simul est et non est*. Et, si deus est nichil simul est et non est: ergo *in quantum deus est, nichil simul est et non est*. Et racione note condicionis debet terminus reduplicativus mobilitate terminum super quem cadit: ut, si iusticia est bonum, *in quantum bonum*; tunc iusticia est omne bonum; quia dato antecedente, tunc in quantum aliquid est bonum, ipsum est iusticia; et per consequens iusticia in commune est omne bonum. Vel si iste terminus, *iusticia*, supponat personaliter cum paribus in hoc dicto, *Iusticia est bonum in quantum bonum*, tunc aliquam iusticiam implicat esse omne bonum.

Quando vero terminus reduplicativus terminatur simpliciter, tunc dicit confuse kathegorice quamcunque causam vel formam racione inherencie predicati ad subiectum, ut hic: *motus est actus, id est forma mobilis in quantum actualiter est mobile*, quod tantum sonat ac si diceretur, *motus est forma actualis mobilis secundum quam ipsum formaliter est in motu*. Et ita auctores describunt quascunque formas, dicendo quod forma talis est actus secundum quem subiectum est sic formatum; et tunc isti termini *in quantum, secundum quod*, et sic de ceteris terminis usitatis in talibus descriptionibus significant circumstanciam cause formalis. Et patet generaliter quomodo forme quaecunque sunt describende, et quomodo descripciones auctorum sunt B 61^b

The reduplicative term is sometimes to be understood reduplicatively, sometimes simply, and sometimes as a comparative. Reduplicatively, when *as such*, &c. point to a cause or a condition;

and in this case, the predicate becomes universal; if A *as such* is B, then every A is every B.

Simply, when it merely implies in general some cause that unites the subject with the predicate: as: A is B in so far as it is C.

In such cases the terms modified by *in so far* does not become universal.

2. redu^{ti} B. 18. d^e B. 20. est bonum est B. 28. te^r sif^r B.

30. act^{us}i. B. 32. act¹ B.

intelligende, et iuxta illum sensum non mobilitat terminus reduplicativus terminum super quem cadit, cum idem sit dicere: *motus est actus mobilis in quantum moretur ac si diceretur, Motus est forma qua formaliter mobile moretur.*

But as for negative propositions, logicians do not agree.
Some admit, v. g. that *a man, qua a white man, does not build,* understanding the negation to fall on whiteness. Some admit that simply: Some say that he does build, considering whiteness as a remote cause. Soine, denying this, would except the case of Christ's actions *qua man.*
In negativis autem, ubi reduplicativi supponunt simpliciter, altercantur logici; ut alii concedunt quod *Sor in quantum albus non edificat*, intelligentes propositionem negative simpliciter, scilicet ad illum sensum, *Sor per albacionem non edificat*; quod tantum valet ac si non in quantum albus edificat. Alii autem concedunt illas ultimas propositiones in quibus negacio precedit terminum reduplicativam, et negant propositiones in quibus negacio subsequitur. Alii etiam in affirmativis concedunt propositiones reduplicativas, ponentes causam remotam causare suum causatum ut hic; Cristus secundum quod homo passus est, moriebatur et sitivit etc., et tamen humanitas non fuit per se causa completa talium. Alii autem negant omnes huiusmodi; sed concedunt quod Cristus secundum quod homo fuit ambulativus, materialis etc., nec Cristus secundum quod deus fuit inmortalis et immobilitis etc., quia non fuit inmortalis immobilitis.

I prefer the first opinion.

The reduplicative term understood as above, no inconvenience follows.

The human actions of Christ proceed from his humanity; and if also from his Deity, it is in another way altogether; so that they cannot be ascribed to the Godhead.

And thus a man does not build *qua man,* but *qua able to conformiter negatur quod aliquid, in quantum homo,* 50

25 Ego autem assencio priori modo loquendi, quia consonancior et antiquior et facilior. Nec sequitur: *Sor in quantum albus non edificat, ergo, si est albus non edificat;* quia terminus reduplicativus terminatur simpliciter ad sensum expositum. Et sic conceditur quod Cristus est corporeus, palpabilis, divisibilis, etc., quia ut homo est 30 huiusmodi; et cum hoc est indivisibilis et inmortalis, quia est due substancialiter vel due nature, quarum una est talis, et alia talis; et una est essentia divina, et alia est minor essentia divina. Quamvis ergo divinitas sit causa ambulacionis Christi, tamen non est causa eiusdem 35 generis cum actu vel proprietate actus; homo tamen per se est gressibilis, etsi non poterit ambulare Gressibilitas ergo est in specie humana tanquam eius passio, quamvis species non sit subiectum eius primum. Et conformiter negatur quod aliquid, in quantum homo, 40

21, 22. *albatus: ambulativus abore deus: Cristus abore* B.

24. *imo* B.

edificativum est, sed in quantum habens artem; quia *built*, which is
esse *edificativum* non est passio sed accidens separabile; of a different
et sic homo est alterius generis quam edificabilitas. order of things.

Dubium tamen est apud multos logicos, si omnis substantia, secundum omnem rationem qua est, sit aliquid. Et videtur quod sic; quia sequitur: secundum istam rationem *Sor est: ergo, secundum istam rationem est ens* et per consequens *secundum istam est aliquid*. In oppositum sic: Si homo est secundum omnem rationem qua est aliquid, tunc per omnem famulatum accidentalem sui esset aliquid. Sed quid est per hoc quod est *albus, pater, currens* etc.? Certum est quod ille nichil esset per ista, nisi homo; et per consequens quodlibet illorum esset substancia et non accidens. Dicitur ergo quod quelibet substancia infinitis modis rationum est, secundum quarum nullam est ipsa substancia vel aliquid; sed aliquantum, aliquale, vel alicuiusmodi. Pro quo nota quod ablatus in tali propositione: *Isto accidente Sor est* potest regi ex vi cause, et sic esset sensus falsus; vel ex vi accidentis, et sic tunc esset sensus verus; ut: *iste equus est albo colore vel albi coloris* vel secundum albedinem vel rationem albandi: que omnia idem sonant. Et patet quod ista proposicio est equivoca: *Iste homo est isto modo*, ex hoc quod iste terminus: *iste homo* potest simul intelligi ut subiectum, et ablatus regi de ly 'est' ex vi accidentis ad illum sensum: *Ille homo est huiusmodi*; vel aliter, quod pronomen sit subiectum, et iste terminus, *homo*, sit appositum, regens alterum ex vi cause formalis, ita quod sit sensus: *iste homo isto modo formaliter est homo*. Notata ergo ista equivocatione, patet quod quelibet substancia secundum infinitas rationes formales vel modos accidentiales est, quia est illorum subiectum; et tamen non secundum aliquam istarum est ens vel aliquid, | cum in talibus regitur terminus ab apposito ex vi cause; ut suppono ex grammatica. Homo ergo humanitate est homo vel substancia, aliquid, et ens; et quantitate est quantus, et qualitate est qualis, et aliis modis aliqualiter; sed nec substancia nec aliquid Nec sequitur secundum istam rationem *Sor est similis alteri*, ergo secundum istam est aliquid; quia circumstancie significante per huiusmodi

A question: whether every substance is something in every one of its modes of being: for a mode is something. On the other hand, every possible accident would then make it something substantially new; which is not admissible. These modes do not make a substance to be some thing, but of some size, quality or manner. The ablative case is ambiguous, and may be understood in several ways, some false.

The answer is therefore that to be thus and thus, and to be being, are not the same; a man is something by humanity, great by size, such by quality, &c.

The argument from what is accidentally

^{3,} editio^{ta} B. 5, 6, a'd B. 8, a'd B. 10, fatm B. 35, ato
or oⁱⁿ B. 30, after aliquid, a space for three words B.

more particular abstracta impediunt modum argumentandi a *per acci-*
to what is more *dens* inferiori ad suum superius; vel ad transcendentis
universal, does not hold.

superius. Sed in genere, argumentando a *per se* inferiori ad superius, tenet consequencia; ut, si *ista albedine Sor est albus*, tunc *ista albedine Sor est coloratus*. 5

Can the same thing be, through these accidental modes, posterior to itself in its essential being? v. g. God, as cause of my being, is not God, and as such, He is in relation to me, and thus identical with my being.

On the other hand, if God is identical with me in any point of view, then He really is not above me in so far;

and God has become our equal by the Incarnation. Some frivolous adversaries never answer such arguments, unless by repeating the reduplicative term in the conclusion.

2º dubitatur si eadem res secundum raciones accidentales sit posterior quam est secundum rationem substancialis; et videtur quod sic, quia deus secundum infinitas raciones est, secundum quarum nullam ipse est deus; secundum rationem ergo qua ipse est causa mei non est deus; et secundum illam rationem habet se in aliquo ordine ad me. Cum ergo secundum illam rationem est prior me, vel posterior me, vel eque primo mecum, non potest dici quod secundum omnem rationem ipse sit prior me; quia, ut sic, ipse est relatus michi, et relativa, ut huiusmodi, sunt simul natura; et per idem sequitur quod non secundum illam rationem ipse est posterior me, potissime cum, ut causa huiusmodi, est prior suo causato. Sed ad oppositum videtur esse hoc medium: Si deus, ut huiusmodi, sit eque primo mecum, tunc ipse est eque primo mecum. Et tunc per idem ipse est eque primo cuilibet rei, et infinitum est posterior se ipso. Sequitur enim: secundum illam rationem est deus eque primo mecum; ergo secundum aliud et secundum veritatem est eque primo mecum. Nec aliter concederent 25 theologi quod deus ex humana concepcione est minoratus. Sicut ergo deus, ut homo, est par nobis, sic, ut causa illius causati est eque primo cum illo. Et in isto est tediosum communicare cum trutatis qui nunquam respondent ad tales propositiones, nisi addendo determinacionem reduplicativi. Ut, quando queritur utrum pater est prior filii, dicunt quod pater, ut pater, est eque primo cum filio; et aliter non respondent; et in ista materia legiste et plebei sunt nutriti.

10. (8) *pro* rationem! B. 12. vel *pro* cum B. 16. h⁹ B. 20. me^m B.

20. h^m co^c B. 20. trutais B.

16. *Simul natura*. This expression is one side of a double distinction: *together in time — together in nature*. I have chosen to render it by the idea of identity; for the difficulty of Wyclif is the very same as that concerning the identity of cause and effect, of subject and object.

Dicitur ergo quod dupliciter dicitur accidentis. Primo modo quando ipsum in sui natura est substancia sed secundum habitudinem alteri actualem habetur ab alio; et illo modo divicie sunt accidentia diviti, et igneitas 5 est accidentis essentie ignis, sicut et humanitas accident Verbo. Ubi ergo est unio talium naturarum in eodem supposito, bene sequitur illud suppositum, in quantum homo vel ignis, est aliquid, cum natura in se unita sit substancia. Cum ergo tale suppositum sit more universali salium multe nature, concedendum est quod est maius et minus, prius et posterius eodem; et sic de aliis que insunt illis naturis. Nec sequitur ex hoc quod idem sit maius et minus se ipso, ut verbum est par patri et minus patre, quia natura minor patre et tamen illa 15 natura est verbum. Nec sequitur: *ista humanitas incipit esse et ipsa est deus, igitur deus incipit esse.* Nec sequitur, etsi verbum quod est illa humanitas sit natura divina, quod illa humanitas sit natura divina. Nec sequitur, si verbum assumpsit illam humanitatem, que est 20 ipsamet persona, quod verbum assumpsit parem vel se ipsum. Nec sequitur quod illa humanitas sit in infinitum perfecta, etsi sit in infinitum perfectum. Nec sequitur, si libere contradictorie assumpsit illam naturam, quod poterit sumpsisse aliam, faciendo se alium hominem, 25 sicut homo facit libere se esse istum currentem, nec possit esse aliud currens. Nec sequitur quod aliqua res que est non idem deo possit fieri idem deo, cum illa natura non posset manere dimissa, cum illa natura sit *Verbum esse hominem.* Est ergo homo optimus possibilis, et tam bonus homo quam bonum est ipsum esse hominem. Aliud ergo est homo et aliud deus, quia alia natura; sed non aliis est iste homo quam deus, sed est homo eiusdem speciei et univocus cum quolibet altero homine. Cristus ergo, in quantum est homo, est B 62^b aliquid, quia substancia et creatura; | et in quantum homo, est posterior essentia divina.

Sed 2º modo dicitur accidentis quod claudit contradictionem esse non inherens, ut accidentia 9 generum; et illa non possunt in se esse substancialia. Ideo nichil

Accident has two meanings.
The first implies one substance that, happening to belong to another, is called its accident; as v. g. riches. Now when two such substances are united in one person, this person is greater or less, &c. according as we speak of one substance or the other; yet not greater or less than itself, nor does any other contradiction follow thence,

because they bear upon the natures, not on that which is these natures.

The second, meaning of 'accident' is what must

20. pm B. 23. qdi⁹ B. 24. ptit B. 28. manere di's dimissa;

in marg. dimesa B. 39. put B.

essentially belong to another; and such an accident brings no otherness with it, nor does it render the substance more or less perfect.

A cause is thus at the same time with its effect, and prior to it, because there is priority and simultaneously both of causation and of consequence. God is infinitely before the effect which he causes, precisely in the order of causation.

Aristotle, saying that relatives are simultaneously related, is to be understood to mean as to consequence; as to causation, one may be prior to the other.

This simultaneity, however, does not identify God with us.

I choose to answer that God, though like to me, is not identical; but that His likeness with me is identical to mine with Him.

in quantum sic accidentatum est aliquid, nec mutat speciem propter tale accidens; quia non est illud accidens concretive vel abstractive. Nec dicitur substancia prior aut posterior propter illud accidens, quia sic necessario deus esset posterior quam aliquid posset esse, 5 cum esset postremum ens, et impossibile est dare postremum ens. Et sic conceditur quod deus, ut est causa mei, est summe prior me, ymmo omnis causa, ut causa,

est prior natura suo causato; et tamen aliqua causa, ut causa, est simul natura cum causato suo; quia est 10 dare duplēcēm simultaneitatem sicut duplēcēm prioritatem nature, scilicet simultaneitatem quo ad causacionem et simultaneitatem quo ad consequenciam. Et sic multe cause simultanee quo ad consequenciam sunt simul cum suis causatis; sicut omne subiectum est eius passio; sed 15 non simultanee quo ad causacionem. Sed in propositionibus concessis tenentur termini reduplicativi simplificiter; quia aliter essent sensus impossibilis. Deus ergo, causando me, facit se esse summe priorem me; nec ex hoc sequitur: omnis causa mei esse summe prior est me. 20 Patet ergo quo ordine prioritatis deus se habet ad me, quia secundum causacionem qua causat me.

Et ad Aristotelem de simultaneitate nature relativorum dicitur quod ipse wult omnia correlata esse simul quo ad correlativa; et tamen non repugnat unum relativum 25 antecedere reliquum causacione secundum quam est relata, et simul alia simultaneitate. Alii vero intelligent per relativa, aggregata per accidens ex subiecto et relacione; et illa possunt simul esse natura; et sic non est dare causatum, quin aggregatum ex deo et relacione 30 ad illud sit eque primo cum illo causato; et talia aggregata intelliguntur communiter per substanciam et per terminos reduplicativos. Et ex illis non sequitur: *deus, ut est causa mei, vel deus causans me est simul natura mecum; ergo deus est simul natura mecum.* Et sic de 35 similibus. Nec est ista sentencia falsa; sed cavillacio verborum stat in eleccione.

Ego vero determinavi me ad priorem responcionem, negando quod deus similis michi est simul natura mecum, sed similitudo dei ad me est simul natura cum 40 similitudine mei ad deum; et deus eque primo natura

est similis michi vel causa mei, sicut ego sum. Ideo God is like me, as I am; so I
posterior natura est similis michi quam est, quia prius being after
naturaliter est quam est similis michi. Nec sequitur: Him, this
deus isto gradu prioritatis vel posterioritatis est causa likeness is also
5 mei vel huiusmodi; ergo isto gradu est, nisi equivocando posterior to
intelligatur quod est subiectum huius gradus; et ita de Him.
similibus est dicendum.

Ex istis dictis inferri potest evidenter quod nullum We thus see
accidens inherens potest esse aliquid per se existens, ut that no inherent
10 partes substancie; quia tunc possibile esset quod substancie accident can
exist by itself, for if it could, it would by
stancia in quantum taliter accidentata esset aliquid; utputa in quantum alba vel similis vel quanta esset itself render the
aliquid. Et per consequens proporcionaliter ut esset magis alba, esset magis illud aliquid, et per consequens substance other, and whiteness, v. g. increasing
15 in infinitum posset aliquid unius speciei esse reliquo indefinitely,
eiusdem speciei magis ens. Consequens est impossible than it was;
de naturis. Ideo dicit philosophus signanter quod substancie but there is no
non suscipit maius et minus. Si ergo albedo more of a being
esset aliquid per se existens, aut natura potens per se
20 existere, tunc utique esset aliquid, et unio illius ad subiectum esset accidens quo subiectum foret accidentatum in immediate formaliter, et non illa albedo Omnis talis
unio esset vere qualitas et non albedo data; ut alias declaravi.

25 Ex istis patent quedam regule. Prima, omnis proposicio de *per se* predicacione infert causalem in eisdem terminis, et non econtra; ut, si per se homo est animal vel risibile, tunc ex hoc quod aliquid est homo, ipse est animal vel risibile. Patet prima pars regule ex B 63¹ descripcione causalis vel reduplicative | complete et dictis de universalibus, eo quod quelibet species est completa causa sui generis et sue passionis. Et 2^a pars regule patet ex hoc quod multe sunt veritates, quarum una est completa causa alterius, inter quarum extrema 35 non est per se predicacio, ut patet in istis: *ex hoc quod paries non habet pulmonem, ipse non respirat; quia deus est, ego non sum asinus; quia deus nult me esse,* igitur *ego sum.* Et patet quam deminute sunt 4 exponentes supradicte, ymmo iuxta illas sequitur indifferenter 40 econtra quod in quantum sum risibilis vel gressibilis sum homo vel animal, sicut econtra Et patet quante It makes a great
difference in the
sense if we

2. filii B. 17. natis B. 20. vere abore utique B. 40. egv^u B.
11. egv^u B.

place the subject refert preponere subiectum ante terminum reduplicative before or after tentum, vel postponere ipsum, ut hoc est verum: *Ali-*
the reduplicative term.

quid in quantum est substancia, ipsum est homo, quia
Sor ex hoc quod est substancia est homo et tamen non
in quantum aliquid est substancia, ipsum est homo; 5
quia tunc, si aliquid est substancia ipsum est homo.

II. Every causal proposition to which is added a minor stating the cause of the antecedent, 2^o patet quod ex omni tali, cum minore capiente causam sui antecedentis, sequitur syllogistice causalitatem. cuius antecedens causatur, et consequens maioris concluditur; ut sic argumentando: *quia tu es homo* 10
tu es animal, sed quia tu es lapis tu es homo; ergo, quia
gives a conclusion, *tu es lapis tu es animal; quia chimera non habet pul-*
thus: *Because A is B, C is D;* *monem non respirat, sed quia non est non habet pul-*
Because E is F. A is B; *Because E is F. regula per hoc: quidquid est causa cause est causa* 15
C is D.

This reposes on *sui causati;* et quidquid antecedit ad antecedens antecedit ad suum consequens. Ut patet quod pulcre syllogizatur ex causali tanquam minori et ex alia causali cuius antecedens est primum consequens ad 3^{am} causalem cuius antecedens est antecedens primo sumptum, 20 et consequens est illud quod est consequens in minori; ut sic argumentando: *quia tu es homo, tu es animal,*
quia tu es animal tu es corpus; ergo, quia tu es homo
tu es corpus. Et tenet ista regula per hoc quod quidquid sequitur ad consequens, sequitur ad suum antecedens; utrumque tamen istorum dictorum intelligitur quando non est variatio in genere vel in modo causandi. Ex hoc patet quod terminus super quem cadit reduplicatio mobilitatur, ut sequitur: *In quantum tu es homo, tu es animal; tu es iste homo; ergo, in quantum* 30
universal; quia tu es iste homo, tu es animal. Et si captiatur in minori quod *iste est homo*, sequitur simpliciter quod *iste est animal.* Sed tamen non tenet descendendo ad inferiora per accidens: ut non oportet quod, si *ex hoc quod tu es homo, tu es animal, et tu es iste homo* 35
albus; ergo, ex hoc quod tu es iste homo, tu es animal. Nam impossibile est quod *tu sis homo ex hoc quod tu es iste albus homo, pater, quantus, etc.;* sed ex hoc quod tu es homo, tu es hoc album, quamvis non secundum causam completam et per se sufficientem.

And we must note that when a term is reduplicated, it becomes universal; 'qua man' means in so far as possessing the essence humanity.

40

2. *fem* B. 24. *consequencia;* regula *ab ore B.* 33. Non tamen illud: *corr. ab ore B.*

3º patet quod sicut ex nulla causa necessaria per se sequitur logice contingens, sic non quelibet parcialis causa et per accidens inferens causatum sequitur logice ex eadem. Verbi gratia, quamvis deum esse sit causa quare ego sum, non tamen si deus est, ego sum; sed oportet illi necessario adiungere causam contingentem, ut est volicio dei respectu mei esse, vel aliquid consimile. Ex quo patet quod non est latitudo causandi a prima causa usque ad contingens, quia totum genus contingencium est creatum a causa necessaria, et inter necessarium et contingens est magna distanca. Ymmo, dato opposito, sequitur quod, posita prima causa, ponetur omne possibile. Ex quo sequitur quod oportet dare causas reciproce se causantes, ut volicio qua deus est formaliter et contingenter volens me esse bonum est relacio ponens deum et me esse bonum; et illa causatur a me, sicut quodlibet extrinsecum volitum a deo causat in ipso, sine eius mocione, unam volicionem vel complacenciam; omnia tamen volibilia extrinseca causantur ex eius volacione eterna, que est prima essencia.

B 63º Est tamen ordo in volicionibus dei, cum una prior causat aliam posteriorem: | ut volicio qua wult me esse precedit wolicionem qua wult me esse virtuosum; et sic volicio qua wult omnem hominem esse precedit volicionem qua wult me esse; nec indiget volibili extrinseco ad eius volicionem, quia non indiget sic velle. Nulla ergo accidentia sunt subiective in prima essencia que implicant ipsam esse mobilem.

Exemplum 2º partis est: lumen ideo est, quia producitur a luminoso; et anima est, quia creatur a deo: et tamen lumen et anima possunt esse sine talibus productionibus. Tales autem producciones sunt cause parciales et per accidens productorum, et per se causa producionum passivarum, sicut producciones successive permanentium non sunt cause illorum productorum, sed suarum producionum passivarum. Sic ergo producencia mundi fuit causa per accidens mundi, sed mundus fuit

III. As a necessary cause does not infer what is contingent, so neither does it infer a partial cause. V. g. God is the cause of my being; yet God's existence does not infer mine. We must, therefore, admit that some causes cause each other; for instance God's will that I exist causes me and is caused by me to be such.

There is besides an order in the volitions of God, one being prior to another and causing that other; the universal v. g. causing the particular.

Though light is because produced by a luminous body, it can exist without that production; so also of the soul. This brings us to admit the existence of certain truths which are

^{31.} Sicut B.

29, 30. *Produccionibus.* I can only understand this passage by supposing Wyclif to mean by *production* and *creation* what takes place at the first instant of being; it is then true that during the rest of their existence, both light and the soul *are*, while the first act of causation *is no longer*.

neither the
causing nor the
caused
substances; if
not, the world
could not have
been produced.

causa per se sue produccionis, cum sit subiectum illius accidentis, sicut deus fuit subiectum illius active productio[n]e. Nec aliter esset possibile mundum fuisse productum, nisi esset reciproca causacio, eo quod necesse est omne causatum habere causam, qua posita ponitur,⁵ et qua non posita non ponitur; quod non esset possibile nisi essent veritates preter substancias causantes, et encia reciproce causata a se ipsis.

Three
objections
severally
answered.

Sed huic obicitur; si A causat B, et econtra, tunc A est prius natura quam B et econtra; et sic idem esset¹⁰ prius se ipso natura. Similiter complacencia dei, cum sit relacio, non causat suum causatum ipsa prius natura. Similiter subiectum pro instanti prioritatis naturalis foret non volitum a deo, cum non prius sit volitum quam deus illud velit.¹⁵

1. If A and B
cause each
other mutually,
they are each
of them prior
to the other.
This, however,
does not follow
except with a
distinction:
prior *qua*
causes, not
otherwise.

Ad primum dicitur quod consequencia ultima non valet, quia est dare multos ordines prioritatum naturalium; ideo, ad modum exponendi hoc verbum *differt*, superius expositum, debet ista proposicio: *A est natura prius B*, sic exponi: *A est aliquo ordine nature prius B*;²⁰ et, notato omni ordine in quo utrumque est, capienda est 2^a exponens: *talis B non est isto ordine eque primo cum A*. In diversis ergo ordinibus utrumque antecedit reliquum.

2. It is false that
relations cannot
be causes; but
one volition
of God, if
posited, at once
positis infinite
others, He
Himself being
the efficient
cause of all.

Ad 2^m dicitur quod relaciones faciunt multa bona;²⁵ ut proporcio causat modum. Videtur tamen michi quod ista: *deus wult me esse*, ponit infinitas voliciones dei; et alia est causa *esse* mei, ut volicio qua wult me esse, volendo omnem hominem esse (et sic de multis aliis); et causa agens in ipsis omnibus volucionibus est ipse qui³⁰ est prima voluntas. Complacencia ergo presupponens me esse, si sit causa conservans me, conservatur a me in illo ordine causandi obiective.

3. A creature
must be willed
by God before
it exists; for if
not, it would
not depend on
His volition.

Ad 3^m dicitur quod conclusio est impossibilis. Et admittantur quotlibet instance nature esse simul in³⁵ eodem instanti temporis, cum illa instance non sunt nisi gradus prioritatum naturalium. Nec posset deus

12. ipso B. 25. Ad 2^m dr underlined B.

34. Ad 3^m dr under-

lined B. 35. q^a pro instantia B.

6. Before the world existed, God could not have become its cause, if there had not been *something* to make God that cause; that *something* is *the truth that the world is possible*.

ponere complacenciam suam in instanti nature quo est obiectum, quamvis utrumque sit quandocunque est alterum, altera. Pro illo ergo instanti nature nec est obiectum volitum a deo, nec pro illo est non volitum, sed pro illo est volitum *vel* non volitum in sensu composito. Illud patet de virtute sermonis, ut alibi expōnitur.

But we must distinguish between time instants and nature instants. In the same instant of time there may be infinite instants of natural priority. Before the creature exists it is willed or not willed.

IV. Affirmation causes affirmation, negation negation: thus every causal proposition is tantamount to a conditional with a contradictory members.

Ex: *A* is *B* because *A* is *C*; therefore:

1. If *A* is not *C*, *A* is not *B* because not *C*; or, 2. If *A* is not *B*, *A* is not *C*, because *A* is not *B*; 1. being employed in the case of partial and 2. in that of complete causes.

This, however, does not hold, according to some, when the antecedent is the efficient cause of the consequent.

Digression concerning the origin of evil: *I do well because God wills so; if God wills that I do ill, I do ill because God wills it.*

It would surely follow that, God's will that I do good being removed, I cannot do good;

4º patet quod si affirmacio sit causa affirmacionis, et negacio est causa negacionis: et hinc solet regulare riter antiquitus inferri ex qualibet completa causali condicinalis facta ex causali oppositarum parcium; ut, si *Sor est respirativus quia habet pulmonem; ergo, si non habet pulmonem, ideo non est respirativus vel igitur non est respirativus quia non habet pulmonem.* Solertia tamen 15 est, quando capitur oppositum consequentis et quando oppositum antecedentis; quando enim consequens est naturaliter prius quoad consequenciam suo antecedente; tunc antecedit condicinaliter negacio consequentis negacionem antecedentis; ut: *quia tu curris, tu moveris: 20 igitur, si non moveris tu non curris, quia non moveris.*

B 64^a Sed si antecedens sit causa completa, convertibiliter inferens suum causatum, sicut est de subiecto et sua passione, tunc negacio cause antecedentis sequitur mixtum causaliter et condicinaliter ex negacione causati 25 consequentis; ut: *Sor, quia est homo, est risibilis; ergo, si non est homo, ideo non est risibilis, quia ideo non est homo: et non econtra; sed non oportet, si antecedens sit causa convertibilis efficiens consequentis, quod negacio antecedentis sit causa negacionis consequentis; ut: 30 quia deus nult me bene agere, igitur bene ago; si deus non nult me bene agere, ideo non bene ago quia deus non nult me bene agere, non sequitur secundum aliquos; quia tunc deus esset causa quare non bene ago, et cuiuscunque inordinacionis mundi. Ac si gratis sub- 35 traheret volucionem suam, necessitando me cessare a bene agere, cum tamen cuiuscunque defectus moralis radicalis est causa in deficiente et non in summo bono conservante; ideo, sicut repugnat solem debite applicari medio diaffano et non illuminare idem, nisi defectus 40 fuerit in medio, causans privacionem luminis, sic repugnat hominem esse non motum a deo ad agendum sibi*

4, 5. a deo —in sensu *in marg.* B. 48, 10. above negacionem *an illegible word*: *id: B.* 38. ymmo; ideo above B.

but the defect complacenter, nisi defectus sit in homine. Sic quod deus would be in me, not in God, non causat istum defectum; quia defectus posizione illius solis, vel defectus applicacionis, vel invidia de *bene* prevents the light from penetrating; and God would not give His grace, because I should not receive it.

It is thus impossible that God should be the cause of all that is caused, if we include non entities and privations under that head. Quod si arguatur deum esse causam uniuscuiusque causati, dicitur quod est impossibile, cum negaciones et privaciones et earum futuriciones vel pretericiones eterne sonantes in deordinacione non causantur ab illo, cum nichil causat nisi complacendo de causancia et causato.

We grant, however, that all, directly or indirectly, depends on the pecco, quia sum peccabilis, et sum sic motus, cum First cause: my illa pauca sufficiencia ad resistendum; et non bonum want of temptation to est ut causatum a deo quod sum peccabilis. Sicut et in my nature, ista veritas eterna est bona: *Omnis natura peccabilis erit peccabilis*; et ab isto bono processerunt contingenter futuriciones peccatorum, et de necessitate primo omnium futuricio omissionis alicuius debiti deo. Et prima omissionis habuit disposicionem et inclinacionem in obmittente, cum qua non tunc stetit oppositum illius omissionis; et tamen inmediate ante instans omissionis fuit declinacio omissionis possibilis, cum summa contingencia sit de talibus futuracionibus, cuius contingencie primaria et radicalis causa fuit prima essencia. Ista ergo generalia de causalibus notata habuerunt introduc-toria in pulcerrimas veritates.

2. po^e B. 3. fol B. 13. av'e above avari B; ib. qmtr; in marg.
qmcatt B. 23. mo or zuo B. 24. est et B.

5. *Antecedens . . . iniustum*. Wyclif means here, I believe, that the fact of sin, because of its injustice, being the cause of its punishment, pleases God. 34. *Primaria et radicalis causa*. It is well to note the boldness of Wyclif's speculations in this (apparently) his first work.

CAPITULUM SEXTUM.

Restat ergo dicere de terminis reduplicativis comparative tentis. Hoc autem non est commune omnibus terminis reduplicativis, cum iste terminus, *ex hoc*, ex-
5 presse connotat causam et non comparacionem, sicut
isti termini, *in quantum*, *de quanto*, *pro ut*, *secundum*
quod etc. Quando ergo predicti termini tenentur comparative, propositiones ratione illorum exponende de-
bent exponi secundum exponentes positivi gradus, de
10 quibus dictum est tractatu proximo. Sunt ergo deno-
B 64^b minaciones sibi mutuo correspondentes, ut bonitas | crea-
ture et eius obligacio deo, entitas rei et eius cognoscibilis,
et intellectivitas, et intelligibilitas; et sic de
omnibus denominacionibus, quarum unam gradatim
15 repugnat correspondere alteri: sicut est de per se causis
et suis completis causatis. Ut entitas rei causat eius
cognoscibilitatem, sed non intelligibilitatem, eo quod omne
ens est necessario eternaliter intelligibile, quanto deus est
illius intellectivus; ipse enim est tam intellectivus quam
20 volitivus. Quamvis multa intelligit que non wult, quia
non de omni intelligibili habet volitionem; et per idem
est tante causativus, ordinativus, et productivus, sicut
est volitivus. Multa tamen wult que non ordinat; et
volendo se non causat se, quamvis causet illud quod
25 est ipse. Queliber autem alia persona volitiva est plus
volitiva quam causativa. Ipse etiam precise tam bonus
est quam iustus est; et sic de aliis que non sunt sibi
actualia. De ipsis autem respectu cuiuscunque subiecti
est maxima difficultas, cum tangat raciones ydeales
30 que sunt principia rerum, sine quibus cognitis nemo
est sapiens.

Reduplicative terms, considered comparatively. They cannot all be so considered: v. g. *ex hoc*. The exponents of such propositions follow the rules of comparisons of equality (as much, as &c.) already dealt with.

There are many qualities that go beyond each other in degree and cannot be thus reduplicatively affirmed. Examples: entity, intelligibility, &c.

But this question is full of difficulties, touching as it does, the ideal principles of all things.

1. *Cap. deest.* 2. *Space for initial R. B.* 26. *creativa B; ib.*

Ipsa B. 28. *accua B.*

The present chapter deals with positive and negative 'breadths' of qualities. Is it true that if two things agree to a certain extent, they disagree to the same extent?

If so, every privation that admits of variation in intensity is equal with the opposite quality.

And many absurdities follow.

For if some opposite qualities are thus equal, all of them are so.

Take a line; an infinitely small part of it belongs to the line; so the line is what its part is, infinitely small; and its smallness is infinitely great: so it is both at once.

Increase, lessening, and change, are all impossible thenceforth.

What is proved of size can be likewise proved of all other qualities. An infinite number of small, because its smallness is infinitely small; &c.

Istis autem primisis, tractandum est de denominacionibus, latitudinibus positivis et latitudinibus privativis ex opposito sibi correspondentibus: ut si aliqua in quantum convenient, in tantum differunt. Quod si sit verum, tunc aliquorum consequencia et eorum diferencia sunt pares; 5 et per idem quelibet privacio suscipiens magis et minus foret parificabilis suo positivo; ut similitudo disimilitudini, magnitudo parvitati, intensio remissioni, rarefaccio condensacioni, distancia propinquitati: et sic de aliis. Quo dato, secuntur multa inconveniencia; et consequencia prima patet ex hoc quod illa proposicio: *in quantum aliqua convenient, in tantum differunt*, expresse parificat comparata secundum convenientiam et differentiam. Et quod ex illo secuntur inconveniencia, patet ex hoc quod pari evidencia qua aliqua talia opposita sunt 15 equalia, et quelibet; et tunc sequitur quod nulla talis denominatio suscipit magis et minus. Si ergo omne magnum sit ita parvum sicut magnum, et econtra, tunc omne magnum est infinitum magnum et infinitum parvum; et per consequens, proporcionaliter ut est maius 20 est minus, et econtra; et per consequens non esset possibile maiorari vel minorari, vel aliter moveri subjectum aliquod, cum nichil possit fieri intensius vel remissius, distancius vel propinquius. Prima consequencia probatur, dando oppositum de A pedali: quantumcumque parva est aliqua pars A, ita parvum vel magis parvum est A. Sed infinitum parvum est aliqua pars A; ergo infinitum parvum est A; et omne parvum est ita magnum sicut ipsummet est parvum. Per datum ergo infinitum magna est aliqua pars A, et per consequens A 25 est infinitum magnum, et infinitum parvum. Argumentatur ex hoc quod A est magis magnum quam aliqua eius pars, et precise tam magnum est quidlibet, sicut est parvum; ergo A est magis parvum quam aliqua eius pars.

Et idem argumentatur de qualibet magna vel qualicunque denominacione suscipiente maius et minus denominato; ut, si infinitum sit aliquis numerus, tunc infinitum parvum intensem est; et sic de aliis, eo quod omne tale 40 est precise ita magnum sicut parvum; et per consequens,

si est magis magnum, tunc est magis parvum. Ex quo
B 65^a palam sequitur quod repugnat quicquam se habere pro-
porcione | maioris inequalitatis ad aliquid, eo quod ex-
cedens aut excellens vel plus denominaretur positivo quam
5 privativo.

Hic audivi multas fugas sophisticas. Illi enim qui
ponunt omne ens absolutum, ponunt quod omnis priva-
cio et suum oppositum comparantur sicut termini vel
conceptus aut subiecta taliter se habent; cum omnis
10 privacio vel sit terminus privativus vel subiectum priva-
tivum; et sic concedunt quod illa privacio est pedalis
vel tanta, sed non est tanta privacio. Alii dicunt quod
si parvitas augmentabitur ad suum duplum, tunc erit in
duplo maior quando est subdupla quam est modo. Et
15 ali dicunt quod talis privacio privative intellecta est
tanta, et positive intellecta est tanta, ita quod ipsi fa-
ciunt ex sua consideracione ens extrinsecum esse tantum
vel tantum. Sed falsificant se ipsos, et distinguunt ig-
noranter inter esse positive et esse privative. Tales ri-
20 mas circumpalpitantes excogitabant, qui per ignoranciam
distincionis encium tenebantur.

Supponatur ergo quod loquimur de entibus ex parte
rei non causatis ex consideracione hominis; et tunc
patet quod stat difficultas querens sub quo gradu est
25 ista parvitas; utrum secus sit tanta magnitudo sicut
parvitas vel non; aut, sub aliis verbis, utrum subiectum
sit tantum sub ratione qua magnum, sicut predicatum
est sub ratione qua parvum. Idem enim est querere
utrum tanta sit illa magnitudo, sicut est illa parvitas,
30 et querere utrum hoc sit tam magnum sicut ipsum est
parvum. Nam iuxta primam responsionem, non sequi-
tur A est tanta parvitas: igitur A est tanta res; quia
parvitas proporcionaliter ut est maior parvitas est minor
res, ut dicunt. Multum ergo differunt magnitudo et par-
35 vitas, cum est dare maximam magnitudinem et non est
dare maximam parvitatem; et duplare parvitatem est
subduplare magnitudinem et nichil duplare. Ymmo fa-
cere parvitatem sic quod fiat et incipiat esse quantum-
libet magna parvitas, non est facere sed destruere magni-
40 tudinem. Aliud ergo est rem esse magnam, et aliud
rem esse parvam. Quod tantum sonat ac si diceretur:

There are many answers that attempt to elide the difficulty.

Some say that a privation of size is so great, but not so great a privation of size.

Others that smallness, to be doubled, would require to be halved.

Others that smallness and magnitude are both equally great, but one understood positively, the other negatively.

But we are speaking of things as they are, not as created by our mind. What we want to know is if greatness and smallness are equal or not.

The first answer says that as smallness becomes greater, entity decreases.

There can be a maximum of magnitude and not of smallness: to double smallness is to halve a magnitude, and not to double at all.

Smallness being thus distinct

18. se ipsas B. 25. sq B. 30. duplæ B.

4. A word is probably wanting after vel.

from magnitude aliud est magnitudo et aliud parvitas. Loquimur ergo
the question de tali privacione secundum rationem sue magnitudinis,
bears upon the magnitude that
is wanting;
and neither
the 1st nor the
2nd answer
touches the
difficulty.
The question
is: "How can
that privation
have
magnitude?"

It is a flat
absurdity to
say that at the
some instant it
is double and
half of itself.
If the smallness
of A = 4 and
will be twice
as great when
A = 2, this is
merely calling
things by
contrary names.

Thus the third
answer avoids
the difficulty
too; for
magnitude,
positively or
negatively
understood, is
still magnitude.

Less logically
wrong than the
two former
answers, it is
more erroneous
than they are.

Every negative
quality for
which no
medium degree
can be assigned,
becomes
infinite by the
very fact, like
certain positive
qualities.

And if the
medium degree
of a positive

qua privatur, et ut distinguitur a magnitudine: et tunc
patet quod nec prima responsio nec 2^a tangit difficultatem logicam illius materie.

5

Totum ergo intentum logici est querere quomodo magna est illa privacio; et non solicitatur de subiecti magnitudine. Patet ergo quod claudit contradiccionem in terminis apud quemcunque bene intelligentem dicere quod hoc erit in B instanti duplum ad hoc quod illa est; et tunc erit in duplo minus quam illa est. Si enim loquimur de magnitudine privacionis, ut distinguitur contra magnitudinem positivi, utamur terminis numeri ad denominandum maiores gradum privacionis. Quando ergo dicunt quod parvitas A corporis iam est ut 4, et infinite erit in duplo maior quando erit ut duo, vel mensurant parvitatem secundum equalitatem subiecti, vel aliter, gratis vocant maius, minus.

Et patet ex eadem consideracione quod 3^a responsio fugit difficultatem, quia queritur utrum magnitudo positive intellecta sit tanta magnitudo, sicut est parvitas, vel privacione intellecta. Et supponatur quod in quaunque denominacione maius et minus sit signandum proporcionaliter maiori termino numerali, ut ipsum est maius. Est ergo illa responsio, ponens quod omnia privative opposita sub mediis gradibus correspondent, et proporcionaliter ut gradus positivi supra medium gradum sunt intensiores, sub gradus privacionis remissiores; et econtra. Ista autem responsio minus peccat B 65^a in logica quam priores, cum respondit formaliter iuxta 30 veritatem sermonis; sed magis peccat in sentencia, cum per alias non devenitur ad aliquam difficultatem propter proterviam. Improbatur autem ista posicio per hoc quod cum latitudinem privatarum non sit dare medium gradum, eo ipso quelibet talis in infinitum procedit in 35 quibus positivum infinitum procedit; ut patet de motu et raritate. Ymmo, secundum magnificantes potentiam dei, omnis species denominacionis positive in infinitum potest procedere. Et si gradus medius in actu alicuius positivi sit semper par privacioni correspondenti sibi, 40

13 utantur B. 10. patet quod B. 31. latitudinem B. 30. in aliquo B; ib. zifz^m pro infinitum B.

sequitur quod quemcunque gradum positivum possibile quality is equal
esset parificari privacioni sibi correspondenti. Et cum correspond to the
tales gradus nunc equales non possent fieri inequaes, negative one,
sequitur quod omnes tales gradus correspondentes sunt then the same
5 equales. Sive ergo latitudo positiva ponitur procedere takes place in
in infinitum, vel non, semper procederet altera in every degree.
in infinitum, cum cuiolibet parti finite terminate ad non gradum If we posit a
de una latitudine correspondet latitudo infinita de quality extending from
suo opposito; ut magnitudini a gradu ut 4 usque ad o to 4 in
10 non gradum correspondet in infinitum magna latitudo intensity, this o
parvitatis. Et sic invenies in aliis.

Similiter videtur quod repugnat certe calculacioni ut, intensity of
posito quod A calidum sub medio gradu ut 4 sit pre- smallness; thus
cise ita intensem sicut ipsum est remissum; tunc, ipso we shall always
15 remisso ad suum subduplum uniformiter in hora, intens find the infinite
detur remissio uniformiter ad suum duplum, eo quod in such cases.
proporcionaliter ut aliquid est magis intensem quam sub It is impossible
medio gradu est ipsum minus remissum, et econtra. In to admit that a
20 medio ergo instanti erit intensio A calidi ut tria, et re- body can be
missio erit ut sex; et per consequens infinitum velocius. equally hot and
Et non proporcionaliter acquireretur remissio quam de- cold; if
perderetur intensio; cum tamen quantumcunque velociter heat = 4, then
fiet aliquid magis intensem, fiet ipsum minus remissum, becoming half
et econtra, cum illud sit motus utriusque. Vel aliter as hot, cold
25 oportet ponere processum in infinitum in motibus; non becomes double; between
enim gradum finitum motus infinitum velocem motum the two, we
consequi, et per consequens omnem motum velociter have Heat = 3,
in infinitum velociter moveri. and Cold = 6;
cold having increased infinitely faster.

Ex isto videtur quod non sit possibile idem esse precise
30 [ita] intensem ut remissum; quia tunc, acquisita remis- It is, therefore,
sione dupla, deperderetur precisely intensio subdupla, et evident that no
cum tantum deperderetur de intensione sicut acquirere- quality can be
retur de remissione, patet calculanti quod sequitur intens- equally intense
tionem fuisse duplam ad remissionem in principio. Non and lax; for if
35 enim stat aliquod ens crescere ad suum duplum propter its laxity
tantam latitudinem acquisitam, quantum reliquum de- doubled, only
perdendo decrescit ad suum subduplum, nisi primum intensity would
fuerit subduplum ad secundum, eo quod oportet sic be lost, and we
should see that the intensity was from the
beginning double of the
laxity.

22. intensio above remissio B. 30. it*i* deest. 36. acquirendam;
acquisitam above B.

5. Here Wyclif enters into mathematical calculations on a subject which is perhaps not to be dealt with thus, and at a time when mathematics were hardly able to grapple with questions concerning the Infinite.

What increases, increases by the whole of its intensity; what

diminishes, only by the half.

The third answer denies that positive and negative intensities are comparable.

But this is false, since privations can be compared with positive qualities as to their good or evil results.

No two things can bear the same specific name, unless they are in so far comparable, at least analogously: which the very answer implies, by saying that positive and negative qualities differ;

for to differ supposes comparison. They are besides properly comparable, for their magnitude is of the same nature.

And when we say that each has v. g. an intensity equal to 2, we mean that it really has this intensity.

All doubles being equal, the magnitude A is to its half B as its smallness which makes a regular proportion.

augmentum acquirere tantum quantum ipsum est; et diminutum non oportet deperdere nisi medietatem sue latitudinis. Repugnat ergo illas latitudines esse pares.

3^a responsio negat omnem comparacionem privacionis ad habitum; et istam opinionem tenent aliqui (de quibus miror), qui ponunt omnem privacionem esse rem privatam. Ista autem responsio excedit, cum stat privacionem comparari quo ad bonitatem vel maliciam positivam; et sic de causacione et multis aliis. Nam habitus facit plus boni, et per consequens est religiosior data 10 privacione; sicut et una denominacio talis est reliqua durabilior, potencior, remocior, propinquior; | et sic de B 66^a quibuslibet denominacionibus extrinsecis. Ymmo, claudit contradiccionem aliqua esse, quantumcunque dispara fuerint, nisi sit comparatio inter illa secundum con- 15 venientiam et differentiam in aliqua denominacione specifica generali vel analogia. Et hoc invenitur in re sponsione, cum dicitur privacionem et habitum tantum differre quod neutrum est compossibile alteri. Omnis enim differencia vel est comparatio, vel ad eam secun- 20 tur infinite comparaciones.

Item, videtur quod ille forme sunt proprie comparabiles, quia eadem est magnitudo utriusque, cum utrumque capit magnitudinem suam a subiecto preter eius subiecti magnitudinem; non est illis alia, quia aliter ad 25 omnem punctum, quam talis infinitum magna esset magnitudo parvitatis. et per idem ad omnem punctum mundi infinitum magna intensio.

2^o confirmatur illud per hoc quod utramque significatur vere habere magnitudinem ut duo, et unam esse 30 causatam in genere suo, sicut reliqua est in suo; cum ergo omnia quorum magnitudines vere significantur, cum eodem termino materiali sunt equalia, sequitur quod omnis privativa denominacio sit equalis denominacioni positive.

3^o sic: proporcio A magnitudinis ad eius medietatem est equalis proporcioni B parvitatis ad eius medietatem, quia omnes proporciones duple sunt equales. Ergo illa 4 sunt proporcionalia ad invicem secundum 6 genera proporcionum, de quibus in 5^o elementarum Euclidis. 40

10. rligior B. 12. diurnior; corr. below B. 13. q, l3; and so very often throughout the MS. 25. e $\overline{\beta}$ ll a^a B; ib. ar B. 26. q, B. 30. q, utrq3 $\overline{\alpha}$ trq3 B. 30. ad $\overline{\beta}$ m B.

Aliter enim non esset verum quod proporcionaliter ut privacio est maior est eius oppositum minus, et econtra.

4º sic; posito quod A et B in principio illius hore fuerint eque bona cum suis habitibus et quod habens 5 A sit frustratum ab illo, salvo B eque bono suo habenti, patet quod tam mala est privacio A quam bonus est habitus B, et per consequens malicia privacionis est par bonitati habitus. Et sic non solum malicia et 10 bonitas, sed carencia et habitus sunt equales. Et per idem in quacunque proporcione maioris inequalitatis sunt comparabiles. Et idem patet de privacione privacionis; ut quam bonum est habere visum, tam bonum est carere cecitate, quia tantum proficeret (eo quod sunt proprie idem); sicut tantum nocet carencia rei. 15 sicut proficit habitus eiusdem; et sic iuvamentum et nocumentum, carencia et habitus, erunt quomodolibet proporcionalia.

Pro responsione ad istam difficultatem, suppono quod omnis privacio differt ab habitu et econtra. 2º suppono 20 quod aliqua sunt comparabilia immediate per se, ut due substancie comparantur in perfeccione essenciali, due quantitates in equalitate et due qualitates in intensione. Quamvis enim talia formaliter comparantur relacionibus distinctis a comparatis, non tamen habent accidentia 25 absoluta subiectata in illis et per que fundamentaliter comparantur; 2º comparantur aliqua per accidentia eorum absoluta, ut homo et asinus eque proprie comparantur in quantitate et figura et qualitate et aliis accidentibus, que univoce participant, sicut homo et 30 homo, quamvis substancie magis differunt. Et 3º comparantur aliqua secundum accidentia respectiva extrinseca; ut due albedines sunt eque proprie michi, quia subiecta quibus insunt sunt ita proprie michi. 3º supponatur quod aliqua comparantur in denominacionibus certi generis univoce particularis; ut, *Sor est melior lapide*. Aliqua autem in denominacionibus analogis extra genus; ut dicitur: *deus est sapiencior Sorte; Affirmatio est melior quam privacio vel negacio*. Tales enim 40 denominaciones secundum quamdam analogiam insunt vel circumeunt multa genera analogica. Et 4º supponitur quod aliqua sit comparacio vel proporcio proprie dicta, qualis est proporcio numeralis quantorum eiusdem

Again, it is evident that it is as bad to lose a good quality as it is good to have it; therefore goodness and badness are equal here, and also the 'having' and the privation.

To solve the problem, we must make a few assumptions.

1. That privation and possession differ.

2. That some things are immediately comparable with each other, and others by means of their absolute or relative accidents.

3. That some things are univocally, others analogically comparable.

4. That there is a kind of comparison properly so-called, as

among quantities of the same species,
whether rational or irrational;
and another sort of proportion, that is not mathematical but universal. It is obvious that all beings are comparable according to this universal proportion.

No negation is by itself and properly comparable with a positive quality; not even by means of an absolute accident, for they can be the subject of none such.

But they are comparable, even properly, if the comparison is founded on some extrinsic relation.

Some privations, especially worthy of the

speciei, sive sit rationalis, que in immediate denominatur B 66^b ab aliquo certo numero, sive sit irracionalis, sicut est medietas duple, ut proporcio diametri ad costam quadrati. Alia autem est proporcio communiter dicta, que non est numeralis; sed ad illam sufficit habitudo. 5

Istis premissis, patet quod omne ens secundum proporcionem communiter dictam est comparabile alteri cuicunque. Patet ex hoc quod quidlibet habet se ad quidlibet aliud in quadam habitudine. Sic enim homo sapiencior est, deo similior, lapide perfeccior; et erit 10 affirmacio negacione melior; et tamen non oportet in talibus dare proporcionem numeralem, quia similitudo, perfeccio, bonitas, et magnitudo analogice ampliata ad magnitudinem molis et magnitudinem virtutis, circumeunt omne genus. In omni enim genere contingit reperire 15 similitudinem, perfeccionem, bonitatem, unitatem, magnitudinem, prioritatem etc., que convenient transcendentि.

2º dico quod nulla negacio vel privacio est positive proprie proporcionaliter, vel per se vel per absolutum accidens quod subiectat. Primum patet ex hoc quod nullum genus est illis commune; ergo non per se sunt talia proprie proporcionalia vel comparabilia. Conse-25 quencia tenet ex illa suppositione; et 2ª pars patet ex hoc quod privaciones et negaciones non possunt sub-iectare aliquod accidens absolutum, nec forme illis opposite; patet ergo quod non sunt secundum se proprie comparari, nec secundum quantitatem nec secundum qualitatem quam subiectant.

Et 3º, dico quod tales forme opposite possunt tam communi comparacione quam comparacione proprie 30 dicta fundata in accidente extrinseco ad invicem comparari; ut contingit dandas privaciones esse datis habitibus, in quacunque proporcione volueris, plures aut pauciores, diuturniores vel breviores; et sic de aliis que insunt illis per accidentia suorum subiectorum vel alias respectus. Et patet quid generaliter sit dicendum de comparacione privacionis ad habitum.

Sed pro ulteriore declaracione notandum quod aliique sunt privaciones que non suscipiunt magis et minus;

3, 4, 4^a B. 11. aff'maor B.

3. *Irrationalis.* Irrational quantities, or surds; as $\sqrt{2}$ (proporcio diametri ad costam quadrati). But what Wyclif means by (I. 4) *medietas duple*, unless it be *the square root of two* I cannot imagine. Mr. Matthew suggests *aut* for *ut*, on I. 4.

ut quies et cecitas, et breviter omnia que non comparantur in eodem subiecto aliquid positivi sibi oppositi. Et ille proprie et simpliciter privaciones sunt. Omnes tamen dicunt aptitudinem subiecti ad formam et negationem habitus talis forme. Sicut ergo omne privatum visu est quod non habet visum, sic omnis cecitas est cuilibet alteri cecitati par; et sic de talibus similibus. Alii autem dicunt quod tales privaciones sunt eo maiores quo forme quas privant forent maiores; de quo alibi. ¹⁰ Alie autem sunt privaciones communiter dicte, et secundum quid, que ponunt sua subiecta et aliquid de forma, et alicuius gradus forme carenciam, ut parvitas, remissio, etc. que ex opposito correspondent suis positivis. Ista autem non proprie privative opponuntur suis ¹⁵ positivis; sed quodammodo relative, ut duplum et dimidium; et de istis est nobis sermo.

De istis ergo dicitur quod nulla talis privacio est suo positivo maior vel minor, nec inequalis secundum essentiam, vel equalis. Illud patet ex 2^a conclusione; quia, ²⁰ si aliqua talis esset reliqua maior vel minor, aut finite aut infinite. Si finite, tunc contingeret aliqua talia parificari. Per idem non est causa dicenda quare non omnia forent paria. Si infinite, tunc omne magnum foret infinite magis magnum quam parvum, vel econtra; et ²⁵ quecunque pars detur, sequitur inconveniens. Si enim omne quantum foret infinite magis magnum quam parvum, tunc infinitum parvum foret in tanta proporcione ^{B 67^a} magis magnum quam parvum, sicut maximum in mundo; et cum infinitum crescit parvitas alicuius talis super ³⁰ parvitatem maximam, sequitur quod minus, in quantum minus, foret maius. Et idem patet, dato quod quelibet parvitas sit infinitum maior magnitudine.

Ultimo dic quod omnes tales forme proporcionaliter et non secundum equalitatem ex opposito correspondent; ³⁵ ut si magnitudo corporis fiat in duplo maior, parvitas eius fiet in duplo minor, et econtra; et sic de quacunque proporcione signanda. Ex quo sequitur quod si una talis forma acquiratur uniformiter, reliqua deperderetur difformiter; et econtra. Et pro tempore quo una ⁴⁰ velocius acquireretur, reliqua tardius deperdetur et econtra. Ut, maiorato A uniformiter ad sui duplum in

name, do not admit of increase or diminution; but all imply not only the denial of a quality but the aptitude of the subject to receive that quality. All these are equal to each other by reason of their absoluteness. Others are not so absolutely opposed to their contrary qualities, but rather relatively; it is with them that we have to do. We deny that any of these privations is greater or smaller than its positive quality, or equal or unequal; to grant this would be to admit many absurdities.

But they correspond one with another symmetrically, and not as equals; so that, as one quality increases faster, the other decreases slower; as one increases more, the other decreases less, but always in proportion.

^{6. ~~est~~} ep, pro est quod B; ^{ib.} hns above habet B. ^{12. prim^s(?) B.}

^{30. maxi} B. ^{39. after econtra three lines crossed off B.}

hora, tunc in prima mediate maiorabitur, ad sui sexqui-alterum et in 2^a mediate ad suum sesquiterium et parvitas econtra in prima medietate diminuetur ad suum subsesquiterium, et in 2^a ad suum subsesquialterum. Et sic invenies omnia talia opposita in suis denominacionibus et condicionibus valde dispariter se habere; ut, si una illarum quantumcunque tarde remittatur ad non gradum in situm, celeriter intenderetur reliqua, quia semper infinitum magno de uno infinito parvum correspondet de reliquo; et sic est de multis proprietatibus, iuxta quas possent multiplicari quotlibet conclusiones. Et patet responsio ad omnia argumenta, preterquam ad ultimum cum suis confirmationibus.

To the first difficulty we reply that privation has no magnitude, nor parts.

Two shadows may make one doubly intense: but they are not the parts, but the cause of that new shadow.

If privations had parts, why should they not be extended like positive qualities?

Ad primum dicitur quod privacio non est mole magna; quia si sic, tunc infinitum modica eius pars ¹⁵ quantitativa foret quantumlibet infinitum maior suo toto. Infinitas tamen parvitates in quocunque continuo est signare quantumlibet maiores parvitatis tocius, quarum quelibet presupponitur adesse parvitatis tocius; et tamen non sunt eius partes, cum nulla talis privacio ²⁰ habet partes. Unde, quamvis due umbre causant per idem medium umbram magis intensam, neutra tamen est eius pars intensiva, sed causa suppositiva. Ali quando non posui parvitatem habere duplices partes, sicut motum; utputa partes magnas mole et partes intensivas; ²⁵ et sic proposui tales privaciones esse dupliciter magnas proporcionaliter ad illas partes, ita quod pars infinitum parva quo ad molem esset quantumlibet maior suo toto quo ad intensionem; quia grave videtur quod talis privacio sit continue magna sine hoc quod habeat partes. ³⁰ Nec est explicabile qualiter parvitas partis principiare parvitatem tocius, nisi causacione intrinseca. tanquam pars componens. Si enim cecitas habet partes secundum extensionem subiecti, sicut et quies, et alie privaciones, quare ergo non extenderenter alie privaciones ³⁵ que plus ponunt: Sed grave videtur fundare partes intensivas parvitatis vel principiare illas secundum disparem individuationem ab individuacione aliarum parvium.

1. sex B. 4. ses B. 11, 12. gones B. 23. Above supp. p B;
ib. alii: alii above B. 24. possunt: posui above B. 33. sic (v) B.
35. qr pro quare B.

Quomodounque ergo de hoc sit, certum est quod opposito modo est de talibus privacionibus et aliis positivis; quia in quantis positivis maius minus presupponit tanquam eius partem; sed in privativis minus presupponit maius et minimum est dandum; ut patet de parvitate mundi. In proporcionibus autem conservantur maior proporcio maioris inequalitatis, et minor proporciona minoris inequalitatis; ita quod deperdita proporcione maioris inequalitatis usque ad equalitatem, infinitum cresceret proporcio minoris inequalitatis; et maiorata in infinitum proporcione maioris inequalitatis, infinitum diminueretur proporcio minoris inequalitatis; B⁶⁷ sic quod infinitum | magnam proporcione maioris inequalitatis, si detur, consequitur infinitum modica proporcio minoris inequalitatis et econtra: minima tamen proporcio, a qua alie procedunt, est proporcio equalitatis. Cum ergo magnitudo magnitudinis non sit, nisi illa magnitudo, sicut magnitudo parvitatis est vel ipsa parvitas vel eius passio, ne sit processus in infinitum, vel nugatorie replicetur eadem sententia: patet quod falsum est quod eadem est magnitudo magnitudinis et parvitatis. Nec est inconveniens, extendendo nomina intentionis et magnitudinis, concedere quod infinitum intensa magnitudo et intensio sunt ad quemlibet punctum mundi; sicut theologi concedunt de potentia dei. Ista tamen anologa per se supposita communiter intelliguntur de magnitudine molis et intentione qualitatis: magnitudo tamen parvitatis non est magnitudo, sicut nec intensio remissionis est intensio, si non equivocetur. Ad secundum dicitur quod minor est falsa, quia, ratione certitudinis, in numeris qui sunt prime masure rerum, signantur exemplariter per eumdem numerum qui non possunt equari; ut perfeccio hominis vere designatur suo genere, gradu ut 8, et perfeccio asini gradu ut 8, sicut magnitudo temporis, magnitudo corporis, et velocitas motus signantur gradu ut 8. Et tamen dicere quod illa sunt equalia est pure demencie. Et si argumentatur sic: A est tantum in suo genere, sicut B in suo genere; ergo A est tantum sicut B, eo quod quantumcunque est aliquod ens in suo genere tantum est:

In positive quantities the greater implies the less; in negatives, the less supposes the greater, and as the one increases the other must diminish.

Now as there is no magnitude of magnitude, so there is no magnitude of smallness: and to say that both have the same magnitude is false; for we either mean nothing by that term, or else greatness and smallness in themselves: which are evidently not identical.

The second argument is met by denying that, if the same numbers are employed to designate things that are not homologous, they are therefore equal. Though 8 may stand for the perfection of a man in his species, of an ass in its

3. "mig p̄suppt "maig B. 6. gnt se; abore gfernt B. 10, 11. et — inequalitatis bottom of page B. 15. nūa B. 23. īt̄ B. 32. veris (?: B. ib. signant²; f,or above B. 33, 34. designatur B.

species, of a length of time, a volume, or a movement, it were folly to say that these are equal.

This may apply to all similar cases.

And it does not follow that two things being great, and neither greater than the other, they are equal.

The third argument is valid; but Euclid understood quantities of the same sort. These quantities may be proportional with each other, even though neither equal nor unequal. Thus the world is as much greater than a grain of millet, as it is less small than the same.

If not, we could neither assign a minimum nor a maximum of size,

dicitur quod argumentum non est verum de virtute sermonis; sed A est ut 8 in suo genere et B est ut 8 in suo genere. Et sic in consimilibus proporcionibus se habent ad gradus suorum generum eisdem terminis numeralibus signatis. Cum enim non cognoscimus gradus talium magnitudinum nisi ex suppositione, nec habemus dispare numeros proporcionatos ad denominandum omnes dispare magnitudines. Nec mirum, si magnitudines diversorum generum mensuremus eodem termino numerali; nec sequitur: *utrumque istorum est magnum* 10, *et neutrum reliquo maius: ergo, utrumque est equale alteri;* quia oportet ad equalitatem esse convenientiam specificam fundamenti.

Ad 3^{cium} conceditur quod argumentum est verum; sed quo ad illos sex modos argumentandi Euclidis, 15 dicitur quod ipse intelligit illas in quantitatibus eiusdem generis (quamvis aliqui illorum possunt habere locum) etiam quantumcunque disparatis. Conceditur ergo quod proporciones aliquorum sunt proprie comparabiles et proporcionata, nec sunt equalia nec inequalia per se, 20 sicut patet de proporcione temporis ad tempus, et spacii ad spaciū, et similiū discontinue proporcionarium quibus proporcionantur proporcione communiter dicta. Unde non sequitur: *proporcionaliter ut magnitudo est maior, parvitas est minor, et econtra; ergo, parvitas* 25 *et magnitudo sunt equales vel inequales;* sed sufficit quod proporciones excessum sint equales, vel ex opposito correspondentes. Ex istis enim probabiliter infertur quod omne finite denominatum aliqua tali denominacione participat proporcionaliter suo opposito: ut mundus 30 situ sic finite magnus, est eo minus parvus quam mileum, quo est magis magnus.

Aliter enim non esset dare | minimum gradum quo aliquid est parvum, nec maximum quo nichil est parvum. Ymmo nulla foret subdupla parvitatis ad parvitatem 35 medietatis mundi; quia, dato quod sic, mundus foret in duplo minus parvus sicut est in duplo magis magnus. Non enim est verisimile quod addicio unius puncti ad istum mundum induceret parvitatem ad omnem eius punctum, postquam per ante non fuit usquam eius 40

7. quando above cum B. 11. utr^o q. B.
18. despate B. 23. cp por^{uter} cpor^{oe} B.
illegible B. 37. mi^o underlined B.

17. pūt above com^t B.
31. sc^u pro situ; very

aliqua parvitas; et ablacio puncti tolleret parvitatem a remanente, cum unum talium oppositorum non possit auferri, nisi per oppositionem reliqui. Sicut ergo est dare maximam magnitudinem, sic est dare minimam but there must be a limit both to magnitude and smallness.
5 parvitatem, quia aliter mundus infinitum maioratus successive non esset minor in aliquo instanti quam in quolibet instanti; et per idem posset in tantum diminui ad non quantum sine hoc quod minoraretur et non minoraretur, nisi pro instanti *foret* parvus; et per con-
10 sequens, nisi fuerit ita quod est parvus.

Probabile ergo est dicere quod parvitas mundi est We may affirm that the world minima, sicut eius magnitudo est maxima; et sic gradus parvitatis mundi est primum et minimum, quod est at once the least small of metrum et mensura omnium aliorum illius generis; ut possible beings.
15 alia sunt eorum minora, que ab illo sunt plus distanciam, et gradus magnitudinum mensurantur penes distanciam a non quanto; et sic principium magnitudinis non communicat in illa denominacione cum suis principiatis, sicut principium parvitatis communicat in illa denominacione cum suis participiatis: quia perfectionis est 20 participare positivum et non communicare cum illo in denominacione imperfeccionis. Primum ergo principium est indivisible et tamen inmensum virtute, sed non mole; et ipsum principiat utramque denominacionem 25 ultimate. Mundus ergo est parvus, non secundum comparacionem ad maius ymaginatum quod non est, sed in comparacione ad magis parvum; et alia sunt parva in comparacione ad maius. Et proporcionaliter dicitur de remissione, propinquitate, et similibus. Tales ergo 30 denominaciones que non sunt similiter denominaciones quo ad aliquid habent se positive, et quo ad aliud privative; ut densitas quo ad quantitatem privative se habet, sed quo ad multitudinem materie positive; et econtra de raritate. Et sic est de sompno et vigilia, que 35 suscipiunt magis et minus, sed non proporcionaliter ut alie privaciones nunc citate.

Et si queritur quid est talis privacio, dicitur quod est forma denominans subiectum formaliter huiusmodi; et sunt de eodem genere in quo sunt sua positiva oppo-
40 sita, sed per reduccionem; ut parvitas est in genere quantitatis, et cecitas in genere qualitatis. Non enim

The first principle of all things is infinite, but without dimensions, because indivisible: the world is not infinite since something exists greater than it, not in magnitude but in smallness. The like may be said of remissness, propinquity etc. but some qualities are positive from one point of view, and privative from another; as density, rarity, sleep and waking, etc. If asked, what this privation is, we answer: A form

5. minoratus above B.

6. maior above minor B.

27. $\widehat{\text{gun}}$ B.

36. ne citate.

intrinsically causing its subject to receive a certain name, and belonging to the same genus as the positive quality to which it is opposed.

There is a question whether that which increases or diminishes can be called a privation or not; some admit this; some call privation the property of an accident and some, a mere want.

Privations are either of something already possessed, or to be possessed, or that might be so; or of a merely intelligible form that cannot be possessed v. g. to be deprived of infinite size to be small.

My opinion is that smallness is a property of quantity, not a privation of infinite size. Though not so properly as in the case of substances, accidents may have the five predicables; but the accident, difference or property of an accident belongs to the substance.

As to the fourth argument, the conclusion may be granted. Opposite forms can be properly compared, though not in

oportet ponere privacionibus, negacionibus, futuracionibus, pretericionibus et possibilibus, nova genera; quia de ratione generis est dicere positivam quidditatem substancie vel accidentis, que est veritas de presenti in substancia, fundata per formalem inherenciam. ⁵

Utrum autem illa que suscipiunt magis et minus sunt privaciones vel non, est dissensio. Aliqui enim vocant ipsas | quantitates vel qualitates, alii melius vocant illas passiones vel proprietates accidentium, non per se in genere. Et alii vocant illas privaciones carencias et ¹⁰ tunc illa verba *privari* vel *carere* etc., non mobilant terminos. Sed idem esset hoc, *carere quantitate et quantitate carere*. Unde aliqua est privacio forme habite de predicato, ut cecitas, vel visus debilitas; aliqua privacio est forme habende, ut privacio principians generacionem ¹⁵ compositi naturalis; aliqua est privacio forme possibilis, ut inpotencia infantis qui moritur in prima eius etate. Et aliqua est privacio vel carencia forme intelligibilis que non potest esse, sed subiectum habet formam talis speciei; ut omne quantum est parvum, et omne intensum ²⁰ est remissum, ipso carente infinita quantitate et infinita intensione. Si ergo esset aliquod tale infinitum magnum vel intensum simpliciter, tunc esset non parvum et minime remissum.

Videtur autem michi quod parvitas est proprietas ²⁵ quantitatis et non carencia quantitatis infinite. Et sic de ceteris que suscipiunt magis et minus. Ad alias enim consequuntur carencie, sed non formaliter sunt carencie. In omni enim genere accidentium est dare genus et speciem, differenciam, proprium et accidens, quamvis ³⁰ non ita proprie sicut in cathegoria substancie. Omne tamen accidentis accidentis est accidentis substancie, sicut omnis differencia vel proprium accidentis inheret substancie per accidentis cui per se inest; ut parvitas quantitatis est subiectum, sic quantum, esse parvum; et sic ³⁵ illa parvitas potest separari a subiecto, sed non ab illa quantitate. Non tamen est possibile quod accidentis habeat sic per se, posterius illo quod ipsum accidentis posset esse non inherens et subici tali posteriori.

Ad 4^m dicitur quod in casu positivo est conclusio pro- ⁴⁰ babiliter concedenda, cum tales forme opposite comparantur in suis denominacionibus ab extrinseco causatis;

et in talibus sunt ipse proprie comparabiles, iuxta 3^{am} themselves.
conclusionem. Quod autem talis forma sit bona vel Their goodness
mala, hoc est per comparacionem ad utilitatem sub- or badness
iecti et ad multa alia; et ita de malicia est dicendum. proceeds from
5 Omne enim bonum est quodammodo bonum debile; ut a comparison
res quecunque est precise tam bona alicui alteri quam with outside
utilis est eidem; et tam mala est res alteri quam in- objects, to
utilis vel impediens est ab opposito alterius indebite. which they are
useful or the contrary.

Ex quo sequitur quod non proporcionaliter est res Intrinsic and extrinsical
bona alteri sicut est bona in se, ut habere centum solidos est bonum virtuoso indigenti; et prodigo forsitan goodness (utility) are not
esset malum. Ymmo, cum diversis circumstanciis potest the same. Money may be
vicissim esse magis bonum vel minus bonum habere a good for a poor but honest man, and an evil for a spendthrift.
centum solidos, sicut patet de valore usibilium que sunt According to circumstances,
15 eo alicui valenciora quo utiliora: ut panis valeret in the same thing, equally good
tempore necessitatis famelico quodlibet magnum aurum, in itself, changes its extrinsical
ubi non valeret denarium solidi pro loco et tempore value; as bread in a famine; or a sword in the hands of a warrior or of a madman.
quibus posset habere illum pro obula. Et sic gladius In these things demand is an important factor.
valeret iniuste obsesso centum guldenis; et tamen eidem Physical goodness
20 furioso esset alias malus. In omnibus ergo talibus, ubi depends on the perfection of that being which possesses it. The salvation of one man is worth more than the whole world.
agitur de valore vel bono sub ratione qua utile, atten- But natural good comprises in every case usefulness to some one;

25 Bonum autem nature est eo maius quo ens habens illud est naturaliter perfeccius, sicut fines perfecciores sunt hiis que sunt ad finem. Homo enim, qui est finis omnium | aliorum sublunarium, daret in casu iuste pro salvacione sua quotlibet talia bona. Ideo est quantum- 30 libet melior illis; sicut deus est sic optimum quod B 69^a potest esse, et quamvis omnis res naturalis absolute sit taliter bona, omnis tamen res naturalis est bona primo modo, quia aliter talis. Ymmo probabiliter potest dici quod quelibet pars mundi est cuiilibet indigenti utilis; 35 et de facto prodest cuiilibet homini ut quelibet pars celi, causando celum, prodest michi, cum ipsum celum causatum conservat me secundum corpus. Et sic invenies de bonis accidentalibus quibuscunque. Vicia autem et peccata sunt occasionaliter bona, cum prosunt

18. st B. 19. g^o pro guldenis B.

18. *Obula*. Cf. Lafontaine, Le Serpent et la Lime: "Seulement le quart d'une obole."

and even vice and sin have their uses.

Nothing can exist that is not good in some way. non solum in exemplum aliis, sed et ipsis peccantibus quod peccaverunt. Unde impossibile est esse ens, nisi fuerit quodammodo bonum.

The third sort of good — moral good — is useful; it is impossible to put virtue to a bad use.

But things morally good are sometimes equally so, sometimes more,

sometimes less; their utility also varies so much

that at times very slight external advantages outbalance it. Evils in like manner are threefold: unserviceable, injurious, immoral.

Nothing is of use to God; because he has need of nothing.

He is unserviceable to none, since He preserves all nature in being, and punishes only for the good of the universe; so that the punishment He inflicts is not an injury.

Moral evil can in no case be committed by

Him.

Thus God cannot make a man sin, though He can make his sin to be good,

3^m vero genus boni, honestum est utile; ut omni virtuoso prosunt virtutes et actus virtuosi; ymmo tanta est de illis virtutibus honestas quod nemo potest utili male virtute morali, sicut potest abuti virtute naturali, et forte intellectuali. Unde virtutes anime valent multa bona naturalia et extrinseca. Et quo ad rationem boni honesti, sunt quedam eque bona, quamvis quo ad rationem bona utilis quandoque plus prosunt et quandoque minus; ymmo quandoque superantur a parvis bonis extrinsecis. Cum ergo tot modis dicitur unum oppositorum esse, sic et reliquum.

Patet ergo quod 3^x est racio mali. Divicie enim quandoque actualiter sint male, eo quod alicui inutilis. Peccata nature et morum sunt mala nature; et actus viciosi sunt mala inhonesta. Ex quibus patet quod sicut nichil est bonum deo primo modo; sic ipse nulli est malus primo modo, sed cuilibet alteri nature est ipse bonus primo modo, sed nulli tam bonus quam bonus est in sui natura. Prima pars patet ex eo quod deus non potest alio indigere. Cum ergo *utile* dicit indigenciam, nichil potest esse utile vel commodi- ferum sibi. Et 2^a pars patet ex hoc quod ipse pre- exigitur tanquam necessarius observator et dans omne bonum cuilibet tali nature; et per consequens nulli tali est inutilis; quia si puniat aliquos, hoc est misericorditer, et ad universi honestatem, et ad eorum utilitatem. Ideo non nocet vel impedit aliquos, etsi infligit illis malum pene, quod est malum et nocens nature secundum quid. Malum autem moris non potest principiari, quamvis illud bonum non formaliter.

Ergo deus potest facere hoc esse bonum quod Sor peccat, et tamen non potest facere Sor peccare. Et sic

4. honeste B. 16. accar^r B. 28. qui sic above B. 33. vdbom
nō fōr^r B.

32. *Malum moris* is here taken evidently in the sense of sin; I think that *peccata morum* (l. 17) may mean a bad habit. Scholastics divided good into *utile*, *delectabile* and *honestum*, evil into *inutile*, *molestum*, *inhonestum*. On l. 15, 16, we have *inutile*; on l. 16 *molestum* and on l. 17 *inhonestum*. Now only *inhonestum* corresponds to moral evil; and if we take *peccata morum* as sin, it would not necessarily be malum nature (i. e. *molestum*).

ista [conclusio] est bona: *Sor peccat*: ergo, *bonum est* vel because the first
verum est quod Sor peccat; et deus facit consequens et does not belong
 non antecedens. Racio, quia antecedens non est in or- to the physical
 dine nature, sicut consequens; quia *Sor peccare est de* order.
 5 *ordine nature*. Et primo conclusio probatur: *Sor peccat*; Whatever
 ergo *verum est quod Sor peccat*; ergo *ens est quod* exists
Sor peccat; ergo *bonum*. Similiter: *Sor peccat*; ergo must be good.
 iuste punitur; deus facit consequens et non facit ante-
 cedens in sequela logicali, ut est hic. Et sic licet facit
 10 posterius, non tamen facit prius in sequela logicali; licet Thus the
 in sequela reali semper faciens posterius, facit prius. dum
 modo illud prius non sit suppositum in ordine nature. antecedent,
 Nec facit consequens et antecedens non facit, quia ipse is logically
 non est naturaliter prius, cum non sit in ordine nature. ascribable to
 Him.

B 69^b 3^a autem pars patet ex 2^a; nec obest res eternas habere God is good to
 indigenciam alicuius quod semper habent et appetunt all His
 sed non indigent aliquo quo eternaliter carent vel sperant, creatures.
 cum habent inammissibiliter quo indigent vel declinant.

Et quarta pars patet ex hoc quod tam bonus est deus But to none so
 20 cuiquam quantum prodest illi, ut patet de virtute ser- much as He is
 monis; sed nulli tantum prodest quam bonus est in se; good in
 ergo, etc. Nec sequitur quod deus infinite concurrit ad Himself; for
 actum essencie create; quia necessario libere concurrit He is that
 ad omnem talēm actum causate essencie, quante iuvat infinite, and
 25 ad illum; ideo proporcionaliter concurrit ad actum ut He is good to
 ipse est magnus; et hoc est melius quam esset, etsi infinite
 concurrenit ad quantumlibet actum. Et hoc est creatures only in so far
 impossible, quia tunc prima mensura immoderate habe- as serviceable
 ret, quia nullum haberet motum ipse deus; quia ad to them.
 30 agendum magis vel minus equaliter se haberet. Et si God's concursus
 infinite concurreret illi, non esset modus vel moderacio. to the acts of
 Nec potest probari quod quante deus est, tante con- His creatures,
 currit, vel est alteri similis vel dissimilis. Minima enim since it is free
 diferencia possibili differt primum suppositum a 2^a. cannot be
 infinite; besides, it must be adapted to the intensity of each act.

35 Et si arguatur sequi: *illo modo deus agit similatur vel* Analysis of an
differt ab aliquo quare deus est sicut est causa: ergo *illo* objection,
modo est, dicitur quod non est color in argumento si showing it to
 non equivocetur; quia tunc esset respectus accidentalis be based on an
 causa, qualiter similatur vel differt ab aliquo; et cum equivocation,

1. conclusio deest; qne B. 11. 12. dn^o B. 14. za^a B. 26. actus
 sit underlined after ipse; est above the line B. 27. actum underlined:
 q,; above B. 28. m̄esa B. 31. i' B. 36. q̄r quare, qualiter) ergo in
 marg. B. 39. q̄r deus est sicut est causa underlined before q̄r B.

taking the causa formalis sit eadem forma que est causatum, ablative case in different senses. sequitur quod talis respectus foret essentia divina. Quod si equivocetur in relatione ablativi casus, intelligendo in antecedente, "isto modo deus differt a me" ablativum regi ex vi cause formalis, et in consequente "isto modo deus est" ipsum regi ex vi accidentis, tunc est imperfittens sensui concludere, quia *quante deus est* quod *tante differt a me*. Non enim est subiectum tante quante est accidentis, sed plus. Nec est verum quod differencia qua deus differt a me est par deo vel infinita, quia terminatur ad duo extrema, et non convenit deo in magnitudine.

It follows that many things that we call evils are good; for instance, punishments and misfortunes.

Patet eciam ex dictis quod multa sunt bona que dicimus mala; et alia plus valent quam estimamus, alia minus valent, cum omne tale imperfectum tantum valet quantum iuvat ad perfectionem universitatis. Prima pars patet ex hoc quod penalitates et alia que dicimus infortunia, sicut generaliter cuncta que nobis displicant, dicimus mala, cum tamen iuste ex divina providencia ad bonitatem universi eveniunt; et sic nobis placencia dicimus bona, etsi de facto sint mala; sicut patet de ignorantibus et viciis corruptis.

Also, that our estimate of values is often mistaken. Dearth raises prices; we can never exactly regulate supply and demand. Sometimes man's wickedness makes the estimate to err notably; sometimes it approaches truth; but it is Nature and not the estimate that really fixes the worth of things. The measure of worth of anything is its utility in the universe, even though it be not actually in use:

Sed 2^a pars patet ex hoc quod venalia plus valent in caristia quam in fertilitate valerent, eo quod equivalens plus valet cum paucioribus quam, ceteris paribus, cum pluribus. Cum ergo nullus hominum scit proportionare incorrigibiliter usualia ad multitudinem utencium, patet quod ignoramus valorem talium. In empacionibus autem et vendicionibus, accedit quandoque error notabilis ex sceleribus hominum, et quandoque accidit iusticia ex quadam estimatione propinqua veritati; nam quam tamen accidit valor ex sola ordinacione hominis, vel ex hoc quod pro pluribus vendi potest, sed ex dispositione nature regentis sublunaria.

Et ultima pars patet ex hoc quod *valere vel esse bonum utile* dicit habitudinem ad id cui est utile. Et cum universitas sit a deo cathereta participando quo cunque tali bono, patet quod participacio utilitatis ab universitate est mensura valoris rei. Nec obest rem cuius non est usus actualis valere, quia ipsa iuvat quiescendo; licet avarus | quandoque impedit rem iuvare. Summe B 70³

3. re^{mo} B. 10. penas B. 18. et ex fune *abore* ex divina B.
22. venialia B. 24. veniat *abore* valid B. 29. felib^o B. 30. iustia B.
30. cathēta B.

ergo inter creaturas valet humanitas in Christo, de qua non est nostrum scire quantum valet, sed relinquatur consideracio illius subtilioribus theologis.

Redeundo ergo ad propositum, conceditur quod est dare habitum rei tam bonum quam mala est alterius rei privacio; et sic bonitas et malicia sunt denominacionibus extrinsecis pares, sicut sunt habitus et privacio: sed hoc est impertinens ad concludendum magnitudinem et parvitatem esse pares; quia iste denominaciones sunt per se quante, et secundum se non possunt parificari, modo bonitas habitus rei et malicia privacione rei capiunt suam magnitudinem ab extrinseco, sicut a profressencia vel utilitate universi quam ponunt vel privant. Et ideo generaliter tam bona est res corruptibilis quam mala esset, cum paribus, eius privacio. Et isti termini *tam* et *quantum* dicunt parvitatem proporcionum et non parvitatem illorum proporcionatorum secundum sua intrinseca; ac si diceretur: tante est magnitudo illius minorata quante est eius parvitas maiorata; vel econtra. Et sic de similitudine et dissimilitudine et cunctis similibus. Et si aliquis inferret ex illo exemplo quod magnitudo et parvitas parificentur, negatur; quia illa *tanta quanta* dicunt paritatem proportionem solum et non paritatem magnitudinis et parvitatis ab intrinseco.

Nota tamen quod dupliciter intelligitur inter aliqua esse similitudo vel conveniencia, et dissimilitudo vel disconveniencia: vel quo ad sua accidentalia, vel quo ad sua essencialia. Et utroque modo tripliciter, vel secundum speciem, et sic Sor et Plato sunt similes in humanitate et accidentaliter similes in albedine; vel 2º generaliter, et sic homo et asinus sunt similes in animalitate et accidentaliter similes in colore; et 3º analogice, sicut motus et color sunt similes in *esse*, et accidentaliter sunt similes in calefaciendo. Et correspondenter de dissimilitudine.

Unde patet quod impossibile est quidquid produci nisi a sibi simili. Nam quodlibet est simile cuilibet, ut homo melior est deo similior, proporcione communiter dicta, fundata in similitudine analogica. Stat ergo infinitum dissimilem alicui in uno accidente esse, quantumvis sibi similem in alio. Ymmo stat illud quod non est simile alteri in genere vel in specie, sive substancialiter

Christ's
Humanity is
of all creatures
that which has
most worth.
Thus to have
may be as good
as to want is
evil;

but this does
not prove that
magnitude and
smallness are
equal.

Tam and
quantum
indicate or
proportion, not
intrinsic
equality.

Similarity and
unlikeness are
either in
accidental
or essential
qualities; and
either specific,
generic, or
analogous.

Nothing can be
produced except
by its like; but
likeness can be
understood in
many ways,
and is not
contrary to
difference.

13. aq^o descendēt B.

sive accidentaliter, esse quantumlibet sibi simile similitudine analoga. Ex quo patet quod simile et dissimile non sunt contrarie nec privative opposita. Nam duo summe calida sunt in caliditate simillima; ita quod sunt calida infinitum simillima, et tamen sunt finita⁵ et ceteris accidentibus valde dissimilia. Similia ergo possibilia sunt supposita increata.

We say of help
and hindrance
what has been
said of the
useful and the
useless; God,
hindering one
species from
being another,
does not
properly hinder,
but helps.
Some say that
everything is as
much a
hindrance as a
help; but this
is an abuse of
terms.

As the
privation of a
priviation is not
a privation,
neither is to
hinder from
evil properly to
hinder, nor is
the magnitude
of smallness
anything but
smallness.

Hindrance
may, therefore,
be a thing
positively good;
and thus God
may hinder
some from
attaining eternal
happiness.

De iuvamento vero et impedimento dicitur correspondenter sicut dictum est de utili et inutili; ut deus summe iuvat, nec potest impedire vel nocere. Impedit¹⁰ tamen ne homo sit asinus, et ne mundus vel eius partes deficiant; sed hoc non est impedire sed iuvare. Unde abutuntur terminis qui dicunt quod quodlibet tantum impedit sicut iuvat. et quodlibet equale cuilibet, ne peccet. Ipsi autem dicunt quod omne impeditum est infinitum impeditum, et tantum adiutum, ut omne mobile impeditur ab infinito motu, ab infinita magnitudine, et sic de ceteris infinitis, et iuvatur ne idempi-
ficetur cuilibet; et sic de ceteris denominacionibus²⁰ infinitis, unde, iuxta sic loquentes, deus tantum vel plus impediret hominem fieri quam potest iuvare, quia quodlibet impedit ne faciat infinita bona.

Dico ergo, sicut privacio privacionis non est privacio sic impediare rem a malo non est impediare sed iuvare. B^{70b} Nec magnitudo parvitatis est magnitudo, sed pocius parvitas. *Impedire* tamen quandoque accipitur largius quam obesse, et iuvare quam prodesse; ut omne habens naturalem inclinacionem ad finem et prohibitum ab illo sine vel execuzione dicitur impeditum; et isto modo³⁰ grave impeditur a descensu, et leve ab ascensu. Sic autem loquendo de *impedire*, quod sonat in bonum et naturale, non est inconveniens deum impediare; et sic forte impediret aliquos eternaliter a sua beatitudine. Sed de limitibus huius impediti, et aliis huiusmodi³⁵ superficialiter solutis, sunt difficultates plurime; quas transeo, tam propter impedimentum ignorancie quam gracia brevitatis.

14. *éle after* quodlibet B. 35. *delib9* B.

34 *Beatitudine*. This looks like a foreshadowing of the doctrine of the 'Presciti', or foreknown. If God prevents any from attaining eternal bliss, it is in order to further the accomplishment of the Divine Plan of predestination.

CAPITULUM SEPTIMUM.

Consequens est ad dicta superaddere in capitulo de comparativis sentenciam de maximo et minimo. Voco autem propositionem comparacione yppothetica et nota 5 comparandi denominatam, ut hec, *Sor est ita sapiens vel magis sapiens quam est Plato*; et sic de comparativa vera. Nam ista species yppothetice multum accedit, ut dictum est, ad condiciones kathegoricarum; cum idem sit dicere, *Sor est melior Platone et Sor est melior quam est Plato*, nec perfecte intelligitur altera pars sine cointelleccione alterius partis. Ideo possunt dici tam quante quam quales, ut kathegorice. De exposicione vero talium ratione termini comparativi gradus, dictum est superius, et quomodo refert dicere, *Sor fuit melior Platone et Sor fuit melior quam fuit Plato vel quam Plato iam est*. Si enim *Sor fuit melior Platone* tunc fuit ita quod *Sor est melior illo*, et econtra. Sed si *fuit melior quam fuit Plato*, tunc fuit melior quam unquam fuit Plato. Nec requiritur quod simul fuerunt, sed requiritur quod 20 aliquando fuit ita quod *Sor est melior quam fuit Plato*, vel quod est melior quam erit Plato, et ita [ad] dandum instans.

Comparativa ergo, sicut quecumque alia proposicio, tunc est vera quando est signum primarium veritatis, 25 et falsa quando deficit veritas quam primo significat. Supponatur ergo ex ante dictis quod nichil vere comparatur alteri, nisi in aliquo communi univoco vel analogo, quod utrumque participat; et hoc sive sit essentiale comparatis sive accidentale. Patet quod omne sic 30 comparatum alteri vel comparatur sibi secundum magis vel secundum minus; aut aliter secundum equalitatem,

Of comparative hypothetical propositions and of maxima, and minima.

They very much resemble categoricals.

The way of expounding them and pointing out their different meanings, has already been shown.

The truth of these propositions depends on their comparisons being true. Comparison must be made respecting some other thing common to both, and concerning excess, deficiency or

2. Blank space for initial C.
26. $\alpha\eta$ B.21. 71st; ad deest B. 4. comparacionem yppotheticam B.

26. parte pro ante B.

7, 8. Ut dictum est See *Logica*, Vol. I, p. 30, l. 27—37.

equality of
that thing
which is
common.

Every power is
limited by the
utmost that is
possible to it;
and this is not
only true of
active power,
but of every
sort of
potentia-

All there
proceed from
the first active
power, which
is purely Act,
and the term
of Divine power
is the limit of
actual
possibility.

Thus we must
in every
proposition
presuppose the
power of the
First Entity.
Those who
sustain that a
negative
proposition
cannot be
absurd, put
logical
potentia
before Divine
Power; at the
same time they
lose the
meaning of the
word.
God's being is
absolutely
necessary.
If God is
possible, He
exists.
But God's
existence is
possible;

et sic equale vel inequale, que proprie competit
quantitati, transumuntur ad denominandum quemcunque
excessum vel paritatem in quacunque denominacione
signanda.

Et hinc dicitur quod quelibet potencia terminatur
affirmative vel negative maximo vel minimo in quod
potest, nec solum restringitur potencia ad potentiam
activam, que est accidentis de 2^a specie qualitatis, sed
ampliatur ad omne posse logicum respectu cuiuscunque
denominacionis predicable, ymmo respectu cuiuscunque
entity possibilis, cuiusmodi sunt tales potencie cum suis
contentis: posse esse substanciam, posse esse quantum
discrete vel continue, posse esse quale, posse esse ad
aliquid, agens vel paciens; et sic de potenciis respectu
privacionum, potenciarum, pretericionum, futuricio-
num, et negacionum. Omnes ergo tales potencie pro-
cedunt a prima potencia, que sic est actus purus quod
sibi non inest potencia respectu sue denominacionis
absolute, nisi quam habet | necessario actualiter coeter-
nam; et ideo, cum omne posse causati procedit ab illa 20
potencia que est actus, potest dici quod quilibet ter-
minus alicuius potencie terminat potentiam activam.

Ex isto patet quod omnis potencia logica vel natu-
ralis presupponit potentiam primi actus. Si enim potest
esse quod nichil sit ab alia potencia, potest sic esse. 25
Aliter enim non quilibet affirmativa poneret significatum
sui verbi; sicut fantasiantur illi qui dicunt quod nulla
negativa includit repugnanciam. Ipsi enim preponunt
posse logicum posse dei; sed nesciunt exprimere quid-
ditatem illius potencie, sicut nec sciunt huius verbi 30
potest significacionem declarare.

Secundo patet quod absolute necessarium est deum
esse; eo quod, si aliqualiter potest esse, deus est; sed
absolute necessario aliqualiter potest esse; igitur etc.
Maior patet ex nota proxima; minor patet per deducens 35
ad impossibile. Si enim potest esse quod non aliqualiter
potest [esse] tunc potest esse quod nichil potest
esse; et cum iuxta opinionem nichil potest esse

B 71^a

27. fantasiat^a B. 37. esse deest B.

19. From the beginning of f. 71^a there is another hand,
much more cramped than the former, up to f. 82^b. After which,
and until f. 122^a, there is again another.

impossibile, nisi claudans formaliter contradiccionem, sequitur quod potest claudere contradiccionem quod aliquid sit quod nichil simul est et non est; quod si homo est, animal est; et sic qualitercunque proposicio nata est significare. Et cum nichil potest claudere repugnanciam nisi quod claudit repugnanciam, sequitur quod claudit repugnanciam aliqualiter posse esse: quod est impossibile.

Tercio patet quod omnia citra deum que dicuntur posse, dicuntur posse a potentia aliena. Sicut enim homo potest vinci a potentia aliena, sic qualitercunque potest esse ipsum; vel suum antecedens potest esse a potentia prima. Actus enim principians est simpliciter prior potentia, sicut esse est naturaliter prius posse; cum omne posse sit esse. Patet ergo quod ad unam simplicem que est actus primus possibilis habet reduci quelibet alia potentia, cum quelibet talis sit causata.

Sed hic obicitur. Videtur enim quod potentia dei terminatur ad eundem terminum ad quem terminatur quelibet alia potentia, quia usque ad illum terminum potest deus cum tali potentia, et non ultra. Et sic non distingueretur posse dei absolutum a posse ordinato, sed omne potens tantum posset quantum posset cum concurso prime potentie et sic quodlibet foret cuiolibet eque potens, quia vel ad eumdem terminum terminaretur eius potentia usque ad quem deus posset cum illo et non ultro, vel aliter non terminaretur.

Ad illud dicitur quod potentie sunt distincte respectu dei secundum formalem distinctionem ab invicem et ab eius essencia; et quelibet talis potentia terminatur ad deum ut ad eius subiectum. Et preter hoc est dari extrinsecum in quod potest et non in aliud, cum tot posse sunt in deo quot res possunt causari ab eo; nec est tale posse alia essencia, sed veritas ponens deum esse, et tantum causatum causari ab eo. Nec est inconveniens deum deperdere quotlibet tales potencias per lapsum rei in preteritum quam impossibile est redire; sicut patet de motu, tempore, et multis aliis. Et in talem distinctionem dei incident qui verbaliter illud negant, dum ponunt quod aliqua deus potest a

otherwise nothing would be self-contradictory.

All powers below God imply another power that gives them movement for act is simply prior to power, and all powers have their source in Act.

Objection. The power of God goes no further than any other power; thus absolute and ordinary power are not distinct in Him; every power does all it can with His concourse.

Answer. There are as many powers in God as there are things able to be caused; and these powers are formally distinct from each other and from His essence.

When a thing becomes past, God loses that power, it is true, but this makes no change in Him.

q. cir^o dm B.

38. Quam. Rem understood.

An eternal accident may exist in God, if independent of all but Him. Thus active power merely expresses the fact that God can act thus and thus; like the visual power of the eye.

And such power can be lost, but not acquired, by God.

God's power of producing things is anterior to their potentiality of being produced.

Why should this power be called an accident? Because it inheres in a subject and qualifies it. Active power does so formally;

passive power does not, though it is also in God as in its cause.

It has been denied that there are relations in God, on account of there being no foundation of such relations.

But logical (not real) relations are generally admitted, which imply only the existence of the First Essence: and I am willing to grant that they are such.

potencia absoluta que non potest de potentia ordinata. Nec est inconveniens accidens eternum esse in deo, cum non dependat ab essentia extra ipsum. Nec est talis potentia activa, quia ipsa potest quicquid agere, sed quia ipsa denominat formaliter deum posse agere: sicut virtus oculi visiva dicitur, et qualitates potentie active, quia per ipsas potest subiectum agere. Tales ergo potencias potest deus deprendere sed non acquirere, sed cum sint relationes, habent possibilitates passivas ad quas dicuntur. Et, ut ego credo, prius est deum posse in hoc, quam hoc posse fieri, non quoad consequiam, sed quoad perfectionem. Nec repugnat veritatem eternam que non est accidens obiective terminare accidens eternum in deo secundum rationem obiecti, esse quodammodo prius posse dei sibi relato. Sic enim tam non potest facere deus me esse asinum quam non possum esse asinus, quam econtra.

Et si queretur quare deum posse agere est accidens et non rem posse agi ab illo, dicitur quod ideo quia de ratione accidentis est inherere subiecto quod presupponit et determinat modo. Non dubium, conciliante alias veritates, quin deum posse producere B actu, sicut est veritas, sic est in deo, et denominat ipsum formaliter id posse; et cum idem accidens potest desinere esse per causacionem B actus, patet quod a divina essentia quam presupponit. Sed B actum posse produci, quamvis sit in deo causaliter, non tamen denominat ipsum formaliter, nec per consequens aliquod aliud subiectum. Ideo non habet rationem accidentis. | B 71^b

Et, si dicatur quod auctores negant esse relationes in deo propter defectum fundamenti absoluti, dicitur quod communiter ponunt auctores relationes rationum esse in deo, et non dicere mobilitatem subiecti, nec requiri accidens absolutum pro suo fundamento; et tales ponunt in predicione modali esse illam primam essentiam, quia nullam aliam ponunt. Sed non est dubium quin tales distinguuntur formaliter a subiecto, si aliqua distinguuntur. Et placet michi quod sint relationes rationis. Modicam enim vel nullam realiter tantum ponunt aliique relationes preter realitatem subiectorum. Et, si dicatur quod multe tales positive

superfluunt, cum nunquam procedunt in actum, dicitur quod non sequitur; sed videamus quid valet quod deus potest *hoc* producere (demonstrando unum quod nunquam producetur). Ad hoc valet prima potencia; et sic facit multa bona, sicut privaciones et negaciones, cum omne *causare*, extendendo terminum, sit facere; nichil tamen agit proprie nisi essencia absoluta, cuiusmodi est substantia habens propriam inclinacionem naturalem, a qua procedit accio extrinseca, ut sepe dictum est, quod alienum est a quocunque accidente.

Dicitur igitur quod nec potencia dei nec alicuius alterius terminatur ad aliquod non existens. Ideo, si maxima quantitas quam possum habere non est, tunc nulla potencia terminatur ad ipsam. Si autem illa potest esse, tunc sicut ad illam possum maiorari, et non ultra. Sic unum *posse* dei usque ad illam potest me maiorare et non ultra. Et ad illum intelligentibus dicitur communiter huiusmodi potencias ad tales terminos terminari. Ad quam sensum concedendum est nullius potentiam terminari ad aliquid non inseparabiliter malum, quin potencia dei terminetur ad illud. Talia enim mala non sunt in deo, sicut nec causantur ab illo, sed sunt in rationibus eternis que causantur a deo.

Ulterius per distincionem potencie absolute a potencia ordinata est notandum quod illos terminos magistrales et consimiles diversi diversimode concipiunt. Aliqui enim large intelligunt, per potentiam absolutam, essentiam rei sub ratione qua absolute est potens, non considerando possibilitatem vel impossibilitatem termini in quem potest per alicuius posterioris ipsa potencia; et 2^m talem potentiam Filius dicitur producere alium Filium, infinitos modos, et ipsos infinites annichilari. Ipse enim, ut prius dictum est, habet suffici-35 entem potentiam ad omnia illa, si illa possent esse. Et ad illum sensum dicunt auctores quod potencia absoluta potest multa facere que non possunt fieri: ut post lapsum operis mei, manente potencia eadem, sum ita potens sicut fui in principio; ideo non est 40 defectus in potencia absoluta mei quod non possum

To say that a power that will never be exercised is superfluous, does not include these;

for the real agent is God's essence.

No power can have the non-existent for its term. If there is no maximum of quantity, nothing can produce it; if there is, it can increase so far and no farther, and God's power is limited by that maximum.

Likewise, God's power extends to every act, however evil, it not inseparably so, by means of the eternal laws of things. *Absolute* and *ordinate* power have different significations; some understand by the first the essence of a being, as having power, distinct from that on which it has power.

In that sense it is said that God can do things that cannot be done:

For instance it is impossible to do the same thing twice, yet the power to do is not gone.

16. dei B. 26. mgrales B. 27. cōcīnt B. 31, 32. ñ p̄ B.
32. tig dr B. 33. fīm B.

facere illud opus, sed impossibilitas est ex parte factibilis. Sicut non est defectus in visu meo quod non possum videre remotissimam arenam in occano, sed ex impossibilitate proporcionate applicacionis; ideo potencia absoluta est potencia, sed deficit potencia respectiva que ponit, et agens posse facere productibile, et illud posse esse; et illud vocatur potencia ordinata.

Others say:
All that can be done by God's ordinance, can also be done by His absolute power; and vice versa.
Alii dicunt quod omne quod deus potest facere de potencia ordinata potest facere de potencia absoluta, et econtra, et solum que ordinavit fieri de potencia ordinata potest facere. Et ista via ponit omne quod fuit vel erit esse deo presens, et sic nullam potentiam a deo deperdibile; ut dicetur capitulo ultimo.

But I follow this opinion:
that a past thing must have existed, and many things future do not exist.
The distinction between the two powers, though practically useful, would imply a power (absolute) that is never exercised unless with the other (ordinate).
And the loss of such power merely on account of the want of receptive power munis trinitati. Quamvis ergo tertium suppositum non in the subject is no defect.
I grant that every being can act in so far as it is able with the concourse of the First Cause.
In so far as God can give aid, in so far it is possible to act.
How far? I do not know; but God knows.
Hic tamen prosequor prius dicta quod rem preteritam impossibile est non fuisse, et quod multa erunt que non sunt; et sic de aliis que sunt magis famosa. Oportet enim gradatim ascendere in subtiliora. Quamvis autem illa distinccio deservit pro auctoribus concordandis, videtur tamen michi quod nullum potens potest in aliud, nisi posset in ipsum de potencia ordinata. Illud patet ex hoc quod omnis potencia activa dicitur comparative ad potentiam causabilem; ut, si posset facere hoc, hoc posset fieri. Nec propter depercpcionem potentie respective materie potencie absoluta dicitur aliquid simpliciter minus potens, sicut nec Pater 25 potest tantum producere sicut alterum priorum, est 30 tamen id quod potest tantum producere.

Ulterius conceditur consequenter quod omne agens tantum potest, et usque ad tantum, sicut potest cum B 72^a concursu vel iuvamine prime cause. Et sic, si deus potest facere me causare quodcumque opus ad quantum- 35 cunque intensivum gradum, et ego possum usque ad illum gradum in illud opus. Striccius tamen sumitur quandoque potencia pro sufficiencia quam potens habet; sicut dicitur puerum non posse in actus viriles antequam acquisiverit potentiam naturalem. Si vero queratur a me usque ad quantum potest talis potencia, deum contestor ego ignoro de quacumque, sed bene credo

quod est dare terminum quem deus satis noscit. Ideo damus nos per modum peticionis vel suppositionis termini talis potencie, quis, queso, non ignorat gradum magnitudinis, intensionis, vel alterius singularis accidentis subiecti? Nec est cura de talibus individuis corruptibilibus, cum non sit sciencia habitualis de illis ut de subiecto prime sciencie propter confusionem et rectitudinem. Ideo iubent populo quiescere a talibus et intendere utilibus.

10 Istis ergo premissis plus pro fundamento declaracionis materie quam pro fructu sciencie qui exinde patefecit pueris, videndum est quomodo regulariter ponendum est tales potencias terminari. Et quicquid moderni dixerint, videtur michi probabile 2^m sentencias antiquorum, 15 quod respectu cuiuscunque potencie terminabilis est dare cuiuscunque speciei denominacionis maximum in quod potest; ut est dare maximam quantitatem sub qua homo potest esse, maximum gradum quantitatis et cuiuscunque alterius accidentis sibi possibilis; et pro-20 porcionaliter de aliis potenciis.

Et suppono quod ille terminus *maximum* dicat superium vel excellentissimum in quod potest talis potencia. Probatur ex hoc regula: quelibet talis potencia dicitur esse maior, que cum similibus paribus in plus potest; sed cuiuscunque talis potencie est dare maximum gradum possibilem; igitur etc. Maior patet ex hoc quod quelibet talis potencia eo est magna quo in magnum potest; ergo est eo magis magna quo in magis magnum potest. Aliter enim non diceretur in qua proporcione est potencia que 30 precise in duplo plus potest quam A, maior quam A.

Sed hic dicitur quod non est dare quantum precise potest, et per idem non est dare precise duplicatum vel in quacunque proporcione rationali proporcionatam ad illam. Sed illud videtur michi nimis mirabile quod 35 data sit potencia finita et non sit dandus gradus magnitudinis sue. Aliter enim foret mirabiliter magnum, si nichil posset cognoscere quam magnum ipsum esset. Ymmo, per exponentes sequitur quod hoc est precise tam magnum sicut ipsa est; et per idem sequitur quod

The foregoing questions: being elucidated we come to the main point, and affirm that every power is limited by a maximum: v. g. that there exists a maximum size possible for a man, &c.

7, 8. v'eti^{as} B. 8. plō B. 21. t^m B. 26. et maximum gradum possibilem pro etc. B. 32. duplam B.

2. *Ideo*. To give this sentence a reasonable sense, it would be necessary to supply too many words wanting. Perhaps *non* is superfluous. At any rate, the text is corrupt.

The word *maximum* implying the highest stretch of possibility, we affirm this, because the more anything is able to do, the greater its power is said to be; and there is a maximum of anything that can be done.

It may be said that there is no precise limit to power, and therefore our proportion does not hold.

But if the power is finite it is limited, and the limit is precise.

The very meaning

of the proposition proves that two things can be precisely equal; if not, there would be no equality, and if a power can be doubled or halved, it is exactly half its double and double its half.

Every power is as great as the sum of its parts:

it can diminish to zero and increase again.

If the power of a given subject increases uniformly from a given instant to another until it is four times as great, then, when exactly half the time has elapsed, it must be exactly twice as great as at first.

illa potencia potest equari alteri, quod possibile est alteram et ipsam precise esse equeales, cum contradiccionem includit equalia non esse precise equalia, eo quod qualitas consistit omnino indivisibili. Et per idem, si aliqua potest esse dupla vel subdupla, aut in quaque cuncte alia proporcione ad illam, tunc stat quod aliud quid sit precisely duplum vel subduplicum ad illam; nec magis quam duplum, nec minus quam duplum, est duplum. Ideo omne duplum ad aliud precisely est duplum ad idem. Et sic invenies de quaunque proporcione rationali. Si enim millecuplum foret duplum ad suum submillecuplum, et per idem esset sesquialterum, et equale; et omne magnum esset sub quounque gradu parvum, quo alia esset pars, esset parva: quod non est opinabile.

Quelbet ergo talis potencia est precisely dupla ad eius medietatem et quadrupla ad eius ^{4^{am}}; et sic de aliis proporcionibus. Et per idem sine dubio est precisely tanta quantam eius partes ipsam constituunt. Et confirmatur ex hoc quod potencia, cum sit debilis, potest remitti ad non gradum, et iterum crescere; vel saltem

subiectum potest intendi vel remitti in potencia. Pono ergo quod subiectum intendatur quousque fuerit in ^{4^{lo}} magis potens; et sit A totum temporis per quod erit in duplo potentius quam est modo. Et sit B tantum ²⁵ temporis per quod erit minus quam in duplo quam est modo. Talia enim tempora sunt danda, cum iste proposiciones sint primarie significantes; A est plus quam in duplo potentius quam fuit in F instanti, et A est minus quam in duplo potentius quam fuit in F instanti, ³⁰ maneunt vere in suis adequatis temporibus. Sit ergo C medium instans inter illa duo tempora, et patet B ^{72^b} quod in C erit subiectum precisely in duplo potentius quam est modo; quia, si excederet, tunc non esset datum tempus totum per quod subiectum erit plus quam in duplo potentius. Et per idem si deficeret a potentialitate dupla, non esset datum tempus totum per quod erit minus quam in duplo potentius. Nec potest dici quod illa tempora non erunt immediata, quia tunc esset dare medium inter contradictoria. Relinquitur ergo quod pro ⁴⁰ instanti erit precisely in duplo potentius quam est modo.

29. ffūp B. 31. adēte tib⁹ B.

Dicitur quod forte est dare quanta est quecunque potencia, sed non est dare quante potest. Sed contra, illud est primo illud quod superius tangitur, quod potencia non dicitur magna quo ad molem, sed eo maior 5 potencia quo plus potest. Sic enim dicit potencia relacionem ad suum potenciale, iuxta dicta. Cum ergo potencia capit suam magnitudinem per comparacionem ad potenciale et non nisi ad maximum, sequitur quod tunc, data magnitudine respective potencie, dandum esset 10 maximum posse. Ymmo illud posse est illa potencia.

Similiter, cum posse plus vel minus sit denominatio consistens in latitudine, est dare gradus et proporciones in illa latitudine. Et per consequens est dare unum quod precise tantum potest sicut illa potencia, unum 15 quod precise in duplo plus; et sic de quacunque proporcione: et stant raciones superius facte. Ut ponatur quod A sit in quadruplo plus potens quam B et remittatur quousque precise tantum possit sicut B; et sit C tempus maximum per quod poterit in duplo plus 20 quam B et D tempus per quod non poterit in duplo plus quam B; patet quod in medio instanti inter illa precise in duplo plus poterit A quam B. Et patet iuxta superius arguta, cum non sit latitudinem dare subito acquisitam vel deperditam, quod in medio instanti pre- 25 cise poterit in duplo plus A quam B. Sed, iuxta opinionem adversam, est dare potencias indefectibiles, respectu quarum est dare maximum in quem possunt.

Et cum infinitum modica sunt, sit aliqua potencia talis: It is admitted by all that certain forces do attain their utmost limit; but there are other forces that are equal to them, being in the same genus, though perhaps differing by incorruptibility, present or absent, which makes no difference; sequitur quod est dare potentiam defectibilem et poten- 30 ciam indefectibilem equales. Ergo sic ut est dare maximum in quod potest prima, sic et de reliqua. Non enim est possibile quod, duarum potenciarum equalium quo ad posse, una plus potest quam reliqua. Nec valet dicere illas potencias esse incomparabiles 35 propter differentiam corruptibilitatis et incorruptibilitatis, quia talia sunt propriissime comparabilia: ut patet de qualitatibus et quantitatibus eiusdem speciei sic differentibus, et patet de quantitate partis celi et quantitate hominis, que sunt eiusdem speciei, et tamen 40 differunt corruptibilitate et incorruptibilitate. Nec nor does the length of time

3. car. B. 26. indebilis B. 28. ilis B. 29. debilem B.
30. indefibilem B. 36. ppiissic.

during which they are active, capiunt potentie suam magnitudinem a diuturnitate temporum per que possunt esse, quia potencia non consistit in successione, quia tunc quelibet defectibilis foret infinitum minor [in] defectibili, cum tamen aliud sit posse ad diuturnitatem et aliud posse quo ad maiorem causabilem.

Nor can we call a negative limit a limit properly; what cannot be done is not the limit of what can.

A stone that is too heavy to be carried by me is no more the limit of my strength than any greater weight, unless it be — which can never be known — the least weight I cannot carry: The proposition is therefore proved.

Objections:
1. This theory would destroy all difference between active and passive power.

2. It would make all power — even God's omnipotence — to be limited by some extraneous bounds.

3. It a given power can carry a maximum of weight for a

Similiter, per deducens ad impossibile, patet quod non est dare terminum negativum, ut communiter signatur; quia si terminus temporis est, tunc non potest esse ad terminandum potentiam, cum illa potencia non potest in illud quo non plus illud est finis termini illius quam quodlibet aliud. Ut, si non possum ferre A lapidem, que racio quare ille plus terminat potentiam meam quam quodlibet reliquum quod non possum portare? Non enim illud potest esse signum noscendi magnitudinem potentie mee, quia nemo potest cognoscere quod illud sit minimum quod non possum, cum non possum tantum nisi sicut possum. Exponentes enim talium negativarum sine putaciis sunt incompossibles. Sequitur ergo quod proporcionaliter ut potencie ad 20 potencias, sic posse potenciarum habent se ad invicem; illud patebit particularius in processu.

Sed contra illud arguitur primo: Aut sequitur quilibet potentiam esse activam, cum passiva potentia differt ab activa in hoc, eo quod activa eo ipso 25 quod potest in maius potest in minus, et potentia passiva econtra eo ipso | quo potest in minus potest in B 73^a maius. Sed vix 2^m illam viam est dare maximum in quod quecumque potencia potest.

Similiter, quantumcunque potencia debilis proporcionatur passo, potest melius proporcionari ab extrinsecō; ergo nec est dare per maximam potentiam resistivam in quam potest, nec maximum gradum actionis possibilis. Sic enim ex proporcione equalitatis proveniret motus, vel accio; vel aliter unum excedit 35 aliud per indivisible, et deus terminaretur maximo iuvamento quo posset iuvare agens.

Similiter, cum facilius sit difficillimum facere parem per minus tempus quam per maius tempus, sequitur

1. in deest B. 5. a^{nt} B. 19. putacō B.

28. *Maius.* There is probably a sentence missing in this paragraph, somewhere about this place.

quod si potencia debilis facit difficultatem per A tempus, per partem illius temporis posset facere maiorem. Ymmo potencia minor sufficeret ferre tantam difficultatem per tempus minus, et illud communiter tangitur deportacione. Et per idem non est dare maximum temporis per quod corruptibile sufficit durare; et sic universaliter de omni accione quam debile sufficit ferre.

Similiter non est dare maximam quantitatem sub qua potest esse homo, sicut nec maximam parvitatem sub qua potest esse: ergo regula falsa. Antecedens patet ex hoc quod, signatis 2^{bus} hominibus, quorum unus sit maximus possibilis, et alius minimus possibilis, neuter sufficeret ferre aliquam lesionem, cum maior propter quamlibet tensionem, ab ictu vel punccione desineret esse; et minor propter quamlibet ablacionem partis superflue corrumperetur; et sic esset dare ultimum instans hominis et in infinitum debilem hominem.

Similiter non est dare maximam multitudinem habituum quos quis simul potest habere; quia Sor habens illos ipse, esset habilior ad ulterius discendum. Aliter enim impediret plenitudo sciencie Sortem ad quidquid discendum a sensu; et sic esset habitus de infinitum facili mobilis. Et idem argumentatur de cumulo mixtorum que possunt per homines congregari, de gradu et de multitudine caliditatis vel frigiditatis, quos potest homo simul habere. Videtur enim quod, sicut non est dare difficillimam penam quod potest tollerari, sic nec in maximum gradum quantitatum nocivarum.

Similiter de potenciis passivis, videtur quod non sit dare minimum quod data virtus sufficit videre; tum quia infinitum modicum sufficit cum alio confuse videre, tum quia, visu vidente illud, possunt 8 circumstancie concurrentes ad visionem vel aliqua illarum meliorari, et per consequens videns sufficeret minus videre. Ymmo, cum non sit dare remississimum gradum visionis, nec acutissimum pyramidem radialis, sequitur quod minus visibile sufficeret videns confusius et sub apparenzia minoris quantitatis videre aliquod visibile. Tales quotlibet evidencie se offerunt deducendas in quibus materie difficiles possunt introduci.

certain times,
it could carry
double that
weight during
half that time,
the quadruple
during the
quarter &c.;
so there is no
maximum.

1. The biggest
or smallest
man possible
is impossible;
the first could
not receive
a *blow*, nor
could the
second lose
any part of
himself,
without ceasing
to be a man.

5. There is no
maximum, v. g.
in learning;
the more one
learns, the
more
one becomes
able to learn.

6. So also of
passive powers:
a minimum
visible is
absurd.
We see
(confusedly)
even the
infinitely small.

1. difficult^m B. 4. 5. tār deptacōe B. .5. tuo³ B; ib. puccōe B.

General

Answer: Not only is there a most perfect substance of all, but every substance is as perfect as it can be; there is a maximum in the possible number of points in any continuous body; also a limit to the velocity of movement, action and passion; to the number of possible men, &c.

Ad illud dicitur sicut prius, tenendo generaliter partem affirmativam in talibus dimensionibus, ut est dare perfectissimam substanciam que potest esse, sicut et quelibet substantia est tam perfecta essencialiter sicut potest esse; et sic est dare maximam multitudinem punctorum et punctualium que possunt esse, sicut patet de punctis mundi et maximam quamlibet continuatatem de points in any que potest esse; ut patet de corporeitate, de loco, et de duracione mundi. Est eciam dare velocissimum motum, accionem et passionem, que possunt esse; et sic generaliter de omnibus aliis, tam simpliciter quam respectu speciei. Est enim dare maximam multitudinem hominum qui possunt, simul vel successive, esse; et sic de aliis speciebus; quia, signata minima multitudine hominum possibilium que non potest esse, patet quod auferendo unitatem ab illa multitudine foret residuus numerus maximus sub quo homo posset esse. Et sic generaliter, cum omne continuum sit compositum ex non quantis, dato numero negativo, patet quod, auferendo ab illo vel vel addendo ad illud unum indivisible, foret residuum maximum vel minimum respectu talis potentie.

Confutation of objections:
1. Every power must be active, in so far as ease of dissolubility is impotence, not power in the form that disappears.

Ad primum dicitur quod impossibile est signare rem absolutam quin sit potencie active, nam posse faciliter vinci vel corrumpi non attestatur super magnitudine potentie, sed super impotencia minoris potencie; quia aliter ad omnem punctum mundi infinitum magna foret potentia, et infinitum minoris potencie cuiuscunque corruptibilis pars, quam ipsum totum; sicut communiter argumentatur quod omne corpus sit infinitum potens ratione materie sue prime, que videtur infinitum potens passive; quia infinitum passivior quam forma vel compositum. Potencia ergo materie prime est potencia passiva denominacione extrinseca, et est finita, cum terminatur ad maximum in quod potest; quia capacitate eius repleta, sive forma substanciali sive forma accidentali, non potest ulterius recipere formam illius racionis, stante illa, quia recipiens oportet denudari a natura rei recepte. Unde, si aliquod subiectum haberet secundum ultimum sue capacitatis formam innatam, non reciparet super illam formam eiusdem racionis.

The potentiality of primordial matter is only extrinsically passive; and as it cannot receive one form while it has another, its power has a maximum—the maximum of the form that it can receive.

3. *fa^m* = figuram: B. 19. *mb^o* ne^vo B. 34. *infinita* B.

Et hinc est quod intellectus non habet species innatas eiusdem rationis cum speciebus quas recipit. Nec materia prima formas substanciales, nec primum organum sensus recipit species ducentes in distinctam noticiam qualitatis sensus conformis gradus cum gradu quantitatis sui organi; sicut supposuerunt philosophi tanquam per se notum. Sicut enim subiectum habens 2^m ultimum sue capacitatis formam quamcunque, non recipit super illa novam consimilis rationis; sic subiectum cognitionem, i. e. animal secundum partem corpoream non gignit distinctam noticiam per receptionem similitudinis ab aliquo simillimo, sed confunditur noticia sensus per notabilem fixionem speciei in suo primo organo extranei accidentis.

15 Prima pars patet de racione, cum recipiens formam ulteriore non habuit capacitatem prius saciatam; et 2^a pars patet experimento, quo scimus visum non noscere dyaphanum quale est in *xpo elayde*, que est primum subiectum visus; nec auditu sonus percipitur in 20 crystallo connaturalis aëris in miringa; nec olfactu, gustu, vel tactu qualitatis connaturalis primi sui subiecti: ut tactu non percipitur distincte qualitas sub illo gradu sub quo est organum sensus tactus. Sensus autem interiores sunt multiplicate per organa spiritualia, quia 25 per sensus alentes, et tamen non illis distincte cognoscuntur quantitates sui organi. Et 3^a pars patet ex hoc quod intritus vel habens fortē impressionem visibilis, confuse iudicat de aliis visibilibus; habens tinnitus auris, vel forte sonum extraneum, permixtum discernit de 30 aliis: et sic de habente fetorem narium, de ethico, de habente gustum infectum (ut febricitantes); de ethico non percipiente propriam inanicionem propter calorem occupantem diutine nervos tactus; et conformiter stupescunt sensus propter fortē sensibilis extranei impressio-35 nem. Ymmo ymaginatiya in sompnis movetur ad apprehendendum secundum impressionem humoris complexionati; ut melancolici sompniant de nigris; et sic de aliis, sine hoc quod species primo recepte sint in sensu

Digression on the forms received by intellect and sense; if either had any 'innate' forms, they would be incapable of receiving any others.

Sense impressions become confused when the organs are very strongly impressed in one particular way.

Both reason and experiment teach us this.

The first subject of vision, hearing &c. must be quite free from any quality perceptible by those senses.

If not, both sight, hearing, taste feeling and smell are apt to judge wrongly of their impressions.

10. \widehat{a} B. 12. $qf\bar{u}r$ B. 18. xo *abore xpo* B. 24. $sp\bar{u}al\bar{a}$ B.
25. $ales$ B. 27. $\widehat{itr}'ius$ B. 32. $\widehat{i}anico$ B. 36, 37. $coplexi\bar{o}$ B.

18. *Xpo elayde*. Of *xpo* I can make nothing; but *elayde* seems to stand for *hyaloide*, the vitreous humour; which would very well agree with the sense.

This proves that intellect, which perceives all beings distinctly, has no organ; and that wherever there is a receptive faculty there is a maximum of reception, both as to number and intensity of the forms received. Return to the main subject: the distinction between active and passive power is at fault. Whether active or passive, the power is in any case a form.

The stronger a man is the more work he can suffer. Sight is active and passive at once.

The essence of these powers is identical, but the point of view from which they are considered is different. And as a fact, the world is the maximum of our sight, and also of our power of producing change.

There must be some limit — though unknown to us — to the aid given to the power of any creature. Whether, v. g. pigs can fly miraculously, is but a small thing;

particulari. Et per illam consideracionem probatur intellectus cuiuslibet entis distincte perceptivus non esse organicus. In quibus omnibus patet quod, data capacitate, danda est maxima multitudo forme quoad partes quantitativas et quoad diversas species; maxima eciam intensio et maxima diurnitas temporis per quod materia prima potest taliter transmutari. Ideo materia est omnimode potentie finite. Sed non obest partem plus esse passivam suo toto.

Redeundo ergo ad propositum, dicitur quod non bene distinguitur potentia activa a potentia passiva per differenciam recitatam. Sed potentia activa est forma qua substancia est formaliter activa. Et potentia passiva est forma qua substancia est formaliter passiva. Et talis vocatur habitudo ad agendum vel paciendum. Nota tamen quod in omni obiecto quo substancia est possibilis, potest agere et econtra; ut fortis homo potest plus pati laborando quam datus debilior, et idem homo qui potest oculo plus diaphano recipere speciem visibilis potest plus active videre ipsum idem. Virtus enim visiva est tam activa quam passiva, sicut materia prima habet actionem manentem; raciones autem illarum potentiarum, sicut et ipse potentie, formaliter et abstractive intellecte, distinguuntur, quamvis essencia sit eadem: multe ergo sunt potentie active que, si possunt in minus possunt in maius, ut potentia videndi, potentia transmutandi; et sic de multis similibus. Est enim dare maximum quod quis potest videre, ut patet de mundo; et maximum quod alteratum potest alterare | ut mundum vel eius materiam 2^m partem. Est eciam dare potentiam passivam que, si potest in maius, potest in minus; ut potentia portandi, potentia recipiendi, et sic de multis aliis. Non ergo in hoc dicuntur potentie supra dicte.

Ad 2^m dicitur quod est dare optimam applicacionem possibilium, et maximum iuvamen possibile ab extrinseco, quod nobis vanum est venari sive supponere. Utrum autem possibile sit porcos volare, muscas arare, et plumbum natare, cum iuvamine extrinseco, [est] alterius negotii. Talia enim creduntur deo valde possibilia 2^m acciones quas nostri vocant miracula. Non tamen potest [facere] lapidem posse intelligere vel

12. ^{am} B. 16. ab^{to} B. 2^m. tr^{nsdi} B. 37. ^ηlupp^ē B.
18. est deest B. 11. facere deest B.

sentire: et sic de accionibus appropriatis speciebus. on the other hand, God could not make a stone think.
 Suspendere tamen nisum gravis ad inferius vel levis ad superius; vel iuvare nisum porci plumbati ad volandum in aere, vel musce trahentis quodlibet trahibile videtur
 5 deo satis facile. Nullum tamen istorum sufficit in ista de sui natura; sed si deus potest ista iuvare ad talia, tunc est dare maximum gradum iuvaminis deo possibilem et maximum gradum motus vel accionis cum tali concursu dei. Nec est ymaginandum quod una pars
 10 accionis tribuatur deo et alia pars intensiva vel extensiva agenti; sed tota accio tribuenda est utrique, cum nullum tale agens ^{2^m potest sine deo iuvante et agente communiter totam accionem, quidquid agere.}

Nec sequitur ex isto quodlibet esse tante potentie
 15 sicut aliud, etsi possit cum deo iuvante tantum agere, quia non habet in se tantam potentiam vel sufficienciam ad sic agendum, sed hoc potest potencia activa. Essencialiter tamen quantum potest quicquid cum iuvante, tantum potest. Et si amplietur potencia ad posse logi-
 20 cum, tunc conceditur quod tantam potentiam habet quodlibet tale agens sicut aliquod, sed non est ita sufficiens nec ita activum vel passivum, quia isti termini dicunt dispositionem actualem potentis. Unde deus con-
 currens miraculose cum tali agente <sup>2^o infundit sibi po-
 25 tentiam, quia aliter non ageret totam accionem. Ideo creditur non esse possibile deum sic insoliter agere, nisi adaugeat potentiam cause cum qua concurrit. Non enim potest concurrere ex equo ut unus homo iuvat alium sine augmentacione sue potencie; et credere
 30 quod talis potencia sit absolutum quod per se esse potest, quamvis sit qualitas, non est sani capit. We admit miraculous aid; but there must be a limit even to that. In every action, both the First cause and the second causes work together.</sup>

Ulterius dicitur quod stat unum excedere aliud minima proporcione maioris inequalitatis; et per consequens minus habet se ad maius in maxima proporcione mino-
 35 ris inequalitatis. Est ergo dare motum velocissimum possibilem, ut motum equivocalem, vel cuiuscunque quod in quolibet [instanti] oppositi motus acquirit unum indivisi-
 bilitate materie motus <sup>2^m eius indivisible. Et quando suppo-
 nitur motum [in] infinitum velocitari ex subtiliacione</sup>

This does not prove that all things have equal natural power; for God, making one being to do more than it can do naturally, gives it an augmentation of power. If we mean by 'power' mere absolute possibility, one may have as much as another; but this is not the proper signification of the word. And thus, for one being, to equal another in act, its power must be increased by the help of God.

There is both a greatest and a least possible inequality between two things; and consequently the most rapid movement possible, sudden or

18. quod quantum B. 19, 20. loc^e B. 28. bonus B. 31. q^s B.
 36. eq^{voc^l} B. 37. instanti deest. 38. m^e B. 39. in deest;
 ib. velociⁱ B.

infinitely rapid movement is either not properly a magnitude, or is impossible; as in the case of movement *in vacuo*, in which there would be a successive change of place, but rapid in the highest possible degree. If it be asked what cause could produce such a movement, it is to be answered that there would be present only the aptitude of the motive power.

In movements that are violent, the cause is a proportion of greater or less inequality between the activity of the motor and the resistance of the thing moved; and the greater the inequality, the more considerable the movement is.

But there are also natural movements, in which the thing moved does not resist, but the influence of the motor may be greater or less; as in the movement of the heavens. But it is often impossible to say by how much such an

cione medii, vel capitur hoc ex dicto, sicut fecit Aristoteles, vel supponitur impossibile, gracia argumenti. Potest enim aliquid subito moveri et multiplicari per quotlibet loca, sed nullum tale subitum est magnum, sic nec aliquid indivisibile est quantum. Posito ergo ⁵ vacuo, per summum impossibile, simpliciter mobilietur successivo motu in illo motu naturalissimo ^{2^m} ultimum sui appetitus, pro quolibet instanti acquirendo quolibet eius indivisibili situm indivisibilem.

Et si ponitur partes eius laterales non resistere toti ¹⁰ (sicut tamen communiter ponitur, proper appetitus earum per lineam rectam brevissimam); et si queritur de proporcione ex qua talis motus causaretur; dicitur quod proporcio ex qua talis motus causatur non est nisi ydoneitas vel sufficiencia moventis ad movendum ¹⁵ mobile. Unde in motibus quodammodo violentis vocatur proporcio maioris inequalitatis, maior ydoneitas moventis ad motum quam est resistive ad impediendum. Unde, quamvis minus potens agat in magis potens, propter bonitatem applicacionis, propter iuvamentum ²⁰ extrinsecum, vel propter difformitatem passi, potentiarum, aut aliam talem causam, non tamen ex proporcione minoris inequalitatis | provenit motus, sed ex proporcione maioris inequalitatis, que est maioris sufficiencie moventis ad movendum quam est resisticie ad resi- ^{B 74^b} stendum.

Alii autem sunt motus pure naturales, qui causantur ex proporcione maioris inequalitatis, que est dominium moventis super motum, sine eius reclamacione vel prohibicione. Taliter enim proporcionatur motor celorum ³⁰ ad quascunque partes eorum motas; et taliter proporcionatur anima corpori. Sed in multis proporcionibus istis non est dare excedens et excessum; sicut in proporcionibus quantitatum. Nec sunt ille proporciones racionales; ideo non abutitur terminis qui vocat ³⁵

1. car B.
34. qui^m B.

19. motum B.

21, 22. pos^r B.

28. dm^m B.

1. *Velocitari.* Aristotle demonstrates as follows the non-existence of a vacuum: If the resistance of the medium in which a given body moves is halved, quartered, &c. the velocity must be doubled, quadrupled, and so on: thus a vacuum being absolutely unresisting, movement would be infinitely rapid.

proporciones (quas motus consequitur) nec proporciones maioris inequalitatis nec proporciones minoris inequalitatis. Sed una proporcio est 2^{la} vel quomodolibet magna ad aliam, sine hoc quod ista proporcionata proprie
5 comparentur. Quis, queso, scit signare proporcionem 2^{lam} maioris orbis ad eius partem, vel fundare illam proporcionem in fundamento debito? Unde est ordinatum quod intelligencia proporcionetur uni parti orbis ad movendum illam certo gradu motus? quem ex suppo
10 sitione mensuramus termino numerali, ut 2 vel ut 4. Sed quod illa proporcio sit 2^a vel alia numeralis, non est docibile.

Ulterius, pro ultimo verbo nota quod solum loquimur pro presenti de iuvamento quod deus potest naturaliter 15 vel ordinare 2^m possibilitatem cursus naturalis facere, et non de illo quod deus potest facere de potentia absoluta. Sed revera illud verbum non solvit, cum quicquid deus potest facere cum agente 2^o, potest facere de communi cursu nature, et de naturalitate agentis 2ⁱ. 20 Ymmo, iuxta dicta, deus nichil potest facere de potentia absoluta, nisi quod potest de potentia ordinata; quia quotquot miracula deus potest facere, potest ipse ordinare potentiam ad illa faciendum. Ideo stultissimum est verbum modernorum quo dicitur deum 25 non posse de lege vel potentia ordinata talia facare; quia si intelligunt quod repugnat isti ordinacioni et legi qua deus voluit eternaliter universitatem ordinare, certum est illi legi vel ordinacioni [repugnare] quod [ne] 30 quicquam boni fiat preter illud quod fit vel fiet, cum eternaliter ordinavit quod solum ista vel aliqua illorum fient. Et si intelligunt de parte legis ordinata, illa esset explicanda, sicut repugnancia illius ad illud quod deus potest facere. Et non assignabitur repugnancia; quia 35 talem contingit assignare inter aliam partem ordinacionis dei et potentiam cuiuscunque preter illud quod de facto erit. Dicendum ergo est de talibus, utrum potentia eorum repugnat ordinacioni dei vel non. Si ergo loquimur de potentia que potest esse ordinata, a qua talia possunt fieri, tunc certum est quod nichil potest facere 40 nisi de potentia ordinata.

influence may be greater or less; and so these proportions might even be said to be neither of greater nor of less inequality. We can indeed suppose, but not prove, that a greater orb has influence on the movement of a smaller, as 2 to 1. The present question concerns the aid that God gives naturally and ordinarily to His creatures, not that which he can absolutely give. But there is no real distinction between absolute and ordinate power. If God can work a given miracle absolutely, there then can be an ordinate power for the miracle to be wrought. To say that such and such an act is against God's ordinate power, either means that it is contrary to the eternal law of what is and will be; or that it is opposed to something that God can do: in the first case the act is impossible; in the second, no such opposition can be proved. So God can do nothing but by His ordinate power.

8. mteia pporoct^v B. 17. rena' B. 28. repugnare deest; ib.
ne deest B.

Speaking, therefore, of this latter power, there must be a maximum limit to it. For if there is a limit to causability, there must also be a limit to causing power; and, therefore, there is a maximum in both cases.

If God was indefinitely able to create, we should have to admit an infinite vacuum, because beyond the limits of this world, God could create still.

This vacuum would be necessary, and more able to receive bodies than God to produce them; unless we suppose that God could create a world as large as this vacuum; it would again be coeternal with God, not to be

annihilated or changed in any way. And God could not accelerate to an infinite degree the speed of the world; because all movement supposes a new accident (of position) successively gained and lost; but here there would be no all.

Supposito ergo quod loquamur de posse dei relativi, ponente possibilitatem factibilis, tunc videtur valde inconsum quod non sit dare quam causativus sit deus alicuius causabilis. Posita enim sua causabilitate, oportet ponere causabilitatem causabilis sibi parem; quibus datis, oportet dare maximum in quacunque specie produccionis quod deus potest producere; sicut patet ex superius deductis. Nam causativitas est eo maior quo plus potest; ergo, data maxima causativitate vel causabilitate, est dare quante ad maximum deus potest active causare, et quante causabile potest passive causari.

Similiter, si cuiuslibet speciei effectus sit deus infinitum causativus, tunc necessario est vacuum undique infinitum; quia si versus aliquam differenciam terminatur, tunc extra eius terminum deus posset producere mundum, cum non posset producere mundum nisi in vacuo. Sequitur: si vacuum potest esse, necessario est vacuum undique infinitum. Et quod illud sit passive susceptivum corporis plus quam deus est productivus caret omni apparenzia. Si ergo ipsum potest suscipere tantum corpus sicut ipsum est, tunc deus potest producere tantum corpus. Sed non dabitur quod ipsum est tante susceptivum quante est, nec quod [pars] suscipiens sua sit per totum tanta precise quantum est totum, nisi ipsum possit suscipere precise tantum corpus quantum est ipsum terminis.

Similiter, cum illud vacuum sit a deo, et tam utile patet quod est necessario coeternum, sic quod deus non posset ipsum annichilare, vel unam partem eius cum alia coextendere. Si enim posset, tunc non requiri vacuum recipiens rem corpoream, | ut dicitur, et B 75^a tunc sine dubio deus non infinitum velociter posset movere mundum versus occidens, ut communiter conceperit quod omnis motus successivus ponit formaliter ali. 35 quod accidens aquisitum mobili, et aliquod deperditum; quia aliter non est fingenda causa quare mundus tam infinitum velociter movetur versus omnem differentiam, all.

12. effus B. 23. pars deest B. 26. t^o B. 36. acci^{en} B.
38. dram B.

19. *Plus quam.* Because the vacuum would be actually infinite; and God, however able to create new worlds, would never fill it up successively.

eo quod nullum ens foret aquisitum mundo, si de possibili sic moveretur, quia iam aquiritur; et sic de deperdito.

Ponendo ergo vacuum, ut nostri senciunt, oportet 5 ponere ipsum esse ens positivum, specificans motum et eius accidencia. Si ergo vacuum sit tante permanencie et necessitatis, patet ex ratione substancie quod esset substancia, eciam ordinata valde. Sed quomodo hoc, si, infinitum multas et magnas partes eius auferendo, 10 residuum sufficeret? ideo est servicium ad quod totum deservit. Frustratorium ergo esset vacuum ad omne eius punctum, et huic sine dubio non esset a deo bono conservatum.

Similiter, iuxta modernos ponentes potentiam terminari 15 exclusive ad infinitum quod non potest deus, non tantum potest producere quantum potest, cum non potest cognoscere quantum potest producere, et per consequens non potest cognoscere quam potens precise ad quidquam producendum sit, et per consequens est plus 20 causativus vacui quam substancie corporee, et sic non omnium specierum est eque causativus. Causat enim vacuum, et contradiccionem claudit quod tante esset corpus, cum exclusive et non inclusive usque ad tantum potest causari corpus. Potencia ergo qua deus 25 causat vacuum per indivisibile excedit producibilitatem corporis. Vel aliter sequitur quod due sunt concausantes eiusdem rationis, et una earum non potest tantum causare sicut reliqua, cum tamen ille potencie dicuntur pares, quia illis paria possunt causare. Corpus ergo 30 per indivisibile excessum a vacuo foret maximum in quod deus posset.

Similiter, iuxta illud sequitur quod unum infinitum sit reliquo maius; quia rectificaret deus lineam giravam (cum sit secundum se totam rectificabilis) et pre-35 tendat ipsam in infinitum versus oriens, servando a punto continue fixo Oxonie; quo facto, pono quod in qualibet parte proporcionali illius hore deus protrahat A, totam lineam, versus occidens, et deuento ad finem hore noto lineam terminatam ad situm Oxonie, 40 ubi finit A punctus in principio, et signo illam per AB, sive fuerit finita ad reliquum extreum linee girative, sive non. Circumducat ergo deus AB lineam, fixo B

To posit a vacuum is to posit it as a real being, nay as a substance; and yet it is useless; for no one part of it is necessary.

The moderns admit that God can do all things, except create what is infinite; then God can do more than He is able; since He is not able to know all the objects to which His power extends; and at any rate He would conserve vacuum in being, rather than substance.

And the maximum of God's creation would be a body infinitely small, surrounded by an infinite vacuum. One infinite would be greater than another. Example to demonstrate this.

If, one end A of an infinite line AB being in Oxford, God was to make the whole line turn on B,

we should have puncto, et patet quod in vacuo causabitur circulus in-
an infinite circle finitus, quo circumducto super polos, et axe quiescente,
a vacuum, the causabitur spera infinita; et per idem contingit in-
circle could generate an scribere vel circumscribere quadratum et habebitur que-
infinite sphere; other volumes cunque figura superficialis vel corporea infinita in va-
could be cuo: quod claudit contradiccionem in terminis. Patet
inscribed or ergo quod [ad] nullum tale est deus infinitum [potens],
circumscribed; all which are cum ipse cognoscit ubi sit quilibet eius punctus et
impossible things. quante pedale confert ad eius magnitudinem; et sic per
consequens in qua proporcione se habet ad pedale, et ad quamcunque eius partem proporcionalem: et per
idem deus scit ubi terminabatur A linea in principio
versus oriens; quia aliter, circumducendo A, stante ex-
tremo eius fixo et circumducendo B lineam infinitam
versus oriens excessam ab A per pedale, sic quod tam B quam A fiat infinita versus occidens, foret B maius
quam B per pedale sine alterius maioracione vel mino-
racione: et sic de infinitis quorum primum excedatur
a B per pedale, 2^m per 4rupedale, et sic in infinitum.
20

Refutation of certain weak answers to this difficulty.

1. Denies that the Infinite is not great, because it is not small. But in this case it would really be smaller than a part of the infinite vacuum;

besides, the idea of quantity includes that of magnitude.

2. Considers each proportional part of such a line as equal to the whole; but there can be no proportion between equals.

Thus an infinite line must have a half, a quarter, an eighth, &c.

Hic sunt responsiones inutiles. Prima dicit quod tale quantum infinitum magnam, partem habet, sed ipsum non est magnum quia non est parvum. Sed hic non valet, tum quia est minus parte vacui infiniti, tum etiam quia ad esse quantum sequitur omne magnum sive immensum, ut videtur de vacuo sive finite | magnum, B 75^b sicut est de linea girativa. Quid, queso, componerent magnitudines parcium A linee, nisi magnitudinem? cum pars, ut huius[modi], requirit suum totum.

Secunda responsio dicit quod quelibet pars proporcionalis linee A est ita magna sicut A. Sed contra illud est descripcio proporcions multiplicis que non potest esse inter equalia. A ergo habebit se ad eius medietatem, 4^{am}, 8^{am}; et sic in infinitum in proporcionibus multiplicibus correspondet. Aliter enim non fieret alia pars finita ipsius ad eius quantitatem, nec per consequens ad eius esse. Cum enim tantum sit residuum sicut est hoc totum, quomodo habet hoc totum esse sic magnum ab ista parte? Ymmo, aggregatis infinitis partibus in A et totidem in B, sic quod prima in A 40

2. axem quiescentem B. 4. 4^m B. 7. ad deest; ib. potens deest.

26. immū B. 29. modi deest. 32. multō B. 35. a^a pro alia B.

38. e₃ B.

sit dupla ad primam in B, 2^a sit dupla ad 2^{am}, et sic in infinitum; patet quod totum aggregatum ex primis est duplum ad totum aggregatum ex 2^{is}, ut patet 11^o elementorum Euclidis, prima conclusione. Nec 5 refert sive illa fuerit finita sive infinita. Et evidencia ad illud est quod non quantum additum finito quanto facit totum maius: ergo per idem, quodlibet finitum, pars infiniti, facit totum maius. Et ad illud valet quod quelibet linea quantumlibet magnum est par alicui de 10 genere superficie vel corporeitatis. Non ergo foret pars linee per se causa sue magnitudinis, nisi, illa ablata, residuum foret minus.

Tertia responsio negat deum taliter posse movere vel causare substanciam vel accidens infinitum, ut in 15 infinitum potest movere lineam, rare facere corpus, et sic de aliis; sed repugnat quod illa maneant in fine. Illud non valet isti vie, quia in vacuo infinito est linea infinita, vel extremum simillimum linee, cum vacuum sit quasi quantitas abstracta. Nec dubium quin, si deus 20 potest protrahere illam lineam vel rarefacere illud corpus [in] infinitum usque ad finem illius hore, vel aliter continuare recte lineas pedales ad invicem, ipse potest omne tale finitum conservare in fine, eo quod non corrumperetur nisi ab eo; et ille libere contradictorie cor- 25 rumpit illud, cum tamen non necessitaret se ad corrumpendum illud, propter producciones precedentes, cum sit tam conservativus rerum talium, sicut est productivus. Nec deest sibi locus ad conservandum, quia est vacuum undique infinitum, cui deus non potest quid- 30 quid addere vel quidquid auferre. Deus ergo, in infinitum rarefaciendo mundum usque ad finem illius hore exclusive, repleret illud totum vacuum, quia cuiuslibet partis illius repleret aliqua parte. Ideo replecio totalis, sicut rarefaccio totalis, erit ita magnum sicut vacuum.

35 Et, ut breviter dicam, non est aliquod inconveniens deducibile ex admissione corporis infiniti, quin conforme deducibile sit ex posizione vacui infiniti. Quelibet enim pars eius superflueret; et cum nullum eius punctum foret sursum vel deorsum, ipsum non posse circum- 40 duci, nisi pro quolibet instanti transiret infinitum magnum spacium, sicut patet ymaginando lineas concur-

Yet one of its parts taken away, it remains as great as before.

An infinitely small added to a finite quantity makes the whole greater; therefore a finite added to an infinite quantity should make it greater too.

3. Denies that God is able to cause a substance or an accident that is infinite; a body infinitely expanded would cease to exist.

But for those who admit an infinite vacuum, this answer is of no use.

If God can expand a body *in vacuo* so that it attains the infinite in a given time, He can also preserve it from ceasing to exist, being as much the preserver as He is the cause of everything; nor would room be wanting for this expanded body, since the vacuum is also infinite.

Thus the hypothesis of an infinite vacuum entails as many difficulties as that of an infinitely large body.

Not one of its points could be moved up or down, nor could it revolve upon itself, without

4. quone B.
21. in *deest* B.

12. maius B.
2ⁿ. per B.

16. maneat B.

18. xmfil^{im} B.

supposing an infinite space traversed; for however small the angle made by the lines that meet in the centre of revolution, still they are at last at an infinite distance.
Other difficulties.

rentes in centro, causando quantumcunque acutum angulum infinitum. Namque magna basis terminaret aliquem angulum conatum in centro. Ideo infinities infinitum spaciū transiretur, antequam una parva linea deveniret ad situm in quo est reliqua. Nec posset deus alterare, movere localiter, augmentare vel diminuere aliquam partem vacui, cum sit per se quantum et immutabile. Ymmo tunc deus posset movere se, cum quiescit in vacuo tenebroso, visibili per totum, ut tenebra videtur et infinitum taccio. Cum ergo quotlibet talia inconveniencia sequuntur ex posicione vacui, et necesse sit ponere vacuum ad hoc quod deus posset talia mirabilia mobilia facere, videtur quod deus non potest facere talia.

That there is a limit to God's power can also be proved by arguments leading to absurdities.

If there was no limit He could make one part of the world as large as the whole, together with many other impossibilities.

Similiter per deducciones ad inconveniens videtur idem probari. Videtur enim quodlibet tantum posse sicut aliquid; sed nichil tantum quantum ipsum potest. Deus enim potest facere quodlibet secundum tantum per idem tantam difficultatem facere |, et cum difficultas attenditur penes gradum proprie potencie, sequitur quodlibet habere tantam potentiam sicut deus, cum quilibet habens tantam potentiam sicut deus, haberet corpus infinitum magnum, quod foret deo par in potentia. Et si dicatur quod omnis talis est potencia dei, et non potencia rei tante potentis, vere sic posset dici nullam substanciam habere potentiam, inclinacionem vel actionem; sed totum fit, aliis solum passive se habentibus. Ymmo, non essent raciones immobiles secundum quas partes mundi ordinantur, eo quod contingentissime posset esse ita ordinatum quod terra locketur in supremo mundi et sol in infimo, et quod minima species corporum foret maxima species, et sic de anathomia hominis et cuiuscunque partis mundi; ymmo inclinaciones et proprie acciones rerum possent in toto

3. conatū B. 6. altar' B. 9, 10. teneb^v vir B. 10. tētio B.
18. βην^λ B. 24. habet pro habens B. 31, 32. ḡtm^m B. 35. antho^a B.

16. *Idem probari.* This evidently makes the present paragraph a mere sequel to the preceding one. I have not been able to see the sequence, and not understanding this paragraph clearly in any sense, have been very sparing of marginal notes.

communicari. Omnes ille leges dependent ex voluntate dei contingentissima, secundum quam posset facere quamlibet partem mundi esse totum mundum, ut hominem posset constituere ex terra vel parvis accidentibus, cum anima, ita magnum sicut iam est mundus, sine aliquo corpore alio preter eius partem. Et sic periret substancialium certitudines, raciones eterne et incorruptibilitates rerum.

Posset ergo philosophus dicere quod deus in omnibus talibus terminat se ^{2nd} raciones eternas maximo in quod potest; quia aliter esset imperfectus; nec est solum infinite potencie durative, ut alie partes mundi, sed tripliciter excedit alias potencias. Primo in hoc quod quilibet alia potencia habet finem extrinsecum finientem ipsam; sed nichil potest finire deum. Et ad illum sensum demonstrat Aristoteles deum esse potencie infinite ex hoc quod eternaliter movet celum, tanquam finis ultimus. ^{2nd} excedit potencias quascunque alias infinite, in hoc quod eternaliter gignit actum vel intelleccionem sibi equalem, et nichil potest causare tam perfectum causatum, nisi fuerit infinitum. Tercio, in hoc quod ipse potest creare sine materia preiacente, et hoc claudit contradiccionem aliud facere.

Et ex istis sequuntur multe proprietates in modo causandi independenter et ultimate sumendi; et sic de ceteris, que solum sibi possunt competere. Nec est alicuius potencie intellective, nec proporcionaliter sufficit facere maius opus, nec est plus potens, nec est modo minus potens quam quando produxit mundum, etsi nunc non possit mundum producere. Nec sequitur quod prius potuisset produxisse mundum, nec forte posterius, nec maiorem nec minorem, et sic libere contradictorie produxit mundum. Et conformiter est dicendum de aliis factis ^{2nd} ultimum sue factibilitatis. Nec probatur ex operibus que deus fecit, vel ex auctoritate sufficienti quod ipse possit taliter facere. Nec valet protervia qua dicitur, quod deus tante potest quante potest sustineri ipsum posse. Sed potest faciliter sustineri quod ipse potest [in] infinitum perficere et operari cum quocunque, igitur etc. Taliter enim arguant aliqui, induendo habitum responsalem, quando deficit illis

God's power, thus terminated by a maximum, differs in three ways from that of His creatures;
^{1st} because He alone has only Himself for end;

^{2nd} because He eternally begets an Act which is infinitely perfect; and ^{3rd} because He can create without any previous matter.

Many other consequences flow from these principles. Though God cannot create the world now, He is just as powerful as when He created it.

Nor could He have created the world before or after the fixed time, nor larger nor smaller than He did.

To say that God can do as much as He can be maintained to be able to do, is idle obstinacy. It consists in merely shifting the burden of proof upon other shoulders

We do not however deny that God, if He chose, could render any being indefinitely perfect. Ad 3^m dicitur quod est dare maximam difficultatem 5 quod quecunque potencia sufficit facere, et multitudinem et magnitudinem, que communiter attenditur 2^m eius ultimum virtutis. Et sic locuntur (quamvis inconvenienter) illi qui negant potentiam terminari maximo in quod potest. Ipsi enim nec darent totalem potenciam, nec maximum 10 nisum eius possibilem, nec maximam difficultatem eius possibilem fieri a data potencia; ita quod grave plus posset niti, sicut omne divisibile per comparacionem suarum parcium posset melius applicari 2^m partes que propter distanciam ocliantur, non tantum intendentis sicut inten- 15 dentur propinquius posite. Sed quomodounque sit de hoc, claret michi quod quelibet essentia habet unum suppositum, 2^m quod producit aliud suppositum par priori; et illa est accio immanens perfectissima possibilis tali nature, 2^m aliquod eius suppositum; ut per- 20 fectissima et difficillima accio quam deus potest agere est produccio ad intra, et proportionaliter de aliis essentiis.

It is quite certain that every suppositum can produce another equal to itself, and this is the highest act of all, similar to the begetting of the Word in God's essence. There are also certain actions in which a maximum of difficulty is overcome; but in reckoning this, we must not say that these actions are greater in proportion as they last longer.

Est eciam dare acciones et facciones ad extra perfectissimas et difficillimas possibles | respectu talium B 76^b agencium; que acciones non sunt eo maiores quo per maius tempus durant; quia sic infinitum modice difficultatis esset portare maximum lapidem per tempus, cum portare ipsum per horam sit tantum finita difficultas, et nisus minor esset portare ipsum per infinitum 30 minus tempus. Et sic in infinitum magna difficultas esset portare quamlibet leve per tempus eternum, et per consequens nulli difficultati finite proportionalis.

Nec attenduntur tales difficultates penes magnitudinem effectus extrinseci producti; quia tunc semper ad maiori- 35 ritatem motus consequitur maioritas difficultatis, et per consequens quantamlibet magnum difficultatem sufficit quantumcunque movens facere. Nec in aliquo conseruentur se magnitudo potencie prime agentis difficultatem et difficultas facta. Ymmo stat "facere diffi- 40 cultatem" univoce cum "producere effectum extrinsecum"

nor that the difficulty is in direct ratio with the effect produced;

difficulty may be overcome without any external effect being produced.

2. misitate B. 1^m. a3 (o3^z) pro claret B. 30. nisi B. 41. pro-
ducente B.

solum conservando productum vel resistendo produccioni, sicud patet de conservante lumen vel quemcunque effectum alium, et de portante proporcionale vel prohibente actionem agentis.

5 Videtur ergo quod hoc nomen, "difficultas", sit nomen equivocum, sicut et hoc concretum, "difficile", et termini illis oppositi. Quandoque enim quecunque res difficultis dicitur difficultas, sive sit accio, sive obiectum circa quod est accio; et ista accepcion est 10 valde extensa; ut sic loquendo: *omne difficile est difficultas*. 2º modo accipitur pro illo quo res formaliter denominatur difficultis, quod est accio vel passio circuens multa genera: ut res varie dicuntur difficile. Dicitur enim aliquid difficile, quia est ens circa quod est 15 agencia requirens certam potentiam. Et cum omne ens sit taliter intelligibile vel conservabile, qualiter a sola potencia infinita potest conservari vel intelligi, patet quod cuncte res sunt summe difficiles, inseparabiliter quoad aliquem actum: ut puta actum intelligendi vel 20 causandi. Sed 3º modo dicitur res difficultis propter eius perfeccionem; penes hoc enim uno modo mensuratur difficultas causancie. Et sic est maior difficultis producencia qua deus producit animam quam producencia qua producit lignum. Et forte non est una difficultas 25 respiciens illas ambas, si non aggregative. 4º modo dicitur aliquid difficile, quia infert fatigacionem vel debilitacionem exercendi potentiam circa illud.

Et ita tripliciter dicitur difficultas formaliter. Prima respicit perfeccionem potencie causantis subiectum 30 difficulter. 2ª respicit perfeccionem causati. Sic enim duobus modis dicitur causancia bona. 3ª vero difficultas respicit fatigacionem vel debilitacionem causantis subiectum illius difficultatis. Ut summe difficile, tam primo modo quam secundo, est producere deum; et 35 quoad primum modum eque difficile est intelligere vel causare quidquid finaliter. Omnis autem causancia pure naturalis excludit difficultatem 3º modo dictam, cum omnis talis respicit penam vel debilitacionem potencie. Nec video quod ille 3 dicuntur univoce difficultates; sed forte omnes fundantur in causaciis.

Different acceptions of the word difficulty:
1. The thing itself that is difficult is called a difficulty.

2. That by which it is difficult; requiring a certain power either to be made or preserved in being, or understood; in this sense all things are difficult.

3. The perfection of one thing above another, requiring a greater display of power to produce it.

4. The tendency to tire or weaken the force that produces it.

Only the three last kinds express difficulty properly so called:
1st as requiring a cause,
2nd as implying perfection in the effect,
3rd as implying that the effect makes the cause to deteriorate.

The 3rd sort of difficulty is to be first discussed. Nothing is in this sense difficult to God or to purely natural agents, only to things that act by material movements. The same thing may be more or less difficult to different agents; it follows that there is no sense to the word "difficult" unless we determine the agent.

It follows also that the magnitude of the difficulty is in direct ratio to the deterioration or fatigue caused by it.

Also that it cannot increase infinitely, since that would totally destroy the agent that is to overcome it.

Conclusions.
1. If it be asked how difficult it is to carry a bean, we must, to answer, first know, who carries it, how long, and in what way.

2. But speed or slowness makes no difference; and the carrying it for one instant or for a longer period bears the same proportion as one instant to the same given time.

3. The length of time only accidentally affects the fatigue, and consequently the difficulty;

De tercia autem fiat nobis primo sermo. Et patet quod sic loquendo nichil est deo vel aliis pure naturaliter agentibus difficile, sed mobilibus physicis que continue modo moventur, et sic sicut idem uni est bonum, et alteri est magis bonum, et 3^o non sic bonum; sic 5 eadem accio uni est difficilis, et alteri est magis difficilis, sed 3^o facient illam est ipsa non difficilis; ut de deo et homine et eius factis, faciendo idem opus. Nec est oracio perfecta qua dicitur difficultas sic magna, vel res sic difficilis, nisi explicetur illud respectu cuius 10 ultime dicitur; ut imperfecta est locutio dicere quod aliquid est simile, nisi explicetur cui est simile. Sic ergo, loquendo de difficultate, patet quod est eo maior quo maiorem penam vel maiorem fatigacionem vel debilitacionem infert, sive agenti, sive pacienti, sive 15 quolibet aliter accidentato; ut uni est magna difficultas comburendi, alteri est magna difficultas stare vel sedere, vel esse in tali loco per tantum tempus etc. Nunquam tamen crescit talis difficultas in infinitum, cum nichil B 77^a in infinitum puniri, fatigari, vel debilitari potest, sed 20 in omnibus talibus est dare maximum terminum possibilem.

Unde querenti quante difficultatis est portare fabam, querendum est econtra difficultatem cui, qualiter, et per quantum tempus; uni enim esset maior difficultas 25 et alteri minor uno modo portandi; ut velociter movendo esset maius difficultas, et alio modo portandi minor; per maius tempus portare esset maior difficultas quam conformiter portare per minus.

Ex quo 2^o patet quod velocitas vel tarditas motus 30 est impertinens tali difficultati; et difficultas instantanea, vel aliter indivisibilis, est taliter comparabilis difficultati temporanee vel aliter divisibili, sicut instans est comparabile tempori; vel continuare res 2^m puncta tantum non est simpliciter infinitum facilius quam continuare 35 ipsas 2^m lineas vel superficies; sicut nec superficies infinitum excedit lineam, nec accio corporea, actionem superficiale vel linearem.

Patet etiam quod difficultas non est eo maior quo diuturnior, quia magnitudo debilitacionis vel fatigacionis 40 accidentaliter respicit diuturnitatem; sicut nec motus

12. aliud B. 20. infinitū B. 34. otiae B.

(ut aliquid habens magnitudinem maiorem a diuturnitate vel longitudine) est eo maius quo longius, ut patet de corrupcione et de aliis multis. Tempus tamen et linea, cum sibi similibus, sunt eo maiora quo longiora. Pena ergo eterna non erit infinitum magna, sicut nec gaudium eternum sibi oppositum; sed videndum est quantum bonum ponit vel privat, et penes hoc mensuretur eius magnitudo. Dampnatus tamen semper fatigatur et debilitatur, semper fit fatigatus et debilis, etsi non successive 10 desperdat potentiam.

Patet 4º quod non penes proporcionalem deperdicionem potencie attenditur difficultas, quia tunc omne deperdens potentiam in agendo usque ad non gradum infinitam difficultatem faceret. Ex quo sequitur 15 quod nulla pars corporis maiorem difficultatem facit quam suum totum; et per consequens stat aliquid continue debilitari et fortificari 2º diversas partes sicut simul fit forte et debole. Non enim, si aliquid calefit, incipit esse calidum, sed satis est quod nova caliditate 20 vel intensione fiat calidum: et sic de impedimentis denominacionum que videntur contrarie. Unde patet quod forte agens facit maiorem difficultatem, que tamen est sibi insensibilis, et debilius facit sepe minorem debilitatem, que tamen est sibi sensibilis, quia equalis 25 ablacio a minori est sibi sensibilior quam a maiori.

Quinto, patet quod summa difficultas huius generis est peccare moraliter, quia patet sic: nullo modo pro aliquo bono possibili servando vel acquirendo, et per consequens pro nullo malo possibili evitando vel 30 evadendo [homo] committeret aliquod huiusmodi, unde deus offenderetur: quod non esset, nisi omne tale peccatum esset peius pene sensus; et sic de ceteris. Et maior patet ex hoc quod, si commutaret aliquid huismodi pro obtentu alterius, offenderet contra summam 35 iusticiam, sicut patet explicato; sed quilibet debet non

movement is not always greater in proportion to its length of duration; e. g. corruption; Thus neither damnation nor eternal bliss is infinite; both are to be considered according to the amount of happiness lost or gained.

4. Difficulty is not to be appreciated by the loss of power occasioned by an act, or a man would overcome an infinite difficulty by exhausting himself completely. If a man is exhausted in one part of his body, and not in the whole, it does not follow that that part has overcome a greater difficulty than the whole; so also in the case of a strong and a weak agent.

5. In this sort of difficulty, mortal sin is the greatest of all, since it should not be committed for the sake of any possible good.

The reason why mortal sin is never licit, is that God is thereby offended; and

3. corpore? 17. fort^{ri} B. 24. difficultatem before debilitatem B.
27. mōr = mortaliter? B. 30. homo deest B. 32. ē^r pro et sic de ceteris B. 33. 9mittar³ B. 34. altius B. 35. explicato (sic?) B.

3. *Corruption*, or decomposition, was counted by Aristotle as a sort of *movement*, meaning *change*. 26. *Difficultas*. We must remember that Wyclif speaks of that which, if done, tends to make the agent deteriorate. Mortal sin is in that sense a difficult thing.

as we should always choose the lesser of two evils; mortal sin is the greatest possible; and what is true for sin in general is true for individual sins.

There is also a maximum difficulty in the other two senses of the word; difficulty may be greater or less, just as the perfections of things, or the powers of causes are greater or less.

These three senses are not opposed. Most sophists only speak of difficulty as to external effects; but the word means something to be mastered; and what is more masterly than

God's preservation of the world? In the second sense, difficulty does not imply any particular effort of the agent; God, a spirit, our soul, and a material body can all produce the same given movement without any difference of effort;

taliter commutare: igitur maior vera. Et minor patet ex hoc quod semper de duobus malis minus malum est eligendum, si oportet alterum habere: in malo vero moraliter non potest esse eleccio. Sicut ergo in privativis est dare maximum genus difficultatis, sic est de esse et individuis.⁵

Et quo ad difficultatem primo modo vel 2^o modo dictam, patet ex dictis quod sicut perfeccio difficultis, vel potencia causantis ad actionem, sic difficultas ad difficultatem; et sic aliqua sunt univoce comparabiles,¹⁰ et aliisque equivoce; aliqua proporcione proprie dicta, et alia proporcione communiter dicta. Omnes autem ille difficultates sonant in bonitatem, sicut omnes priores in maliciam pene vel culpe. Nec distinguuntur illa difficultia ex opposito, cum puniri sit tribus difficultatibus¹⁵ difficile, sed non peccare moraliter. Hoc enim consequitur penam maximam 2^m genus. Communitas autem sophistarum non loquitur nisi de difficultate actionis ad extra. Certum est tamen quod tunc omne ens predicamentale est difficultas. | Nam difficultas, positive B 77^b intellecta, sonat in magisterium et subtilitatem. Sed quis dubitat magnum esse magisterium servare mundum in quantitate, bonitate, proporcione, situ, tempore, posicione, et habitu suarum parcium?

2^o patet quod 2^a difficultas non consequitur nisum²⁵ aut multitudinem potencie secundum se totalem agentis, quia contingit animam movere corpus proprium vel alienum localiter et alteracione; et parem difficultatem contingit agens corporeum facere, et deum per se, sive intelligentiam cum communi influencia. Et certum est 30 quod talia non apponunt certos nisus vel potencias. Ideo non oportet ad huiusmodi paritates difficultatem rerum productarum esse equalitatem nisum vel potenciarum. Non enim includit difficultas ista fatigacionem vel debilitacionem causantis, ita quod maior sit difficultas rem fieri a debiliori quam a potentiori. Nec

1. commutari B. 6. a^g B. 16. h^e B. 17. g^{'o} B. 18. e^s B.

19. 20. p^le B. 21. m^{grm} B. 22. m^{grm} B.

21. m^{grm}. This form occurs three times; *magisterium* does not agree well with the sense each time; but I can find no similar word that is on the whole preferable.

includit ista 2^a difficultas generaliter paritatem prime difficultatis in gradu, sed communiter oppositum, cum omne ens primo modo sit summe difficile.

Tercio patet quod omnem difficultatem concomitantur difficultas summa; nam si quidquid ego facio, deus conservative, ultimate, et omne opus meum facit; et hoc non posset aliquid facere preter deum. Unde patet quod infinitis modis contingit facere opus. Cum modo facere illud est facilis, et alio modo facere illud est difficilis; ut cultellum facere opus artificis, quam hominem qui dirigit; quia ipse multas difficultates coefficit quarum nullam cultellus potest facere; et per idem longe difficilior et artificialior est facienda dei. Faccio autem passiva est eadem, eque difficilis, causata ab omnibus. Aliquas autem faciencias reservat sibi deus 2^m totam speciem, ut creare, finaliter gubernari, iustificare etc. Et alias communicat creaturis, ut patet de operibus nature que sunt communia deo et nature, et alias operaciones nature malas moraliter, ut [deus 20 potest hec] facere sed non approbare, quamvis approbet bonum consequens ex illis: ut patet de blasphemia, mendacio, furto, homicidio, luxuria, et cetera. Talia enim dicitur deum velle esse permissive, approbando sua convertibilia et non illa. Unde, sicut passio aliqua 25 bene placet deo et agencia secum convertibilia non sic placent; ita econtra bene deo placet facere actionem moraliter malam, et non sic placet sibi illam actionem fieri, quoniam si genus eius placet deo, sic et convertibile sequens ex eo. Videtur ergo tantam difficultatem 30 esse movere fabam, quantumlibet tarde, sicut facere mundum; quia deum sic movere est sumimum magisterium; sed distinctione solvit.

Quarto patet quod stat idem equivoce, et univoce respectu diversorum, esse sub quibuslibet gradibus esse difficile et per consequens facile; ut idem opus est unius agenti facile et alteri difficile; et respectu unius agentis summe difficile et respectu alterius minoris potentie facilius secundum equivocationem dictam. Unde non oportet, si tante sit difficultatis quo ad potentiam 40 requisitam, quod sit simpliciter tante difficultatis. Et ita dicitur de perfectione denominacionis et multis

13. facia B. 15. aboibg B. 16. finar B. 19, 20. deus — hec deest B.
31, 32. m̄grm B.

It is clear that similibus que augentur ex denominacionibus et con-
in these
different senses, sequentibus; et acciones dei, relaciones, et multa alia
and in the same similia positiva et privativa.
sense relatively

to a different Et per ista patet aliqualiter quod est dare maximam
being, the same difficultatem quam agens sufficit agere vel causare; 5
thing may be difficult and sicut est dare maximum tempus per quod corruptibile
easy at the same time, or more sufficit durare; cum sequitur: Usque ad finem illius
and less difficult. temporis sufficit Sor durare; ergo per totum illud

There is thus a tempus sufficit durare. Sic enim durabit motus et alie
maximum to any difficulty res per tempora, ex hoc quod exclusive durabunt usque 10
that can be overcome; there is also a posset durare per tempus, et per consequens non esset
duration to all longum vel breve, nec aliquam partem posset habere.
decomposable things.

Nec dubium quin pari evidencia qua ille motus per
totum tempus *illud* durabit (demonstrando *illud* quod 15
ponitur minimum tempus per quod sufficio durare) ita
ego per totum illud tempus possum vel sufficio durare,
quia continue a principio usque ad finem possum
durare, et sic precise tamdiu possum durare quamdiu
durabit ille motus; quia tamdiu, et quandocunque erit 20
aliquid instans intrinsecum motus huius qui erit per
totum tempus.

Nec aliter posset aliquid deperdere potentiam durandi
successive, nec senescere; sicut nec aliquid posset in
proporcione rationali esse reliquo durabilius. Et sic 25
nichil haberet periodem naturalem; ut si tempus centum
annorum sit minimum per quod non possum durare,
et nunc sit medium instans, ita quod precise medium
duracionis deperdi posset, patet quod adhuc sufficio
durare per dupla instancia. | Aliter enim non esset B 78^a
homo magis durabilis quam homo, et continue successive
decresceret, quoisque fuerit minus durabilis; et cum
inde quam fuerit durabilis ut homo cum tamen dura-
ciones sunt eiusdem rationis; et tunc sine dubio deus
non posset scire in qua proporcione unum est dura- 35
bilis reliquo, nec aliquid tale posset tamdiu durare
sicut posset. Nec esset dare maximam durabilitatem
mei; et sic partes sine toto vel totis. Quamdiu ergo
erit ita quod ego sufficio vivere in instanti quod est
presens, certum est ergo quod cuiuslibet corruptibilis 40

1. dno⁹ B. 10. por B; ib. per quod non B. 21. intu'cn B.
23. a'd B. 29. pos³ B. 30. 20, fro dupla B. 33. n, pro inde.
38. ps B.

sive permanentis sive successivi quod natum est durare per tempus est signare maximum tempus per quod potest durare.

Et conformiter est dare maximam difficultatem que possunt facere quo ad diuturnitatem temporis, quo ad intensionem difficultatis per instans et quo ad minucionem difficultatis per minimum tempus compositum ex 2^{bus} instantibus. Et conformiter dicitur quod est dare maximum grave quod per totidem sufficit portare.

10 Pro quo est notandum quod *portare* est equivocum. Quandoque enim sumitur generaliter pro *sustinere* vel *conservare* cuiuscunq; effectus. Et taliter princeps dicitur portare illius onera regni et deus totum mundum. Quandoque capitur striccius pro *prohibere grave 15 a descensu*; et isto modo equus portat hominem succursando pro declino montis, quamvis aliquando sit alcior et aliquando bassior, sicut homo gradiens portat cibum. Et sic loquendo aer sufficit portare quocunque grave, quia impedire ipsum a descensu. Sed 3^o modo sumitur 20 portare pro *impedire grave ne descendat*; et hoc dupliciter, vel per se, vel cum alio ex equo concurrente, quod nec est ipsum portans nec aliquid eius. Quamvis enim ad portacionem hominis concurrat terra supportando, deus eciam gubernando partes hominis, et 25 alia iuvando; et tamen dicitur homo per se portare, quando portat cum ipsis adiutoriis sine aliquo eius concurrente ex equo; ut aere existente indifferenti, et quo- cunque alio comportante quod non est illius hominis extrinsece causa portacionis sue. Unde impertinens est 30 portacioni sue quod portans moveat localiter vel allevet pondus portatum.

Ex quo patet quod abutuntur termino qui restringunt *portare ad per se rehere per tempus*. Sic enim, iuxta principium illorum non esset possibile quicquid portare 40 nec distinguuntur *rehere* et *portare*; et per consequens

We must also admit a limit to the difficulty that can be overcome in a given time, and in the smallest possible amount of time, which is composed of two instants; also a limit to the weight that can be borne in that time. Three senses of the word to bear: The 1st(very wide) is to maintain anything whatever, even metaphorically; the 2nd is to prevent a heavy body in its fall; the 3rd is to hinder a heavy body from falling; and this last sense is again subdivided, according as the thing which bears does so by itself or by means of another.

To bear does not mean to carry, nor to lift up:

6, 7. mi^o, B. 11. gnalit^r B. 13. 1^o pro illius B. 24. et cetera pro eciam B.

3. *Durare*. The whole of the preceding paragraph, especially from *Aliter* to *Certum est* is not easy to understand, for me at least. I have a note on the transcript that it is not very illegible; so perhaps the text is corrupt. But I cannot see why Wyclif strives to prove at such length that all things have a limit of duration, nor how his arguments prove it.

if we restrained its meaning to movement in time, a column would no longer bear up a building.

Thus a weaker column et cetera quiescencia nichil portant, cum quietum may bear a stronger one; escant. Patet etiam quod stat in potentia portare a plank or a potencius; ut lignellum vel lapillus portat fortissimum stone may bear a strong man; hominum. Ymmo tenuis aer interceptus inter duos so also of the air between two lapides planos in fundo castri, vel quantumlibet gravis stones at the foundation of a castle. portat per se totum edificium suppositum; et sic sine dubio sufficit stappa pluma vel lana, ymmo omne corpus quod potest per se subici cuicunque gravi.

It does not follow, however, that portativum; quia unum excedit aliud quo ad sufficientem any body can bear any weight, ciām diuturne portacionis, quantum ad modum portandi, nor that all can bear equally well; for some modis portandi. Non ergo sequitur; si [A] sufficit tan- longer time, and thus their mode of bearing is more perfect. tamen B excedit A in aliquo modo portandi, non ut

Besides, the way of application of the weight makes much difference; a straight perpendicular rod can stand under any weight without bending, because there is no reason for it to bend on one side rather than another.

This is seen in the sails of ships, in pressing an egg lengthwise, and in experiments with a balance. The least weight that a man can bear for a given time is identical with the greatest weight that he can bear for the same time; so here again we find a

Ymmo, signato minimo ponderoso | quod non sufficit portare per tempus, sed per instans, iuxta ad versarium, ex hoc tam contingit eum levefieri, vel plus debilitatur ex eius portacione. Se- 35

13. A deest B. 16. est pro ut B. 19. g^officieie B. 21. fig^m B.
26. artuaⁿ B. 26. finitis B. 27. oīm B. 29. fūget^r B. 30. et
deficiencie B. 31. elc^r B.

26. *Arcuacionis.* This sentence, of which I can make nothing, is the exact reading of the MS.

per tempus. Et ita undique tenenda est pars affirmativa, iuxta regulam Aristotelis. Et si argumentatur quod est dare gravissimum portable, cum spera terre non est portable et non est dare eius maximam partem quantitatивam, dicitur quod deus portat terram, primo modo loquendo, sicut et mundum qui est maximum portable; sed aliis modis loquendo non portatur, sicut nec celum, eo quod terra non potest esse inferius, nec celum esse grave. Et portacio ^{2bus} posterioribus modis dicta includit violenciam tam ex parte portantis quam ex parte portati. Unde, sicut inclinacio ferri ad deorsum suspenditur per attracionem adamantis, sic et naturalia, terra, et quelibet eius pars caret nisu ad inferius. Sicut ergo aqua constituta cum spera totali non est gravescens, sicut patet expertis subversis in aquis, ita credo esse de partibus spere terre. Et si obicitur quod partes spere terre violente cadunt ad puteos perpetua violencia, et per consequens habent inclinacionem ad esse inferius, et ita ad omnem punctum elementi esset perpetuo violencia, cum cuiuslibet partis terre violentatur aliqua pars: dicitur quod haberet in tali casu appetitum descendendi pro ordinando aere inclusu in puteo supra terram, sicut aque pro illo fine descendant ad quantumlibet ynum locum. Existente autem corpore naturaliter locato in illo situ, non sic appeteret. Ideo talia inanimata, pro universi ordine servando, mirabiliter mutant appetitus suos ex regimine et inclinacione prime nature portantis omnes partes mundi in suis sitibus.

Est ergo dare maximum portable, sive sit lapis, sive terra, sive aggregatum ex talibus gravibus; et valde modice potens sufficit illud portare cum iuvamine virtutis regitive universi, a qua orbis terre movetur, motus localiter, etsi pars terre levefiat vel auferatur. Nec est verum quod spera terre moveatur circulariter vel recte propter partes exalatas a sole, et ipso facto conteratur; quia vel circumdatur virtute regente et supplente per aliquid intrinsecus ad oppositum, vel proporcionando unum orbem terre pure in medio mundi, cui tanquam fixo et immobili innitatur, tota terra, sicut omne motum, innititur fixo; et sic partes circumferenciales terre

maximum, since our opponents admit there is a minimum of weight that can be borne for one instant. If it is said that no one can bear the globe, and that there being no maximum to a part of the globe, there is no maximum of bearable weight; we answer that God bears it up in the first sense of the word, and that in the other senses, neither the earth nor the sky can be borne, since the former cannot fall lower than it is, and the sky has no weight.

As divers tell us, water has no weight in its own sphere; soitis, I believe, with the parts of the earth.

We, therefore, must admit a maximum of weight, which can be borne by a small power with the aid of the Divine influence, that governs our globe.

The earth moves neither circularly nor in a straight line;

12. alteracionem (:) B. 14. qstn^{ta} B; ib. ^Noli B. 10. qte^{ti} B. 28. finib⁹; ti very illegible B. 32. movet B. 35. qte^{ar} B. 36. vel quia B.

its central parts stat tremere et alterari propter suam porositatem, non
are fixed, and autem illud purum. Nec est vis, sive idem numero sit
the exterior parts, which eternum, sive idem in specie, corruptis individuis. Et
may move and tremble, rest quamvis sit mobile naturalitate prima, tamen naturali-
upon them. state 2^a repugnat legi eterne quod moveatur. 5

IV. Every thing has a limit both as to possible magnitude and species corporum et qualitatum corporearum sit di-
littleness.

Ad 4^m respondet negando assumptum, cum cuilibet distincta magnitudo usque ad quam inclusive potest integrum esse magnum, et parvitas usque ad quam potest tale per se existens esse parvum; et illa vocantur apud 10 philosophos minima et maxima naturalia, non quod continue sunt in tali specie, sed quod sic per se existencia in tali specie. Infinitum namque modicum homogeneum creditur esse inexistens parcialiter suo toti in

Proof: Nature proceeds with order in all her works; this implies a definite relation between each individual and its possible size.

Not to admit order in nature is to deny God's existence, which is one of the first principles of *a priori* cognition.

As the whole world, composed of all its parts, cannot be made greater, so each of its parts must have a definite and certain size.

Order must prevail in the world as in the human body:

13. rime' B. 1. nate' B. 7. 8. dtstta B. 12. q pro quod B.
16. philosophorum (e) B. 20. non deest. 24. in in B. 28. gg'o' B.

centro, aut quadrangularis figure, protensus ab uno polo ad alium, vel quodlibet astrum tantum sicut orbis, vel totus mundus esset lucidus sicut astrum. Ideo non dubium quin natura ordinat pro partibus maioris mundi, quoad numerum suarum parcium, quoad appetitus mundi vel pondera tendendi ad certos fines, ut locaciones et naturales acciones, et quoad instantias in quantitate, figura, potencia, et ceteris accidentibus, non solum pro sempiternalibus aut incorruptibilibus, sed pro naturalibus, pro terre nascentibus et suis seminibus, pro animalibus, et breviter universis conservatis quoad singula corporum accidencia naturalia.

Nec valet dicere quod iste terminantur exclusive ad suos terminos, quia nichil potest terminari ad terminum quem non potest attingere. De terminis autem corporum naturalium aliqui possunt sensu et experientia convinci, ut termini corporum eterogeniorum et seminum. Sed aliorum parvitates excedunt sensus et experiencias, ut parvitates lapidum, mineralium, elementorum, et talium simplicium. Certum tamen est quod est dare cuiuscunque talis speciei simpliciter minimum quod potest per se existere.

Contra hoc tamen argumentatur. Primo sequitur quod sit generacio subita, sicut et corruptio subita minimi numeralis; et sic, tam subita generacio quam subita corruptio cuiuscunque generis accidentis; quod est contra rationem proporcionis agentis ad passum. Racio satis patet ex hoc quod ignis, applicatus passo carente igne, subito inciperet inducere minimum naturale. Et sic ex minori proporcione velocius ageret.

Similiter, tale minimum non esset alicuius potencie active vel passive per se, cum quodlibet contrarium superdurans subito corrumperet ipsum, et per consequens cum ipsum non posset pati, non posset naturaliter agere. Cum tamen tam perfecta sint minora sicut maiora eiusdem speciei, ymmo perfectissima sunt non quante; quomodo ergo derogaret perfeccio proporcionum mundi ad eius partes? quia quantumlibet perfectum foret simplex aggregatum cum aliis, tamen tantum figuratum constitueret, sicut contingit de arena.

Similiter, capto igne duplo ad minimum naturale per se existens, videtur quod contrarium subito ipsum

and if so, no doubt this order extends to everything, and consequently to the accident of quantity, both in things incorruptible and corruptible, inanimate and animated.

It is ridiculous to say that these limits are never reached; a limit that is never reached is not a limit. In some cases we see that in fact this limit is reached; in others, as in stones and minerals &c., the smallness of their parts exceeds our powers of sense.

Arguments to the contrary.

1. If there is a minimum of size, we must also admit instantaneous combination and decomposition, which is impossible.

2. There would be a want of unity and stability in all bodies composed of such parts, since every thing possessed of a contrary activity would destroy the compound, and the whole body would be a mere aggregate, like a heap of sand.

3. If two bodies of different sorts are mixed in

unequal quantities, the greater quantity will meet with no resistance at all from the smaller. corrumperet, quia non posset inducere de contrario per se, nisi par minimo igni, ad cuius inductionem sequitur minimi ignis corruptio. Et ultra, cum accio contrariabitur propter facilitatem, ex inductione talis minimi sequitur quod subito corrumperetur totus ignis: 5 et per idem quantumlibet magnum simplex, cum continue post erit agens melius dispositum ad agendum, et subiectum ita capax sicut in principio fuit. Ymmo tunc infinitum facile esset corrumpere totaliter tale simplex, cum per divisionem in minima naturalia subite 10 cederet in continuis, et per consequens motus in nullo consequitur proporcionem.

Answers. 1. We admit the possibility of instantaneous combination and decomposition in these cases but it would take place according as circumstances allowed, just as a full bottle empties itself only when the air penetrates.

Ad primum dicitur quod minimum naturale est subito generabile et subito corruptibile, ut assumitur; et sic de accidentibus ipsum consequentibus. Nec sunt 15 tales minores partes motus successivi; sed termini motuum successivorum. Non desunt illis motibus proportiones ex quibus causantur; aliter agunt cum quibusdam circumstanciis et aliter cum aliis, propter motum et ordinem universitatis servandum: ut, plano existente 20 inmediate plano, natura non sinit unum elevari a reliquo, nisi tali modo quo corpus potest subingredi pro pleno servando. Sicut nec liquor exit fialas vel alia vasa, orificiis eorum subversis, [nisi aliunde aer posset B79^b subingredi, supplendo locum liquidi exeuntis. Et sic de 25 multis exemplis naturalibus in quibus certum est naturaliter occulte facere talia, vel per se, vel supplendo sufficienciam agentis sensibilis. Et alia est proporcio cum talibus paribus. Alia autem erit cum aliis paribus proporcio.

30

Ad 2^m negandum, cum tale potest esse minimum per se possibile in quantitate et non in virtute; quod si

2. eius B. 11. gtiis B. 32. v^{te} B.

19. *Circumstanciis.* I can very doubtful as to Wyclif's meaning, but it is perhaps this: Each movement of combination or of decomposition of two atoms (minimum naturale) must be instantaneous, but as a vacuum is impossible (*pro pleno servando*) such movements can take place only when other atoms are so situated as to fill up the vacant space which their movement occasions, and thus the combination or decomposition of the *whole* must take place in time. Wyclif two pages later (p. 166, l. 32) distinctly uses the term *atoms*, which are probably identical with his bodies that occupy *only two points in space*, as we shall see towards the end of *Logica*.

utraque insit alicui corporis, tunc ipsum est minime potencie per se possibilis, et talia minima iuxta potentiam, 2^m proporcionem debitam constitueret maximum, cuius forma superaddita servaret illa minima in tempore et operacione. Nec est verum quod inanimata omogenia minora sunt tam perfecta sicut maiora eiusdem speciei; eo quod non solum perfeccio accidentalis, sed essencialis perfeccio componitur ex suis partibus integralibus. Omne tamen individuum alicuius speciei 10 habet perfeccionem debillimam speciei ad minimum; sed unum in perfeccione individua maiori, et aliud in perfeccione individua minori, 2^m quod contingit universitati. Ideo, ex dacione perfeccionis specificae, implicatur minimum naturale. Nec obest quod perfectissima sunt 15 non quanta, quia illud quod est perfeccionis in uno foret imperfeccionis in alio; ut habere magnos oculos est in equo bonum signum perfeccionis, in homine vero signum stoliditatis. Indivisibilitas ergo est simpliciter prestancior divisibilitate, sed non potest competere 20 corporalibus; ideo non sequitur quod essent perfecciora vel eque perfecta propioribus divisibilitati. Ymmo, cum deo sit quodammodo cura de omnibus, ut dicit commentator, non sineret tam modicum corpus per se esse quod ipsum non sufficeret in operacionem, nec servaret 25 per successionem debitam speciei. Utrum autem simpli- citer non quanta de corporibus homogeniis possunt integrare mixtum, et sic per se esse sine inmediacione corporum speciei sue, est dubium. Sed de arena, de 30 partibus metalli calcinatis, de carnibus, et aliis mixtis ceteris, patet quod sunt quantitative divisibiles, cum aliter non servarent formam mixti. De elementis vero in mixtis est credibile quod multa non quanta sunt coniuncta. Certum tamen est quod continuacio vel adnascencia talium in mixtis est de perfeccione universi, 35 eo quod inordinacio esset, si omnia mixta essent cathe- nata, eciam minima naturalia non adnata.

Ad 3^m dicitur quod non sequitur; sed posito igne 3. In the given case, i. e. fire duplo ad minimum, tam quantitate quam virtute, applied to a subducta sensibili conservacione, contingeret ipsum minimum of quantity, the 40 corrumphi subito. Ideo de elementis non sunt minima fire itself would go out.

4. 5. $\widehat{\text{te}}\widehat{\text{ce}}\widehat{\text{oe}}$? pro tempore B. 18. scollit^{is} B. 21. ppiorib^g B
34. aduasc^Y B 36. ec^e B.

And for that naturalia nec solum dupla ad minima, nisi in mixtis, reason there are no such minima ubi conservantur ex armonia commixtorum. Nec est in the elements, difficile nature, gracia mixti producendi, subito producere quotlibet minima naturalia in medio contrario, sicut contingit distanter infra terram et aquam et ignem et aerem a celestibus generari ad mixti constitutionem. Nec sequitur quod continueabitur subita elementi produccio, quia deficiet proporcio recta, gracia cuius sic fieret. Conceditur tamen quod per divisionem contingit mixtum celerius consumi, sicut noverunt Alchimiste, calcinantes metalla imperfecta, et postmodum per mediantes, disponentes calcinata, purgata, et coagulata, ad formas perfecciores. Verumptamen sic dividere per ignem est laboriosum; nec scit artifex per sublimacionem dividere talia omogenia in minima naturalia, cum excedunt iudicium sensus. Ideo errant artifices in istis operibus; quod si perficiunt est prope casuale, cum execucio practica huius sciencie deficit propter materie subtilitatem.

This, however, is great labour and does not reduce the metals to their smallest parts; for that reason, if they succeed, it is by chance.

Thus bodies that form a continuous whole vary both as to continuity and as to the forms that make them so; first the forms of the elements, then the superadded forms of the compound, and so on; but each form is extended through a number of its subjects sufficient to make up the whole; as e. g. if a stone requires 1000 elementary parts, the form is diffused through all.

So of plants and animals, one form of plant or of animal

Ex quo patet quod sunt multi gradus in continuacionibus corporum, et formarum quibus fiunt continuaciones; et simplicia sunt fortissime continuata, et post gradatim modis suis extenduntur forme mixte, secundum quod sunt propiora elementis. Nulla tamen forma superaddita extenditur per subiectum par vel minus subiectum quam sufficit corpus illius speciei per se esse; ut si ad esse lapidis requiritur adnascencia mille non quantarum de elementis, tunc quotquot sunt tales millenarii debite proportionati, sive continuitates, sive non continuitates, tot precise sunt forme lapidum et per consequens lapides. Et sic, notatis numero et modo athomorum requisitorum ad esse causans plante arboris vel cuiuscunque alterius mixti, tot sunt forme et individua quo sunt tales numeri; et ad omnem punctum talis numeri est causa, forma indivisibilis, multiplicata. Ideo differt extensio forme superaddite cuius pars indivisibilis est multiplicata, et extensio forme elementaris cuius pars indivisibilis est punctualiter situata. Et in prima specie sunt multi gradus; ut patet de mixtis inanimatis, de plantis, et anulosis, quorum forme extenduntur modis suis. Nec est omne continuum

divisibile in infinitum, cum sit status ad numerum indivisibilium, ut postea dicetur. Verum tamen ultra hoc quod nos sufficiimus cognoscere est quodlibet tale divisibile; ideo ponitur tale mixtum omogeneum, cum nulla pars eius quantitativa sensibilis sit disparis speciei a toto. Manifestum tamen est eterogeneum, cuius una pars quantitativa est ignis, alia aeris. Unde non infinitum est parvum tale mixtum, sed ad omnem eius punctum quelibet species elementi, sine earum extensione vel continuacione, ut alias dicetur. Sed, si fuerit aliquod individuum per se quantumlibet magnum, et non habuerit multas partes non communicantes, quarum quelibet componitur ex atomis sufficientibus 2^m numerum et modum principiandi tale individuum, 15 tunc forma illius est multiplicata per totum, sicut est de hominibus et bestiis que requirunt membra simplicia, et componi in debita qualitate, quantitate et proporcione; et ex nulla tali forma cum parte sui corporis componitur adequate aliquod unum, vel qualitative; quia sic quilibet homo foret quodlibet eius pars, sicut communiter tangitur de Sor. Anima tamen inest, continue actuabit illam, sed diversimode cum fuerit pars materie, et cum fuerit completa materia ex qua adequate fiet totum animal. Si ergo tales due materie 25 non communicantes adunatae, tunc sunt duo animalia, sicut patet de monstro habente duo corda et duo capita, cum aliis membris sensibilibus duplicatis, et cum toto residuo inferiorum membrorum ac si esset unici animalis. Tale autem aggregatum esset duo animalia communicancia et non per se individuum alicuius speciei; sed esset unum, continuum, animatum, vivum etc. et tamen nec substancia nec accidens etc.

Redeundo ergo ad propositum, conceditur quod maximus homo possibilis non posset augeri per assimilacionem alimenti, stante habita materia. Sed contineret ipsum tumefieri 2^m partes, sine eius maioritate; quia magnitudo corporis attenditur penes multitudinem suarum specificarum parcium non quantitivarum. Unde non sequitur ipsum maiorari, si pars eius maioraretur; 40 nec haberet minimus homo possibilis partes superfluas. Nec est inconveniens, sed verum, quod est dare tam

lite is multiplied in each atom. Each elementary form occupies only one point: each superadded one is diffused through many. In the lower beings, stones, plants, and annelida, the superadded forms are also to some degree extended. No continuous being is infinitely divisible, but far beyond all we can conceive. The forms of men and of the higher animals require all their organs to be properly disposed; and thus these forms belong indeed to each part, but only partly, and not in the same way as to the whole body.

As for monsters with double organs joined together, they are simply two animals and not one individual of any species, having no one common form. To return to the question: the biggest of all possible men could not become bigger by assimilating any food, so long as his body remained that maximum of size. But a part of his body might swell up, provided it was not a specific part.

There is a first primum quam ultimum instans esse hominis. Nec foret
and a last instant of talis homo infinitum debilis, cum posset tam agere
man's being; he would not then be gradu disposicionis materie actuare materiam in quam
infinitely weak, though his soul est inducta, quam potest noviter induci. | Nec ideo desi- B 80^b
might actuate his body less intensely.
incepionis sue materie. Nec foret materia incipiens indispositionem in tali gradu disposicionis in quali
immediate ante hoc fuit.

V. The assumption of the fifth objection is false; the blessed will enjoy Heaven to the utmost of their capacity. Grosseteste says that they will know all things. The soul has a natural disposition to know all truth, whether complex relations or simple facts.

But the intellectual habit, or actual exercise of this faculty is required, in order to know.

And it actual knowledge is acquired by contemplation without labour, it is called *knowledge in the Word*, and implies that the soul, tending towards God, is enlightened by him.

It may, however, be denied that the soul has a separate

Ad 5^{am} obiectionem dicitur quod assumptum est falsum, cum beati habebunt habitus 2^m ultima suarum capacitatum. Et 2^m Lincolnensem, quilibet talis cognoscet omnia, cum anima eius non fuerit mole corporis prepedita nec aliunde accidente extraneo occupata, sed primo lumine 2^m ultimum irradiata. Nec est hoc in-¹⁵ credibilis quam quod unum punctuale lucis diffundat infinitas lineas radiosas, manifestando distincte omnia que prius confuse videbantur in humine radioso. Anima ergo habet in se naturalem disposicionem ad cognoscendum quamcunque veritatem sue noticie possibilem.²⁰ Et illam disposicionem, habilitatem, proritatem, vel potentiam naturalem ad complexe comprehendendum, vocant habitum aut scienciam innatam; sicut proritatem naturalem ad incomplexe comprehendendum vocant speciem innatam vel noticiam innatam. Sed ad actua-²⁵ liter et distincte noscendum veritatem requiritur naturalis exercitacio; et disposicio ab illa adquisita vocatur habitus intellectualis, ut habitus, sciencia intelligibilis, ars vel prudencia. Et correspondenter dicendum est de speciebus aquisitis, respectu apprehensionis incomplexe.³⁰ Quod si quis, contemplando veritatem primam secundum omnes raciones suas causandi cognoverit sine proprio labore singulas alias veritates, tunc vocatur illa noticia apud theologos noticia in verbo, noticia matutina vel meridiana, noticia facialis vel intuitiva clara.³⁵ Et illa non est res absoluta, sed ponit animam non extranea impeditam, tendendo in deum, inclinari ab ipso ad taliter clare noscendum huiusmodi veritates.

Utrum autem anima habeat tot habitus correspondentes, dubitatur a multis. Et videtur quod non, tum⁴⁰ quia tunc infinitum perficeretur per infinitos habitus,

14. ^{Pre}pedita B; *ib. ut pro* nec B.

35. *Facialis*. Face to face. "Now we see as in a glass, darkly."

tum quia obiectum primum sufficit ad illam noticiam actualem, sine habitu inclinante. Videtur tamen michi quod ex illis fortibus impressionibus causantur 2^m ultimum tam species quam habitus, quorum primum inclinat ad apprehensionem incomplexam, et 2^m ad complexam; sic quod anima per impossibile impedita ab impressione felici, adhuc posset recolere de actibus preteritis et per consequens de veritatibus obiectis illis actibus. Et pronitatem derelictam voco speciem vel 10 habitum; quia, cum anima nunquam ociabitur a talibus actibus, ideo communiter ponitur quod non intelligeret in habitu. Omnes ergo huiusmodi actualem apprehensionem consequitur vel precedit disposicio vel habitus inclinans ad talem actum, et per consequens species. 15 Actus autem est prius causacione quam species vel habitus ab illo generatus; sed habitus est prius quo ad consequenciam, et talis habitus intellectivus vocatur apud theologos lumen glorie; et habitus voluntatis vocatur caritas. Nec potest deus sine talibus beatificare 20 hominem, sicut nec potest sine actu.

B 81^a

Unde frivoli sunt casus, quibus ponitur deum supplerent vicem speciei vel habitus sine posicione talium, quia claudit contradiccionem quod sic faciat. Sed magis frivolum est credere quod talia possunt per se esse, 25 sicut aliqui arguunt de disposicione, causata in corpore circumducto. Nec sequitur deum correspondenter qualificari, quia non potest aswefaccione disponi. Nec sequitur quod anima sit in infinitum perfecta accidentaliter propter infinitatem talium accidencium, sicut nec subiectum | est infinitum perfectum propter infinitos modos et infinitas relaciones, vel talia accidencia; nec est subiectum proporcionaliter perfectius, ut plures tales qualitates habet, sicut infinite partes subiecti perficiunt ipsum omnes equaliter: et tamen ex illis resultat una perfectione finita, sicut deus scit ex quot partibus tale componitur.

Alia ergo est perfectione essencialis quam claudit contradictionem augeri vel minui, quia, si posset, esset accidentalis et non essencialis subiecto; et alia est perfectione accidentalis, sive ex substanciali sive ex accidentibus resultans; et sicut deus scit numerum principium talium, ita scit gradum perfectionis et quanto unus numerus dictus a nobis infinitus excedit alium

disposition for each object of cognition: these being infinite, the dispositions would be so too.

Possibly the powerful impression of God's being causes both the images and the dispositions towards them; so that if the Saints could be without the actual sight of God, they would still enjoy its remembrance. This tendency taken by itself,

I call the cognitive image or disposition. It is the light of glory in the intelligence and charity in the will; both are necessary.

It would be self-contradictory to suppose cases in which God dispenses with these dispositions; or to fancy that they can exist by themselves.

It does not follow that the soul is accidentally infinite; a substance may be qualified by infinite modes without being infinite on that account.

There are two sorts of perfection: one essential, that can in no wise increase or diminish; the other accidental, resulting from

different causes, numerum finitum nobis vel infinitum. Et per consequens of which God knows the number, and the degree of perfection they give.
 No being is infinitely perfect in the sense of good, God alone is infinitely perfect.

Though the blessed in Heaven may have infinitely more both of knowledge and of happiness, they are not infinitely more perfect than we.

Two senses to A exceeds B infinitely; one, as the number of points in a surface and in a line, i. e. infinitely to us, but absolutely capable of equality; the other implies no equality possible.

Thus, though a being is twice as perfect in science (or any accident) as another, we cannot conclude that it is twice as perfect simply.

different causes, numerum finitum nobis vel infinitum. Et per consequens of which God scit quante beatus est accidentaliter perfeccior non beato. Nichil enim est infinite perfectum, nisi forte intelligatur ille terminus *perfectum* nominaliter pro bono et non participialiter pro plene perfecto. Sic autem deus dicitur infinite perfectus, hoc est, bonus. Et ex istis patet quod impossibile est aliquid esse in proporcione rationali perfeccius quam prius; quia vel oporteret perfeccionem essentiale crescere, vel perfeccionem accidentalem parificari perfeccioni essenciali; quorum utrumque est impossibile. Nec sequitur: *Sor beatus est infinitum perfeccior accidentaliter quam Plato est accidentaliter: ergo, Sor, est infinitum accidentaliter perfectus.* Sicut non sequitur: *virtus est infinitum melior dominio coactivo: ergo, illa virtus est infinitum bona.* Quando- cunque ergo dicitur substanciam esse ita perfectam, intelligitur de totali perfeccione aggregata ex substanciali et accidentalili; et ita de perfeccione accidentalali vel perfeccione generis accidentis, semper intelligitur de totali huiusmodi perfeccione. Et hinc non sequitur quod ultimate felices sunt infinitum perfecciores nobis, quamvis infinitum perfeccius cognoscunt et delectantur quam nos.

Nota tamen quod aliud dicitur infinitum excedere aliud quoad nos, aliquando cum aliqua deo finita parificarent unum alteri; ut patet de numero punctorum superficie, et numero punctorum linee. Et aliqua non sic; ut comparando virtutes fortitudini, felicitatem delectacioni sensuali, noticiam intellectivam sensacioni; et sic de aliis. Unde non sequitur: *A est in duplo perfeccius accidentaliter quam B: ergo est in duplo perfeccius B.* Nec sequitur: *A est in duplo perfeccius quo ad scienciam, vel aliud genus accidentis, quam B; ergo, A est in duplo perfeccius quam B;* quia non est possibile subiectum esse tam perfectum accidentaliter quam perfectum est simpliciter, aut econtra. Nec sequitur: *ille due intellections perficiunt in duplo plus subiectum quam faceret altera illarum per se: ergo, subiectum per illas est in duplo perfeccius quam fuit, quando solim unam habuit.* Sed bene sequitur quod in duplo perfeccius intelligit et est in duplo perfeccius intelligens per illas quam per alteram solam intellexit.

Sunt autem multa dubia contingencia hanc materiam; utputa si una sit perfeccio composita ex accidentalis et essenciali, aut una accidentalis perfeccio composita ex perfeccionibus diversorum generum aut diversarum species cierum. Et videtur quod sic, quia aliter nichil possit crescere in perfeccione. Vel aliter; substancia posset esse perfeccior quam prius fuit, sine hoc quod habeat maiorem perfeccionem quam prius habuit. Ideo videtur esse una perfeccio unitate aggregacionis vel unitate subiecti; et illa crescit per adventum accidentalis perfeccionis, salva perfeccione priori.

Several minor points.

1. There is one single perfection consisting of accident and substance, and one likewise consisting of the different sorts of accident.

2. Every accident renders its subject more perfect; for every sin makes the sinner suffer, thus rendering the universe more perfect;

3. accident gives a real quidditative perfection; if not, bodies would have very little perfection indeed. Quantity helps towards perfecting substance, as it helps in dragging a ship; and every accident aids in so far as it is perfect itself.

B 81^b 3º. Videtur quod omne accidens perficit subiectum, quia privaciones, ut peccata morum et nature, faciunt substancialm iuste pati. Et in hoc, pulcrificant universum, et per idem imperfeccio perficit subiectum efficienter et non formaliter, cum solum perfeccio perficit subiectum formaliter. |
25 3º. Videtur quod omne accidens subiecti facit ipsum tam perfectum sicut aliquid; quia aliter esset quelibet substancia corporea infinitum modice perfecta et per consequens quelibet eius perfecta cuilibet. Nec aliud posset esse minus perfectum quam est, et per idem omne quantum esset infinitum parvum vel remissum. Sicut ergo musca contrahit navem, sic quantitas perficit subiectum ad gradum totalis perfeccionis. Sed 30 precise tante perficit quam perfectum accidens ipsum est, loquendo de perfeccione quam ipsum per se facit, et non de perfeccione quam ipsum conficit. Unde non sequitur; *sub illo gradu accidens perficit subiectum: ergo, sub illo gradu subiectum perficitur*, cum aliud sit perficere et aliud perfici. Et ad antiquas reduplicativas quibus solet concedi quod subiectum, *ut quantum*, est sic perfectum, et, *ut sciens*, est perfeccius. dicendum quod intelligende sunt de quantitate et sciencia quod ille sunt sic perfecte, et illa perfeccio attribuitur subiecto; 35 quia nullam aliam essenciam ponit tale accidens.

Nota tamen quod aliquod dicitur per se, excludendo actualem inherenciam, et aliud, excludendo parcialel inexistenciam; quomodo completa accidentia sunt per se, cum non sunt partes aliquorum sue speciei. Unde

Remark that by itself may either mean the negation of 'in another', or of 'part of another'.

19. aliquod B. 23. musca B; *ib.* nāne B.

37, 38. *Inherenciam . . . parcialem inexistenciam*. The former word is used by Scholastics to denote an accident as distinguished from a substance; the latter to denote a part as different from its whole.

The whole of a nota quod dupliciter dicitur bonitas reliqua maior; vel given accident is in the latter quia sic perfectum per se habet bonitatem cui reliquum sense by itself. Again, a thing non habet per se parem vel excedentem; et illo modo quelibet substancia infinitum excedet quodlibet accidens in perfectione; 2º modo dicitur unum participativa 5 reliquo perfeccius; et illo modo virtutes, et felicitates, et multa alia accidencia, nedum excederent substancias inanimatas et vegetabilia et irrationabilia, sed homines; ut perfeccius et melius est hominem esse virtuosum vel felicem (quod est virtus vel felicitas) quam est 10 habere quotlibet divicias; ymmo quam est hominem esse absolute, cum preexigit esse hominem, et superaddit finem eius perfectum. Ista autem perfeccio vocatur participativa vel relativa, quia nichil valeret nisi, communicando cum perfeccione substancie, supperadderet 15 bonum modum, qui non potest per se esse, nec uniri vel parificari perfeccioni per se. Sed quantitas et alia accidencia corporea non sunt sic perfecta, quia tunc subiectum, ex hoc quod sic quantum vel accidentatum, esset sic perfectum; et per consequens omne sic acci- 20 dentatum est sic perfectum. Omnis ergo essencialis perfeccio accidentis est per accidentalem perfeccionem substancie, vel pars talis perfeccionis.

Thus it may be maintained that a blessed soul has at the same time infinite acts, relative to the infinite objects it knows, all clearly seen in the First Sight. Even now the fact of sight proves that we have an infinite multitude of acts: we do not, it is true, see all distinctly; but

God can strengthen our mental vision.

All other visions merely follow upon the sight of God.

Unde videtur michi probabile quod aliquis ultimate felix habeat infinitos actus, terminatos ad veritates 25 cognitas, qui omnes causantur et clarificantur a prima luce, in qua felix clare videt omnia que ego uno actu transeunte confuse. Possibile enim est animam simul habere infinitos actus; ut patet ex intuacione visibilis; et quamvis nunc non sufficio in tot obiecta simul di- 30 stincte tendere, facile tamen est illi luci prime disponere animam meam ut distincte in tot tendat. Et tunc in ipsa et per ipsam viderem omnia, et ab ipsa terminari omnis talis visio mea; sed non obiective ad ipsam, cum idem sit obiectum sic terminare visionem, 35 et illud obiectum esse illa visione visum. Ad visionem ergo felicem qua videtur deus terminans illam obiective consequuntur omnes alie visiones quas et ipse terminat ad obiecta visa. Visiones vero in proprio genere possunt excidere, stante felicitate, | per desinacione veritatum in- B 82* tuitarum, et non aliter, sic quod anima langueat desiderando videre ignotum; et per consequens non esset

plene felix. Ideo ponitur beatitudo essencialiter consistere in visione et amore summe boni; et alie visiones vel alia bona contingencia ponuntur ipsam concomitari accidentaliter, que vocantur quandoque beatitudines accidentales, intensibiles et remissibiles. Quotquot ergo veritates beatus voluerit recolere, tot promptitantes vel habitus habet quot sunt ad prompte cognoscendum illas veritates; et, cum omnem veritatem potest cognoscere, sicut et homo hic, verisimiliter omnem veritatem distincte cognoscit in actu vel habitu; ut cognoscendo deum clare sub ratione qua creatus est A rei, cognosco causabilitatem A rei, et A rem, tam in verbo quam in ratione ydeal. Et sic, quotquot cogniciones consecuntur cognitionem claram dei, quam non stat esse sine illis, nec illas sine illa, cum noticia dei et eius passionum de necessitate inducit in noticias ydearum et exemplatorum.

Utrum autem oportet felices omnes sic habere tot actus, ego ignoro, sed credo me scire quod omnes sic felices necessario clare intuuntur deum, et tot alias veritates quot desiderant videre, sive uno actu sive distinctis actibus, et quot erunt gradus capacitatum animarum, sicut et claritatum noticiarum, quibus omnia erunt cognita. Ideo non sequitur: *A perfecte et clare cognoscit omnia: ergo, ita perfecte sicut deus.* Nec sequitur: *ista sunt individua eiusdem speciei: ergo eque capacia et eque activa.* Sed ille qui limitavit animas ad diversimode appetendum uniri corporibus, et ordinavit substancias individuales multiplicatas diversarum specierum de facili potest ordinare animas eiusdem speciei diversarum capacitatum. Et forte homo, discendo et amando deum, potest augere capacitatem suam, sed non obedientiam potentiam recipiendi felicitatem. Semper tamen est dare maximum ad quod terminatur, sive universale sive singulare, in quacunque denominacione. Unde felix taliter sciens omnia nichil disceret, sicut nec aliquid ignoraret, cum ad generacionem veritatis desineret scire eius futuricionem, et inciperet scire eius esse vel pretericionem; et ita semper, si homo incipiat scire unum, desinit scire reliquum, et econtra; vel si remissem, beatus multa ignorat que sunt impertinencia ad sui beatitudinem, ut patet de conclusionibus doctrinalibus et peccaminosis operationibus, tunc non desinat

The blessed can lose sight of a truth only in so far as that truth itself ceases to be, otherwise they would desire it and not be fully happy.

The essence of beatitude is the sight of God; all the rest is accidental, and may be greater or less.

The clear cognition of God in all His relations probably implies the distinct sight of all in Him.

Whether it be so as a fact, I know not, but only that the blessed see God, and in Him all that they can desire to see.

Knowledge of all would, therefore, make a man as

perfect as God.

God can easily give different degrees of capacity to different souls. Man can also perhaps increase his capacity up to a certain point; but that point is the maximum.

The blessed thus, if ignorant of anything, are yet perfectly happy.

However, this illa cognoscere, et potest tantum discere quod vel igno-
 secondary
 knowledge may
 proceed not
 from the
 sight of God,
 but from
 previously
 known truths:
 and such may
 also be the
 knowledge
 of the blessed.

ret vel si, aliqua ignorando, fuit felix, tantum sciens
 sicut potest; tunc huiusmodi aquirendo noticiam unius
 deperdit noticiam alterius. Potest tamen esse quod ad-
 quirat illam noticiam sine hoc quod deperdat reliquam,⁵
 sicut communiter sophisticantur in materia de fortitu-
 dine solius mulieris derelicta de specie humana impre-
 gnate. Semper ergo felix habet noticiam claram de
 deo; et replecio capacitatis sue impedit ipsum in casu
 ad discendum; quod non est proprius impedire. Non ¹⁰
 tamen est possibile quicquid discere vel scire, nisi dis-
 catur vel sciatur in verbo vel per verbum. Sed si no-
 ticia fuerit imperfecta, et per mociones veritatum sci-
 tarum ignorato verbo, tunc vocatur noticia vespertina
 rerum in proprio genere. Et forte habitus tales ad-¹⁵
 quisitos habebunt ultimate felices sicut et noticias ab
 illis causatas.

Leaving this point, we say that there is a limit to the size of a pile that can be made by men, and to which no addition can be made without diminution on another part. As its building progressed, the powers of the human race would be exhausted.

Nature thus imposes a limit to men both in this respect and as regards curious instruments,

Sed relinquendo illa theologis, | conceditur quod est dare maximum cumulum possibilem fieri ab hominibus; quo dato, repugnat quod cumuletur ulterius, nisi ali-²⁰ unde fiat diminucio. Nec est hoc incredibile filosopho, quia antequam fierit talis turris, valde debilitaretur tota multitudo hominum qui forent habiles ad agendum opus. Ita quod, vel propter inpotenciam illorum, vel propter carenciam vel indispositionem materie, vel ²⁵ propter vetacionem virtutis regitive universi non sufficerent ulterius, ymmo data minima quantitate sub qua non potest esse talis cumulus. Iuxta opinantes contrarium tam incredibile esset plebeo, postquam cumulus non desiceret nisi per 4^{am} pedis a tali quantitate, quod ³⁰ omnes homines mundi non sufficerent addere ille quantitati 4^{am} pedis.

Certum ergo est quod est dare quantum regula na-
 ture sinit homines inordinate vagari in talibus edificiis
 et curiositatibus instrumentorum, indumentorum, vel ³⁵

6, 7. fortine B. 10. ad discendum B. 13. mocoes B. 22. Iris B.
 27. 9^ute B.

6, 7. *De fortitudine.* This example occurs at more length in other works. Mediaeval philosophers, debating the question whether, if the whole human race perished, except one woman in a state of pregnancy, she could possibly die or miscarry, decided it negatively, because she would be necessary for the existence of the species.

quorumcunque aliorum artificiatorum. Immo quantum sinerentur inordinate procedere in destrucionem policie, superhabundanter augendo agricolas, vel bellatores, vel artifices, vel mercantes, vel qualescunque ritus ecclesiasticos: et sic de bonis que sibi accumulant. Sicut enim ex ordinacione politica nature prime universum est dispositum in numero, in qualitate et quantitate ac posizione suarum parcium, ita non dubium quin deberet esse in arte regendi policias imitante naturam; et cum pars polieie tantum hodie excedunt in multis nominatorum, verisimile est quod aliqua pars polieie cito pacetur eclipsim; ymmo, cum homo sit quodammodo dominus et finis aliorum que sunt in mundo, iusticia exigit quod illa que homini subserviunt sint proporcionata suo fini et dominio, cum a fine impidente necessitatem rebus, limitantur modi mediorum ad finem. Et hinc credo homines proporcionabiliter puniri ad sua vicia. Relinquendo ergo illa moralibus conceditur quod est dare maximam penam vel indispositionem quam quis potest subire, tam quoad intensionem quam quoad extensionem vel monstracionem.

Ad 6^{am} obiectionem conceditur quod est dare maximum et minimum quod quecunque data virtus visiva sufficit videre. Nota tamen quod duplex est visio, scilicet sensitiva et intellectiva; et utraque duplex, scilicet distincta et confusa. Distincta, qua excluditur a vidente ignorancia primo visi; ut cognoscendo per visum quod hoc sensibile est video illud distincte. Sed visio confusa non excludit ignoranciam primo visi illa visione; ut, videndo a remotis silvam vel acervum, video confuse multa individua illius multitudinis, que tamen B 83^a ignoro; ita quod, quesito | a me utrum sint, dicerem quod nescirem, nisi forte in universalis. Et in utroque membro visionis sunt quotlibet gradus; utrumque eciam 35 membrum subdividitur in 3^a; ut aliqua est visio recta, aliqua reflexa, ut visio ad specula, et 3^{cia} est visio refracta, ut visio per media diversarum dyaphaneitatum. De visione eciam intellectuali sunt proporcionabiles distinciones.

garments, numerous husbandmen, soldiers, artisans, merchants, or ecclesiastical rites and possessions. Government ought to imitate nature in these things. And as men are punished proportionately as they are wicked, I believe there is a limit to the greatest punishment of all.

VI. There is a maximum and a minimum that the visual faculty can see; but both intellectual and bodily sight are either distinct or confused. Confused sight does not exclude ignorance.

There are infinite shades dividing these two extremes; and each of them belongs to direct, or reflected, or refracted sight, physical or intellectual.

2. indestruicōη B. 4. agri col tices B. 21. mraοι B. 23. visiva in marg.

5. Ecclesiasticos . . . accumulant. Note this.

The minimum of intellectual sight is the union of two mathematical points.

There is also a minimum of bodily vision; for nothing can be seen confusedly that could not be seen distinctly: thus the composition of quantity out of mere points could not be seen; for this minimum must be the basis of a pyramid whose apex is in the eye.

Some details about the eye.

Compositum ergo ex duobus non quantis est minimum quod potest intellectualiter videri. Est autem videre in communi apprehendere visibile inmediate virtute visiva; et sic est dare minimum visibile sensu exteriori, ut superficiale circulare. Et probabiliter potest dici quod nichil videtur aliqua virtute confuse, nisi quod a virtute talis speciei sufficit videri distinete: et sic visus corporalis non potest videre non quantum, nec compositum adequate ex non quantis nobis finitis; sed minimum sic visibile videtur 2^m pyramidem radialem, cuius basis est in viso et conus in centro oculi. Et consequenter ponendum est quod est dare remississimum gradum cuiuscunque 8^{to} circumstanciarum ad visionem concurrencium, et optimum gradum possibilem, et per consequens remississimum gradum confuse vel 15 distincte videndi, qui gradus est subito generabilis: et patet responsio ad 6^{am}.

Nota tamen quod nec organum nec sensus videt, sed animal organo et virtute, nisi forte *ridere* sit equivocum ad *recipere speciem visibilis* et ad *apprehendere virtute 20 visira dandum visibile*. Sed quia visio corporalis est medium ad visionem ymaginativam et intellectualem, necon et subtilior inter alias sensaciones ac propinquior intellectui, ideo perstringam aliquas paucas notas in ista materia.

25

1. The eight varying influences: light, distance of the object, its position, its size, its density, its shape, the transparency of the medium and the sanitary state of the eye, are all factors in the act of vision.

Primo dico quod ad visionem respondent octo circumstancie, 2^m quarum variacionem variantur gradus visionum et erroris in visione contingencium. Circumstancie vero sunt iste: lux, distancia, situs oppositionis, magnitudo visibilis, densitas visibilis, figura visibilis, 30 dyaphaneitas medii, tempus conveniens, et sanitas oculi. Cuiuslibet autem istorum est dare gradum summe conveniencie ad visionem, et gradum minime conveniencie ad visionem, et 2^m variacionem graduum in istis variantur gradus apparenciarum visibilium.

35

2^o nota quod 20 sunt sensibilia communia; ut, remocio, magnitudo, situs, corporeitas, figura, contiguitas, separacio, numerus, motus, quies, asperitas, levitas, dyaphaneitas, densitas, umbra, obscuritas, pulcritudo, deformitas, consimilitudo, et diversitas. Omnia 40

2. intbar (:) B.

9. fit^e B.

11. cono B.

13. cūfūciar^r B.

23. subtilior' B.

26, 27. cūfūtātie B.

37, 38. ḡitas B.

autem istorum visiones presupponunt visionem lucis vel coloris; et aliqua istorum subtilius videntur et aliqua difficilius; aliqua subito et aliqua successive, aliqua con-B 83^b fuse et aliqua distinete. | Ad omnia tamen ista con-5 currit virtus distinctiva vel sensus communis, eliciens diversos actus de ipsis, 2^m modum presentandi speciei per se sensibilis sine specie illorum acta per medium.

have each a limit favourable and unfavourable to this act.

There are 20 common objects of sensation perceived by sight, by means of colour, its primary object, some more, some less easily: but the interior sense is needed to distinguish them:

Anatomical description of the different parts of the eye;

of the crystalline lens, of the vitreous and the aqueous humours, of the optic nerves, that cross each other, traverse the *pia mater*, and widen out into the retina which separates the crystalline from the vitreous and both from the aqueous humour.

They take from the *pia mater* a their pellicle which, in the eye, becomes the iris,

and from the *dura mater*

Tercio. nota compositionem oculi ex tribus humoribus; scilicet, ex humore crystallino vel glaciali, ex 10 humore vitreo, et ex humore albugineo. Primus humor est sperula in medio oculi constituta, ad subiectandum virtutem visivam, habens in anteriori parte compressionem superficialem ad modum lenticule. 2^s humor est inter primum et cerebrum, subrubens in propinquā 15 dispositione, ut ex illo fiat humor glacialis. Sed 3^s humor est quasi fex primi in anteriori parte oculi, constituentis cum vitreo quasi unam speram continentem primum humorem. Duo ergo nervi exeunt a lateribus exterioris ventriculi cerebri directe ad ambos oculos, 20 qui sunt primum par nervorum concavi pleni spiritibus, et statim canallisant se eversim, exeundo piam matrem, hoc est pelliculam tenuem involventem cerebrum contextam ex venis et arteriis referentibus a corde vitam et spiritum, et ab eppate nutrimentum. Et per illos nervos 25 vocatos opticos referentur species ad intra. Ex optorum ergo substancia oritur in oculo tela aranea vel retina 2^m unam eius partem, separans humorem 1^m a 2^o, et 2^m aliam centuram utrosque primos humores, dividendo illos a 3^o. Deinde nervi predicti, antequam 30 subintrant duram matrem, coniunguntur, constituentes unum nervum concavum; deinde obviant dure matri et accipientes ab ea pellem unamexeunt craneum. Ex substancia ergo pie matris accipiunt nervi optici tenuem pelliculam ex qua producitur in oculo 2^a tunica que 35 vocatur uvea vel etina, circumdans tercium humorem, sed cum nigra, viridi vel glauca, perforata rotunde ad anterius, ut per pupillam species ingrediantur. Sed de

21. canallant B. 22. cœlurȝ B. 35. z̄na B.

5. *Sensus communis*. This is the sense which, according to medieval philosophers, receives the impressions of the different external senses, and also those feelings that arise within the body.
 21. *Canallant*. Perhaps a mistake for *cancellant* (see pag. 180, l. 27) but I understand one word as little as the other; unless *cancellare* means "to cross".

a membrane
that thickens
into the cornea.
The whole is
covered with
a membrane
called the
conjunctive.
All this is
wonderfully
contrived by
nature to
enable us to
see.

Location of
different
sensitive
faculties in the
brain: The
interior sense
resides in the
first lobe of
the first
ventricle; the
imaginative in
the 2nd; the
estimative,
together with
fancy, is in the
middle
ventricle; the
memorative
and the motive
faculty is in
the last (the
cerebellum?).

substancia dure matris producitur in oculo tunica,
vocata cornea sive sclerotica, que est alba, operiens
foramen uvee ad anterius. De substancia autem panni-
culi involventis craneum, cui per commissuras alligatur
dura mater inmediate intra craneum procedit 4^a tunica, 5
vocata coniunctiva vel consolidativa, que continuatur
cum cornea, constituens orbem oculi; et ista est cornea
anterius alligata in concavitate ossis, vocati orbita oculi.
Complexiones autem, qualitates, quiditates, et posiciones
istarum parium oculi sagacissime sunt ingeniate a 10
natura pro visione complenda.

4^o nota | quod sensus communis viget in prima parte B 84^a
primi ventriculi cerebri, sicut ymaginativa in 2^a, et
correspondenter estimativa et fantastica in medio ven-
triculo, et in postremo ventriculo memorativa et virtus 15
2^m locum motiva. Et sunt omnes recte virtutes multi-
plicate per sua organa, sicut visiva virtus multiplicatur
per crystalloidem et locum concursus opticorum. Visiva
ergo virtute elicetur actus videndi, que non est mole
magnus, sicut taccio, sed obiective magnus, habens 20
quotlibet partes 2^m differenciam basium pyramidis ra-
dialis, et tactus ille est quodammodo inextensus in
illo visu, sicut et virtus visiva. Formaliter tamen et
subiective solum est actus vel virtus inidente. Et hinc
posuerunt antiqui visionem fieri per extramissionem 25
virtutis, et animam vel hominem esse quodammodo
cum illo cui afficitur. Et defectus noticie terminorum in
tali materia, et defectus admissionis modi loquendi, facit
multas dissensiones ab opinionibus antiquorum. Cer-
tum tamen est quod visio est de genere actionis, de 30
pendens essencialiter a viso et a parcialibus visionibus
dependentibus a suis obiectis ad que terminantur. Nec
terminarentur ad illa, ut ad suas causas, nisi aliqualiter
essent in illis. Ymmo, in medio est actus videndi, ubi
non est terminative; sicut patet quando, propter 35

8. of. B. 9. 9^{tes} qptes B. 22. 1^{con}di B.

14, 15. *Estimativa memorativa*. These must not be confounded with judgment and memory; the former belong to man in common with the more perfect animals, and exclude any idea of abstractive cognition. 16. If by *postremo ventriculo*, Wyclif really means the cerebellum, then he is in singular agreement with recent physiological experiments as regards the motive faculty. The cerebellum has certainly a good deal to do with the motor apparatus.

dislocationem oculi vel aliam rationem, de uno continuo appareat quod sint duo distancia localiter. Vanum tamen est credere quod actus tales possunt per se esse vel conservari sine obiecto; et sic de multis que loquentes 5 nostre legis fabulantur.

Omnis ergo actus anime ponit formaliter animam agere, et imprimis dispositionem vel habitum; et sic est in alteracione, et arguit animam mobilem. Ymmo, habita prima noticia primi veri 2^m intellectum et plene 10 amore 2^m voluntatem et scienciam perpetuo sic manendi cum summa dotacione corporis et infringibili subordinacione completarum virium inferiorum ad superiores, resultat naturaliter felicitas, que est qualitas inseparabilis. Et iste disposiciones prime quandoque 15 vocantur partes beatitudinis; et beatitudo vocatur aggregacio omnium istorum bonorum. Quandoque vero materialiter loquendo, unum istorum vel multa vocantur beatitudo particularis. Actus ergo denominat subiectum quale, sed non formaliter.

20 Per istas 4^{or} notas posset naturalis dare causas omnium erronearum apparitionum in visione; utputa quare uritur nebula a longinquu et non de prope; quare latent anguli et supereminencie visibles a longinquu; quare propter velocem giracionem tictionis 25 appetet carentem circulum in noctibus causari, et quare de quiescentibus appetet quod moveantur, et econtra. Et sic de multis aliis. Dubia tamen copiose B 84^b pulcerrima circumstant ista dicta: | utputa, quomodo distanca vel magnitudo visibilis est pertinens visioni, 30 cum per media diversarum dyaphaneitatum contingit quantumcunque parvum ad quantumlibet magnam distanciam apparere quantumlibet magnum distincta visione. Ymmo, homo videt acervum et tenebram, sicut audit silencium infinitum, si esset: ubi non videtur 35 virtutem egredi, cum non percipitur talis privacionis distanca. Ymmo, cum eadem visio non potest esse in diversis locis, hic confusa et ibi distincta (et sic de quotlibet gradibus) videtur quod visio sit extensa per medium habens in aere partem confusam, sicut et in 40 tenebra per quam videtur visible, et in obiecto partes disperiter distinctas. Aliter enim esset quelibet anima

Every act of the mind supposes a new state of mental movement. And when this act is an act of perfect knowledge and love of God with the certitude of never changing, it is a state of bliss, the necessary dispositions to which are called parts of bliss, or particular bliss.

The preceding observations enable the natural philosopher to explain the cause of all errors in sight: the red clouds of sunset, the invisibility of angles and the conspicuousness of heights at a distance, and why a brand whirled round seems a circle; also, why motionless things seem to move and vice versa. Some very interesting questions are e. g. in what way distance affects the sight; how we can see darkness, whether sight is not extended in the object and in the intervening air, whether, as a body at the greatest

5. nrē B. 8. art B. 9. pleno B. 10. sc̄ent̄ B. 22. v̄tr̄ B.
23. an̄li B; ib. visīl B. 39. āe B.

possible distance would appear as a point, the slightest change for the worse in the conditions would render it invisible; whether a piercing sight cannot see what a weak sight can; whether there is a limit to human merit; whether our eyes deceive us as to the position of objects.

Waiving all these questions, we may say that the perpendicular ray penetrates to the centre of the nerve common to both eyes; the others are refracted in the same direction, so as to coincide with the perpendicular ray; if they did not, they would cross each other in the centre of the eye, and form an inverted image. There are thus four pyramids of rays; two based on the object and with their apex in the centre of each eye; and two based on the surface of the vitreous humour, with their apices

ubique, cum omnia intelligit. Videtur eciam quod remocio facit ad noticiam; quia, posito B visibili in fine maxime distancie possibilis videri, cum aliis optimis circumstanciis videndi, videtur quod ibi appareat indivisible; et quantumcunque modica elongacio vel debilitatio circumstancie perciperetur a visu, cum tamen non a maxime proporcionato propinquō perciperetur quodlibet tale crementum vel decrementum. Et idem videtur de acie visus penetrantis et non videntis medium quod visus debilior satis videt. Videtur eciam quod homo possit tantum mereri hic, quod non possit promereri ulterius. Et sic terminaretur potentia dei respectu cuiuscunque effectus ad maximum in quod posset; cum homo in ultimo instanti sue promericionis non posset ulterius convalescere merendo. Videtur eciam quod continue erratur, videndo propter partes oculi diversarum dyaphaneitatum ad quas oportet radios visibilis frangi.

Sed dimissis illis, gracia brevitatis, dicitur quod perpendicularis, que est axis pyramidis radialis, penetrat usque ad centrum nervi communis; et alii radii obliqui franguntur declinantes a perpendiculari propter humorum vitreum, quia est maioris dyaphaneitatis quam glacialis; et cum species visibilis in concavitate sit quasi conformis dyaphaneitatis, multiplicat species 2^m congruam posicionem, usque ad nervum communem. Aliter enim cancellarent se in centro, et eversim intendentem, signarent posiciones eversas sensibiles. Patet ergo quod sunt 4^{or} pyramides per quas visio completur, quarum duo bassantur in visibili et conantur in centris oculorum, et due alie bassantur in anteriori superficie vitrei et conantur in centro nervi communis, ratione cuius concursus appetit una res, non obstantibus ambobus oculis. Ibi enim fit individuum 2^m posicionem et figuram duarum proximarum pyramidum. Et conformes sunt pyramides virtutes egredientes ab oculo, que vocantur pyramides visuales; et punctus, ubi concurrunt in basi visibili, vocatur | punctus coniunctionis et axis communis vocatur linea recta protracta a centro communis nervi, stans perpendiculariter, connectens centra foraminum; et quando punctus coniunctionis est in axe communī, tunc est optima opposicio

possibilis. Et semper per axem pyramidis radialis sit joining at the
distinccior visio, et indistinccior ut, cum paribus, radius common nerve;
est ab illa axe remocior. Unde, ad iudicandum uni- the pyramids
formitatem rei, oportet punctum coniunctionis rotari of visual force
super superficiem visam; quia videtur quod axis pyra- being similar to
midis radialis, quantumcunque debilis, penetrans refracte, the former.
sit forcior ad certificandum quam radius obli- Sight is more
quus, quantumlibet fortis. or less distinct
according as the ray is more or less in the direction of the visual axis.

Si autem delectat videre particulariter istam materiam,
notetur Alacen et liber tercius Vitulonis etc.

7. *Alacen* is Alhazen, an Arab philosopher; *Vitulonis* is Vitellion (Ciolek), a Pole, who lived in Cracow in the XIIIth century. His works were printed at Basle in 1572.

CAPITULUM OCTAVUM.

This chapter deals with conditional propositions; i. e. all such hypothetical propositions as imply a condition.

The particle *if* differs from others that suppose causation, in that it merely implies necessary sequence.

If is sometimes taken to mean because; sometimes a mere link of sequence, either existing for the present,

or eternally, or from all eternity till now. It may imply that the consequence must exist so long as the condition exists;

Sequitur de condicionalibus pertractandum.

Et primo supponatur omnem yhypotheticam subordinatam actu condicionato, esse condicionalem; ut est talis: *Si tu es homo, tu es animal*, et cetere que vulgariter vocantur consequencie, quamvis 2^m vim vocis habitudo veritatis posterioris ad priorem sit consequencia qualis est in significato cuiuscunque conditionalis vere, inter antecedens naturaliter prius et suum naturaliter consequens. Et hinc patet quod differunt iste note consequiarum, *si, ergo, igitur*, et forte omnia synkategorica que nos ponimus synomina. Nam iste coniunctiones *ergo, ideo, igitur*, et si que consimiles, connotando causacionem, ponunt consequenciam nec in materia nec in forma peccantem: Sed non sic conditionalis: cum hoc sit necessarium, *si tu es asinus, tu es rudibilis*. Et sic differunt note consequiarum 2^m genera causandi.

Sed, relictis istis altercacionibus signorum grammaticis, notandum quod *si* quantocunque ponitur pro *quia*, quandoque dicit simpliciter necessariam veritatem condicionatam. Et hoc 2^{ter} variatur; vel sic quod sit veritas condicionis tenens ut nunc: ut hic: *si ego sum Rome, falsum est verum*. Nam veritati eterne repugnat quod nunc sim Rome, nisi quidlibet sequatur. Istam tamen significacionem communiter abiciunt sophiste. Vel 2^o quod sit veritas condicionata tenens pro omni tempore eterno; ut: *si deus est, ipse mult mundum esse*. Vel pro tempore eterno a parte post; ut: *si ego non sum, nichil fuit*. Et talium per accidens consequiarum aliqua ponit quod impossibile est veritatem conditionaliter assumptam esse pro aliqua mensura temporis pro qua non sit veritas conditionaliter deducta. Ut: *si*

deus mult tempus esse, tunc tempus est. Aliqua autem or that it exists solum ponit quod impossibile est veritatem condicio- during some naliter assumptam esse, nisi veritas conditionaliter de- part of the ducta sit pro aliqua mensura. Ut, si deus mult me existence of its condition.

esse, *ego sum*; nam antecedens est eternum, et con- sequens temporale. Semper tamen fuisse tale signum verum; *ego sum*; quia sufficit ad veritatem talis signi quod suum primarium significatum aliquando sit, ut patebit capitulo ultimo. 4º vero modo sumitur nota Again, it may conditionalis de condicionato extremo, quandoque co- have its pulans imperativam: ut hic; *si vis vitam ingredi, serva condition under mandata*; quandoque coniunctivam, ut hic: *domine, si or the si fuisses hic, frater meus non fuisse mortuus*; quandoque subjunctive copulat oraciones imperfectas in proposicionibus non tentis conditionaliter; ut hic; *tu es quicquid es, si or the si esces asinus*. Omnes tamen tales implicant conditionalis. Unde videtur michi quod sicut hec oratio individua non est propositionaliter vera: *fecistine hoc?* ita ratione coniunctionis est hec proposicio conditionaliter vera: 20 *si Judas decessisset in gratia, fuisse salvatus*.

Ex istis patet quod 3^{ter} est conditionalis vera. Primo simpliciter et absolute; 2º per accidens, et 3º ut nunc. Et omnis conditionalis vera convenit in hoc cum quilibet, non solum quod primarie significat veritatem, sed 25 quod impossibile est veritatem conditionaliter assumptam esse, nisi sit veritas eius conditionaliter deducta; et econtra. Et hoc est quod principaliter solet dici quod signanter tunc est consequencia bona quando impossibile est antecedens illius sic primarie significantis esse 30 verum, nisi suum consequens sit verum.

Et ita tripliciter dicitur *impossibile* et *necessarium*: *Impossible and necessarium* are scilicet simpliciter, per accidens, et 2^m quid. *Simpli- either 35 citer necessarium* est quod de nulla potencia potest non esse. *Necessarium per accidens* est veritas quam ordinacioni eterne repugnat pro aliqua parte dati temporis eterni non esse. Et *necessarium 2^m quid* quidem solum temporaliter est, sed legi eterne repugnat ipsum non esse. Et correspondenter de impossibili per accidens et 2^m quid. Unde, sicut omne necessarium per accidens 40 aut 2^m quid potest non esse, sic omne impossibile per accidens aut 2^m quid potest esse.

Rules:
 1. As a 'conditional' is true, so it is necessary; as it is false, so it is impossible.
 This is not generally admitted now, unless for absolute necessity and impossibility; so it is no wonder if our rules present some discrepancy.
 From what is absolutely necessary may follow what is so contingently; and thus all that happens, happens necessarily; though not absolutely so;
 2. Truth may follow from falsity, but not vice versa.
 In things contingent, however, what is false may become true, what is necessary, false and what is true, impossible, at a different time, but it does not follow that *this will be false implies this will be*.
 Some say that falsity is true in so far as it is an object of thought; others that what is true (at one time) is false (at another).
 And thus falsity follows from truth: If God wills that the day of judgment be, *it is: it is, false now, will be true at a given time.*

Ex istis patent quedam regule. Prima quod proportionaliter sicut condicionalis est vera, sic necessaria; et sicut ipsa est falsa, sic est impossibilis; et econtra. Communitas tamen sophistarum non admittit condicionalem esse bonam, nisi fuerit absolute necessaria. Ideo non mirum si regule eorum dissonant ab ampliantibus *necessarium* et *impossibile*. Nam ex absoluto necessario sequitur necessarium per accidens: ut ex *deum esse* sequitur *ipsum velle mundum esse*, et per consequens *mundum esse*; et breviter omne aliud verum, quantumlibet contingens. Ex quo sequitur quod omne futurum necessario eveniet, non quidem necessitate absoluta, sed necessitate ex suppositione. Sequitur etiam quod consequencia sit ponibilis et de impossibilibus, cum talis impossibilis per accidens potest esse vera. 15

2º patet ex falso, tam signo quam signato, sequi verum; sed nunquam ex vero sequi falsum ex parte rei, pro mensura pro qua est falsum. Pro omni enim tali mensura, ipsum non est. Potest tamen falsum contingens esse verum, et per consequens necessarium aliquo modo. Unde in talibus que sunt per accidens, nedum ex falso fiet verum, sed necessarium erit falsum et verum erit impossibile. Hoc enim potest esse necessarium: *Iste lapis occidit Sortem*; et hoc potest esse impossibile post corrupcionem lapidis. Idem ergo in re est, *falsum fore verum et illud quod aliquando non est aliquando fore*: quia, si hoc nunc non est tunc *hoc esse* est falsum, et si illud est, tunc *illud esse* est verum. Nec est color, si *hoc tunc erit falsum vel impossibile* | B 86^a
quod tunc erit; cum oppositum sequitur. 30

Unde aliqui dicunt quod verum converteretur in falsum et impossibile, et ipsum falsum habebit esse possibile vel intelligibile. Alii autem dicunt quod verum est falsum; quia quod pro uno tempore est, pro alio non est. Unde non sequitur: *hoc est falsum vel impossible; ergo, non est*; sed bene sequitur quod pro aliqua mensura repugnat necessario illud esse; non tamen simul et semel est verum et falsum; et sic ex vero sequitur falsum ut ex *deum velle diem iudicii esse*, sequitur *illum esse*; quod adhuc est falsum, sed in tempore suo verum. Et illud reproto esse probabile.

14. *pont* B. 20. *alη* B. 27. *a'η* B. 35. *esse* B.

40. *Illum*, i. e. *diem*.

Alii autem dicunt quod si *hoc esse* sit falsum, tunc pro nulla mensura est, quia aliter quelibet creatura esset impossibilis, cum in eternitate sit falsum et per consequens impossibile illam esse; et ita de veritate et falsitate signi sunt opinones. Ego autem voco signum verum, si suum significatum primarium est aliquando.

Alii autem dicunt quod non est verum pro mensura, nisi suum significatum sit pro eadem mensura. Et iuxta primum modum dicendi foret illa copulativa nunc vera:
10 *Primum instans mundi est, et dies iudicii est.*

Alia via dicit quod, sicut signum non est falsum, quamvis deficiat pro aliqua mensura temporis a veritate significata, sic nec ens ex parte rei est falsum, quia aliquando fuit falsum; quia *esse falsum* est sim-
15 pliciter *non esse*; et ista tollit multas conclusiones concessas que male videntur sonare. Tota tamen ista difficultas stat in significacione termini. Ideo eligat logicus viam plus placitam. Dimissis ergo istis usque ad ultimum casum, fiat restriccio veritatis condicionalis ad
20 absolute necessariam.

Et tunc patet 3º quod quicquid sequitur ad tale consequens, sequitur ad suum antecedens; et per consequens, quicquid antecedit ad antecedens antecedit ad consequens.

25 4º patet quod quidquid repugnat consequenti, repugnat antecedenti; et si quid steterit cum antecedente, ipsum stat cum consequente. Sed non oportet in altero quod econtra.

5º patet quod ex opposito consequentis sequitur 30 oppositum antecedentis, et non generaliter econtra; et per consequens, quicquid antecedit ad oppositum consequentis, antecedit ad oppositum antecedentis; sed quicquid sequitur ad oppositum antecedentis sequitur ad oppositum consequentis; sed in neutro oportet gene-
35 raliter quod econtra.

6º patet quod ex omni simpliciter impossibili sequitur quodlibet concludendum, sicut ex omni antecedente sequitur quodlibet absolute necessarium assignandum. Si enim impossibile est te esse asinus, non potest esse
40 quod tu es asinus, nisi deus non sit; quia si posset esse cum hoc quod deus sit, tunc potest sic esse, et per

Others maintain that what is false never can be true; for then the existence of every creature would be false from all eternity.
Others think that what is true at any time is true now.

Finally others affirm that not to be completely true does not exclude some truth; to be quite false would imply not to be at all; and this view avoids many ill-sounding conclusions.

3. The consequent of a consequent is the consequent of its antecedent;

4. What contradicts the consequent, contradicts its antecedent but not *vice versa*.

5. What contradicts the consequent, is the consequent to the opposite of the antecedent; but not *vice versa*.

6. From any absolutely impossible proposition any conclusion whatever may be drawn; and any absolutely necessary proposition may follow from any antecedent whatever.

consequens non est impossibile sic esse: quod tamen datum est. Et eodem modo probatur 2^a pars regule.

7. In the latter case God's existence is supposed; in the former, it is denied. Every true proposition posits the existence of truth, and the latter the existence of God, on whom all truth depends.

7^{mo} patet quod omnis talis consequencia ponit formaliter *deum esse*, et econtra; et per consequens necessitates sunt sic concathenate, quod posita una, impossible est quod reliqua destruatur; sicut, posito uno impossibili, formaliter sequitur quidlibet concludendum. Si enim quelibet talis ponit aliqualiter esse, utputa, veritatem significatam primarie per eandem, sequitur quod quelibet talis ponit primam veritatem esse, ex 10 qua posita sequuntur due partes residue. Medium autem ad probandum istas regulas est descripcio consequentie bone superius posita, et lex contradictiarum. |

Objections.

1. The old rules of logic say that no conditional posits anything. 2. According to this doctrine no irrelevant truth could flow from an impossible proposition, which is also against the old rules.

Answers:

1. This, not being strictly true, cannot be a rule. Yet it is partially true, if understood of contingent conditionals. 2. From the absolutely necessary or impossible no irrelevant proposition can be deduced, since the former follows from any truth, and the latter contradicts all truth.

And a proposition is relevant to another, either because it follows from or because it contradicts it. There can be no good

Sed contra illud argumentatur *primo*, per hoc quod, B 86^b iuxta antiquas regulas, nulla condicionalis quidquid 15 ponit; ergo non ex qualibet tali sequitur *deum esse*. 2^o sic nunquam, nisi materialiter, sequitur impertinens ex impossibili, sicut antique regule sumant; addentes, quod nunquam sequitur necessarium nisi materialiter ex impertinenti. [3^o] multe necessitates possunt non 20 esse, quia aliter non esset ordo inter illas; sed, posita una veritate, poneretur quelibet veritas possibilis.

Ad primum dico quod assumptum non est regula, cum obliquat a veritate. Verum tamen cum antiqua sentencia communis non sit in toto falsa, intelligitur isto modo: nulla condicionalis de contingentibus extremis ponit alterum illorum; ut non oportet si *tu morearis te currere* quod *vel curras vel morearis*; quodlibet tamen talis condicionalis ponit suum primarium significatum et omnem eius causam. 30

Ad 2^m dicitur quod nichil est impertinens simpli citer necessario vel impossibili, cum omni tali impossibili repugnat quodlibet assignandum; et omne sic necessarium sequitur ad quidlibet. Et ex istis duobus modis dicitur proposicio pertinens alteri; vel quia, 35 antecedens ad illam, vel quia repugnat illi. Si enim A est pertinens B, quia sequitur ad B, per idem B est pertinens A, quia antecedens ad A, cum pertinencia sit relacio equiparancie, eque fundabilis in antecedencia sicut in consequencia. Ulterius dicitur quod tam repugnat consequenciam esse bonam et non de forma

20. et sic(?) pro 3^o B.
31. 3^{bus} B.

23. argumentum? B; ib. r'a = vera? B.

quam repugnat materiam esse informem. Nam ista est consequence if veritas et forma exemplaris per quam quelibet alia conditionalis tenet: *si duarum veritatum unam impossibile est esse cum hoc quod non sit reliqua, tunc, si illa est, reliqua est.* Verumptamen est dare aliquas formas, substanciales, syllogisticas, entimematicas, et induciones; quia tenent aliqe consequencie que vocantur formales; sed non iste vocate materiales. Non tamen est possibile quod aliqua consequencia teneat, nisi teneat ad minimum per hanc formam. Sufficit ergo ad investigandum bonitatem formalem cuiuscunque consequentie logice, quod sit consequencia; et demonstratis primarie significatis per suum antecedens et suum consequens, sit impossibile hoc esse, nisi hoc sit.

not in due
form, according
to this
principle:
*If A cannot
exist
without B,
then if A is
posited, B
is so too.*

15 Nec aliud intendit logicus per huismodi consequencias; ut quando dicitur: *si ego sum asinus, tunc baculus stat in angulo*, idem est ac si diceretur: *non potest esse quod ego sim asinus nisi baculus stet in angulo*. Quod patet ex hoc quod contradictoria istorum sunt convergibilia. Ista enim proposicio repugnat tanquam contradictorie conditionali signata: *potest esse quod ego sim asinus, cum hoc quod nullus baculus stet in angulo*; ideo communiter, negata consequencia, ponit logicus communiter quod oppositum stet: quod sibi tantum valeat ac si dicatur: detur oppositum consequentie negate. Et hinc dicitur illam notam sic mobilitare terminum subsequentem, more negacionis. Unde sequitur: *si homo currit, animal currit; ergo, si iste vel quicunque alias homo currit, tunc animal currit*. Nec oportet capere constanciam subiecti, sicut nec in negativis; quia quilibet talis includit contradictionem negacionem de possibili: ut idem est dicere: | *Si tu es asinus, tu es animal;* ac si dicatur: *Non potest esse quod tu sis asinus, nisi tu sis animal.*

No
consequence
can be good
unless based
on this
principle.
In fact
consequence
means that
the contrary
is impossible.
Example.

B 87^a 35 Et constat michi quod wulgare sentencie in illa materia sunt infundabiles; utputa quod nulla negativa includit repugnaciam, sed quod possibile est nullum ens esse, cum hoc quod non antecedit ad affirmationem; ymmo quod possibile est quod si deus est, tunc, qualitercumque potest non esse, est. Hoc enim iuxta sic fantasiantes est possibile, cum non includit repugnaciam. Sed procul a philosopho ista sentencia! Ad

If like no
renders the
following term
universal.
It is not even
necessary
that the subject
should be the
same; the fact
is that every
conditional
includes a
negative:
*If A is B,
C is B means:
No A can be B,
without C
being D.*

The common
opinion on this
subject seems
to me quite
unfounded,
viz. that no
negative
includes
impossibility.
It leads to
many absurd
consequences,
and is to be
rejected.

6. spales; in marg. sales B. 23, 24. logicus communiter in marg. B.

3. Necessary truths are coordinated by the dependence of one upon the other, which their essential connection does not destroy. A truth may be necessary, and yet not exist actually; it may also be at the same time contingent, in the various senses of the word.

3^m dicitur quod necessarium est quod sit ordo inter necessitates, quarum nulla potest esse sine reliqua; ut prius naturaliter est *nullum hominem esse asinum* quam est *me non esse asinum*. Et prius naturaliter est *consequens esse, si antecedens est* quam est *animal esse, si homo est*. Et sic de infinitis similibus. Ideo non est color concludendi quod non sit ordo prioritatis vel dependencie inter aliqua, si unum non potest esse sine reliquo. Nec est inconveniens quod multe necessitates possunt non esse, que non possunt destrui, corrumpi, vel desinere esse, ut tales: *ego fui quadragenarius, ego predicari etc.*; et multe veritates que iam non sunt possunt esse, sed non possunt incipere esse; cum, si sunt, eternaliter fuerunt, ut sepe dictum est de talibus: *ego fui predicatus, Sor fuit episcopandus*. Nec est inconveniens, necessarium ex suppositione et impossibile per accidens, esse secundarie contingens natum in maiori vel minori vel semper.

We must remember that the signification of the present sense can be extended to the past and future.

From a proposition that is false now we can draw any conclusion that is false at the same time; and contrariwise for true propositions.

Moving my hand, I produce a new truth, and consequently a present necessity, throughout the world.

On account of this extension of meaning, we must define the

Determinate as that which must exist at a certain time; the Contingent ad utrumlibet as anything caused by an agent that is quite free not to cause it;

Et ad cognoscendum dicta hominum in ista materia multum confert cognoscere quomodo verba presentis temporis ampliantur ad quodlibet tempus, preteritum, presens vel futurum, ut postmodum docebitur. Admittendo autem consequenciam ut nunc, conceditur quod ex omni nunc falso sequitur quidlibet ut nunc, sicut omne nunc verum sequitur ad quidlibet ut nunc. 25 Et ulterius patet ex dictis quod sicut movendo manum meam facio ad omnem punctum mundi veritatem, sic facio universalem condicionalem necessitatem. Unde, propter ampliacionem temporis verborum, oportet aliter loqui quam in proximo tractatu locutum est; ut determinatum potest dici *omne quod necesse est esse pro aliquo tempore*; et per consequens omnis veritas est alicui esse determinata. Contingens vero ad utrumlibet potest dici *omnis effectus agentis libere, quod pro omni mensura qua causat eundem eque potest ipsum non causare*. Ex 35 quo patet quod omnis creatura est contingens ad utrumlibet quo ad deum. Ymmo [sunt] quotlibet voliciones dei eterne que possunt non esse, sed non incipere vel desinere. Unde libere contradictorie causare, est causare causatum voluntarie pro omni mensura pro 40 qua eque potest non causare illud; ut est omnis volicio

1. q.^t pro quod sit B. 12. p*ui* B. 15. p*urg* B; ib. ep*andus* B.
37. sunt deest B.

dei ad extra. Contingens vero semper est *effectus habens causam ex qua sequitur*; et huiusmodi est omne contingens; ut voliciones dei ad extra sequuntur ex esse dei contingenter. Et omne aliud contingens sequitur
 5 necessitate condicionali absoluta ex voluntate dei. Contingens in maiori est *effectus habens causam ex qua naturaliter sequitur*. Contingit tamen casualiter causam illam poni, et effectum illam non sequi. Contingens in
 B 87^b minori est *effectus preternaturaliter sequens ex causa illud non intende*re. Ex quo patet quod dicta contingenter non opponuntur contrarie, sed relative. Nec obest equivocantes in temporibus verborum sic varie loqui, et cognoscere utrumque modum loquendi; ut, communicando cum iuvenibus, loquamur primo modo,
 15 et cum proiectis, modo secundo.

Dubium autem est si pretericio, futuricio, volicio, et posse logicum (ut sunt iste veritates: *A fuisse, fore, non esse, posse esse*, etc.) individuantur a tempore. Et videtur quod sic: nam alia est futuricio Sortis, alia
 20 Platonis, quamvis utraque sit futuricio hominis; quia aliud est unum illorum futurorum quam erit reliquum; ergo, per idem, alia est futuricio A cursus mei, alia futuricio B cursus mei, quamvis utrumque istorum sit veritas que est *me esse cursurum*; et sic de pretericio-
 25 nibus. Nam pretericio cursus mei incipit esse, me desinente currere, etsi millesies prius desii currere; et per consequens sunt tales quandalitates communes tam a subiecto quam a tempore, continentes sub se alias infinitas; ut per quot tempora ego durabo, tot sunt veri-
 30 tates, quarum quelibet est *me esse duraturum*. Videtur eciam quod necessario individuantur a tempore; ut, me non sedente postquam sedi, est alia necessitacio sessio-
 nis quam fuit ista eterna que precessit *esse* mei; quia
 35 aliter eadem veritas potest infinities redire. Ymmo videtur quod necessitacio potest incipere esse propter incepionem nove per se cause, etsi eternaliter fuerit talis necessitacio, ut, me incipiente esse, verum est quod non sum extra B situm qui de facto continet me; et hoc fuit eternaliter verum. Cum ergo existencia mei
 40 in B situ sit sufficiens causa ad faciendum me non esse

the Contingent in all cases, as an effect having a cause, and flowing from it;

the Contingent in most cases as an effect that usually flows from a given cause; the Contingent in few cases, as an effect that flows from a given cause, contrary to the usual tendency of the same. Contingent and necessary are merely relative terms.

Whether the past, the future, &c. depend on time for their individual entity, differing from all others. Reason pro.

Two truths of the same kind, existing both in the future, in the past, &c., are nevertheless different from each other.

The difference of time is what makes them differ;

otherwise the same truth might exist an infinite number of times.

Besides, a necessity that is eternal in itself, may begin to exist in a new way in time.

10, 11. *gtn*^t B. 26. *millesius*; *ib.* *desiit* B.

26. *Millesius* is probably a corruption of *millesies* for *millies*. Wyclif speaks of a series, A, B, etc. of runs.

extra illum situm, et illam potencia non impedita, videtur quod facit unam talem negacionem preter illam eternam.

Reasons contra.
 If this were so,
 all things
 would
 continually be
 new,
 according
 to Heraclitus,
 for if the
 individuality
 of such truths
 is caused by
 time, their
 essence is
 succession;
 and every
 necessary
 truth is
 composed of
 successive
 parts;
 so also of all
 accidents; and
 this is
 inconceivable.
 Again, if there
 can be an
 infinite number
 of individual
 negations under
 the same form,
 there must be
 as many
 affirmations;
 and this would
 destroy
 individuality.
 Again, all
 things would
 be eternal.
 Nothing
 commences
 without its
 opposite
 ceasing.
*Wyclif's own
 opinion.*
 Every
 individual takes
 its individuality
 from its proper
 cause;
 but God is the
 supreme
 principle of
 individuation.
 Accidents, such
 as time,
 movement, &c.
 are principles
 of cognition, of
 individuality,

Sed contra, ista videtur esse opinio Eracliti, ponentis omnia continue esse nova. Nam si veritates recitate 5 individuantur a tempore, tunc consistunt in successione, sicut tempus. Et per consequens tam necessitatibus quam pretericiones et futuriciones, habent partes successivas, quod non est sane intelligibile. Ymmo, multo magis, omnia alia accidentia individuantur a tempore. 10 Et sic, moto uno, omnia mobilia moverentur.

Similiter, iuxta illud oportet ponere infinitas aut communes synonimas, quod est summe nugatorium. Et consequentia patet ex hoc quod tot modis ponitur unum oppositorum quot et reliquum; ergo, si infinite 15 sint tales negaciones, *me non esse extra B situm*, infinite forent tales affirmaciones, posita una, quarum quilibet esset *me esse extra B situm*; et sic non esset dare ultimum singulare; sed omnia essent communia, cum accidens posterius subiecto individuat subiectum. 20

Similiter, cum nulla necessitacio potest incipere esse sine desinacione sui oppositi vel econtra, videtur quod *me generato in B situ*, ratione cuius generacionis incepit necessitacio, que est *me non esse extra B*, deserret ista affirmacio; *ego sum extra B*, et per consequens, ista affirmacio fuit ante esse mei; et tunc non esset possibile aliquod ens incipere esse, sed omnia essent eterna. Et tamen prius deductum est omnia esse nova.

Quantum ad istam materiam de individuatione rei 30 videtur michi pro presenti quod omnis substancia B^{88a} individua individuantur a qualibet sui per se causa, sicut est a qualibet tali. Deus autem, extra genus, et per consequens carens individuatione, est principium individuandi omne individuum. Accidencia etiam principia substanciam sunt cause cognoscendi et regulariter individuandi omne suum causatum, ut mensura temporis in qua generatur res corruptibilis, motus, accio, potentia etc. que per accidens causant rem talem, individuant ipsam; ut existente eadem materia et eodem 40

1. iam B; ib. pov (por?) B. 13, 14. a'coes pro aut communes B.
 16, 17. iñite B. 17 a'coes actuaciones B.

agente respectu B ignis quod sint respectu A ignis, alia tamen est forma et per consequens alias ignis: quod cognoscitur ex alietate temporis in quo producitur, ex alietate producencie et multorum consimilium 5 accidencium que concausant productum; quia aliter rediret idem ignis in numero, quociens eadem materia susciperet formam eiusdem speciei. Est autem aliqualis idemperitas in talibus circa ydemptitatem specificam, que vocatur ydemptitas ^{2^m} materiam. Et maior est 10 ydemptitas qua corpus laceratum vel divisum ^{2^m} partes aliunde continuatas, nulla penitus corrupta, maneret idem corpus, quam prius; quia est idem ^{2^m} materiam primam et ^{2^m} partes quantitativas, que sunt materia propinqua. Unde sicut unio materie cum forma in ista, continuacio 15 parcum materialium est de essencia ultimi singularis. Rediret autem idem homo quamcunque materiam anima actuaverit, quia anima vere est persona hominis. Et sic rediret quodammodo idem corpus.

Omne ergo accidens individuatur a suo subiecto, cum 20 sit ab illo, ut situs individuatur a mundo et eius quantitate et figura, et situs individuat motum, et modus in communi individuat tempus, et tempus individuat omnem motum singularem, et omne aliud successivum; cum ad unitatem motus, unitas mobilis, unitas temporis, et unitas materie motus requiratur. Et correspondenter, futuriciones, pretericiones, et potencie, principiantur a suis causis a quibus individuantur talia a tempore: ut si alia eveniunt futura, alie erunt futuriciones, et si alie fuerint res preterite, alie sunt earum 30 pretericiones. Et sic alie possunt esse res producte, alie sunt potencie ex quibus possunt produci. Nec individuantur talia a tempore, nisi sui termini individuentur a tempore. Et sic, eo ipso quod aliquid non per se substancia, successivum vel permanens, pro aliquo instanti ^{2^m} se totum incipit esse, non solum pretericio instantis iniciantis, sed ipsum instans est principium sue individuationis: ut si sessio mea, actus anime, habitus, et quecunque forma accidentalis vel substancialis materialis non potest fieri ante vel post idem instans in 40 quo fit; quia existente alia generacione, non foret illud ultimum singulare. Et forte sic est de omni generali.

and are accidental causes. If the same matter and the same agent produce fire in two cases, the form is different; and this is known by the difference of time &c., in their production. There is identity of species, called identity according to matter.

Thus every accident is individuated by its subject.

Things future and things past individuate futurity and preterition; things possible, their possibility, &c. The instant at which any successive or permanent substance commences to be, is the principle of their individuation;

14. 91^a cō B. 17. r' between and above anima and actuaverit.
30. res rs' B. 38. fal B. 40. fit B.

Re-creation
is self-
contradictory;
so is
annihilation.

It is absurd to suppose that after dissolution the same form can return again; or that negative qualities are individuated by time.

These consequently have no real existence.

This solves the second objection, as to the infinite multitude of negatives; for it is eternally true that one negation is true at certain times, and in that there is no succession, as in created things.

There is a third action by which God produces a thing instantaneously; which action is also to be found in second causes.

Successiva tamen individuantur 2^m suas partes continuas a novo tempore; sed permanencia a primo sui instanti, et ab aliis quorum ipsum est principium. Ex quo videtur quod impossibile est aliquod ultimum singulare fieri prius atque posterius quam sic. Successiva 5 autem non possunt corrumpi prius aut posterius quam corrumpuntur, sed permanencia bene possunt et hoc. Sed impossibile est aliud recreari; et per idem videtur nichil posse annichilar. |

Et patet impossibilitas casuum quibus ponitur quod B 88^b idem ultimum singulare forme substancialis vel accidentalis absolute vel respective redeat post sui corruptionem; et per consequens non redit eadem negacio in numero, potissime cum nulla potest incipere vel desinere. Ex quo videtur quod nulla negacio individuatur 15 a tempore, tum quia non potest esse individua respectu sue speciei, tum eciam quia omnis negacio videtur esse communis in finitis a tempore. Ergo videtur nullam negacionem habere esse, cum quelibet sit eterna, quamvis vicissim habeant diversas causas per accidens. 20

Et patet responsio ad 2^m, superius suadens multitudinem talium negacionum. Unde, si sto postquam sedi, non est verum quod non sedeo, sed est eternaliter verum quod non nunc sedeo, quamvis habeant diversam causam. Talia enim fiunt continue, et si non consistant 25 in successione, sicut omnia creata sunt de quanto conservantur in esse; ut Sor facit Platonem fore episcopum; sicut et multa alia prius fecerant et facient in futurum. Unde deus simpliciter facit qualibet partem mundi, non solum quia eternaliter wult illam esse ad 30 intra, sed quia facit illam esse ad extra, dum ex eterna voluntate necessitat illam esse.

Est tamen dare 3^{am} faciem quia Deus subito facit opus, que facienda desinit esse quando opus incipit esse. Et tales facientes est dare in causis 2^{is}, tam 35 respectu affirmacionum quam negacionum. Unde miro modo negacio eterna fit, nunc ab uno corruptibili et nunc ab alio, sicut contingit successivum fieri et quolibet corruptibile. Unde existencia mea in B loco facit me non esse extra B; et tamen illud fuit factum eter- 40 naliter ab illo qui fecit me non esse.

8. si pro sed B. 36. mi's B.

Et ex istis patet quid tenendum est, 2^{mo} meum *videre*, in dubio, et quomodo respondendum est argumentis. Non enim est inconveniens, sed verum, quod idem commune potest redire, intendi, et remitti. Nam 5 quecunque veritas primo significata per oracionem infinitivam est communis ad infinita; ut *me currere*, vel *esse calidum* est commune ad *me currere* isto cursu, vel isto, vel isto; et sic de similibus; et *me esse calidum* ista caliditate, vel ista; et sic de similibus. Est 10 tamen dare singularia significata per abstracta; quibus accipiunt infinita actu; que omnia ponuntur de infinitiva oracione contracta.

Sed pro individuatione privacionum, notandum quod individuantur a suis privativis, ut a subiecto et tempore, 15 et a quibuscumque suis principiis, saltem 2^m esse intelligibile: ut alia est privacio A materie et alia privacio B materie, propter diversitatem subiectorum; et aliud est materiam carere B forma et aliud est ipsum carere C forma, quia B forma differt a C forma 2^m esse possibile; et per idem individuantur a tempore sicut sua positiva. Ex isto videtur quod quies habet partes successivas 2^m quas mensuratur tempore, sicut motus. Nam unaqueque pars motus nata est opponi sue proprie quieti; ut motus B tempore mensuratus 25 non potest opponi, nisi quieti pro eodem tempore. Unde B 89^a opposicio vel repugnancia inter significata | non ponit illa ambo simul existencia; sed unum ponit et aliud destruit. Ex quo patet quod quies est longa 2^m longitudinem temporis, habens partes successivas temporis 30 correspondentes; et per consequens impossibile est quietem esse sine tempore, si non equivoce sit quies. Sed istis satis.

Contra predicta de bonitate consequentie arguitur. Videtur enim sequi ex dictis, quod homo sit asinus, vel 35 quodlibet volitum, probari. Nam *si ista consequentia est*

Such is my opinion in this matter. It is quite true that the same universal quality can return again, and become more or less intense in its individuals.

As for the individuation of privative qualities, its principle is in that which they deprive — subject, time, &c: in different subjects, what is called the same privation is really different; rest as well as movement is measured by time.

Every movement has its opposite rest; so movement in a certain time is opposed to rest in that same time. Rest, properly so called, must take place in time.

Objection to the preceding doctrine.

35. This argument, as Wyclif himself says, serves to bring in the question *De Insolubilibus*, one of the most difficult points in logic at that time, and for which he proposes a special solution. It may be stated thus: *If the present proposition is true, you are an ass*; the defender must either deny or grant it. If he denies it, it follows that even if the proposition is true, he is not an ass; and thus he would at the same time be and not be that animal. If on the contrary, he grants it, he grants a very inconvenient proposition indeed.

If this consequence is good, you are an ass; meaning by this, the consequence of the present proposition and by consequence, either the power of concluding from one proposition to another, or the conclusion itself. candem consequenciam quam facio); potest enim consequencia duplamente significare vel pro habitudine qua veritas posterior formaliter sequitur ad priorem, sive inter signa, sive inter signata; vel pro illis veritatibus, sive sint signa sive signata. Et sic dicunt sophiste quod consequencia est proposicio antecedens et proposicio consequens cum nota consequentie. Et illa est bona, quando primarie significat necessitatem conditionalem. Et si suum significatum non fuerit talis necessitas, tunc dicitur talis consequencia non valere. Quibus modis loquendi suppositis, patent argumenta ad utramque partem; quia, si consequencia sit impossibilis et non valens, tunc cum paribus est antecedens impossibile; et sic, iuxta predicta, ipsum infert quodlibet consequens concludendum. Si dicatur quod ista consequencia est bona, tunc, cum veris, sequitur quod antecedens est verum, et sic consequens. Et conformiter argumentatur ad quodlibet volitum probare.

This introduces the grand question *De Insolubilitate*, to which there are very many answers, but six principal ones.

I. The first denies that any such proposition is either true or false. But can it be said to have no meaning? and if it has, it must be either true or false.

II. The second maintains that such propositions are true, but

Et hic introducitur materia de insolubilibus, in qua sunt tot opiniones, quot sunt fuge invenibiles movende in eadem; quod sine dubio attestatur super difficultatem materie.

Sunt ergo opiniones sex in ista materia plus famose, quorum prima dicit quod nullum insolubile est verum vel falsum. Sed ista tollitur, querendo de significato insolubilis, utrum sit vel non. Ut in communi casu: *utrum Sor dicit falsum vel non?* et cum nemo dubitabit divisionem datam per contradictoria, patet quod stat difficultas, etc. Si enim hec sit omnino individua, congrua, significans primarie sicut non est, tunc est falsa. Vel si negatur consequentia, supponatur illa significacio termini, vel queratur utrum hec: *Sor dicit falsum*, sit signum tale vel non. Potest enim cuiuslibet insolubilis materia trahi ad divisionem regulariter factam per contradictoria.

2^a via dicit quod omne insolubile est verum et falsum, falsificando se; sed illa tollitur, sicut prior, supponendo

1. tunc *in marg.* B. 17. vi's B. 21. mode B. 28, 29. negabit *in marg.* B. 30. *Idius* B. 35. *di'os* B.

28. Wyclif explains this further, pp. 167, 199. Socrates (or Sor) is supposed to be the only man of that name, and to utter this one proposition: *Sor dicit falsum*.

existenciam vel non existenciam significati primarii sufficere, et exigi ad hoc quod sit vera aut falsa. 2^o supponatur experientia certa quod insolubilia, sicut alie proposiciones primarie, significant iuxta extensionem terminorum; et tunc patet contradiccionem sequi, querendo si ex parte rei sit ita in communi casu quod Sor decipitur vel non. Et patet per communem deductionem quod, quecunque pars detur, sequitur oppositum: ut, si decipitur et solum credit quod ipse decipitur, ut pono, tunc non est ita quod decipitur; et si non decipitur et credit precise quod decipitur, tunc credit sicut non est; et omnis talis et solummodo talis supponitur decipi: et ita contingit argumentare in aliis.

Tercia opinio ponit nullam partem supponere pro B 89^b toto cuius est pars. Et sic | dicit quodlibet insolubile significare exceptive: ut, posito quod ista solum sit proposicio: *Nulla proposicio est vera*, sic primarie significando tunc dicit quod illa significant quod *nulla alia ab ista est vera*; et correspondenter dicit in aliis casibus quibuscumque. Sed contra illud est veritas quod pars supponit pro continuo, et per consequens pro toto cuius est pars. Ymmo in ista, *omne ens est*, supponit subiectum pro omni quod potest esse, et per consequens tam pro se quam pro tota propositione. Terminus universalitatem supponens supponit pro omni quod significant, ut alias declaravi. Cum ergo multe partes supponentes significant naturaliter se ipsas et sua tota, quare non supponerentur pro illis? Sicut ergo hec proposicio scripta, *hoc est falsum*, potest significare se esse falsum, sicut nullus dubitat; ita potest subiectum specialiter supponere pro ipsa propositione, cum significat illam; sicut quilibet pars significans significat suum totum. Nec dubium quin contingit in universalis intelligere subiectum huius proposicionis, *propositio est falsa*, sine contracta connotacione, eque ipsa sola existente propositione, sicut multis aliis existentibus cum illa. Ymmo si sic significaverit: *omnis proposicio alia ab ista est falsa*, tunc subiectum significant et supponit pro ista excepcione, cum proposicio exceptit *illam esse falsam*. 40 Non enim consonat huic vie quod subiectum supponat pro illis solummodo, pro quibus proposicio verificatur;

falsity themselves. But again have they any meaning? if so, they cannot be both true and false.

And, e. g. a man must either be mistaken or not;

if he is mistaken and thinks he is, he is no longer so; and if not mistaken and thinks he is, he is mistaken.

III. The third affirms that a part cannot stand for the whole; that every 'insoluble' accordingly has the meaning of an exceptive proposition.

No proposition is true, must mean except this very proposition. But this part stands for a universal whole, and therefore it also stands for itself.

The proposition: Whatever is, is stands for itself too.

In the written proposition, This is false, this may mean the proposition itself.

And the words, *propositio est falsa*, have quite a universal meaning,

and do not signify that every proposition, but the present one is false. It is impossible that the subject should stand only for such individual cases as would verify the proposition. And in such a case *A is A* would be false, for *A* (subject) would no longer be the same as *A* (predicate). It is, moreover, quite possible to affirm what is false, the falsity being in the mind alone; and at the same time to believe that no such thing can exist in the mind.

IV. The fourth denies that in such cases there is any signification that agrees with the terms; thus there is a primary signification different from what the words imply, and impossible to be known by them.

This is a mere sophistical evasion; that alone is false which is false, and if I do not know it to be so, I cannot affirm it as such.

quia sic dicto, *falsum est*, supponeret subiectum huius proposicionis false in casu communi, non pro falso quod *est*, sed pro falso quod *non est*; quod contradicit rudimentis de suppositione. Ymmo, sic dicto, *propositio est proposicio*, predicatum non esset possibile esse⁵ synonymum cum subiecto, quia pro una parte proposicionis significat, pro qua reliqua non potest significare. Et tamen potest significare pro se et vero, que sunt illa *propositio pro qua negatur posse supponere*. Nec dubium quin contingit terminum fieri proposicionis¹⁰ partem prius apprehense per illam, ignorante apprehendente. Unde ergo non significaret sicut prius? Contingit etiam hominem componere quod *falsum est*, ipsa sola existente ad intra, cum hoc quod credat nullam talem rem esse in anima, sicut vulgus et multi¹⁵ clerici credunt. Sed quis dubitat quod sit contingens the mind alone, ut, sic concipiendo, appropriate apprehendit illam pretensionem? non enim cogitat de hoc. Non ergo oportet multum insistere ad refellendum hanc fugam.

^{4^o} via dicit quod repugnat insolubile significare²⁰ precise primarie sicut termini pretendunt. Ideo sequitur in communibus casibus quod insolubile significat primarie aliter quam pretendetur de famosa significacione, sed casus non certificat quomodo aliter. Unde concedit insolubilia, sed negat illa esse vera, quia quamvis significacio communis talium insolubilium sit vera, tamen habent aliam significacionem falsam, sicut sequitur ex casu. Ideo sunt concedenda esse falsa propter illam ignotam significacionem. Et tamen sunt concedenda propter significacionem cognitam.³⁰

Sed ista via, inter alias, est pure fuga sophistica. Gradus certe experientie, qua scimus quod solum primarie concipimus per talem, *falsum est quod falsum est*. Ymmo non esset possibile illam significare primarie michi aliter, nisi innotescat michi quare sit aliter, cum significare sit "movere veritatem apprehensivam"; et apprehensio hominis est sibi notissima, cum actus anime sint per se noti, et potissime actus connotandi. | Quo modo, rogo, exponerem distincte copulative quod *Sor dicit falsum*, et uno alio modo, cum hoc quod non⁴⁰ haberem experientiam de significacione alia? Oportet

13. *quod* phone' B. 37. *et pro cum* B. 39. *cum* B.

enim sub quadam habitudine illud absconditum significatum significari; et habitudo copulandi est maxime pertinens cum, propter illud significatum, est insolubile falsum. Sed utrum possibile vel impossibile, hoc nescit 5 sic opinans. Si enim disiunctive significaret, vel condicionaliter, vel alio modo ypotetico, tunc non respondendum esset regulariter, sicut docet hec posicio.

We must make a copulative proposition out of this 'insoluble' one, of which we grant the first part and deny the second; but it is impossible to expound it thus, if we do not know the second sense, nor even whether it is possible or impossible.

Caret eciam omni ratione quod propter proposicionem desinentem esse Rome, me latente, ero coactus ad to eliciendum novum actum apprehendendi distinctum, quem ego ignoro; ut opinio concedit, posito quod A sit ista proposicio: *homo est asinus*, Rome impossibilis, et B: ista: *in mente mea falsum est*, sicut precise significans ipsis solis existentibus; tunc, si cum paribus 15 corrumpatur A proposicio Rome, manente solum B in mente mea, naturaliter significante, significabit, me invito, aliter quam prius. Unde, queso, principium movens ipsam ad sic faciendum? Multi eciam sunt casus insolubilium in quibus non satisfacit illa evasio.

20 5^a via singit diffuse quod nulli tali termino 2^e im- V. The fifth positionis, verum, falsum, proposicio, terminus etc. says that terms correspondere potest intencio universalis; sed compo- of the second nendo quod *Sor dicit falsum*, oportet singulariter in- imposition (true, false, proposition,&c.) telligere proposicionem falsam, que concipitur *Sor* have no dicere; ut sic: *Sor dicit illam proposicionem: homo est meaning, but asinus, que significat primarie aliter quam est.* in particular instances.

Sed revera ista fuga non minus contradicit experien- But this cie quam proxima, cum caret omni ratione diversitatis evasion contradicts experience as ponere quod terminis prime impositionis possunt cor- much as the former one. There is no respondere intenciones reales, et non terminis 2^e im- reason to deny a general meaning to these terms. And there are many 30 positionis. Quis enim non credit quod multe sunt proposiciones in mundo quas ipse ignorat esse? iuxta illud wulgatum sophisma: *tum scis aliquam proposicionem esse veram quam ignoras esse reram*. Et certum est quod 35 hoc non posset sustineri, nisi ponendo actus ac inten- propositions of which a man may be ignorant; so there must be a universal signification to the word.

7. r^{sa}et^t B; ib. pō B. 12. roune B. 17. alit' alr' B. 28. du^rφ B.
33. for(or fo^a :) B.

8. *Caret*. The whole of this proposition seems so unintel- ligible that I fancy the text is corrupt, though the grammatical construction does not appear very faulty.

And when we say that of two contraditories, one is true; we do not give a precise individual meaning to 'one'. contingencium est verum: *rex sedet vel nullus rex sedet*, quamvis nec sic credit illam, *rex sedet*, esse veram, nec reliquam. Nam, sciendo me sic habere illas significantes, puto me scire quod altera illarum est vera, et de neutra illarum sic scio quod illa est vera,⁵ cum utramque illarum dubito, sicut dubito que illarum est vera. Ubi patet sic componendo: *altera illarum est vera*, nec singulariter compono pro prima quod illa sit vera, nec singulariter pro 2^a; quia tunc non assentiret compositioni mee.¹⁰

Aristotle and Boetius give general rules for propositions; so the word 'proposition' has a general meaning. The very enunciation of this theory implies this belief in a general meaning.

Again logicians dispute as to what a proposition is, some saying that every sentence is one, another that it must signify something true or false.

In each case there would be contradiction, if there were no such thing as a proposition in general.

Similiter, auctores tradunt regulas universales de propositionibus; ut patet per Aristotelem et Boecium, describentes proposiciones: ubi nemo dubitat quod ipsi non intendebant singulariter proposiciones suas describere, sicut nec sic opinans, ponens pro conclusione quod nulli 15 propositionum correspondet intencio simplex, nec simpli- citer negat pro illa que est in mente sua, nec pro illa que est in mente mea; quia sic non esset conclusio alicuius efficacie pro intento. Et si dicatur quod sic componit, non illa proposicio: *deus est in mente mea*,²⁰ habet intencionem simplicem sibi correspondentem, nec aliqua proposicio sibi similis. Quero qualis intencio correspondet | subiecto secunde propositionis; si uni- B 90^b versalis, contradicit regule impositionis; singularis, non probatur nisi de illis 2^bus quod non correspondet illis 25 intencio universalis. Et cum isti termini, nomen, verbum, etc. sint termini 2^e intentionis, repugnat quod illis correspondeat talis universalis intencio.

Similiter est dissensio apud logicos quid requiritur ad esse propositionis, cum unus ponit propositionem 30 quam reliquus non ponit esse propositionem; ut unus ponit quidlibet esse propositionem, alias quamlibet oracionem individuam veram vel falsam ponit propositionem; et sic opinans ponit omne connexum in anima et solum tale esse propositionem. Modo quod-35 libet illorum clauderet contradictionem, si non posset esse intencio communis de propositione. Nam sic dicto,

quodlibet signum in anima, significans verum vel falsum, est proposicio, elicetur iste sensus; *quodlibet tale signum significans deum esse vel hominem esse asimum est hoc*;⁴⁰ quia iuxta istam viam sequitur: utrumque illorum est proposicio; ergo, utrumque illorum est hoc.

7. alta B. 8 fin^r B. 31. net; np^t in marg. B

Unde talia sunt incongrua vel impossibilia: *Omnis proposicio est, multe sunt proposiciones, ego credo quod tu habes propositionem in mente tua; et sic de similibus.* There are also other absurdities.

Sed ista haberent concedere in casu: *omnis proposicio est omnis proposicio, quamvis proposicio tua differt a proposicione mea, ego habeo omnem propositionem,* et sic de multis frivolis, quarum deduccio esset stulcior quam est posicio.

Nimis ergo profundaret se sic opinans pro fundamento solucionis insolubilium stabiliendo, quia negando intenciones universalium fluctuaret in respondendo in propria materia, sicut edificium constructum super aquas. Singularia enim, propinqua divisioni, et incerta sicut aqua, non fundant scienciam propriam obiective.

15 Sexta via ponit in quolibet insolubili 3 concurrere, primo, casum facti; 2º, antecedens vel causacionem: et 3º consequens ex 2º. Ut, posito quod unus Sor sit omnis Sor qui dicat solum quod ipse non est albus, hoc totum est casus facti; et quando adiungitur quod 20 quicunque dixerit verum quod sit albus, hoc est antecedens vel causacio ad esse album, quod est naturaliter consequens causacionem illam; tunc tenet ista posicio pro regula generali quod *omne naturale antecedens est prius pro aliqua mensura quam suum consequens;* ut esse 25 album, in casu posito, sequitur in fine prolacionis sicut talis motus ipsum consequitur. Et ita dicit insolubile esse verum post causacionem et falsum ante causacionem, et per ista tria inventa in quolibet insolubili solvit generaliter insolubilia. Nam primo sunt falsa, vel 30 neque vera neque falsa, et in fine erunt vera. Ideo oportet diligenter notare mensuram pro qua opponens querit utrum insolubilia sunt vera vel falsa.

Contra illud sunt multe instance. Primo enim videtur quod impossibile sit hominem esse album propter dicere 35 talis propositionis, sicut et impossibile est solam obviam esse causam libertatis. Et sic generaliter in omnibus

This opinion can, therefore, give no stable foundation to explain the 'insolubles', because singulars have no coherence, and no theory can be based on them.

VI. The sixth distinguishes in every such proposition the fact itself, its antecedent and its consequent.

Ex. gr.

1. Whoever speaks the truth is white.
 2. A says he is not white;
1. is the antecedent;
2. is the fact;
and to be white is the consequent.

These propositions are false or doubtful, considered before the antecedent is applied, and afterwards true.

Objections:

13. di'oni B. 31. pp dice⁸ B.

32. The first conclusion is: *A says he is not white; if so, he does not speak the truth.* The second conclusion is: *If he does not speak the truth, saying he is not white, then he is white.* The solution would consist in asking the opponent how he understands the proposition? As merely containing the first conclusion, or as containing the second too?

1. This theory casibus insolubilium implicatur pro causa quod non makes the mere meaning of a proposition to be the cause of its objective truth or falsity: which is impossible. Ut dicere istius proposicionis: *Sor 5 dicit falsum*, non implicatur per communem casum esse causam quare illa sit vera; quia tunc esset vera sine correspondencia veritatis significate. | B 91^a

2. The antecedent successively enunciated, is never together with its consequent;

so at the end the cause of the consequent exists no longer, and, therefore, can cause nothing, and if we take an indivisible instant and ask if the 'insoluble' is then true or false, this theory can give no reply,

for its upholders do not admit that continuity is composed of things without magnitude.

3. If this proposition be at a certain time neither true nor false, it must be neither granted nor denied; and yet at this time its meaning disagrees with reality. Suppose time composed of instants: we can conceive a case in which the proposition, according to

Similiter, iuxta responcionem, tale *dicere* successivum pro nullo instanti temporis simul erit cum suo causato 10 consequente, eo quod nullum successivum potest esse in suo fine temporale, et per consequens non pro instanti tali determinato erit proposicio vera postquam fuit falsa, vel econtra: et per consequens in fine non erit causa quare proferens est albus. Non enim est 15 possibile quod illud quod non est quicquam causet. Loquamur ergo de eodem instanti temporis, mensurante causam et eius causatum; et queratur si pro illo instanti sit insolubile verum vel falsum, et stant tunc raciones communes insolutes. Et ex isto patet quod 20 distincio quam ponit de *dicere* nichil facit. Ponit enim quod aliud est *dicere* successivum principale quali vocaliter dicitur proposicio et aliud est *dicere* consecutivum quali in finem dicetur proposicio quando erit vera. Nam 2^m illam viam nullum continuum componitur 25 ex non quantis in fine; ergo non erit illud successivum, quia tunc erit dictum, factum, vel causatum. Ergo tunc non erit aliquod eius *dicere* vel aliqua eius causacio. De vocali ergo proposione, et non mentali, tunc primo genita est nobis sermo, retorquendo omnes responsiones 30 ad illud instans pro quo est talis proposicio sic quante significans.

Ulterius dicit ista responsio in particulari quod proposicio insolubilis pro tempore sue causacionis nec est vera nec falsa, et per consequens nec pro tunc concedenda vel neganda, quamvis pro tunc significat aliter quam est. Ymmo, ut dicit, si tempus per yimaginacionem componeretur ex instantibus, et maneat per illud idem tempus talis proposicio in anima, *ego concipio falsum cum tali negativa: "hoc non est rerum"*, foret continua 40 eius mutacio de veritate in falsitatem, et econtra; quia

omnis talis negativa in priori instanti foret vera et in proximo instanti falsa; et omnis talis affirmativa econtra in priori instanti foret falsa et in proximo instanti vera; sic quod continue per idem tempus alternatim esset mutacio a veritate in falsitatem, et econtra.

the hypothesis,
would be
continually
changing from
true to false.

Et addit responsio, quod si pro signando instanti ponitur talem propositionem, *A non est verum*, fore verum, non sequitur ex hoc *A* pro illo instanti significare sicut est, sed pocius oppositum, cum “significare sicut est” est causa quare *A* est verum. Et sic est in proximo instanti precedentie; et conformiter si pro hoc instanti significat aliter quam est, non ex hoc est falsum pro illo instanti, sed incipit esse falsum pro instanti proxime futuro.

A further position of those who answer thus is that if a given proposition, *A is not true*, is supposed true at a certain moment, it would not follow that *A* would signify according to reality at that moment, that would entail its falsity only for the succeeding instant. All this is beside the mark and implies that natural priority causes succession; it may well exist without succession at all; as in the case of cause and effect.

15 Istud autem dictum est multum extraneum; primo, in hoc quod ponit ordinem prioritatis naturalis causare successionem. Nam tota prioritas naturalis est simul pro eodem instanti temporis, sicut prius et posterius in natura; aliter enim non esset possibile quod pro 20 aliquo instanti temporis causatum simul sit cum sua causa. Et tunc vel pro hoc instanti deus et quelibet alia causa non esset, vel pro eodem instanti nullum causatum esset. Sequitur eciam quod nulla successiva proposicio potest esse vera vel falsa; quia “significare 25 sicut est vel sicut non est” antecedit per instans denominacionem esse rei; ut dicere et taliter significare concomitantur illam toto tempore sui esse.

Videtur eciam quod anima, eadem propositione permanente, omni motu subducto, caret successione; quia 30 prioritatem et posterioritatem temporis continue uniformiter componendo sic ex integro falsum; ubi non est singenda racio diversitatis instantium, nec racio quare in uno illorum instantium foret talis proposicio pocius vera vel falsa quam in quolibet illorum. Nam 35 proposicio, solum manendo per instans, foret vera vel falsa cum “significare precise primarie sicut est vel sicut non est” sit sufficiens causa talis denominacionis.

1. falsa pro vera B. 26. veri pro rei(?) B. 20. subducta B.
37. iffus B.

31. The text as it stands has no sense. This, if owing to missing words, is all the more regrettable because the words would perhaps have given a clue to the rest of the paragraph, which I have failed to understand.

Quomodo ergo explicaretur denominacio usque ad non esse subiecti? Habita ergo continue tali causa non foret differenter nunc vera et nunc falsa. | Et ex eodem B. 9^a^b videtur quod non stat eandem propositionem manere per tempus neque veram neque falsam, et tamen per idem tempus primarie significare sicut est vel sicut non est; specialiter cum instans temporis contineat tam prius quam posterius in natura.

There are other manners of eluding the difficulty.

1. By saying that a man is not, but is only called Socrates &c.

2. That successive speech or motion is impossible.

3. That, there being no succession, nothing can move, though it is possible to be moved.

4. That every proposition, as it primarily signifies itself, is true.

5. That no meaning of a proposition can be reflected upon itself at the same instant as it is considered separately.

6. That every negative signifies an affirmative negatively; and that an insoluble proposition is one of them.

7. That there is no truth at all in negatives.

8. That some such are true, and some are false.

Preter istas vias audivi multas evasiones; ut prima dicit quod non est possibile hominem esse Sortem vel 10 Platonem, quamvis vocetur taliter. 2^a dicit quod non est possibile loqui vel moveri successive. 3^a dicit quod non est possibile movere aliquo motu, quamvis possibile sit moveri sine motu, quia non est possibile successivum esse: et multo magis non est possibile propositionem 15 vocalem esse, cum tunc forent distincte voces que non possunt pro eodem instanti proferri. Et ille sunt fuge sophistice interrupentes doctrinam. 4^a dicit quod omnis proposicio significat seipsam primarie et sic verum. 5^a dicit quod non sunt responsiones vel denominaciones 20 propositionum retorquendo ad idem instans, cum hoc non sit possibile. 6^a dicit quod quelibet negativa principaliter et primarie significat affirmacionem, ut ista: *homo non est*, primarie significat *hominem esse*, sed negative, sicut ille terminus "inintelligibile" significat 25 intelligibile, sed privative; et per hoc evacuat insolubilia negativa. Ymmo dicit quod quelibet talis proposicio, *hec non est vera*, *hec non habet primarium significatum*, etc. primarie significat illam propositionem, et per consequens primarie significat illam esse: 7^{ma} negat 30 omnes veritates negativas; nec est possibile quod proposicio precise primarie aliqualiter significet, nec quod proposicio nunc significet uno modo et alias alio modo; quia significacio propositionis est eius forma. 8^{va} dicit altercando quod aliqua talis est vera, et aliqua talis est 35 falsa; et, posito quod una talis sit omnis talis, tunc vel dubitat quam opponens proponit, vel dicit quod repugnat casui aliquam talem esse propositam, vel 3^o distinguit infinite quamlibet talem.

Tales innumeris responsiones potest quis audire, 40 quas oportet cum solertia excludere, inmutando casus

successionis in casus de permanentibus; ut, posito "Sor videat vel intelligat istam, sic primarie significantem: Sor videt vel intelligit falsum?", et sic de similibus. Vel aliter petatur concorditer, gracia noscendi veritatem, talis modus loquendi; vel tertio directe vel oblique destruatur fundamentum evasionis, utendo veris verbis; quod est in pluribus onerosum.

Relictis istis ergo viis volentibus per ipsas incedere, suppono aliqua alibi declarata. Primo quod cuiuslibet 10 proposicionis vere pro suo significato significatum primarium est veritas. Istud patet; quia aliter non foret significatum proposicionis ipsam esse veram.

2º suppono quod ad contradiccionem, convertibilitatem, vel equipollenciam proposicionum, non sufficit 15 habitudo signorum, sed requiritur habitudo in modo significandi. Contradiccio enim non est nominis tantum, sed rei et nominis. Unde in multis talibus homo non intelligit, etsi voluerit, sensus equivocas sub eadem habitudine; ut nemo simul intelligit illam: nullum A 20 videt B, intelligendo distincte subiectum vel predicatum tam in nominativo quam in accusativo. Ideo non contradicunt talia, equivoce intellecta: nullum A videt B, et aliquod A videt B.

3º, supponatur quod cuiuslibet proposicionis vere pro 3. The primary
25 suo significato significatum primarium est veritas signifi-
catione per suum verbum principale, in comparacione
ad eius suppositum: ut ista proposicio, *Sor est*, pri-
B 92º marie | significat esse Sortem, quod est essencia Sortis,
et per consequens ipse Sor. Et hoc, *Sor moverit*, signi-
30 ficat primarie moveri Sor, quod est accidentis priori; quia
eius motus. Et sic de aliis verbis adiectivis, significanti-
bus accidencia inexistencia subiectis significatis per verba
substantiva. Et ex ipsis patet quod omne verbum signi-
ficiat substantivum copulacione, quia aliter aliquod esset
35 verbum singulare, et per consequens eius participium
esset pronomen.

4º, suppono quod omnis veritas 2ª mensuretur a prima, que deus est, et in latitudine illarum veritatum sunt tot gradus defectuum vel falsitatum quot sunt 40 gradus deficiencie a prima veritate. Et sic omnis veritas
creata est vera, quia prime veritati conformis, et falsa,

*Wyclif's
solution of the
difficulty:
preliminaries.*

1. The primary
signification of
every true
proposition is
truth.

2. Two
propositions
cannot
contradict each
other in form
alone; the sense
must be
contradictory
too.

3. The primary
signification of
every true
proposition is
the meaning of
the verb
together with
its subject,
and every verb
is a compound
of the verb
to be.

4. All created
truth is to
some extent
false, because,
compared with
the first truth,
which is God,
it falls short
of it to a
certain extent.

14. *e'els* B. 19. *nā* B. 31. *sm* *cōne* B. 35. verbum singulare
very illegible B; *ib.* *ppm* = pauperum (?) pro participium B.

There are thus quia ab illa defectiva. Sed restringendo sermonem ad three degrees in the truth of a signa notantur 3^s gradus famosiores quibus contingit proposition; it is true, 1st, in the vaguest sense, because it is what it is, i. e. a proposition, and consequently a being, and thus true. And the falsest proposition is true antecedently to its falsity. The opposite of truth in this sense is falsity as a mere negation, and every false proposition is true in this sense, falsity being grounded on truth.

2^o modo, largissime est proposicio vera, quia ens; nam ens et verum 2^m philosophos convertuntur. Nec est dictum 5 sine ratione; quia, si quicquam est, tunc *ipsum esse* est verum. Sed idem est *quodcumque ens esse* et *ipsum ens*. Ideo non dubium quin, si quicquam est res vel ens, ipsum est verum ens, vel vera res, et per consequens ipsum est verum. Ymmo, cum omne ens naturaliter 10 significat se esse, proposicio falsissima, cum sit ens, significat se esse naturaliter. Et non dubium quin principalius significat se esse quam significat illud falsum quod ex ordinacione hominis significat; quamvis illud quod principaliter intelligitur ex impositione per propositionem dicimus illa primarie significare: ut layco significat proposicio principaliter seipsam, et literato significat preter significanciam naturalem, veritatem quam imponitur significare: et tali primaria significacione suppono quod fiat locutio in presenti. Vero 20 autem isto modo dicto opponitur falsum contradictorie, ut dictum est in principio tocius tractatus. Sic ergo loquendo de vero, omnis proposicio falsa est proposicio vera. Unde peritissimi philosophi posuerunt falsitatem signi esse eius privacionem. que non plus potest esse 25 nisi in vero quam malicia potest esse sine bono.

A second meaning of truth implies that the proposition must agree with the meaning given to it, whether that be the proposition itself, dependent upon it, or wholly independent. This proposition is, merely affirms 2^o modo, paulo contraccius dicitur proposicio vera, propter veritatem quam primarie significat; sive ipsa veritas sit ipsamet, vel ab ipsa dependens, sive ens omnino distinctum; et isto modo sunt tales vere: *hec 30 proposicio est, hec proposicio significat, hanc proposicionem videt Sor, deus est, et similia.* Et isto modo descripta est proposicio vera in principio tractatus primi. Prima autem istarum 4 proposicionum exemplancium significat primarie ipsam proposicionem, quia eius 35 essenciam; et 2^a significat primarie eius accidentis, quia suum *significare*. 3^a significat primarie visionem activam Sortis causatam ex eius significacione; et 4^a significat principaliter essenciam divinam. Prima ergo istarum

16. *layco* (sic!) B. 17. *Irato* B.

17. *Layco*. I have sometimes met with the same word, evidently signifying *loyco* (*logico*). This would agree with the sense pretty well, if not for the *literato* which follows. 22. See Logica I, pag. 77.

propositionum solum in hoc superaddit quodlibet ens significandum, ut ipsa sit proposicio vera, et non quodlibet reliquum quod ipsa ex ordinacione hominis significat suum significatum. Sed ista causa est exilis, cum ordinacio nature sit prestancior ordinacione hominis. Vero autem isto modo dicto opponitur contrarie falsum, quod significat complexe primarie significatum quod non est, ut sunt tales; *homo est asinus, hec proposicio non est*, etc.

that it is something distinct from anything else. The opposite of truth in this sense is falsity as a contrary, in which the signification is affirmed wrongly.

¹⁰ Sed 3º specialiter dicitur proposicio vera, quando habet primarie significatum independens ab ipsa, ut sunt tales: *deus est, sol moretur*, etc. Et isto modo locutus est Aristoteles de propositione, dicens: in eo quod res est vel non est, quam proposicio primarie significat, ^{3. A proposition is true in the third sense, only when it has a primary signification that does not depend upon it.} ¹⁵ est ipsa vera vel falsa, et non propter mutationem factam in propositione. Et cum isto famoso modo intelligendi propositionem concordat ethymologia, qua proposicio dicitur a *pro alio posicio*. Unde intelligentes propositionem significative et proposicionaliter intelligunt ipsam significare significatum quod nec est ipsa proposicio nec ab ipsa dependens; quia aliter non esset propositione vera dicta relacio, que est adequatio significati primarii ad suum signum vel intellectum intelligentem. Nec aliter foret racio quare hoc foret proposicio: *hoc est* (demonstrando se ipsam) quin per idem quilibet res significans se ipsam esset proposicio. Et vero isto modo dicto opponitur contrarie falsum carens primarie significato, quod non est ipsum significans nec ab illo dependens, sicut sunt talia: *hec proposicio est, 30 significat, et movetur*, et similia que materialiter significant pro se ipsis. Et ex ipsis patet quod falsum isto modo est verum tam primo modo quam 2º. Patet eciam quod si quicquam est verum 3º modo, tunc est verum 2º modo; sed non econtra.

In this sense, therefore, the proposition stands for what is neither that proposition, nor depending upon it.

The opposite of truth is here its contrary; falsity; i. e. the absence of any meaning independent of the proposition itself.

This falsity is truth in the two former senses; and truth in the third comprises truth in the second sense.

³⁵ Istis premissis, dico quod omnia vocata communiter insolubilia sunt tam vera quam falsa. Claudit enim contradiccionem quod aliqua sit proposicio insolubilis; sed sicut illud cuius magnitudo est de diffcili noscibilis dicitur infinitum, ut profunditas maris, ita quecumque proposicio de diffcili solubilis, quam quis nescit solvere, dicitur sibi insolubilis, et specialiter proposicio significans affirmative vel negative pro se ipsa, ex cuius

I say that every 'insoluble' is both true and false. 'Insoluble' is a contradiction in terms, unless it merely signifies 'very difficult to solve', or 'insoluble for such and such persons'.

If we take
'true' in its
transcendental
sense, then
*this sign is
true.*: it is a
true sign is no
longer a
sophism.

The general
solution is that
these
propositions
are false in the
third sense, and
true in the
other two;
for they have
no meaning
whatever that
does not
depend upon
the proposition
itself.

Aristotle
says that a
man who
swears that he
is committing
perjury swears
truly; for there
is produced by
a reflex
influence, some
thing of
truth in these,
so that they are
verified in their
significations.
Again, take the
case of a
hypothetical
proposition;
the antecedent
is true in the
first and second
sense; but, as
the consequent
is impossible,
the whole
proposition is
false in the
third.
If an attempt
be made to
urge the matter
sylogistically,
we merely deny
that the
consequence is
good,

veritate sequitur illam esse falsam, et econtra. Nec est hic sophisma, *hoc signum est verum et est signum verum*, intelligendo istum terminum *verum* transcendentaliter quia in talibus non est sophisma, nisi accidentaliter coniungantur. ⁵

Per hoc patet solucio in particulari ad communia insolubilia. Nam, posito quod unus Sor sit omnis Sor, et quod solum istam propositionem dicat vel eius partem: *Sor dicit falsum*, sic primarie significando, patet quod Sor dicit falsum 3^o modo, quia propositionem ¹⁰ carentem significato primario independente ab illa; et in tanto habet rationem falsi vel vacui carencia talis significati. Manente ergo illa falsitate, gignit ipsa per suam significacionem quandam denominacionem que est vera 2^o modo. Et correspondenter dicitur de illis: *hoc est falsum*, scipso demonstrato; *ego cogito vel percipo falsum*. Et [sic] de hypotheticis ex talibus compositis.

Unde Aristoteles solvens talia 2^m quid et simpliciter dicit quod qui iurat se esse perjurum bene iurat, iurans hoc solum, quia non dubium quin talia reflectant super ²⁰ se quandam denominacionem esse veri, propter falsitatem presuppositam. Ideo dicuntur 2^m quid vera et 2^m quid falsa; unde ex suis significacionibus verificant se.

Conformiter dicitur quod ista condicionalis est impossibilis: *Si ista consequencia est bona, tu es asinus*, ²⁵ quia antecedens est verum non solum primo modo, sed etiam ²⁰ modo, et consequens est impossibile. Omnis enim consequencia est bona, sicut et omnis res. Et sic tam hoc antecedens quam hoc consequens est bonum et verum, sed non est bonum vel verum quod tu es ³⁰ asinus; quia non potest esse. Quod si queris utrum illa consequencia sit bona vel vera 3^o modo, dicitur quod non, sicut patet ex supradictis. Non enim est dare veritatem independentem ab illa quam ipsa primarie significat. Et si isto modo formatur consequencia: ³⁵ *Ista consequencia est bona 3^o modo: ergo, tu es asinus*, negatur consequencia, cum antecedens sit possibile et consequens impossibile. | Potest enim esse quod illa B. ^{93^a}

4. accir B. 17. sic d̄est B.

2. *Signum verum.* This is Aristotle's class of fallacies, *dictum simpliciter* and *dictum secundum quid*, as: *This shoemaker is good.*: he is a good shoemaker.

consequencia materialis aliter significet tam pro antecedente quam pro consequente. Ideo antecedens significat primarie de facto qualiter non potest esse. Nec valet responsio que ponit significacionem signi esse eius formam, cum sit illa [tam] accidentalis signo quam accidentale est michi quod sedeo. Non tamen est possibile quod ista consequencia sic primarie significans sit vera 3º modo. Ideo bene sequitur: *ista consequencia sic primarie significans est vera 3º modo: ergo, tu es asinus.*

10 Sed antecedens est improbabile.

Et conformiter respondeatur, negando istam consequiam tanquam impossibilem: *Sor decipitur et Sor credit quod ipse decipiatur: ergo, non est ita quod Sor decipitur;* quia sic credendo clauderet contradiccionem quod non deciperetur, intelligendo terminus ut logici communiter intelligunt tales. Sicut in simili non sequitur: *Sor periurat, et Sor iurat se periurare: ergo, non est ita quod ipse periurat.* Et excludantur eciam dubietates in Sor, cum hic forte dicetur quod aliquis 20 iurans verum, dum tamen dubitaret, illud male iuraret. Et adverte denominacionem veri in hiis, super se reflexam ex falsitate presupposita, in eis tunc est leve [dicere quod] Sor decipitur. nisi ipse decipiatur; quia tunc claudit contradiccionem quod non deciperetur, 25 intelligendo terminos ut logici communiter concipiunt.

Unde, posito quod Sor precise primarie credit quod aliquis homo decipitur, nullo alio homine aliqualiter existente, et quod omnis homo primarie credens falsum decipiatur, et solum talis; patet quod Sor decipitur, 30 cum proposicio credita ab illo careat significato independenti ab illa, cum illa sit causa quare Sor credit illam, et sic quare Sor decipiatur. Unde non conceditur ista consequencia de materia et forma, sed gracia terminorum: *iste homo credit quod aliquis homo decipitur,* 35 *ergo, aliquis homo decipitur.* Et, si ponatur quod nullus homo decipiatur qui credit verum, dicitur quod hoc repugnat casui, cum magna decepcionis vagari in propositionibus carentibus significatis independentibus ab eisdem. Unde quomodounque ponatur istum terminum, 40 *deceptor,* significare, multos homines possibile est decipi-

the antecedent having an impossible signification here;

or we may admit the consequence, taken with this signification, but deny the antecedent.

The answer to the question: *Can a man be deceived and believe that he is deceived?* is the same:

likewise to the question: *can a man be forsaken by swearing that he is forsaken?* setting aside the case of doubts that would render the oath a perjury.

The fact of Socrates believing that some man is deceived loses all independent signification if we suppose that there is no other man but he; and therefore is false.

If it is said that no one who believes the truth can be deceived, we reply that to be misled by propositions that have no sense independent of themselves is a great deception.

3. *no* potest B. 5. tam *deest* B. 15—16. *intelligendo — intelligent punctis deleta;* talis B. 22. *leve* B. 23. *dicere quod deest.* 28. *cre-*
dente *vero* existente B. 30, 31. *idependit* B.

It is quite possible to be deceived without actually believing anything; what is necessary is a disposition to believe what is false.

Case of a tyrant ordering that those and only those who speak the truth, shall pass over a bridge; what is to be done to a man who

says:

"I shall not pass it?"

The case is impossible, for it implies contradiction.

So, if God should ordain the first part, it would be impossible that the second should take place.

Either any ordinance of the first part is impossible, or merely not forthcoming, or no man will speak the above words.

As for the execution of the decree, the man should simply be made

to pass over

the bridge.

Case of a master who decrees of his slaves, A and B, that A is to be free if the first person he meets is a slave; B is to be free if the first person he meets is free;

et esse deceptos, cum hoc quod nichil actualiter credant: ut omnis male agens est deceptus, quia movetur assentiendo alicui tanquam bono quod non est sic bonum; et ista est magna decepcion. Nichil tamen decipitur nisi habeat dispositionem ad credendum falsum: ut incon-⁵ tinens credit vel in actu vel in habitu quod expedit prosequi delectabile, cum omnis sic malus sit ignorans.

Et per ista patet responsio ad casus quibus ponitur condicionaliter quod, *si quis dixerit verum, pertransibit pontem, et aliter non;* et quod *Sor solum dicat primarie¹⁰ quod ipse non pertransibit pontem;* talem enim deordinationem posset tyrannus possessor pontis constituere et casualiter veniens sic dicere. Verumptamen conditionalis est impossibilis, sicut universalis ponens quod quicunque dixerit veritatem pertransibit pontem. Est¹⁵ enim impossibile quod omnis transiens hodie per hanc viam, et dicens propositionem veram 3^o modo, pertransibit A ponte et solum talis, et quod Sor transiens hodie per hanc viam dicat solum primarie quod ipse non pertransibit A pontem. Hoc enim tacite includit B^{93^b} contradiccionem. Ideo, si deus ordinaverit universalem primam partem casus, repugnat quod Sor sic veniens ita dicat. Ideo, vel est impossibile quod deus sic ordinet, propter impossibilitatem et irrationabilitatem ordinacionis; vel 2^o quod deus [non] sic ordinavit et potest²⁵ esse quod deus sic ordinavit, vel 3^o quod talis ordinatio impediret Sor ad sic veniendum et dicendum. Sed primum istorum est michi probabilius. Et si queratur quid procurator tyranni faceret cum Sor in casu superiorius posito, dico quod exequendo vim vocis sive 3^o statuti faceret Sor pertransire pontem, cum Sor dicat verum. Et si gravetur casus quo usque fiat impossibilis, dico tunc quod utendum est epykeya.

Et ex istis patet quod impossibile est tyrannicum dominum ordinare de Sor et Platone servis suis, quod si 35 primus cui ipse obviaverit fuerit servus, tunc Sor erit liber et aliter non: et econtra de Platone; si primus cui ipse obviaverit fuerit liber, tunc Plato erit liber, et

4. ¹¹ in B.

25. non deest B.

20. non sic B.

27. dd^m B.

34. tyc^m B.

8. *Et per ista.* This paragraph and the following may throw some light on the allusions in *De Apostasia* (pag. 34, ll. 23—31) which I did not then understand very well.

aliter non: et obvient isti sibi ipsis primo in B instanti; and it happens
 tunc, si in B instanti cum istis paribus Sor fuerit liber,
 sequens est ex posito quod Plato pro illo instanti erit
 servus. Et sequitur ex opposito cum illo dato, quod
 5 Plato tunc erit liber, cum tunc obviaverit primo libero.
 Sed quamvis 2^m logicum non sit possibile quod talis
 sit ordinacio, sicut nec est possibile quod talis
 quis ex sola carta fiat liber vel servus: tamen difficultas
 est quid fieret 2^m legem politicam, tyranno manu-
 10 mittente illos servos sub illa condicione et residuo
 contingente, ut positum est; dicitur quod logico non
 est difficultas, quia condicionalis est impossibilis, vel
 casus gravatus habebit partes incompossibles, sicut
 proximus. Secundum vero ius humanum rationabile
 15 videtur quod uterque fiat liber, eo quod iura faveant
 libertati et domino deficiet probacio ad detinendum
 eos in servitute; cum, domino affirmante quod pro primo
 instanti obvie alter fuerit servus, redarguetur ex propria
 confessione evidente quod ex hoc tunc uterque erit
 20 liber. Quecunque ergo pars probaverit partem suam
 induceret oppositum. In tali ergo casu utendum est
 epykeya, quid racio iudicaret pro utilitate reipublice;
 et illud est faciendum.

Patet etiam ex hiis dictis et tractatu proximo quod
 25 satis possibile est te scire sciencia actuali solum istas
 tres propositiones, *deus est, homo est, animal est*, et
 omnem propositionem quam nunc scis per horam post
 hoc scies, istis sic primarie significantibus. Nam iuxta
 prius dicta falsum scitur, sicut cognoscitur; sicut enim
 30 scio hominem falsum, sic scio vel cognosco quod hoc
 est signum falsum. Verumtamen eius significatum non
 scio, quia non est; et quod non est non scitur; et si
 ponatur cum casu, *Nullam propositionem sciri nisi cuius*
significatum primarium scitur, patet scientibus obliga-
 35 ciones quod post impositionem stabit responsio sicut
 prius, cum ad esse rei est respondendum. Ymmo
 sophista diceret quod claudit contradiccionem sic scire
 3^{am} propositionem, que sit C, sicud clauderet contra-
 diccionem quod eius significatum maneat per tantum
 40 tempus. |

the case is
 logically
 impossible;
 but the legal
 difficulty

should be met
 by setting
 free both
 A and B,
 because the
 law is in
 favour of
 liberty, and
 the master has no
 convincing
 proof of a
 right to
 keep either of
 them.

Case of three
 propositions
 actually known
 at a given time.

9. tuō B. 22. epybeya? B. 26. est after animal deest B. 30. hō B.
 38. fā B.

Note that there
are many sorts
of propositions,
according to
what they
denote.

Some cannot
be true in their
primary
signification,
although
another with
the same
meaning may
be true.

Some cannot
be false, and
yet a
convertible
proposition
may be so.

And thus
insoluble
propositions
are not
absolutely
convertible with
others,
for *This is
false* (meaning
this very
proposition)
cannot be true;
and *This is
false* (meaning
the preceding
proposition)
may be quite
true.

Their diversity
proceeds from
their mode of
signification,
the second
referring to an
object
independent of
itself.

But it is not
every difference
as to the mode
of signification
that causes this
diversity;
a proposition
may be true for
many men, and
yet false, if
meant for me
and not
corresponding
with its
meaning: as:
I see this,
(written down)
may be
understood in
the first person
or in the third
by one who
reads it.

Unde nota diligenter quod sunt multe manieres pro- B 94^a
posicionum pro suis denominacionibus capescendis. Ali-
qua enim est proposicio que non potest esse vera pro
suo significato primario, sed sua convertibilis bene
potest; ut patet de ista in mente mea: *Ego non sum*,^b
et de ista: *hec proposicio non est* (seipsa demonstrata);
et sic de similibus, quarum significata non possunt esse,
nisi ipsi non sint. Et econtra aliique sunt propositiones
que non possunt sic significando esse false, sed sue
convertibiles bene possunt; ut patet de tali in mente 10
mea, *ego sum*; et de talibus, *hoc est*, vel *significat*, vel
est verum (ipsomet demonstrato). Et hinc bene dicitur
in materia insolubilium quod insolubile significans pro
se ipso non in toto convertitur cum alio consimili de
terminis synonymis; ut hec proposicio, *hoc est falsum*,^c
est vera primo modo et 2^o, et est falsa 3^o, cum solum
significat pro se ipsa, quod est falsa, et vera alia de
similibus terminis, *hoc est falsum*, foret vera simpliciter
pro priori, cum significaret veritatem que esset inde-
pendens ab illa; et tamen primaria significata propter 20
oposiciones non esset diversa, sed modi significandi.
Utraque enim esset vera et convertibilis cum reliqua;
sed prima esset falsa qualiter 2^a non esset falsa. Nec
est inconveniens, duorum simpliciter convertibilium,
unum esse simpliciter verum et aliud falsum, dum 25
significando pro se ipsa careat veritate independente
ab ipsa, reliqua significans primarie illud idem, habeat
suum primarium significatum independens ab ipsa.

Verumtamen non omnis variacio in modo significandi
causat diversitatem talem, sicut facit variacio in signi- 30
ficando materialiter, vel significative. Nam stat A esse
propositionem que quotlibet hominibus potest signi-
ficare, et tamen esset falsa, significando cuicunque
sicut modo significat, si non michi taliter significaret;
ut patet de ista scripta: *ego video hoc* (me demon- 35
strando per subiectum). Quilibet enim alias, intelligens
subiectum sub habitudine prime persone, intelligeret
aliud per subiectum quam ego intelligo. Et quilibet
intelligens ipsam sub habitudine 3^e persone habet alium
modum intelligendi subiectum, eo quod pronomen ideo 40
est prime persone quod singulariter significat ipsum

apprehendens sub habitudine qua ipsum apprehendit. Sequitur enim: *I*y “ego” significat me singulariter et est prime persone: ergo, ego apprehendo ipsum. Verbum autem ideo est prime persone, quia subiectatur pro nomine prime persone. Stat ergo in talibus modum loquendi variari, stante idemtitate significati cum convertente; ut patet de istis: *ego sum*, et *hoc est*; et stat modum significandi manere conformem, variatis significatis et equivalencia. Et patet de istis duabus: *ego sum, ego sum*; quarum prima est michi prime persone et 2^a Sorti.

Thus, though the form is the same, the sense changes, so that *I am*, becomes equivalent to *This being is*. And *I am* has a different sense on the lips of different men.

Aliqua autem est proposicio possibilis cui nec est alia secum convertibilis; potest esse vera pro dato significato, ut patet de talibus: *Nulla proposicio est, nullum signum alicui significat, omne apprehensivum actualiter differt ab actualiter apprehendente, nichil cogitat per dispositionem sibi accidentalem*; et sic de similibus, quarum significata posita tollunt veritatem propositionis. Unde, si sophista velit cognoscere deum suum, capiat pro regula quod solum illud quod omnem veritatem potest cognoscere est deus. Nam 2^m theologos potest esse verum quod nulla creatura sit, quod solum deus est intelligens, qui nichil intelligit nisi distincte, sine actu distincto vel iuvamine alterius. Talia enim B 94^b non potest aliud | a deo cognoscere propter repugnanciam.

Certain propositions that cannot be converted into others may be true in a certain sense, even though that sense destroys their truth; v. g. God's eternal act, if understood in that way.

Quocunque ergo nostrum significato, est dare quotlibet veritates quas non possumus cognoscere; ut ego non possum distincte cognoscere quod oblitus sum 30 omnia que scivi, quod nichil scio, quod cesso ab omni actu intelligendi, et sic de similibus. Et hoc sine dubio arguit imperfeccionem intellectus; quia nos indigemus tot ycraciis ad nostram noticiam, quod multas veritates non possumus cognoscere, nisi destrueremus illas. Noticia vero dei ex parte sui solum ipsum ponit, et ideo 35 omnia potest cognoscere. Unde multa eternaliter cognoscunt omnem veritatem, que non omnem veritatem possunt cognoscere, et 2^m theologos aliquis homo omnem veritatem potest scire, et tamen infinite veritates non possunt sciri ab illo homine, nisi fuerunt

There is an indefinite multitude of truths that we cannot know, as to know what we forget, &c. which argues imperfection in our minds.

God's knowledge in the infinite simplicity of its objects, comprises all.

A man may know all truth, and yet all truths cannot be known by him.

2. significans B. 10. m' pro michi B. 12. que pro cui B. 16. n^l B.
9. d'm B. 33. ycc^Ys B. 35. non solum B.

chymera nescia, quod verificatur de exemplo quod ponunt: posse desinere esse hominem, etc.

And though God teaches all truth there are infinite truths that He cannot teach or reveal to me; for instance, that I shall be damned; and there are truths that neither God nor man can know; to know them would be the total destruction of everything.

Yet God can know all truth; and, therefore, it is false to say that absolute non-existence is conceivable. It is equally absurd to suppose a time in which nothing begins to exist, even in the absurd hypothesis of annihilation. So that time and succession, once posited, must continue to exist.

Some truths are to be known only at a given instant, if we do not take the wide sense of the words; this happens particularly for the truth of propositions in the second and third sense. Some truths, to be known, require to be experienced, and are conditional, like a bribe given

Infinitas veritates deus non potest revelare vel docere, quamvis necessario docet omnem veritatem; nam ipse non potest revelare quod nichil revelat vel 5 docet, sicut nec revelare michi quod non sum; quod nichil revelatur michi, quod dampnabor, etc. sicut nec possum sic cognoscere quod privor omni distincta noticia. Est eciam dare veritates quas possum cognoscere. Et, si homo vel deus ipsas vel alteram earum cognos- 15 tor, tunc quidlibet annichilabitur; ut patet de talibus contradictoriis: *incipio perpetuo oblivisci me fuisse in hoc instanti*, et, *non sic incipio oblirisci*. Contradiccionem enim claudit alteram illarum fore, sicut repugnat primam rememorari vel docere. Deus tamen omnem veritatem potest cognoscere, quamvis aliqui false dicant quod potest esse quod nichil sit. Hoc enim claudit contradiccionem deum cognoscere, cum tamen equa passio entis sit cognoscibilitas. Ideo puto me scire quod claudit contradiccionem "nullum ens esse", aut "tempus 20 fuisse et nullum ens incipere esse"; quia, si per impossibile omnem creaturam deus annichilaret, adhuc infinite negaciones incipiunt esse de qualibet creatura, vel saltem incipit esse quod solum deus nunc est, quod ipse est sine A, sine B, et sic de aliis infinitis. Ex quo 25 videtur quod necessario sunt tempus et successio; quia pro primo instanti annihilationis foret magna successio, et illud semper maneret.

Aliqua autem est veritas quam nemo potest cognoscere nisi pro instanti, 2^m restringentes verba; ut talis: *hoc instans est*, et talis: *omnem proposicionem quam nunc scio, per horam post hoc sciam*; quia aliter posset hoc instans manere per tempus; et breviter ita est de denominacionibus quo ad *esse verum* 2^o modo vel 3^o modo, sicut est de suis primarie significatis. Unde vere 35 dicitur quod non possum cognoscere quod gratus sum deo, nisi fuero in gratia vel caritate; aliquam veritatem non possum cognoscere, nisi fuero cesus; et sic quotcunque possibilia volueris de me vel quocunque alio

15. docv' B.

q. *Est eciam*. This sentence is evidently wrong, as appears from the context.

enunciare. Unde aliqui eliciunt quod reliqui cognoscant veritates, ut prebendarius dat superiori magnam pecuniam ut sciat se esse beneficiatum in tali pingui beneficio: quod caret ratione.

by a
prebendary to
his superior.

5 Redeundo ergo ad propositum: iuxta restriccionem predictam dicitur quod repugnat me cognoscere tales veritates, et cum hoc cognoscere quod omnem veritatem quam nunc cognosco, per horam post hoc cognoscam. Ymo, vocando omnem talam veritatem propositionem, 10 cum significet seipsam, concedendum esset aliquam propositionem veram esse in me, quam impossibile est me distinete cognoscere; sicut dictum est de talibus: *ego nichil apprehendo, omne quod nunc distinete cognosco*

B 95^a *per horam post hoc distinete cognoscam*, posito quod

15 solum cognoscam distinete A vel B, et quod continuem illas noticias per horam, tunc illa C veritas est in me, et si distinete cognoscerem C, tunc cum paribus cognoscerem C per horam futuram. Ex quo sequitur quod *omne quod distinete cognosco, cognoscam per horam;* 20 et sic est verum quod distinete cognosco; ergo illud C distinete cognoscam per horam, et per consequens manebit per horam. Et tunc sine tubio C eternaliter manebit, cum in instanti medio hore erit futura per horam, et in medio instanti istius hore; et sic in infinitum, 25 sicut communiter arguitur in ista materia.

I say that it is impossible for me to know at the end of an hour every truth that I know now, i.e. only at this instant;
at least distinctly.

Unde multe sunt responsiones in ista materia; ut illa prima que negat partem supponere pro suo toto, negat consequenciam factam in *Darii*. Et alia dicit quod bene credo C propositionem veram sine hesitatione, sed repugnat me aliter scire illam. Hoc tamen videtur falsum, eo quod cognosco quod C est verum, et cuiusmodi C verum est. Cui ergo repugnaret me scire C? nam, negato quod scio C, non stat aliquid scitum a me, nisi A vel B; et cum utrumque 35 istorum cognoscam per horam futuram, sequitur quod omne distinete scitum a me cognoscam per horam futuram. Cum ergo sum certus de ista consequencia et de isto antecedente, ut suppono, relinquitur certitudo de consequente. Argumentum enim est racio rei prius dubie 40 faciens fidem, hoc est, certitudinem. Nichil ergo impedit hoc argumentum a produccione sui naturaliter causabilis. Ymmo de illa veritate quam scio stat difficultas.

For the fact of my knowing the truths A and B at the end of an hour is another truth, C. If I know C distinctly at the beginning as at the end of the hour, it would be an eternal, not an instantaneous truth.

There are many answers to this difficulty, either denying the consequence of the argument, or saying that I merely believe (not know) the truth of C at the beginning of the hour; but the latter, denying all knowledge of C, contradicts the hypothesis

and the consequence as well as the antecedent is true; so is the consequent also.

1. *e^{mut}* = eximunt or eveniunt B. 30. alig B.

If we keep to the strict sense of the words and admit a general knowledge of being, it is impossible to know anything for more than one instant; but I can know what it is to cognize during time.

I may know distinctly A and B at the beginning, and at the same time know confusedly my knowledge of A and B at the end; also that this knowledge cannot be distinct at the beginning.

If we give a wide sense to the tense of the verb,

we can admit that C is (i. e. is or will be) distinctly known together with A and B. Thus it does not follow: *I know C now;* ∵ *C is now;* but: C is now about to be in its time. It is possible for me to know C, but many things here can be known only in general; my cognitive act is confusedly known to me. There are thus numberless truths that I know in general; if I distinctly knew

Relictis ergo istis novis invencionibus sophists, suis auctoribus, dicitur sicut prius, restringendo verba et admittendo noticiam confusam quod omne ens cognosco confuse, et per consequens, cum nichil possum cognoscere, ignorando ens esse in communi, patet quod claudit contradictionem me vel aliud cognitum esse quod nunc cognosco per tempus cognoscere, saltem si nichil sit extra presens instans. Possibile tamen est me esse, quod distincte scio vel cognosco quod illud est per tempus cognoscere. Sed hoc creditur esse impossibile deo. Sic ergo posito quod distincte cognoscam solum A vel B que sic per horam cognoscam, cognosco confuse me esse cognitum per horam omne quod nunc distincte cognosco; et, si reflexero actum apprehendendi distinctum super illo, sicut oportet ad eius distinctam noticiam, inveniam in 2º actu reflexo quod impossibile est me distincte cognoscere illam, sicud impossibile est deum qui solum distincte potest cognoscere continuare per tempus omnem eius noticiam.

Sed patet ampliantibus verba de presenti quod deus omne quod unquam novit vel noscet semper noscet, cum non potest incipere vel desinere quicquam scire. Et sic semper noscit omne instans esse pro mensura sua, et hoc distinctive. Sed secus est de homine. Verumptamen iuxta ampliacionem conceditur quod homo potest distincte cognoscere C cum A et B, sicut iam cognosco omne instans quod fuit vel erit esse tempore suo. Et sic, posito quod simus in medio instanti hore sequentis instans demonstratum, concedunt in principio quod omne pro nunc scitum a me per horam, post hoc sciam semper, demonstrando uniformiter; sed non sequitur: *nunc scio C; ergo, nunc est C.* Et istam responsionem approbo. Concedo quod est possibile me scire C; semper tamen, dum sum in via, ignoro multa in particulari. Unde in omni noticia mea remanet aliquis actus meus confuse cognitus, quia aliter reflecterem actus super priores in infinitum.

Unde infinite sunt veritates quas non possum nisi confuse cognoscere, ut est confusa noticia; et multe alie ignorancie mee; infinite enim sunt conclusiones quas ignoro. Et si distincte cognovero quod ignoro illas,

18. q̄t̄re B. 26. non ^afro iam.

tunc non ignorarem illas. Ignorare enim dicit, ultra nescire, existenciam ignorati. Quando ergo sic arguitur *omne quod distincte scio per horam post hoc sciam; sed C veritatem distincte scio; ergo etc.*: conceditur conclusio, sicut minor in casu. Nam si *ego distincte scio quod ignoro C, ergo distincte scio C esse verum antecedens*: patet ex hoc quod videtur michi deductum evidencia infallibili quod ignoro C. Et consequencia facta patet, ex hoc quod distincte scio illam consequenciam esse bonam: *si ignoro C, C est verum et distincte scio antecedens, ergo et consequens*. Sed constat repugnare aliquem distincte scire datum singulare quod ignoravit. Ideo, si in casu posito credo distincte absque formidine contraria quod scio distincte, scilicet C, tunc scio C: quod conceditur. Et patet ex dictisresponsio ad instantiam superius positam; et illa est una evidencia inter multas ad laxandum verba de presenti.

Ulterius patet, cum viator, sciendo in universali veritatem aliquam, scit eius singularia confusa, quod ignorat ab eo scitum; nisi forte de illis sit aliunde scientia specialis, excludens ignoranciam. Tenendum est eciam quod principaliter scitur vel cognoscitur veritas apprehensa, et ^{2a}arie signum. Unde multi laici sciunt multas veritates, et tamen ignorant signa esse; sic ut versatur tamquam dubium inter doctos si sunt talia signa in anima. Et hoc fortificat quod oportet ponere tales veritates, cum aliter foret sciencia sine proporcionali scito (ut tactum est tractatu *de scire*); quoniam sciencia universalis et sciencia singularis non repugnant.

Septimo restat videre quomodo in particulari sint solvendo insolubilia negativa. Ipsa enim videntur habere maiorem difficultatem, ut sunt talia: *hec proposicio non est vera; Sor non dicit verum sicut est; non est ita sicut ego cogito; non est ita sicut ego principaliter credo*: et sic de similibus. Primam autem claudit repugnaciam esse veram pro isto supposito, cum quelibet proposicio est vera, eo ipso quod est. ^{2a} eciam est falsa, cum impossibile sit quicquid dicere, nisi dicatur necessitas eterna, sequens ad omne dicibile. Quelibet ergo creatura dicit quotlibet veritates. Et sic dicitur ad

12. scire datnm twice B. 30. quo B. 32. maiorem twice
34. pnter B.

28. Cf. Logica, Vol. I, pag. 179. "Secundo patet", etc.

that I did not know them, I should know them.
We may thus admit that we know confusedly a distinct act of cognition of C.

If I do not know C, C is a truth; I distinctly know the antecedent and, therefore, the consequent. This is one of many proofs in favour of extending the present tense to more than one instant.

To know confusedly is tantamount to ignorance.

We know firstly the truth and then the sign that denotes it in our mind; for unlearned men may know many things, and nothing about their signs; and even the learned dispute as to whether they exist at all. The negative insoluble propositions, being particularly difficult, are to be dealt with now separately.

"This proposition is not true" is false in the sense given. "A does not speak the truth as it is," is also false, for the act of speaking is true.

"It is not as I

think", is also 3^{ciam}, cum nemo potest cogitare, nisi aliquando principi false, for whatever we paliter cogitet deum esse. Sed in 4^a et similibus modis think we imply fictatis stat difficultas. Et ut brevius loquamur, restrin-God's existence. "It is not as I gatur *verum* vel *falsum* ad verum et falsum dictam believe" gives greater trouble; 2^o modo; et restringatur *significare*, *dicere*, et *cogiri* but we must *tare* etc. ad tales primarios actus ex imposicione cau-words *true* and *satios* et *cogitata*, *dicta*, et *sensata* etc., ad illa que *false* for the second sense of sunt 2^m primariam imposicionem huiusmodi. Quamvis truth and falsehood. And then we answer that these negatives are simply false.

enim illud sit in multis onerosum, tamen potest, gracia argumenti, in multis amicaliter admitti, et responsio 10 aptari ad proporciones, | ac si termini modificantes illos B 96^a sensus essent expressi utrobique. Tunc dicitur quod talia insolubilia negativa sunt falsa simpliciter.

A proposition may be adduced, for which we must deny that there is any signification except what naturally belongs to it.

Or we may say that negotiations have no reality. Or we may note that, though to signify, to be true, and to signify the thing that is, come to the same, yet they may be very different if one is taken to mean something independent of itself.

Sed tripliciter variatur responsio; primo, capta illa proposicione: *non est ita sicut hec proposicio primaria* 15 et *ex imposicione significat*. Dicitur quod non habet significacionem ex imposicione, cum nichil ex imposicione significat simpliciter seipsum, eo quod talis imposicio superflueret, cum hoc habet quidlibet ex natura. Nec est hoc nomen, *propositio*, impositum ad signifi-20 candum, nisi signa veritatum independencium ab eisdem. Et sic talia communiter vocata insolubilia non habent 2^m omnes suos terminos significata primaria ex imposicione resultancia. 2^a responsio evadit insolubilia negativa per hoc quod nulla negacio potest esse ex parte 25 rei. Sed pro 3^a responsione, consequente ad dicta de imposicione ac laxacione proposicionem ac veritatibus negativis, notandum diligenter quod licet hec 3^a convertantur, *hec proposicio significat*, *hec proposicio est vera vel significat sicut est*, *hec proposicio est*, et sic de 30 quotlibet cum istis convertibilibus, in quibus proposicio principaliter significat pro seipsa; ista tamen convertibilitas est gracia terminorum, cum proposiciones consimiles significantes pro significatis extra ipsas sunt valde dispare. Probatur per deducens ad impossibile. 35 Nam si ista non convertuntur, *hec proposicio significat* et *hec proposicio significat sicut est eadem inceptu denominata*, tunc esset possibile quod hoc significaret cum hoc quod non significaret sicut est; quia certum est quod reliqua coniugacio non est possibilis. Sed contra; 40

4. *dctā* B.

18. *fmter* B.

40. *giugo* B.

37—38. *dcta* (= demonstrata?) B.

si C primarie significat sic, tunc C est verum, et tunc significat sicut est: ergo, si C significat precise *se significare*, tunc est ipsum verum significans sicut est.

Et ex isto patet quod in qualibet tali idem est significatio et significatum: ut significatum huius, *A significat, est ipsum A significare*, quod est eius significatio. Et ita est de istis: *A significat sicut est*. Nam hec converuntur: *A habet significatum vel significacionem que est*.

¹⁰ 2º patet quod quelibet talis negativa, significans pro se ipsa, *hoc non significat sicut est*, significat seipsam non habere significacionem et per consequens falsificat se, cum in significando facit se ipsam habere significacionem.

Et ex istis patet 3º quod sicut proposicio significans se esse verum est vera pro veritate extra ipsam, et sic significans primarie, idem est falsum 3º modo; sicut B proposicio, significans primarie quod *non est ita ut A significat*, est vera pro A, et ipsum A sub conformibus vocibus significans est simpliciter falsum.

²⁰ 20 Ex quo patet quod B significat dispariter ab A, quia A significat quasi manenter pro se vel suo actu, cum actus significandi sit absolutus, non transiens in extrinsecum, ut actus significandus. Et ista oportet diligenter notare. Nam sicut conceditur quod A est falsum, ita

²⁵ conceditur quod non est ita sicut A significat; quia non est ita quod A non habet significacionem, quod valde est disparatum a significacione A. Ideo patet quod talis consequentia non valet: *A precise significat se non esse verum et ipsum non est verum: ergo, A primarie significat sicut est; sicut patet in suo conver-*

³⁰ *tibili. Nam non sequitur: non est ita quod A non habet significacionem et A primarie significat quod A non habet significacionem: ergo, A primarie significat veritatem que est; sed directe sequitur oppositum.*

³⁵ 35 Et si dicitur quod sequitur A significare modo quo est, conceditur; sed ex hoc non sequitur A esse verum, cum omne significans significat modo quo est; sed non significat, saltem precise, ens quod est, quod tamen requiritur ad esse verum. Unde patet ex dictis quod B ^{B 96^b} ista non repugnat: *A significat sicut est* (hoc est, modo quo est) et tamen *ipsum non significat sicut est*

And in all such propositions the significatio and the thing signified are identical.

Any proposition that denies its own significatio falsifies itself.

As a proposition affirming its own truth is false in the third sense, so B ($= A$ is false) may be true, while A ($= A$ is false) cannot be true. Thus A and B have different significations, the latter being independent, and the former not.

We admit then that A is false, and that it means that which is not, but not that it means nothing. The arguments to the contrary are not conclusive.

There are two meanings to as: to signify as it is may be either in the way in which it is or the truth that is.

12. se in marg. B. 15. c pro se 16. precise above primarie B.
20. dispi^r B. 21. accidente pro actu (?). 27. desparatum B.

In some cases
these meanings
make one.

For instance:
*It is as C
signifies
contains both
meanings of as.*

C cannot here
be taken as a
general term
implying being.
What C means
is purely its
^{own} signification,

as we see by
turning any
proposition into
the infinitive.

So if C
signifies, it
signifies both
the thing that
is and as it is.

Such
propositions
are true in the
first, and
second and
false in the last
sense of truth.
It is plain that
a proposition
having the
same form as A,
and meaning A,
might not be
convertible
with it.

*It is not as A
signifies would
not mean A has
no significatio.
but the thing
signified by A
is not.*

(hoc est, modum vel veritatem que est). Iste enim terminus, *sicut*, potest intelligi equivoce sub habitudine accusativi casus, vel sub habitudine ablativi casus. In aliquibus autem, significantibus materialiter pro se ipsis, non differunt isti sensus; quod sic declaro. Sit C ista ⁵ proposicio: *ita est ut C significat*; tunc patet quod C confertitur cum qualibet tali: *veritas vel eus est, quod C significat; C significat modo quo est vel modum qui est vel veritatem que est vel habet significacionem vel significatio C est.* Omnia enim talia convertuntur gracia ¹⁰ terminorum. Nam *C est verum*; tunc suum significatum est, et non potest poni ens in communi, quia sic converteretur C cum tali necessario: *ens est.* Ideo non superest quid sit significatum ipsius C aut eius actus, quod est sua significacio; quia nec a subiecto nec ab ¹⁵ obiecto vel fundamento distingwi potest significatum C ab eius significacione. Sicut ergo hec proposicio: *A movetur, significat motionem A, ita hec: C significat sicud est denotat C significacionem esse vel C habere significacionem.* Sicut enim idem est gaudere vel dolere, ²⁰ et habere dolorem vel gaudium, sic idem est significare vel habere significacionem, vel habere significacionem que est, vel significare significacionem que est. Nec dubito quin advertens diligenter satis inveniet illud verum.

Ex quo patet quod idem est C significare et C significare ens quod est, vel veritatem que est, vel modo quo est; et sic de aliis recitatis. Cum enim talibus convertitur hoc: C habet significacionem.

²⁵ 2º patet quod quelibet talis est vera 2º modo et ³⁰ falsa 3º modo. Et per consequens sua contradictoria est falsa 2º modo et 3º modo, et vera primo modo. Et patet 3º quod proposicio de similimis terminus cum A, significando pro A, non converteretur cum A. ³⁵ Nam A, significando quod *non est ita sicut A significat*, convertitur cum illo: *A non significare*, propter hoc quod in suo contradictorio idem est significacio et significatum. Sed B, significando pro A quod *non est ita sicut A significat* non convertitur cum illo: *A non significat*, sed cum isto: *significatum a non est*; quorum ⁴⁰ primum est falsum et 2º verum. Ideo in A propositione est hoc verbum *significat*, quasi absolutum vel

reciprocum, cum comentitur cum illo *non est ens quod est primario significacio A*. Sed B, significans immanenter et transitive pro A, est verum significando quod *ens significatum per A non est*.

5 Et si dicatur quod possibile est B precise convertibiliter significare cum A, et tunc stat racio: dicitur quod repugnat casui A et B significancia sic primarie convertibiliter significare, sicut repugnat quod ista in mente mea: *ego sum homo*, primarie significet sicut ista in mente tua: *ego sum homo*. Denominaciones autem pronominum prime persone erunt diverse; sed sicut oportet mutare personas pronominum ad convertibiliter significandum, ita oportet mutare terminos B ad primarie significandum convertibiliter cum A; cuius 15 racio est, quia A significat negative materialiter pro sua significacione, et B significat significativa pro A. Ideo, si B esset talis proposicio: *non est ita quod A habet significacionem primariam*, tunc converteretur cum A; sed utrumque foret falsum.

20 Et si ultra dicatur quod eque possibile est A contrahi ad significandum convertibiliter cum B, sicut econtra, conceditur: verumptamen non est possibile A primarie significare ut ponitur, nisi significando quod *nullum ens est eius significacio: ymmo sic dicto: nullum ens est extra A quod A significat, foret eius significare*.

Sed B, significando quod nulla est veritas extra A quam A significat, foret falsum transitive, negans A habere significatum extra se; cum tamen eternaliter |

B 97^b ante A esse fuit illa negacio: *nulla est veritas extra A 30 quam significat*. Et certum est quod perpositionem A non extingwitur ista negacio; quia extingwendo illam poneret illam. Ideo manet illa negacio sicut prius.

Scio tamen quod maior pars logicorum mirabitur de significacione imposta insolubilibus negativis. Cuius 35 admiracionis causa est hoc quod intelligendo insolubilia, intelligitur per disparatas propositiones que inmaterialiter et transitive significant. Ideo videtur illa significacio esse contra experientiam qua experimur propositiones nostras significare pro significatis extra se. Certum est 40 tamen quod ita significant insolubilia negativa, et alios

Objection:
1. B may be made to signify absolutely the same as A.

This is impossible; as much so as to say that I am a man in the mind of two different persons, signifies the same.

Personal pronouns, in order to conserve the same sense, have to be changed in form.

2. A may be made to signify the same as B.

A True; but then B would become false.

Most logicians will be surprised at the signification I give to these negatives. They assimilate such propositions to ordinary ones, which we know to have a meaning independent of themselves; but it is not so of these 'insolubles'.

15. $\overset{\circ}{m}r$ mutabiliter (γ) B.

16. 1.^{mo} B.

36 37. $\overset{\circ}{i}$ uir'z B.

37. $\overset{\circ}{u}f$,^{vo} B.

40. aliter B.

We must know
to which of the
two
propositions
we ought to
reply.
"It is not as I
primarily
conceive" =
"Nothing false
is my primary
concept";
which we
admit.

Or it may
mean: "There
is no being
that is my
primary
concept;"
which we deny.
"It is not as I
believe"
should be
explained
likewise;

also all other
negative
"insolubles".
We must note
that many
propositions
are only
apparently
negative
insolubles.
Examples:

A common case
in the exercise
of obligations:
Whoever denies
that he is
refuted is so by
the very fact,
is put and
granted.

propositiones quas proferimus ad eorum similitudinem. Et ideo rationabiliter querit sophista certificacionem de propositione ad quam responderet. Et per hoc patet quomodo respondendum est ad talia: *non est ita sicut ego primarie concipio*. Nam negative tales exemplata sunt concedende propter insolubilia negativa falsa. Unde hoc insolubile negativum significat primarie quod *nullum ens est primaria concepcion mea: quod est falsum*. Ideo concedendum est quod *non est ita sicut ego primarie concipio*; sed significatum primarium insolubilis negativi 10 est negandum, cum sic significet *non est ens quod est primaria concepcion mea*. Et sic tale impossibile: *ego primarie credo sicut non est*, significat primarie quod *ego credo credulitate que non est*. Et sic decipior; et causa quare talia sic significant est ista, quia significatum et res verbi affirmativorum est idem: ut idem est *credo sic sicut est* et *credo credulitate vel credulitatem que est*. Et suum oppositum repugnat esse verum sic significando; tum, quia impossibile est me credere credulitatem que non est, et per accidens est quod 20 talis significat me credere credulitatem que non est, tum [quia] principalis significacio sua sit talis: "me credere ens quod non est;" sed cum actus credendi non transit in distinctum, sed absolute terminatur in se ipso, ideo idem est ac si poneretur "me credere 25 credulitate etc." Et, ut puto, omne insolubile negativum est 2^m istam viam satis solubile.

Ulterius notandum est quod multe sunt propositiones que apparent insolubilia illius rationis, sed non sunt. Ut puta, quando ponitur condicio per effectum con-30 sequendo, et additur casus de scripto aliquo ad denominacionem dependentem ex condicione vel effectu futuro: ut patet de transizione pontis, de liberacione servorum, et similibus 2^m infinitas circumstancias valde confusas variatas. Ubi nunc prodest ars obligacionis 35 pro evasionibus, et nunc tantum gravantur casus, quod sunt impossibilis.

Unde communiter argumentat sophista ad probandum socium esse redargutum, vel cuiusmodi voluerint, ponendo quod quicunque negaverit se esse redargutum, 40 et solum talis, sit redargutus. Et illa est condicio. Tunc

6. pp B. 10. tamen B. 22. cum B; ib. quia deest. 29. i⁹ B.
30 - 31. qf^{edn} B. 41. qd¹⁰ B.

post istam proponitur probandum: tu es redargutus; Then; *You are refuted*, is put quod est negandum, quia falsum et impertinens. Et cum and denied. non sit intencionis sophiste probare nisi manifeste falsum, generaliter sunt talia 2^o loco proposita falsa. Negato ergo illo, arguitur: *Quicunque negarerit se esse redargutum est redargutus; sed tu negas te esse redargutum; ergo tu es redargutus.*

Hic est 3^x responsio. Prima negat antecedens tan- There are three answers.

quam falsa et impertinens, et concedit utramque eius

10 partem. Sed in isto non est efficacia, cum ad hoc ordinatur posicio, ut sustineatur positum cum omni concesso, et sequentibus ex illis. Ideo consonancius esset negare totam copulativam tanquam impertinentem, et

B 97^b concedere primam partem tanquam positam, et | negare

15 2^{am} partem tanquam repugnantem bene concessis, vel oppositis bene negatorum. Nec est inconveniens negare

proprium actum vel eius pretericionem, quia communiter, quando opponens proponit responsali proposicio-

20 nem de proprio actu, non est ille actus; et per acci- dens necessarium frequenter est negandum tanquam

repugnans. Sed quia idem potest tolli mutando casus sic: *quicunque negarerit in ista hora in anima vel voce*

se esse A fit ipse A, tunc tercia responsione conceditur positum; et post conceditur tamquam verum et inper-

25 tinens, quod tu sic negas te esse A; et 3^o conceditur conclusio tanquam sequens, scilicet, quod tu es A.

Probacio tamen conclusionis, subducto casu, nullius est efficacie, cum non plus concedit nisi quod falsum nega-

tum extra casum est concedendum in casu post bonam concessionem antecedencium ad ipsum. Ideo idem est

ac si intendens probare quod *tu es episcopus*, post eius

negacionem ponat *te esse episcopum*.

Et ex istis patet quod negandum est tanquam im- possible quod *quicunque negarerit se esse asinum sit*

35 *asinus*. Ymmo, cum necessario quelibet res mundi negat se esse quod non est, quasi omnes tales casus sunt

impossibilis. Variantur autem tales casus multipliciter; ut ponitur quod *quicunque concesserit, dubitaverit. vel*

negarerit primum sibi proponendum sit talis et post

40 *proponatur unum impertinens concedendum, dubi-*

tandum, vel negandum, et 3^o, facto argumento ex

Lastly, a syllogism joining these two and concluding from them, is formed.

1. To deny the antecedent. But this would be against the rules of Obligations: the antecedent has to be admitted.

2. To deny the whole of the last syllogism, granting or denying its parts, as the case may be; for a past act may be denied in the present, since it exists no longer.

But the difficulty may be formulated so as to render this impossible.

3. To admit everything, and say that the conclusion means no more than that a falsehood has here to be admitted on account of the case put.

Most of such cases, besides, are to be denied as impossible.

They are often varied in many ways.

18. r̄nfali B.

19. See Logica, Vol. I. Introduction p. p. XXVIII, XXIX.

condicione et facto responsali, concluditur intentum. Et eodem modo variatur casus, ponendo quod "quicunque aliter responderit ad istam: *tu es A*, quam respondet Sor affirmative respondens ad illam, sit A, et solum talis." Et sic de infinitis intricacionibus que plus indu-
5 cunt sollicitudines quam profectus.

But these subtleties only give fruitless trouble.

There are also many subtleties concerning the commandments of God v. g. if

God had commanded, under pain of mortal sin, to have sorrow for no sin but one's own, and you, having never sinned before, have sorrow for sin in general: is this a mortal sin or not?

It may be answered
(i) that sorrow for sin in general includes sorrow for one's own sin, even though it be only possible and not existing.

The difficulty here is that sorrow must have some object able to cause it; which mere possibility has not. Or (2) that such cases imply an absurd condition: for God cannot make it a sin to have sorrow for the sin of our neighbours; and if it be said that they only imply the mere fact of sin happening concomitantly,

the whole argument is destroyed.

In aliis autem materiis sunt intricaciones plurime de obligacione legistarum; ut ponatur quod deus precipiat taliter sub pena peccati mortalis quod non doleas de peccato, nisi dolendo de peccato proprio; quod nun-
10 quam ante hoc peccasti, sed quod solum doleas de peccato in communi, sicut faciunt illi qui dolent quod multa peccata sunt in mundo, nec aliunde pro nunc pecces. Tunc videtur quod nunc infringis preceptum; quia si cum istis paribus peccas, non superest unde 15 peccares, nisi contraveniendo precepto. Et ex hoc sequitur cum veris quod non peccas, cum in universali doles de peccato proprio et sic compleas preceptum. Et si dicatur primo quod non peccas, tunc oportet quod doleas de peccato proprio, et per consequens peccas.
20

In isto vero diceret sophista quod stat te dolere simpliciter de peccato possibili, etsi non actualiter sit; et sic in casu positivo tu doles de peccato proprio, non contraveniendo precepto. Contingit enim dolere de impossibili; multo magis ergo, de quolibet seu quo-
25 cunque possibili. Et sic doles de quocunque peccato dolendo de peccato in communi; et sic de peccato proprio, licet illud non sit. Sed quia videtur quod omnis dolor habet aliquod tristabile pro obiecto, ut pretericionem, futuricionem, negacionem, vel aliam quamlibet 30 veritatem; non satisfacit ista responsio casum paululum.

Ideo dicit 2^a responsio quod solucio talium exigit noticiam condicioneis, quia ablativi casus, gerundiva, ista coniunctione, *nisi*, et similia, implicant condicioneis, quarum maior pars est impossibilis: ut, deus non potest 35 obligare hominem quod, si dolet de peccato proximi et non de peccato proprio, quod eo ipso peccet. Et sic de aliis condicioneis simpliciter et absolute intellectis. Si autem condicioneis non dicant causam completam, sed teneantur specificative, tunc non superest 40

1. *rñfali* B. 9. *mõrlis* B. 10. *n'* B. 13. *aliū de pñc pro aliunde ero nunc* B. 22. *finꝝr* B. 22. *simp̄ter in marg.* B. 29. *c̄stale* B.
31. *nec* B: *ib.* *paululum* (*sic!*) B.

argumentum ad probandum quod peccat, si dolet de peccato proximi et non suo, cum stat oppositum. Et ista responsio potenter enervat casus huiusmodi. Unde non est in potestate hominis vel dei statuere quod sim-⁵pliciter et absolute, si homo sic dolet, peccat, vel si sic obviat, liberabitur; et ita de ceteris.

Sed quia admissa est conditionalis bona, ut nunc, sicut et conditionalis necessaria ex suppositione vel ordinacione divina, potest ^{3^s admitti casus, et concedi quod pro dato instanti doles de peccato proprio quod haberes post modum, te adhuc manente innocentem. Et sic cessat obieccio, scientibus ampliaciones verborum, quomodo omne preteritum vel futurum est presens tempore suo. Si autem gravetur casus quod continue maneas innocens, si non sic dolendo peccaveris, stante residuo casus: certum est quod casus est impossibilis, implicans inconvenienciam in ordinacione divina; ut puta quod deus ordinet te perpetuo innocentem et cum hoc ordinet te elicere talem actum ex quo cum obli-²⁰gacione sequitur te peccare. Ideo, si deus ordinat tibi te habiturum perpetuam innocenciam, vel preservabit te ne elicias talem actum, vel faciet quod non obligaberis sub forma ex qua sequitur te perplexi.}

Conformiter dicitur quod, deo precipiente michi negative sub pena peccati mortalis, quod per istam horam non diligam eum, vel cogitem de eo actualiter, sed vacem praxi quod expedit, aliquando non esset possibile solvere illud mandatum quo ad partem negativam, cum non possit solvi quo ad illa, nisi faciendo affir-³⁰macionem negacioni oppositam que est diligere deum.

Et certum est quod claudit contradiccionem, diligendo deum peccare. Et conformiter dicitur ad talia precepta negativa, *non diligas deum ultra gradum ut 4^{or}, non incipias peccare non incipiendo per posicionem de pre-³⁵senti;* et sic de similibus. Nam primum mandatum non possum infringere, nisi diligendo deum ultra gradum ut 4^{or}. Et certum est quod non peccarem, sic faciendo. Et quo ad 2^m, patet quod si infringarem illud pro hoc instanti primo, ego inciperem peccare per posicionem

Or (3) that at a given instant we may be sorry for a sin that we shall commit in the future; according to the doctrine of ampliation of the present.

If it be supposed that no other sin will be committed, but that of being sorry for the sins of others, the case is palpably absurd.

If God forbade me to love Him during a certain time, or to think of Him,

this could not be breaking His law;

to sin through love of God,

or through too much love of Him, is a contradiction in terms.

3. potnt[#] B; ib. en^{*}uat B. 6. si^e B.

6. *Liberabitur.* Allusion to the case of setting two slaves free under certain conditions. See above, pag. 209.

If it be objected de presenti, et non ut sic solverem illud. Et incipiendo
 that man would thus be solvere hoc mandatum, vel aliter, peccarem; per remo-
 impeccable, cionem de presenti non solviter hoc mandatum. Ideo
 should he have patet quod talia mandata de virtute sermonis essent
 no other obligation. insolubilia. Et si argumentatur quod deus, obligans
 we answer that this supposition too implies an absurdity.
 The above remarks, together with practice, are,
 I think sufficient to solve every difficulty of the sort.
 Comparison of Wyclif's opinion with the six former ones.

a) As regards likeness.
 It is like the 1st, as it says that no 'insoluble' is simply true or false:
 Like the 2nd, affirming that the same proposition is diversely true and false:
 Like the 3rd, denying all signification to such propositions except in so far as they signify themselves:
 Like the 4th, denying that they have the same meaning as other propositions having exactly the same form, and standing for them:
 Like the 5th, admitting that many examples of 'insolubles' imply an absurdity:
 and like the 6th, denying that any such proposition is really insoluble,

Et si argumentatur quod claudit contradiccionem hominem solum obligari ad talia, cum necessario, si homo est, obligatur naturaliter multis obligacionibus inseparabilibus. Qui-
 cunque ergo fuerit taliter obligatus potest faciliter pec-
 care aliunde. Ex ipsis ergo notatis credo quod exercitatus cum deliberacione dicta habebit viam solvendi quecumque talia insolubilia proponenda.

Ultimo patet in quibus hec posicio convenit et discrepat a singula de sex opinionibus supradictis. 15

Convenit enim cum prima in hoc quod ponit multa insolubilia nec simpliciter esse vera nec simpliciter esse falsa.

Convenit eciam cum 2^a in hoc quod ponit eandem propositionem esse veram et falsam diversis modis. 20

Et convenit cum 3^a in hoc quod ponit quodlibet tale insolubile in quo pars supponit pro toto suo insolubili manere vacuum, et nullum debitum vel distinctum sensum significans, nisi in quantum antecedit se ipsum et ex sua significacione reflectit quamdam denominacio- 25 nem pro illo insolubili vel causato suo. |

Convenit autem cum 4^a in hoc quod ponit repugnare aliquod insolubile significare primarie in toto confor-
 miter sicut significant proposiciones de similibus terminis significantes immanenter et transitive illis insolubilibus; ut patet de solucione insolubilium negativorum. Ymmo, omne insolubile, sive affirmativum, sive negati-
 tivum, est resoluble in tales terminos per quos non est exprimenda sua significacio, sed per alias disparatos ut credo quod decipior, credo quod credo primarie sicut 35 non est, et sic credo quod credo credulitate que non est: et sic de similibus.

Convenit autem cum quinta in hoc quod ponit mul-
 tos casus positos in materia de insolubilibus esse im-
 possibles; ut patet de condicionibus superius notatis. 40

Et convenit cum sexta in hoc quod ponit nullum insolubile non posse solvi; sed veritatem esse de se

cognoscibilem, licet de difficulti. Nec stat solucio in negacionibus casum vel principiorum logicorum, quibus innitantur responsiones priores; sed specialiter in noticia denominacionis signorum quo ad esse verum vel falsum,
5 et in distincta noticia significacionis proposicionis solvende.

Discrepat autem hec posicio a prima in hoc quod ponit insolubilia affirmativa dupliciter esse vera, et unice esse falsa; et insolubilia negativa 2^a esse falsa et
10 unice vera; et significatum primarium cuiuscunque insolubilis concedit simpliciter esse vel non esse.

Discrepat autem a 2^a in hoc quod ponit nullam proposicionem posse esse veram et falsam denominacionibus contrariis; quia tunc significatum primarium
15 proposicionis esset et non esset.

Discrepat autem a 3^a in hoc quod ponit partem supponere pro suo toto; ut hic: *hec proposicio est, mundus est.* Ymmo, sicut pars integralis significat communiter suum totum (ut patet de partibus superficialibus
20 ostendentibus suum integrum) ita supponit partes. Nec dubium quin contingit me ymaginari singulariter unam talem proposicionem posse scribi: *hoc scriptum est proposicio*, et me oblivious illius ymaginati; contingit illud interim scribi et obici michi, faciendo me re-
25 minisci de tota priori ymaginacione et ymaginato, et ita significabit se ipsum. Et si obicitur quod prius naturaliter intelligitur pars proposicionis antequam intelligitur tota proposicio, et sic proposicio esset prior se ipsa: dicitur quod illud argumentum peccat 3^{ter}.
30 Quis enim dubitat quin eque primo intelligitur per subiectum huius proposicionis, *ens est*, ipsa tota proposicio, sicut et eius subiectum, cum, significacione ex imposicione causata (de qua solum est nobis sermo), omne singulare intelligibile eque primo significat? Nec 35 obest proposicionem prius intelligi sua parte. Nec sequitur, si ista pars prius naturaliter intelligatur a me, quam intelligitur esse pars, vel quam intelligitur esse hec proposicio noticia tali connexa et distincta, quod exinde idem sit prius se ipso. Nam de eodem possum
40 habere multas noticias. Nec obest proposicionem prius intelligi sua parte.

b) As regards difference.
It differs from the 1st in asserting that affirmative insolubiles are true in two senses and false in one, and that negative insolubiles are false in two and true in one. It differs from the 2nd in denying that the same proposition is true and false in the same sense.

It differs from the 3rd in not denying that a part can stand for the whole.

Objection.
1. The part must be understood before the whole; which is absurd if it signifies the whole.
Denied.

When we say: *Something is*, the subject includes the affirmation: the part, the whole.
It is one thing to know a part, and another to know it as a part.

It differs from
the 4th in
stating clearly
what meaning
the insolubles
have and not
shirking the
question
sophistically,
like a man who
despairs to find
the true
solution.

It differs from
the 5th, in
admitting that
not only the
things signified,
but also their
signs, have
corresponding
universals.
But it does not
follow that
every universal
causes a
universal idea
in the mind.

Objection:
2. A true or a
false
proposition
would only
cause an idea
signifying truth
or falsehood.

This is denied
absolutely:
any proposition
may produce
any idea, true
or false, or
none at all.

Truth or
falsehood, i. e.,
the meaning of
a proposition,
is not to be
likened to a
substantial
form.

Objection:
3. It would
follow
that the acts of
the mind act
on the mind,
and so on
ad infinitum.

Denied.

Discrepat autem a 4^a via in hoc quod certificat quater insolubilia significant, et non fingit sophistice, dicens quod sequitur insolubile significare aliter, sed impertinens est qualiter aliter significet. Et sic ponendo in eleccione arguentis quomodo aliter wult propositionem significare, certum est quod illa responsio est similis evasioni | hominis desperati de vera solucione, postquam B 99^a scrutatus est multas vias et nullam invenit ducentem in notiam veritatis.

Discrepat eciam a 5^a in hoc quod ponit intenciones universales eque de signis sicut de suis significatis. Nec sequitur ex isto quod quelibet proposicio vel intencio universalis A gigneret in anima aliam sibi similem, sicut non sequitur de specie singularis gignente aliam singularem vel universalem; quia tale signum non est per se completa causa speciei genite. Ymmo, etsi esset, cessaret ex capacitate anime gignere, sicut luminosum cessat gignere lumen.

Et si obicitur 2^e quod proposicio vera solum gigneret intencionem significantem propositionem veram, et prop. 20 posicio falsa solum gigneret intencionem significantem propositionem falsam: certum est quod nec illud dictum nec eius fundamentum habet linearem umbram coloris; quia stat quamcumque propositionem gignere intencionem universalem significantem omnem propositionem veram vel falsam; et stat quod nullam gignat, sicut homo albus potest gignere intencionem universalem significantem nigrum hominem, et quomodo cumque accidentatum, sine hoc quod gignat intencionem in accidentatis. Non enim per veritatem et falsitatem tan- 30 quam formas substantiales vel accidentales producit proposicio speciem talem; sed est obiectum immediatum anime, faciens cum aliis animam elicere speciem talem; sicut homo magis facit in anima intencionem significantem omnem hominem. Nec est aliquid falsius quam [quod] significacio propositionis sit eius forma substancialis, sicut false fingit ista posicio. Et si 3^o inferatur quod actus anime ageret in animam, dicitur quod non sequitur; actus enim anime est accidentis de genere actionis. Nec ex hoc sequitur processus in infinitum 40

4. a'r B. 13. agigne't B. 16. qta cā B. 23. hāre B.
27. intensionem(?) B. 29-30. accip' B. 36 quod deest. 37. fingitur B;
ib. int'ar B.

vel aliquid inconveniens. Et sic potest facere animam producere speciem, sicut per cogitaciones de diversis individuis 2^m suas conveniencias et differencias producitur universalis species in anima.

5 Discrepat autem in hoc a 6^a via quod ponit multos casus impossibilis quos illa admittit. Dicit eciam quod tales oraciones consistunt in successione, ita quod est dare primum instant in quo non sunt; et per consequens non tunc sunt vera vel falsa. Dicit eciam quod talis proposicio scripta, *hoc est falsum*, continue uniformiter sic significans, non plus foret vera pro uno instanti quam pro quolibet. Ymmo pro quoconque instanti temporis significat primarie veritatem que, pro eodem instanti [quo] fuit, pro illo instanti est vera.

15 In ista autem materia diucius et frequencius fatigavi me ipsum quam in aliqua reliqua materia logicali. Nec dubito quin quilibet sex predictorum opinancium habuit notabilem sollicitudinem pro veritatibus huius materie quas invenit. Modica tamen laus tribui debet invento-ribus huiusmodi veritatum; quia certum est quod ex discibilitate veritatis (que satis presto est cuilibet indaganti), et ex mocione doctrinali prime veritatis, evenit cuicunque quod scrutando invenit veritatem aliquam quam prius ignorans diucius fuerat perscrutatus. Ideo sit laus plena domino veritatis! |

And it differs from the 6^b in setting down many more cases as impossible; such propositions, if spoken, begin to be true and false at a given moment: but when written, are always equally so, as soon as they exist.
I have taken more pains about this subject than about any other part of Logic.
And I do not doubt but the authors of the other six opinions have done their best.

14. quo deest B. 16. in e^t B. 23. c^c3 B

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The Society's book for 1896 is now ready; and the works for 1897 and 1898 are in the binders' hands, and can be sent next month to such Members as will pay their Subscriptions for those years. The Subscription for 1896 became due on Jan. 1, and should be paid at once to the Hon. Sec., J. W. STANDERWICK, Esq., GENERAL POST OFFICE, LONDON, E.C. Cheques to be crost, 'London and County Bank.'

The Wyclif Society.

*Tenth Report of the Executive Committee, for 1896.
(April, 1896.)*

THE continued help that the Society gets from its printer, Mr. Carl Georg Fromme of Vienna, combined with the devotion of its editors, M. Dziewicki and Prof. Loserth, aided by Mr. Matthew, alone enables it to produce its books in time, and in advance.

The volume for 1896, comprising the third and fourth parts of Wyclif's *Opus Evangelicum*, edited by Prof. Loserth, is bound and ready for issue.

The volumes for 1897 and 1898, *De Logica II*, edited by M. H. Dziewicki, and *De Simonia*, edited by Prof. Dr. Herzberg-Fränel and M. H. Dziewicki, are in the binders' hands, and can be issued next month to any Members who will pay the two years' subscription in advance.

The Society is clear of debt to the end of 1895; but it owes Mr. Fromme £350 for its three volumes of 1896–8, and it has about enough in hand to pay its binders for covering these volumes. The Committee therefore appeal to Members for three years' advance subscriptions at once, so that a fresh start may be made, free from all liability, at the future years' work, 1899–1912.

For 1899 and 1900–1, *De Logica III*, edited by M. H. Dziewicki, and Prof. Loserth's edition of *De Civilis Dominio II, III*,—whose sheets Dr. Reginald L. Poole and Mr. F. D. Matthew see, and Dr. R. L. Poole side-notes,—have been some time at press, and may be finished this year. For 1902 or 1903, M. Dziewicki has kindly undertaken to edit the

Miscellaneous Tracts, Nos. 54–61 in Shirley's Catalogue, which were copied by Dr. Buddensieg, and were in the hands of Dr. Schnabel of Dresden, as editor, till his death three years ago. Also, for 1902 or 1903, the *De Potestate*, which has for many years been in the hands of M. Patera of Prag, has just been sent to Professor J. Loserth, so that it will probably go to press next year. For 1904, the Rev. Dr. Buddensieg hopes to produce his edition of *De Veritate*; and then all Wyclif's great *Summa Theologiae* will be in type, except the *De Mandatis Dei* and *De Statu Innocentiae*, which Mr. F. D. Matthew will take up as soon as his help to other editors leaves him time for his own texts.

The other works of Wyclif remaining unprinted and not likely to be included in the second volume of *Miscellanies* § now in charge of the Rev. J. P. Whitney, are, by Shirley's Nos.:

- | | |
|----------------------------------|--|
| 6. De Materia et Forma.* | 26. De Imaginibus.† |
| 7. De Materia (?).† | 28. Peccatum Mortale et Veniale.† |
| 8. De Ente, Bk. I*, Bk. II.* | 32. Errare in Materia Fidei, &c.c.† |
| 9. Replicatio de Universalibus.* | (45. Commentary on N. Test. ? not
Wyclif's.†) |
| 10. De Universalibus.* | 64. De Paupertate Christi.† |
| 11. De Anima.* | (69. ? part of De Potestate Papae.) |
| 13. De Fide Catholica.* | 70. De Clavibus Ecclesiae.* |
| 24. De Prophetia.* | |

Members have, then, to keep “pegging away” till the work they have set themselves is done, and England's long-due debt to Wyclif's memory paid. For that, money is wanted. Who will give it?

In order to increase the Society's funds, the Executive Committee have resolved that any Member may give the right to any Library or person to buy the first fourteen years of the Society's publications, 1882–95, at half-price—19 volumes at 8 guineas and a half—provided that with this sum are paid the full Subscriptions for 1896, 1897, and 1898.

England, Europe, and the rest of the Christian world owe so much to the memory of Wyclif, that support ought to be forthcoming for the printing of his Works, the records of his thoughts and life. Two-thirds of the Society's task will be done by 1900. It is for our Members to see that the other third is finished speedily. Editors are ready and willing. Money alone is wanting.

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The Society's Publications for 1882—1898 (L1 1s. each year) are:—

- 1882.* 1. Wyclif's *Latin Polemical Works*, vol. I, edited by Dr. R. Buddensieg.
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" 12. Wyclif's *De Apostasia*, edited by M. H. Dziewicki.
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1892. 16. Wyclif's *De Eucharistia*, edited by Prof. J. Loserth, Ph.D.
1893. 17. Wyclif's *De Blaspemia*, edited by M. H. Dziewicki.
1894. 18. Wyclif's *De Logica*, vol. I, edited by M. H. Dziewicki.
1895. 19. Wyclif's *Opus Evangelicum*, vols. 1, 2, ed. by Prof. J. Loserth, Ph.D.
1896. 20. Wyclif's *Opus Evangelicum*, vols. 3, 4, ed. by Prof. J. Loserth, Ph.D.
1897. 21. Wyclif's *De Logica*, vol. 2, edited by M. H. Dziewicki.
1898. 22. Wyclif's *De Simonia*, edited by Prof. Herzberg-Fränkel, Ph.D., and M. H. Dziewicki.

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1899. Wyclif's *De Civili Dominio*, Lib. II, edited by Prof. J. Loserth, Ph.D.
1900. Wyclif's *De Logica*, vol. 3, edited by M. H. Dziewicki. (*At press.*)
1901. Wyclif's *De Civili Dominio*, Lib. III, edited by Prof. J. Loserth, Ph.D.
1902. Wyclif's *Miscellanies* I, edited by M. H. Dziewicki (Nos. 54–61 in Shirley's Catalogue). (*At press.*)
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Wyclif's *De Actibus Anima*, edited by M. H. Dziewicki.
Wyclif's *Miscellaneous Philosophical Works*, edited by M. H. Dziewicki.

And the rest of Wyclif's Latin Works.

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